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Introduction
It was the winter of late 1985, halfway through the decade of British 
politics dominated by a science-trained Prime Minister, and Britain’s 
scientists were in open revolt. In October a small group of academics 
had met and shared stories of low morale, declining science funding and 
rumours of a new brain drain of disaffected talent. Quietly, they had 
begun canvassing fellow scientists, seeking modest sums to support the 
placing of a half-page advertisement in The Times, aiming to draw atten-
tion to their collective plight. ‘Within a few days of the first letters going 
out subscriptions began to flow in, and by Christmas £12,000 had been 
donated by over 1500 supporters from across the scientific spectrum … 
The initiators, having tentatively probed for signs of support, were over-
whelmed by a gusher’.1
The advert, which duly appeared on page 5 of The Times on the 
morning of Monday 13 January 1986, announced the existence and aims 
of a new, urgent, campaigning organisation, Save British Science:
Basic science has given us radio and television, plastics, computers, 
penicillin, X-rays, transistors and microchips, lasers, nuclear power, 
body-scanners, the genetic code, … All modern technology is based 
on discoveries made by scientists seeking an understanding of how the 
world works, what it is made of and what forces shape its behaviour. …
Today’s basic research enlarges our conceptions of the world and 
our place in it and underlies tomorrow’s technologies, the basis of 
future prosperity and employment.
Yet British science is in crisis: opportunities are missed, scientists 
emigrate, whole areas of research are in jeopardy. The Government’s 
support for research is declining, falling further behind that of our 
main industrial competitors in Europe whose policy is to increase 
investment in scientific research.
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There is no excuse: rescue requires a rise in expenditure of only 
about one percent of the Government’s annual revenue from North 
Sea oil. We can and must afford basic research, Britain’s investment 
for the future.2
Supporters were urged to contact the Save British Science campaign, via 
a PO Box in Oxford, and to ‘ask your member of Parliament to help save 
British science before it is too late’.
Several observations can be made about the abrupt revolt of the 
scientists expressed by Save British Science. First, the mood was one 
of widespread despair tending to existential crisis, of historically low 
morale and of suffering in silence.3 ‘The state of morale among British 
scientists is at its lowest ebb in living memory,’ Tony Watts, a biochemist 
who had been lured back from West Germany to a lectureship at Oxford, 
told a BBC reporter. ‘In other countries, scientists feel they’re doing a 
job that someone wants them to do. Here, we’re fighting for survival.’4 
The ‘senseless mutilation of the best elements of the research base’ was 
‘totally demoralizing and is making us the laughing stock of our scientific 
and industrial competitors’, according to Colin Blakemore, the neurobiol-
ogist and epitome of fast-rising, British scientific talent. In the same letter 
to his MP, he added that for ‘the first time in my life, I am now thinking 
seriously of leaving this country’.5 ‘The real significance of the extraordi-
nary explosion of support for the advertisement,’ argued John Mulvey, 
the Oxford scientist who co-founded Save British Science, ‘is the measure 
it gives of the intensity of frustration, the depth of the concern so widely 
felt about the damage being done to scientific research – and the teaching 
of science – in this country’.
Second, the feeling was that the old political settlement of science 
was failing. Funding through the research councils had been kept level, 
but the funding going to universities to maintain these institutions in a 
condition able to conduct research had been cut. Even the leading fig-
ure of the research councils, Sir David Phillips, an able friend of science, 
had told scientists that the best they could hope for was a steady state: 
‘What scientists are rebelling against is the realisation that to meet the 
challenges of the future, we have to ask how we can raise the money by 
stopping something’.6 While a few leaders among the science community 
had spoken out – for example, Sir Hans Kornberg, as President of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science had used his presi-
dential address of 1985 to complain of the cuts – the rank and file of Save 
British Science strongly felt that their needs were not being defended 
in political debate. This silence was seen as having deep, cultural roots: 
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scientists, to preserve their autonomy and independence, should refrain 
from political intervention; politicians should likewise desire an autono-
mous and independent science and preserve it by ensuring it was finan-
cially secure. Nevertheless, as Save British Science told a Parliamentary 
select committee in 1986: ‘Ministers have stated that they were surprised 
by the “silence” of the scientific community. We fear that … while the 
damage to science research in the UK has become alarming to those in a 
position to understand it, the Government has been misled by the tradi-
tional hesitation to speak out’.7
Third, attention should be paid to the relationship assumed by these 
academic scientists between ‘basic’ science and industry. The technologies 
of the modern world, and the economic prosperity they generated, were 
founded on prior basic science. Cut basic science, therefore, and future 
prosperity would be undermined. The ‘great damage that is being done … 
to the research base of this country by the Government’s funding policy’, 
wrote Blakemore, was ‘a national disaster that has unthinkable implica-
tions … for Britain’s industrial performance in the coming decades’.8 On 
one hand, this outburst reflected an understandable self-interest of an 
academic scientist, who was more likely to be conducting basic research. 
But, on the other, there was also what science policy commentators label 
the ‘linear model’ at work here: basic science leads to applied science 
which leads to technological innovation and wealth generation.
The linear model was not new in the 1980s and its naivety as a model 
of innovation was well known.9 Yet it survived then, as it does now, because 
it does political work. ‘Basic’ science was a clever and effective conceptual 
invention. As the ‘base’ it was the foundation for later applications. But 
since those applications might be unpredictable and far in the future, ‘basic’ 
science should be supported and protected from demands for immediate 
practical application and relevance. Base talk was therefore also a way of 
delineating and protecting the independence and autonomy of science. 
However, the lack of a sophisticated way of analysing the contribution of 
science to technological change and industrial performance meant that 
science policy in the 1980s was open to a far more ideological attack  – 
one in which the supposed national characteristics of strength in basic 
research and weakness in application could be mobilised with effect. The 
relationship between science – ‘basic’, ‘applied’, ‘strategic’, ‘near-market’ or 
‘curiosity- driven’ – and innovation and industry became the focus, as I will 
show, of the central debate in science policy in the 1980s.
Finally, who was responsible for this ‘crisis’?10 Save British Science’s 
view, in internal deliberations on the targets of their complaints, was 
clear: ‘We feel that the arguments should be directed principally at the 
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Government’.11 The cuts in university funding were a consequence of the 
much wider programme of reduction of public spending, a central policy 
aim, alongside privatisation, of Margaret Thatcher’s radical Conservative 
administration. This reduction was itself part of a Thatcherite package 
that included anti-Keynesian economic theory and a set of political 
values that privileged the individual over the collective. At first glance 
science policy might seem a minor, subsidiary, technical part of this pro-
gramme. But since it contained within it claims about the ultimate source 
of wealth, the importance of science policy was, I argue, far greater than 
its relative invisibility might suggest.
An unusually long editorial was published on the subject of 
‘research and prosperity’ in The Times on 19 February 1987. It drew 
attention to a House of Lords select committee report that had made the 
‘case that the future of Britain demands an attention to scientific enquiry 
that is manifestly absent in Britain today’.12 After a familiar set of argu-
ments – Britain’s political class knew more of the classical world than it 
did of Silicon Valley, Britain failed to turn ideas into products, Britain was 
falling behind international competitors as measured by the funding of 
research and development, talented scientists were moving abroad – the 
editors made clear where responsibility for this lay:
To see the demands of the future, and, by seeing, meet them, is a 
prime duty of government. Britain has to change the way it sees 
science. Its government has to help create that new vision. It has 
to act upon it without rancour over past failures and without dog-
mas of past success in other fields. The Prime Minister has a unique 
opportunity to set the agenda for the future as she has changed the 
agenda of the past. She has a unique responsibility too.13
Margaret Thatcher was seen as having such a ‘unique responsibility’ for 
two reasons. First, as Prime Minister, she possessed the straightforward 
constitutional power to lead on such an important issue, and as a Con-
servative leader her conceptions of science policy must be seen in the 
light of the history of Conservative thinking on science. Science, when 
remembered as a concern of party politics, is usually – and, if taken on 
its own, misleadingly – associated with the left. The rhetorical power of 
Harold Wilson’s ‘white heat of technology’ speech at the Labour Party 
conference of 1963, which he later claimed had ‘replaced the cloth cap 
with the white laboratory coat as the symbol of British labour’,14 had a 
major impact; its association has retained a powerful grip on popular 
historiography of science and British politics.15
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Wilson had used science successfully to rebrand Labour in a mod-
ern image.16 His speech cemented an association that can be traced from 
radical, left-wing scientists in the 1930s17 through the mobilisation of sci-
entists during the Second World War as part of a planned war economy 
and that continued in the 1950s as influential socialist scientists, such 
as the physicist Patrick Blackett, advised Labour behind the scenes. Yet 
the rebranding served to mask considerable continuity. Administrations 
under Clement Attlee, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden had invested 
in Cold War science,18 not least the nuclear projects. Harold Macmillan’s 
Conservative government had been the first to appoint a Minister for 
Science, in 1959, while Macmillan and Alex Douglas-Home, whatever 
their fusty image might suggest, ‘encouraged new, large scale projects of 
scientific and technological modernity’: the Post Office Tower, Concorde 
and the modernisation of British Rail were all begun by Conservatives 
before Wilson’s ‘white heat’.19 Indeed, to restrict historical attention only 
to left-wing technocracy would, according to David Edgerton, be ‘to miss 
most of the history of British technocracy, and most of the history of 
British science and technology policy’.20
The second reason Margaret Thatcher might have been said to have 
had a ‘unique responsibility’ to lead the harnessing of science policy to a 
‘new vision’ of the future of the nation was that she had been a scientist 
herself. She had been trained in Chemistry at Oxford in the 1940s and 
had worked as an industrial chemist at the companies British Xylonite 
and Lyons & Co. until the early 1950s. She actively maintained her inter-
est in science as Prime Minister, and it provided a point of contrast with 
the officials and ministers around her. As her last chief scientist recalled:
Few senior civil servants understand science, think science, or pro-
mote science; they would prefer their ministers not to be distracted 
by it. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was exceptional. She 
wanted to understand and engage in science. She was interested in 
science as a subject, listened to scientific reasoning, was happy to 
talk about science and enjoyed it.21
Furthermore, this contrasting interest in science was seen by commenta-
tors as implying the possession of different analytical skills. ‘Mrs Thatcher 
is unusual in being a Prime Minister with a science degree,’ observed a 
Financial Times journalist, noting that ‘it would be surprising if that did 
not influence her thinking’.22 Her supervisor and mentor at Oxford, the 
outstanding x-ray crystallographer Dorothy Hodgkin, thought her train-
ing equipped her to ‘to see what the scientists are doing’, while one of 
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Thatcher’s biographers concluded that it gave her a ‘blueprint for the 
practical mind’ – a ‘rare capacity to understand the scientific mind at 
all’.23 Many similar quotations could be given. They all assume that her 
scientific training and working experience made a difference to how she 
thought or what she valued.
In a mid-1980s opinion poll, commissioned by the BBC, 67 per cent 
thought that ‘politicians don’t know enough about science to judge its 
importance’.24 This view was not new, and can be seen as the product of 
a century-long lobbying campaign. The historian Frank Turner notes that 
‘Scientists, like other groups of intellectuals who during the 1860s had 
hoped to participate broadly in public life, found themselves able to exert 
relatively little direct power or influence in the civic arena’. Therefore 
after the 1870s the group Turner calls ‘public scientists’ became increas-
ingly critical of ‘politicians and complacent manufacturers’, now seen as 
enemies of the ‘progress and application of scientific knowledge’.25 The 
public scientists now attacked the political system, in which party poli-
tics rather than science guided policy. They promoted science education, 
as means of instilling the desired virtues of truthfulness and endurance 
in citizens (and eventually politicians), and eugenics, as a means by 
which science could deliver ‘direct civic benefits to the nation-state’.26 
An alliance between public scientists, pre-eminently Norman Lockyer, 
the editor of Nature, and sympathetic social imperialist politicians, was 
institutionalised in the British Science Guild in 1904. The Guild lobbied 
hard for science. In particular, it viewed science as a solution to political 
problems:
[The purpose of the British Science Guild] is to stimulate, not so 
much the acquisition of scientific knowledge, as the appreciation of 
its value, and the advantage of employing the methods of scientific 
inquiry, the study of cause and effect, in affairs of every kind. Such 
methods are not less applicable to the problems which confront the 
statesman, the official, the merchant, the manufacturer, the soldier, 
and the schoolmaster, than those of the chemist or the biologist; 
and the value of a scientific education lies in the cultivation which 
it gives of the power to grasp and apply the principles of investiga-
tion employed in the laboratory to the problems which modern life 
presents in peace or war.27
‘Edwardian public science centred on [the] technocratic BSG/Nature 
axis,’ argues the historian Andrew Hull. He agrees with Turner, not-
ing that such an axis ‘continually pressed for executive influence over 
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government policy for scientists, arguing both that scientific method was 
transferable to social problems and that science was the key component 
in national power in a modern state faced with constant economic com-
petition which might at any time become war’.28 From the turn of the 
nineteenth century, through the First World War and beyond, the public 
scientists continued to argue publicly that ‘politicians were ignorant of 
scientific matters’, and that the Government neglected to support or use 
science properly.29
Fast forward to the 2010s and we find a very similar set of com-
plaints. For example, Mark Henderson, Head of Communications at the 
Wellcome Trust, asks why is it that politicians do not grasp that increased 
public funding for science would more than repay its costs in economic 
benefits? Why do politicians misunderstand, misuse or disrespect empir-
ical evidence? Why can they not learn from scientific values and meth-
ods? ‘The answer lies chiefly in the wider failings of the political classes’ 
understanding and experience of science,’ Henderson states, adding 
‘only one of the 650 MPs in the UK’s House of Commons was a scientist 
in his previous career … There is a lack of familiarity with the practice of 
science, of what it needs to succeed, which blinds politicians to the con-
sequences that their funding decisions will have’.30
There has been, therefore, a long-standing view that politics would 
be better if more politicians were scientists. So what happened when 
the leading politician of her generation, a powerful Prime Minister who 
served 11 years, with commanding authority, was indeed a scientist? 
One immediate point to make is that Margaret Thatcher’s understand-
ing of science was not as deep, nor her embrace of scientific rational-
ity as warm, as at least two of her Conservative predecessors. Arthur J. 
Balfour, Prime Minister between 1902 and 1905, was a philosopher of 
science before he was a politician. Thatcher’s predecessor as leader of 
the Conservative Party, Edward Heath, acted on his conviction that tech-
nocratic rationality could be built into government through innovations 
such as the Central Policy Review Staff, the ‘think-tank’ that was home 
to the chief scientific adviser. William Waldegrave, future science min-
ister, recalled Heath should correctly be labelled ‘Technocratic, I mean, 
exactly. He greatly respected the French Civil Service, the French tech-
nocratic elite, he greatly respected them, we saw it even in those days. I 
went with him to China in ’74 and there were Chinese technocrats even 
then. Ted’s view of how the world should be run really was by rational, 
non-ideological people’.31
The contrast with Margaret Thatcher could not be greater. Edgerton 
and Hughes have argued that ‘what is distinctive about Mrs Thatcher is 
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not that she is a scientist, but rather that she is the first anti-technocratic 
Prime Minister Britain has had in the [twentieth] century’.32 By ‘anti-tech-
nocratic’ they meant that Thatcher rejected the views that science and 
technological change were determinants of economic growth and devel-
opment, and that an interventionist state was necessary to deliver them. 
Thatcher’s overall political aim was instead to free private enterprise, 
reduce state intervention and cut public expenditure, ‘and to shape what 
is left to serve industry directly’.
Often the antithesis of the technocrat – but also the populist – is taken 
to be the ‘conviction politician’. Thatcher’s status as the pre-eminent con-
viction politician was the keynote of obituarists on her death in 2013.33 
But another antonym to the technocrat is the narrative politician – the pol-
itician whose tools of persuasion are the stories that can be told. Moral 
stories, as we shall see, were remarkably powerful in how Thatcher inter-
vened in science policy. The story she heard on visiting Cambridge in 1980 
about the apparent failure to patent monoclonal antibodies (as discussed 
in Chapter 3) quickly became the font of her furious analysis of what she 
saw as wrong in the relationship of science, industry and nation. In the crit-
ical years of the mid-1980s, just as Save British Science was telling its own 
public story of plummeting morale and brain drains, the heart of govern-
ment science policy-making was the location for a private battle between 
two different visions of how to reconnect science to industry for national 
prosperity. One side – loosely the research councils, the Department of 
Trade and Industry and the chief scientific adviser – saw the route to per-
suasion in figures and data, and lost; the other – located in the Number 10 
Policy Unit – deployed stories, anecdotes with lessons from historical and 
contemporary science, and won. I trace this central debate in Chapter 3. 
However, the contrast between the technocratic versus the story-led form 
of policy-making should not be turned too high.
In this book I will ask whether it mattered that Thatcher had been 
a scientist. In some ways it clearly did. Science was, albeit intermittently, 
an important part of her public image. In 1951 she had dressed in a white 
coat and been photographed in front of scientific apparatus, instruments of 
her then working life, for electioneering publicity purposes. In the 1970s, 
when she was a minister responsible for science and the new, untested 
Party leader, journalists recalled her science training. In 1979, within days 
of taking office, Thatcher reserved the political right to speak on science 
matters. At Number 10 Downing Street she installed a bust of Michael 
Faraday,34 icon of applied science, and a portrait of Isaac Newton – a ‘great 
star for her’, recalled a Chief Scientific Adviser; the works symbolised both 
unparalleled scientific achievement and her Lincolnshire origins.35 In the 
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late 1980s, at the peak of her prestige, Thatcher made science integral to 
her leadership in speeches to both national and international audiences. 
Of particular note were her 1988 speech to the Royal Society, in which 
she confirmed a new science and innovation policy and highlighted global 
environmental challenges, and her 1989 speech to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, emphasising the need for action on the ozone hole 
and climate change.
Perhaps most significantly, a reason it mattered that one of the 
pre-eminent world leaders of the twentieth century, one who was at the 
peak of her powers in the 1980s, possessed not only scientific training 
but also a working knowledge of applied science, was that so many issues 
of the decade were saturated with science. The 1980s was the decade 
of acid rain, AIDS, the imminent threat of nuclear apocalypse, the dis-
covery of the ozone hole, the first release of genetically modified organ-
isms into the environment, the first cases of ‘Mad Cow’ disease, personal 
computers and Chernobyl. Any British prime minister would have had to 
confront such issues, and formulate and decide policies, in these areas 
where knowledge of science was critical. But we can add to this picture 
a prime minister who pursued a radical conservative agenda of cutting 
public expenditure and privatisation, who challenged union power and 
who fought and won a military and naval campaign halfway round the 
world in the South Atlantic. How did science and science policy fit with 
these ambitions?
What I do in this book is use a wealth of new primary sources to 
explore science policy under Margaret Thatcher. By ‘science policy’ I 
mean not only ‘science-for-policy’, which is how science informed deci-
sions on a range of issues, but also ‘policy-for-science’: how decisions 
were taken about the ways in which science should funded, managed 
and deployed.36 The new primary sources are predominantly the doc-
uments relating to science policy produced by central government – 
especially within Number 10 Downing Street, but also encompassing a 
diverse range of departments and ministries – that have been released at 
the National Archives. For the past few years the National Archives has 
been on overdrive as the United Kingdom moved from a 30-year-rule to a 
20-year-rule guiding the release of public records. This shift in the archi-
val horizon has meant that nearly all governmental records of the 1980s 
have been released (although, of course, a significant minority are still 
retained for a variety of reasons, not least national security) and histori-
ans can already examine records of John Major’s premiership. With these 
new sources the time was right to reassess the government’s actions in 
the 1980s.
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One of the opportunities invited by the availability of these doc-
uments is to contrast what we, as analysts of science policy, knew (or 
thought we knew) from the 1980s public record with what we can now 
trace actually happened, in detail, by whom, when and why, from the 
previously closed record. There are surprises – for example, the extent to 
which the consequences for science of the cuts in public spending were 
not anticipated – and, I think more significant, the identification of pre-
cisely who persuaded Margaret Thatcher to reshape science policy in her 
final years as Prime Minister. I have talked to journalists who covered 
science policy in the 1980s and to academic science policy experts whose 
careers spanned the 1980s to the present, and neither knew the iden-
tity of this agent.37 Historical documents have the considerable advan-
tage of revealing individuals and their roles within institutions in ways 
not as easily revealed through investigations at the time. Nevertheless, 
it is also true that historical documents, not least those written by senior 
civil servants, celebrated masters of word-craft, have to be read carefully, 
critically and in context. Even then the documents do not capture the 
informal, off-the-record discussions nor the conversations in the stair-
well. Some of this culture can be, and has been, captured through oral 
history, although such methods also have their blind spots. Ultimately 
primary source documents are the securest foundation for historical 
interpretation.
In Chapter 2 I sketch the landscape of science policy-making in the 
United Kingdom, providing a ‘who’s who’ of the people, roles and bodies 
that together shaped the direction of travel. I trace Margaret Thatcher’s 
life from chemistry graduate to industrial scientist and then through her 
political career as a Member of Parliament, Minister and Prime Minister. 
I survey the government departments of Whitehall, some of which were 
important because of the funds they channelled towards science, others 
because of their powerful influence on how decisions were taken or how 
money could be spent. I introduce the committees and other structures 
through which advice on science was given. In particular, I show how the 
role of an individual, the chief scientific adviser, has changed over time. 
Chief scientific advisers are crucial figures in the chapters that follow. 
However, some of the most important decisions taken under Thatcher 
on science policy were influenced more by political than scientific advice 
(although the boundary was never sharp). The Number 10 Policy Unit 
is a particularly important source of this political wisdom. Finally I also 
introduce other bodies, including Parliamentary ones as well as those of 
civil society – notably the Royal Society and campaigning groups such as 
Save British Science – which sought to intervene to change policy.
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In Chapter 3 I present my main findings on the causes, topics and 
protagonists of the central debates on science and innovation. In par-
ticular, I show that gathering tensions around a set of complex and inter-
connecting issues – the effects of cuts in public expenditure on university 
science, appropriate policies for government support of research-intensive 
 industry, entrepreneurialism in academia and industry, the preponder-
ance of defence research and the UK’s involvement in CERN – were indeed 
resolved (if not solved) by a decisive 1987 reversal in science and industrial 
policy. In this sense, as I discuss in detail in Chapter 8, all of the commen-
tators – Edgerton and Hughes,38 Wilkie,39 Williams,40 Christie,41 Wilks and 
Cini,42 von Tunzelmann43 – are right to say something happened in science 
policy, that there had been a ‘radical change’ and a ‘great debate’. However, 
their details and explanations go awry. Cuts were part of the mix, but by 
no means the main factor (contra Williams and Christie). The new policy 
sought to end an industrial strategy of government funding of ‘near-market’ 
research, but simultaneously (contra Wilkie) celebrated, rather than cur-
tailed, ‘curiosity-driven research’. Some businesses – notably big pharma-
ceutical concerns – would thrive in the post-near-market-funding world; 
others, notably GEC, would not, and this was anticipated by advisers.44 
Thatcherite policy was not (contra Edgerton and Hughes) a paradoxical 
yet coherent mix of the centralising and the liberating; rather these were 
expressions of different and conflicting protagonists within the science pol-
icy system. Specifically, I demonstrate that the Number 10 Policy Unit (and 
the adviser George Guise in particular) and Thatcher came to have very 
different views from those expressed by the institutional experts on science 
policy. I also show that the reversal happened when her Chief Scientific 
Adviser was sidelined, and also, although the argument has to be counter-
factual, after Michael Heseltine, a potential counterweight in favour of an 
industrial strategy, had resigned.
While it is clear from the primary source documents that this rever-
sal of science policy and industrial strategy was indeed the ‘great debate’, 
an observer at the end of the 1980s would probably have listed the chal-
lenge of the devastating and novel disease of AIDS and the controversy 
over embryos as the two biggest science-related public issues. In a Coda to 
Chapter 3 I trace how central government, especially Margaret Thatcher, 
responded to these challenges. I will show that the ways in which they 
were deliberated and handled were exceptional rather than typical of 
 science policy matters under Thatcher.
The next three chapters examine aspects of Thatcher’s nuclear poli-
cies during the 1980s, a decade that, surprisingly, was the last of the Cold 
War. Chapter 4, as its title ‘Power/leaks’ suggests, has a divided structure. 
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In the first half I follow the Prime Minister’s visits to UK nuclear sites, 
including the fast-breeder reactors at Dounreay in North Scotland and 
the site in Cumbria, first called Windscale and later Sellafield, which con-
tained the first nuclear power station, Calder Hall. This was built in the 
1950s, and by the 1980s had become a vast complex mostly devoted to 
reprocessing and storage. Thatcher was avowedly pro-nuclear, and these 
visits reveal a determination to present the UK nuclear project as neces-
sary, modern and safe.
The key words here are ‘power’ and ‘containment’. Both political 
image and the technical achievement of making, using and reprocessing 
nuclear fuel needed to be carefully packaged and managed to be power-
ful: the lustre of one sought to bolster the fortunes of the other. However, 
as I show in the second half of the chapter, both political image and tech-
nological system, could be – and were – challenged and undermined, not 
least by losses of control, or ‘leaks’. High politics and nuclear power are 
both tightly coupled systems, in which the aim of complete containment 
was unattainable. I examine the Thatcher government’s response to inci-
dents such as the pollution of beaches near Sellafield in 1983 and the 
Chernobyl accident of 1986, as well as issues such as leukaemia clusters, 
the challenges to the search for an underground nuclear waste storage 
site and the Sizewell B inquiry into the next generation of nuclear power 
stations.
Chapter 5 investigates how Thatcher’s nuclear plans intersected 
with the flagship policy aim of privatisation. I made a conscious decision 
to focus research fairly narrowly for this chapter. Privatisation, in gen-
eral, was an immense and complex undertaking, affecting swathes of the 
UK industrial, public and financial sectors. Like all large, modern, tech-
nical enterprises, the nationalised industries needed and used science in 
many ways, and it was not possible for me to research all of these topics. 
The history of science stories of the privatisation of industries, such as 
aerospace and telecommunications, will be told by others. Chapter 5, 
therefore, selects an extreme but important sector, one in which the role 
of the state was extraordinarily dominant, and for which postwar invest-
ment in science was paramount: the nuclear.
I start with the story of the privatisation of the state-owned 
Radiochemical Centre as it became the private company Amersham 
International. While small, this project was one of the very first, if not the 
first, privatisation under Thatcher, and was therefore an experiment of 
sorts. Next I survey the faltering steps towards privatisation of the bulk 
of the civil nuclear project: the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
(UKAEA), British Nuclear Fuels Ltd and the nuclear power stations. 
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Thatcher and her advisers were convinced that only full exposure to the 
market would make nuclear power economic. Yet the irony was that only 
in preparation for privatisation were the costs of nuclear power made 
public – after which, having seen the numbers, few private investors were 
tempted. I also suggest there may be a connection between the rejection 
of government funding of near-market research (in other words the argu-
ment of Chapter 3) and the unwillingness of Thatcher’s government to 
continue to support industrial nuclear projects.
Chapter 6 looks at the military side of the nuclear, but is also the 
result of a decision to focus my research. There are many developments 
of the UK’s military nuclear project in the 1980s that will need to await 
the greater disclosure of primary sources before their history can be ade-
quately told. One example would be the decision to purchase Trident and 
its implications for nuclear weapons laboratories, submarine bases and 
other sites of technical expertise. Instead, I examine the response in the 
UK to President Ronald Reagan’s vision of missile defence, the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). In her autobiography Thatcher recalled that 
‘This was one of those areas in which only a firm grasp of the scientific 
concepts involved allows the right decisions to be made’. But the project 
was also deeply criticised by scientific experts and advisers, not only in 
academia, but even, for example, from within the UK Ministry of Defence.
The chapter therefore raises and answers questions about the roles 
of technical knowledge and advice in policy-making. But interwoven with 
scepticism about whether SDI would ever work were concerns about the 
UK losing out in a new technological race, as well as, frankly, an element 
of avarice. ‘Isn’t there high grade employment here for a lot of British 
brains?’ one senior diplomat asked. I trace the dramatic proposal from 
Michael Heseltine, the defence minister and Thatcher’s political rival, for 
American funding for missile defence research in the United Kingdom – a 
proposal which, if it had been granted, would have been equivalent in 
spending power to a major new research council. Heseltine is a fascinat-
ing although intermittent figure throughout this book, both as a minister 
for environment and for defence. His proposals tended to be bold and 
interventionist, pointing towards an integrated industrial strategy and 
science policy eventually quite at odds with Thatcher’s direction of travel.
Chapter 7 explores five case studies of science, policy and the envi-
ronment. Acid rain was a major issue andone in which scientific evidence 
was central, although uncertainty within such evidence could be, and 
was, used both to support strong remedial action and to delay it. I will 
show how different interests at play encouraged different interpretations 
and deployments of research findings. Acid rain was also intrinsically 
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an international issue. An important turning point occurred when Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, the Norwegian Prime Minister, reached out to 
Thatcher (and, in doing so, emphasised their unusual hybrid status as 
leading politicians with scientific training) in 1986.
The second case study concerns Antarctic science, before and after 
the Falklands War. The diminishing of support for South Atlantic science 
was one of the signals read by Argentina as evidence of a declining UK 
commitment to defence of the Falkland Islands. The strategic impor-
tance of Antarctic science, post-Falklands, was such that Thatcher over-
rode the priorities set by the research councils. Research conducted by 
the British Antarctic Survey, published in 1985, revealed the ozone hole. 
International agreements to reduce emissions of the chemicals causing 
the ozone hole, notably the Montreal Protocol of 1987, became folded 
into the late, green pivot of Thatcher’s administration.
The third case study, anthropogenic climate change, also reflects 
this turn. Both the ozone hole and climate change featured in Thatcher’s 
famous science speech, made to the Royal Society in 1988. Thatcher, 
almost certainly a climate sceptic earlier in her career, became briefly 
an evangelist for international action in the late 1980s, before relaps-
ing into scepticism in retirement. There is a causal chain here: from the 
increased receptivity to Antarctic science post-Falklands, to Thatcher’s 
well-received championing of action on the ozone hole, to the search 
for another international, science-based, green cause, to her alighting 
on climate change – which also aligned to her new, post-1987 empha-
sis of restricting government’s role to supporting non-industrial science. 
Thatcher’s green turn of the late 1980s was partly political judgement as 
green politics spiked in importance (the Green Party received 15 per cent 
of the popular vote in the 1989 European elections, by far its best-ever 
showing). It was also partly a way of intervening on the international 
stage which made the most advantageous use of her attributes (includ-
ing her scientific training) – perhaps partly enabled by her grasp of the 
science, but also, crucially, a product of the conversations she had with 
advisers.
Some environmental issues involving science occupied Thatcher’s 
attention. However, it is important to note that others did not. The fourth 
and fifth case studies, on biodiversity conservation and the release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment respectively, are 
two examples of issues where, despite their importance, policy was not 
driven by prime ministerial concern. The case of Antarctic research after 
the Falklands conflict – in which Thatcher insisted that research council 
funds be redirected, but refused to consider an increase in the overall 
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research council budget to accommodate it – also shows that the over-
riding concern for reducing public expenditure, in other words aspects 
of the debates of Chapter 3, was relatively more important than other 
political targets.
In the final chapter I briefly summarise my main findings before 
reviewing some of the changes and continuities in policies for and 
affecting science after Thatcher fell from power in 1990. The new Prime 
Minister, John Major, had, as was entirely typical of the British political 
class, no substantial training in the sciences. However, when attention 
did turn to reforming science policy, notably as expressed in the 1993 
white paper, Realising our Potential, I will show that it was constrained by, 
and largely followed, rather than broke from, Thatcher’s science policy.
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Who made science policy?
Thirteen days after the 1979 general election the Cabinet Secretary, John 
Hunt, asked the new Prime Minister how she wanted to organise science 
matters. Since Margaret Thatcher had not appointed a Minister for Sci-
ence, he asked whether he was right to assume that the ‘arrangements of 
recent years’ (under both Conservative and Labour governments) would 
continue, namely:
(i) DES [Department for Education and Science] is responsible for 
the Research Councils and for the Science Budget.
(ii) Each major Department is responsible for determining and 
financing its own R and D programme broadly on the ‘cus-
tomer/contractor’ principle.
(iii) There is no ‘scientific overlord’ who tries to run science and R 
and D from the centre, but a Cabinet Minister is given a general 
co-ordinating role and acts as the Government’s spokesman on 
general scientific affairs.1
Thatcher confirmed that Neil Macfarlane as minister at the Department 
for Education and Science would ‘“do” the science side of things of the 
Ministry’, but added that she herself would take a role: ‘I will answer 
questions on science if need be’.2
Hunt’s summary of science in government hid an enormous amount 
of complexity. The Junior Minister at the Department for Education and 
Science would in practice play an almost negligible part in policy-making, 
while the Prime Minister did indeed pay close attention to science mat-
ters and would often go much further than merely answering questions. 
In between were advisers, official committees, civil servants, ministers 
and Parliamentary bodies, as well as a host of interested parties external 
to government but which also argued, lobbied and produced evidence 
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that shaped debate. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide to 
the people, roles, bodies and mechanisms that together produced and 
administered decisions on science and on science-laden issues.
The Prime Minister
As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s roles in science policy-making 
were various and powerful: as the head of the Cabinet that took ultimate 
responsibility for political decisions, including those on science and on 
issues which depended on science; as the senior authority in constant 
communication with ministers on affairs of state; as someone who might 
choose to lead on particular matters (such as missile defence, discussed 
in Chapter 6); as a chair, if she so wished, of the key committees in which 
issues were discussed; and as a recipient for the special channels of 
advice. Such roles were those taken by prime ministers before and after 
her. Thatcher, Prime Minister, had two extra unique dimensions: she had 
said she would ‘answer questions if need be’, and she had a training in, 
and working industrial experience of, science.
The young Margaret Roberts chose to narrow her sixth-form stud-
ies at Kesteven and Grantham Girls’ School to chemistry, biology and 
physics. Her biographers record that the choice of chemistry was one 
that ‘suited her practical bent of mind’ and a subject that had ‘good 
employment prospects’; she was also ‘inspired by the excellent teaching 
of the chemistry mistress at Kesteven, Miss Kay’.3 Roberts applied to the 
University of Oxford to read chemistry, arriving at Somerville College in 
1943, when the campus was eerily empty during the Second World War. 
One early biographer suggested, with little evidence, that ‘she seems to 
have decided rather coolly and calculatingly that for a girl Chemistry was 
the best examination bet’, while there ‘was also the attraction of invad-
ing and succeeding in what was considered a man’s domain’.4 (As Prime 
Minister, however, Thatcher would only rarely accept invitations that 
sought to identify her as a high-achieving female politician who would 
support the recruitment of women into science and engineering.)5
Somerville was a women’s college, with a progressive left reputa-
tion, led by haematologist and radiologist Dame Janet Vaughan. Roberts’ 
fourth-year dissertation was an investigation of antibiotic gramicidin S, 
guided by a refugee German postgraduate Gerhardt Schmidt and Dorothy 
Hodgkin, one of the leading x-ray crystallographers of the mid-twenti-
eth century – a woman who would not only win a Nobel Prize, but also 
be a figure of life-long respect for the young chemist-politician.6 Neither 
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senior woman rated Margaret Roberts particularly highly at her subject. 
She was a ‘perfectly good second-class chemist’, according to Vaughan. 
‘I came to rate her as good,’ recalled Hodgkin, ‘One could always rely on 
her producing a sensible, well-read essay.’7
While already active in university Conservative circles and consid-
ering training as a lawyer as a step towards politics as a career, Roberts 
chose instead to work for British Xylonite (BX) Plastics after graduation in 
1947. She would work in the Essex firm’s new Research and Development 
Section as an industrial chemist for two years before moving to another 
chemistry job, this time in food science at J. Lyons & Company, at the 
cakes and teashop business’s headquarters in Hammersmith, London. 
One reason she wanted the move was that it was nearer to a constituency 
in north Kent, where she had been selected to fight a then unwinnable 
seat for the Conservatives. As part of the publicity for her 1951 Dartford 
election campaign, Margaret Roberts was photographed wearing the 
white coat of a laboratory chemist.
In December 1951 Margaret married Denis Thatcher, who worked 
in his family’s paint and preservatives firm. There was a chemical affinity – 
the couple had met at a paint trade fair in Dartford. In the same year 
Margaret left Lyons and trained as a tax lawyer. Denis took a back seat 
as Margaret’s political career took off, beginning with her success at the 
polls to become Member of Parliament for Finchley in 1959. His business 
life very rarely intersected with her political work, an almost vanishing 
intersection when it came to science policy. However, one exception was 
policy on agricultural pesticides. In 1980 Thatcher’s private secretary 
decided she should be informed of an otherwise routine regulatory deci-
sion of the Advisory Committee on Pesticide’s that 2,4,5-T herbicides – 
one-half of the constituent chemicals of Agent Orange – could safely be 
continued to be used. ‘You may get some reaction to this because of DT’s 
firm,’ he noted.8 As regulation of 2,4,5-T, following changing scientific 
advice, became tighter in the 1980s – as evidence accumulated that 
the chemical was carcinogenic – so Thatcher was kept informed.9 She 
expressed her displeasure at the regulatory bureaucracy, although, as we 
shall see, this was not atypical of her.
In 1970 Edward Heath appointed Margaret Thatcher as his Secretary 
of State for Education and Science. She was therefore the minister respon-
sible for matters of school and university education and relevant aspects 
of civil science policy. Perhaps the most consequential decision on sci-
ence policy during her ministerial career was on the research and devel-
opment funded by government departments. Heath had established a 
Central Policy Review Staff, a ‘think-tank’ charged with providing original 
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and radical examinations and recommendations. Staffed by a mixture 
of Whitehall hotshots and talented outsiders, the CPRS was led by Lord 
Rothschild. Victor Rothschild had been trained in biophysics at Cambridge 
in the mid-1930s before embarking on a postwar career that encompassed 
both government work (he was chair of the Agricultural Research Council 
in the 1950s) and industry (as director of Shell UK’s research programmes 
in the 1960s). In 1971 Rothschild proposed a new way of framing, under-
standing and managing the research and development of civil government 
departments. This framing was the ‘customer-contractor’ principle:  the 
department (the customer) says what it wants, science (in the form of 
research institutes, research council-funded scientists or others) contracts 
to provide it, and the customer pays.10 The proposals, published in the 
‘Rothschild’ report in November 1971,11 were immediately controversial 
and opposed by the established institutions of UK science, including the 
Royal Society.12
The crucial meeting to consider the Rothschild reforms took place 
on 20 April 1971 at 10 Downing Street. Present were Edward Heath, 
Rothschild, the two most senior civil servants (Sir William Armstrong, 
head of the home civil service, and Robert Armstrong, Heath’s Principal 
Private Secretary) and the minister responsible, Margaret Thatcher. What 
is most intriguing about the meeting is that the minutes show Thatcher 
opening with a strong defence of the status quo, as she had been briefed 
by her department and a line supported by the Royal Society. Then, after 
presumably intense argument, recorded by Robert Armstrong in his art-
fully abbreviated summary as ‘discussion [in which it was] recognised 
that this would be fundamentally different from the present system’, 
Thatcher emerged convinced that the ‘fundamental change’, the market-
ised framing of government research, should be adopted. Episodes such 
as this one, crunch situations of political choice where market ideas were 
embraced, are more likely stages in the extraordinary journey of Thatcher, 
previously quite an ordinary Conservative minister, to Thatcherism than 
the standard historiography which sees her being persuaded by weakly 
institutionalised Hayekian supply-side economics ideas.13
The 1971 reassessment of science policy stands out as a concrete 
and early moment when Thatcher chose the market as an alternative 
to established models of resource allocation.14 Having worked as an 
industrial chemist, and therefore witnessed an engaged, problem-solv-
ing side to science very different to the vision of autonomy championed 
by the Royal Society, Thatcher nevertheless also saw science as the 
best of the public economy. She viewed science as a source of wealth, 
and therefore a justified expenditure from the public purse. Yet this 
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elevation made science even more of a test case for her developing 
views on economic liberalism. If markets could work for science policy, 
they could work anywhere.15
Rothschild was patchily implemented: completely in many 
departments, but tried and rejected in medical research, for exam-
ple,16 in the 1970s. Contrary to the view that it was a minor reform 
(in that it only, initially, applied to the research internally contracted 
by government departments, and that it was incomplete), Rothschild 
was of lasting significance. Once departments were buying research 
services from an internal market, it was a natural extension to ask 
those internal suppliers to compete against external suppliers, or 
indeed become privatised suppliers themselves. The significance was 
partly discursive (framing how research could be talked about) and 
suggested a direction of travel.
In 1974 the Heath government fell, and a year later Margaret 
Thatcher became Leader in opposition of the Conservative Party. 
Developing a set of radical policies, science would never be the over-
riding concern of Thatcher when she became Prime Minister in 1979. 
However, as I show in the following chapters, science would nevertheless 
be intertwined with some of the major issues she confronted and policies 
she pursued. The question of whether her scientific background mat-
tered to her prime ministerial career is therefore still an intriguing one. In 
addition to the possibility that practical science policy decision-making 
in the 1970s was a step towards Thatcher becoming Thatcherite, other 
commentators have noted either the application of a scientific frame of 
mind (of which I am sceptical) or the relevance of her scientific knowl-
edge. Hugo Young drew on Dorothy Hodgkin’s judgement:
What, according to the Nobel Laureate, does the study of chemistry 
do to a person’s mind? ‘I think it should interest you in problems 
of finding out as much as you can about the way we work, the way 
matter is put together. And it should give you an interest in using 
the results.’
This blueprint for the practical mind, a marriage between specu-
lative and empirical habits, is one which as a politican Mrs Thatcher 
consistently made much of. She retained a genuine interest in sci-
ence, which Dorothy Hodgkin concedes. It equipped her, says the 
professor, to take serious decisions on scientific matters and ‘to 
see what scientists are doing’. In the politician, her lack of any out-
standing scientific talent was less significant than her rare capacity 
to understand the scientific mind at all.17
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‘Margaret Thatcher much prided herself on being the only scientist in her 
government,’ noted Sir Crispin Tickell, whose advice on climate change 
to the Prime Minister is discussed in Chapter 7. ‘Anything that related to 
science she took a particular interest in, and almost felt that she owned it. 
Some of her views were radical and didn’t always fit the other views she 
heard from others.’18 Jonathon Porritt, the green advocate who was granted 
a meeting with Thatcher in 1989, believed that ‘The ozone layer got through 
to the Prime Minister because she got high-level briefings from NASA, and 
her chemist’s training enabled her to take it seriously’.19 Thatcher requested 
and received unleavened and technical scientific advice from her advisers 
relating to policy issues that were underpinned by science, for example, 
lists of equations describing the chemical reactions of the stratosphere as 
part of acid rain discussions (see Chapter 7) or the qualities of α-, β-, and 
γ-radiation as part of nuclear policy-making (see Chapter 4).20 The informa-
tion was provided with the justified expectation that she would understand 
and use the knowledge. Her blue pen underlining passages demonstrates 
she read them. Her chief scientific advisers would occasionally address her 
with the phrasing ‘as a scientist … ’ if they wanted to appeal to this instinct. 
The Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland addressed her as 
a fellow scientist (with effect, as I show in Chapter 7). I will analyse plenty 
of examples of Thatcher’s special interest in science-related policies in the 
chapters that follow.
However, her relationship with scientific institutions could also be 
problematic. As citizens and voters, British scientists were just as likely 
to have strong views, positive and negative, about Thatcher’s politics as 
anyone else. They also worked in organisations – universities, research 
institutes – that were deeply affected by her policies, not least the com-
mencement of public sector cuts. Thatcher’s communications through 
the scientific press, such as an interview with the editor of Nature, John 
Maddox, were typically forthright and divisive.21 When Thatcher’s name 
was put forward for election as a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1983, not in 
itself unusual for a prime minister, but one with much added significance 
given her politics and background, ‘her candidature split the Fellowship, 
and the normally placid election meeting attracted an unprecedented 
turnout, marshalled by the key protagonists on each side,’ records the 
Society’s historian.22 She was narrowly elected as an FRS, a prestigious 
title in science, but the furore meant that the admission ceremony had to 
be delayed. ‘I need hardly say that this incident does not detract from the 
honour which I feel in having been elected to the Fellowship,’ Thatcher 
wrote to the Royal Society President.23 In 1985 she was denied an Oxford 
honorary degree, ‘the opposition led by scientists’.24
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In this context, Thatcher adopted a noticeably distinctive way of 
doing the business of communicating science policy and gathering scien-
tists’ views: she hosted seminars and receptions in which communication 
could happen directly. Examples include:
Reception for inventors and innovators 26 January 1981
Luncheon with scientists 19 February 1982
Seminar on science, technology and industry 12 September 1983
Recent developments in scientific research 8 July 1984
Meeting with industrialists 21 May 1985
Seminar on engineering and technology February 1986
(Proposed) Seminar on Priorities for Science and Technology Spring 
1987
Seminar with young scientists 13 September 1989
Seminar with young scientists 28 September 1990
Invitees to the 1981 reception for inventors and innovators included P. C. 
Dowles (‘inventor of new type of hotel room safe’), P. Gotley (‘invented 
a new form of gas detection equipment, employing microprocessor’), 
Maurice A. Hiles (inventor of ‘“Sorbothane”, a polymer that simulates 
the energy-absorbing properties of human flesh’), F. B. Mercer (invented 
a ‘new way of making nets’, Netlon).25 These people were among those 
who had received government assistance from an organisation called the 
National Research Development Corporation (NRDC, discussed below). 
They therefore represented the older, collective support of intellectual 
property exploitation. But alongside them were others, including E. Biss 
(an inventor of a new ‘note weighing machine, controlled by micropro-
cessor’), L. Brownlow (managing director of Rodime Ltd, a new company, 
established 1980, manufacturing computer peripherals), T. J. Parker 
(inventor of ‘novel containers for pharmaceuticals’) and Howard Calvert 
(a young inventor of a ‘portable gymnasium’, who had run a ‘family soft-
ware firm while studying for A levels’).26 Here was a new class of inven-
tors, unencumbered by public sector support. Filling the room with these 
‘Inventors’ were ‘Entrepreneurs’ (it is interesting that inventors were not 
themselves categorised as entrepreneurs), venture capitalists, financiers 
and bankers, as well as ‘Industrialists’ the representatives of bigger engi-
neering businesses.27
Thatcher addressed the reception, opening by saying that the ‘prin-
cipal aim of the Government’s economic policies has been to stimulate 
individual initiative by encouraging the formation of new businesses 
and enabling their owners to retain more of the wealth that they have 
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created’.28 It was to smaller firms that would be looked to ‘to take up much 
of the labour now being shed because of the rundown of our older indus-
tries’. She asked what were the ‘barriers to the exploitation of new ideas’, 
and began a discussion that covered such issues as the relations between 
individual inventors and banks, the mismatch in expectations between 
the inventor (‘absorbed in his own vision of his concept in operation’) and 
the financier (who was looking for management skills first before techni-
cal viability), as well as the possibilities of awards and tax incentives.29 
While the record of the meeting suggests that the tone of the discussion, 
perhaps shaped by the realism of the established interests present, was 
fairly sober – ‘Inventions did not necessarily lead to innovation: innova-
tion did not necessarily lead to business success. The individual invention 
could only play a small part in meeting national requirements for new 
products’ – this was in contrast to Thatcher’s opening words, the paean 
to the individual inventor.
One can fairly say there were two groupings present. On one side 
those championing the individual (Thatcher and the lone inventors) and 
on the other the organisations, including those charged with holding the 
individuals back. The fact that this gala was held in Downing Street was 
a statement that the lone inventors should be valued. They were a type 
to champion.30 I will discuss other cases of these events – especially the 
most consequential, the Seminar on Science, Technology and Industry at 
Lancaster House in September 1983 – in later chapters.
In 1988 Thatcher made her most famous speech on science, hosted 
by the Royal Society. As I show in Chapters 3 and 7, while the speech has 
mostly been remembered as the moment a leader of a Western industrial 
nation made a call to arms for action on anthropogenic climate change, 
it also highlighted government support for curiosity-driven science. 
This positive framing of pure science in largely academic settings was, I 
show, the obverse to the cutting of government funding for near-market 
research. In many ways it was a clever, rhetorical move – who could be 
against curiosity? – but it was also the direct product of an ideological 
desire to remove the state from industrially relevant applied research.
Studying the science policy papers that were included in the boxes 
of files that were prepared for the Prime Minister, and read by her, usually 
overnight – the PREM series files now at the National Archives – it is hard 
not to be impressed by her sheer capacity to read, absorb information and 
arguments, and to think politically. And I have only focused on the files 
dealing with science-related issues – such papers were a fraction of her 
daily work. Yet in the last two years of her premiership a new note can 
be detected. She became more impatient of long documents: ‘this is yet 
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another lengthy woolly minute which avoids the real issues’, she wrote 
on Geoffrey Howe’s plans for international scientific collaboration, while 
a review of agricultural R&D was dismissed as ‘guffy’.31 What had been 
forthright now reads as tetchiness. Thatcher, more than before, resorted to 
clichés. For example, she railed at the regulation of agricultural pesticides 
(including 2,4,5-T) in 1990. ‘It sounds like bureaucracy gone mad – and 
all new accommodation to go mad in,’ she wrote of expanded pesticide 
evaluation units’32; it was a ‘bureaucrats’ paradise’33 – a phrase that she 
began to turn to often. In November 1990, following Howe’s resignation 
speech, Conservative MPs, enough of whom now thought she was no 
longer an electoral asset, brought her prime ministership to an end.
Departments
Central government is divided into departments, each of which has one 
or several politician ministers at its head and is staffed by civil servants.34 
Whitehall was therefore formed of a patchwork of departments, some 
powerful, some weaker, some with wide-ranging concerns, some manag-
ing specific interests – all of which could, and did, conflict when it came 
to the use and direction of science. ‘In short’, a review had concluded 
just prior to the 1979 election, ‘the Government does not have a single 
science policy: it has a whole range of policies – relating eg to defence, 
industry, agriculture and the environment – and the role of scientific 
R&D is to contribute to the achievement of those policies’.35
The senior ministers of departments are members of Cabinet, 
which is chaired by the Prime Minister and which possesses executive 
power, collective decision-making and shared responsibility. The Cabinet 
Office supports the work of Cabinet, in particular through providing a 
secretariat for the Cabinet committees, which address specific topics. 
Cabinet committees are typically either ministerial (ie the members 
are politicians) or official (the members are civil servants). Important 
Cabinet committee relating to science in the 1980s included E(ST) – E 
for economics, ST for science and technology – and STO – O for official.36 
Cabinet committees do not have budgets, but they could both advise 
and make decisions. They were therefore crucial sites for the formation, 
negotiation and settlement of science policy. Nevertheless, key decisions 
might be made outside of committees, although some formal approval at 
full Cabinet level would be necessary.
In addition to providing the secretariat for the Cabinet commit-
tees, the Cabinet Office was also home to the Central Policy Review Staff 
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(CPRS) and the Central Statistical Office. The Cabinet Office and system 
date from the early twentieth century, while the CPRS was set up by 
Heath. A second body intimately close to the centre of government, the 
Number 10 Policy Unit, is younger still. Essentially, whereas the CPRS 
offered critical, far-reaching reviews and comments across government, 
the staff of the Number 10 Policy Unit, usually recruited from outside, 
brought these functions closer to the Prime Minister. The CPRS and the 
Number 10 Policy Unit were both sources of influential thinking on sci-
ence policy, although in the Thatcher years the latter thrived and the for-
mer was abolished.
In 1979, out of about £3 billion total UK R&D spending (3 per cent of 
GDP), the UK government planned to spend £2,141 million on research 
and development.37 Roughly half of this – £1,160 million – was budgeted 
through the Ministry of Defence.38 By 1981/82 the expected expenditure 
on research and development by the Ministry was £1,680 million, £260 
million of which was classed as research.39 The leading ministers dur-
ing the Thatcher administration were Francis Pym (1979–81), John Nott 
(1981–3), Michael Heseltine (1983–6), George Younger (1986–9) and 
Tom King (1989–92). The Ministry employed a chief scientific adviser, 
who, during the same period was Ronald Mason (1977–83) and Richard 
Norman (1983–8), both chemists, followed by the geophysicist Ron 
Oxburgh (1988–93). The Ministry had a system of advisory committees, 
including an internal, priority-setting Defence Research Committee and 
a network of subject-specific sub-committees under a Defence Scientific 
Advisory Council, designed to infuse academic expertise into the advi-
sory process. The Ministry ran a number of defence science laborato-
ries, including major ones for nuclear weapons at Aldermaston, radar 
research at Malvern, aeronautics at Farnborough – the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment was the ‘largest research establishment in Western 
Europe’ at the beginning of the 1980s – and naval research and develop-
ment on the south coast.40 It was also responsible for the Meteorological 
Office, which had mostly civil significance. In the late 1980s and 1990s 
the defence research laboratories faced transformation as targets for pri-
vatisation contingent with the end of the Cold War.
While the criticism is sometimes made that the UK did not have a 
unified science policy since defence research and development was con-
sidered separate from civil (and that historians of science policy have 
only focused on the civil side),41 this charge is in fact largely an artefact 
created by what was publicly visible. For example, the large and impor-
tant 1984 annual review of R&D surveyed both defence and civil science, 
but when published (as had happened in 1983) only the civil information 
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was contained.42 The impression from the outside was consequently that 
only civil science was being reviewed. From inside the highest levels 
of central government, however, both sets of data were placed side by 
side, and, as I show in Chapter 3, a ministerial argument over respective 
 balance of civil and defence R&D took place.
The interconnected military and civil nuclear projects were of 
central importance to postwar British science. Both had begun in the 
late 1940s as the UK was excluded from postwar nuclear collabora-
tion with the United States, and an overview of their history is given in 
Chapter 4. By 1979 the UK Atomic Energy Authority was formally under 
the Department of Energy (the responsibility for UKAEA’s laboratory 
for nuclear weapons, Aldermaston, having been passed to the Ministry 
of Defence). The Department of Energy in that year had a budget of 
£155 million for research and development, of which the vast bulk was 
devoted to UKAEA’s civil nuclear work. Chapter 4 discusses Thatcher’s 
symbolic visits to UKAEA and other nuclear establishments, including 
those of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd, while Chapter 5 examines the moves to 
privatise the radioisotopes factory at Amersham as well as UKAEA itself. 
Scientists managed nuclear institutions, and the Department of Energy 
possessed a chief scientific adviser and expert advisory committees. The 
leading minister, the Secretary of State for Energy, during the Thatcher 
administration was David Howell (1979–81), Nigel Lawson (1981–3), 
Peter Walker (1983–7), Cecil Parkinson (1987–9) and John Wakeham 
(1989–92).
The Department of Trade and Industry (the two had been split 
in 1974, but merged again in 1983) possessed a sizeable research and 
development budget (£132 million in 1979), Requirement Boards to dis-
cuss science policy,43 and a Chief Engineer and Scientist. It was responsi-
ble for one of the major laboratories (the centre of precise measurement 
and the maintenance of standards, the National Physical Laboratory at 
Teddington, London), but its importance to the themes of this book went 
much further, since the Department was responsible for policies in sup-
port of industry, technology and the innovation process more generally. 
Peter Hennessy, a long-standing analyst of Whitehall, notes that it has 
housed a long-running conflict between dirigiste (interventionist) and 
laissez faire traditions.44 Under the DTI’s wing was the National Research 
Development Corporation (NRDC), which collectively held and exploited 
patents derived from publicly funded research. As I discuss, the NRDC 
was a target for privatisation and dismantlement by Thatcherites. During 
the Thatcher years there was a frequent turn over of ministers, includ-
ing Keith Joseph (‘who arrived … in 1979 armed with copies of Adam 
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Smith which he urged his officials to read’), Patrick Jenkin (1981–3), 
Cecil Parkinson (1983, almost immediately to resign because of scandal), 
Norman Tebbit (1983–5), Leon Brittan (1985–6), Lord Young (1987–9) 
and Nicholas Ridley (1989–90). Nevertheless, it was in the Department 
of Trade and Industry that strongest support for using R&D as a means of 
promoting industrial competitiveness – that is to say an integral part of 
an industrial strategy – was expressed. For example, Norman Tebbit writ-
ing to Geoffrey Howe in 1984, in the context of a discussion of European 
collaboration, could say:
My primary concern is to allocate our limited R&D resources to the 
more immediate challenge of ensuring that we keep [our] industrial 
capability in place. This means domestically funded programmes 
directed at national objectives.45
Such thinking justified extensive programmes of support for what was 
later described as ‘near-market’ science. As I show in Chapter 3, the DTI 
therefore was a source of opposition to the radical new science policy of 
cutting near-market research in the late 1980s.
The two departments related to land use and natural resources, 
the Department of the Environment (combined initially with the 
Department of Transport) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF), had comparable, middling-sized research and develop-
ment budgets, organised by the Rothschild principles, in 1979 of £59 mil-
lion and £50 million respectively. Each had a chief scientist (known in the 
Environment as the director of research) and a network of research lab-
oratories. Environment was also responsible for the Nature Conservancy 
Council, which offered advice on nature conservation and supported 
research.
The fact that responsibilities and budget for research and devel-
opment were placed in other ministries meant the Department of 
Education and Science did not have the full influence on science policy 
that its name might initially suggest. However, it channelled consider-
able public funds through a ‘dual-support system’ to what came to be 
called in the 1980s the ‘science base’: £190 million direct to universi-
ties and colleges via the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1979, 
and twice that figure through the research councils. Research councils 
are semi-autonomous bodies that distribute research funding, not all of 
which went to universities, guided by expert advice and peer review. In 
1979, there were five research councils, and the funding broke down as 
follows:46
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Science Research Council (SRC)(later Science and Engineering 
Research Council, SERC)
£177 million
Medical Research Council (MRC) £68 million
Agricultural Research Council (ARC)(later Agriculture and 
Food Research Council, AFRC)
£58 million
Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) £55 million
Social Science Research Council (SSRC) £18 million
The belief that the research councils have been and should be autonomous, 
and in particular should not be directed by ministerial (or prime ministerial) 
wishes, is referred to as the ‘Haldane principle’.47 (In fact, under Section 2(1) 
of the 1965 Science and Technology Act, the responsible Secretary of State 
could give ‘directions’.)48 Whether or not it was ever articulated by Lord Hal-
dane is secondary to the effective belief that the principle exists. However, 
as I show in Chapter 3, in which the Chief Scientific Adviser sought legal 
advice on the extent that research council work could indeed be directed, or 
in Chapter 7 where, in the case of Antarctic science, the effective existence of 
the principle was demonstrated by its breach, the autonomy of the research 
councils was put under pressure in the 1980s.
The final stop on our tour of Whitehall, the Treasury, is perhaps the 
most powerful of all, although it commissioned a negligible amount of 
research directly and itself had no chief scientific adviser. (Indeed, as was 
noted within the department, ‘the Treasury does not have knowledge 
in-house to enable it to put forward a scientific view, and prefers it that 
way’.)49 The Treasury controlled the purse strings, and each department 
would have to negotiate with it over the amount and the rules of distri-
bution of public expenditure. The Treasury also influenced taxation pol-
icies, some of which were, in effect, research and development policies. 
For example, in 1984 a ‘scientific research allowance’ (SRA), essentially a 
100 per cent tax credit on capital expenditure incurred by a trader on sci-
entific research (undertaken either by the company or on the company’s 
behalf), amounted to support of R&D to the tune of £100 million a year. 
It was in the Treasury that such schemes were examined, often scepti-
cally. For example, one official asked ‘to what extent do we want to single 
out research as a priority area? Is not the main priority support for devel-
opment?’; he also questioned whether other schemes, such as the indus-
trial strategy in support of advanced information technology – known 
as Alvey (see Chapter 3) – were ‘cost effective’.50 SRAs were the subject 
of departmental horse-trading: the DTI were keen on them, while the 
Treasury looked askance.51 Finally, the Treasury built and ran the mod-
els on which the economy’s performance was predicted and understood, 
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and against which policies were evaluated. The Treasury model did ‘not 
include any variable solely and specifically related to scientific and tech-
nological change’.52
Advice and advisors
Above I quoted Sir Crispin Tickell recalling that ‘Thatcher’s view on sci-
ence and science policy were ‘radical and didn’t always fit the other views 
she heard from others’; he also remarked that the ‘main advice she got 
was, of course, from the civil service machine’.53 I have noted bodies that 
possessed departmental scientific advisers, a presence that was a con-
sequence of the Rothschild reforms. These departmental advisers were 
sometimes part-time or appointed from within (rather than outsiders to 
Whitehall, and therefore lacking academic or industrial experience).54 
Further advice was provided in a collective form, through committees 
that pooled ranges of expertise, including from academia and industry.
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
Some of these bodies sat aside of central government, such as the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, which produced a series of 
reports on environmental matters beginning in 1971.55 Royal commis-
sions are ad hoc advisory and investigatory bodies that, while appointed 
by government, have a useful quasi-independent standing. Thatcher’s 
government received seven reports from the RCEP, as follows.
7th Report Agriculture and pollution Cmnd 7644, September 1979
8th Report Oil pollution of the sea Cmnd 8358, October 1981
9th Report Lead in the environment Cmnd 8852, April 1983
10th Report Tackling pollution – 
experience and prospects
Cmnd 9149, February 1984
11th Report Managing waste: the duty of 
care
Cmnd 9675, December 1985
12th Report Best practicable 
environmental option
Cm 310, February 1988
13th Report The release of genetically 
engineered organisms into the 
environment
Cm 720, July 1989
Other committees, which I now turn to, were more centrally located.
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ACARD and ACOST
The views of industry were represented by the Advisory Council for 
Applied Research and Development (ACARD), first appointed in 
1976.56 When John Hunt had asked Thatcher in May 1979 how she 
wanted to organise science matters, he asked whether ACARD should 
continue:
After a shaky start ACARD now seems to be doing a useful job. Its 
first two reports, on microelectronics and on the encouragement of 
innovation, were well received. It has four more now in progress on 
the employment implications of technological change; joining and 
assembly techniques; computer-aided design and manufacture; 
and the implications for the private sector of the public sector’s R 
and D capacity: and they are also doing a joint study with the Royal 
Society and the ABRC studying biotechnology. The ‘co-ordinating’ 
Minister chairs ACARD (the scientific community have welcomed 
this as a visible token that Government takes the applied end of civil 
science seriously): but there are two working Deputy Chairmen 
(Dr Alfred Spinks and Sir James Menter): all the other members 
are outsiders but Sir Kenneth Berrill and some Departmental Chief 
Scientists attend as assessors; and some support … is provided by 
the Chief Scientist in the CPRS (John Ashworth) and the Cabinet 
Secretariat.57
In 1979 the companies that were represented on ACARD by individuals 
were ICI (Spinks was former director of research), the Scottish Offshore 
Partnership, GEC, Ricardo Consulting Engineers Ltd, Delta Materials 
Research Ltd, Vickers and British Petroleum. In addition there were four 
academics and two trade unionists. ‘The point is not how many interesting 
reports ACARD produces but whether those reports have practical value,’ 
noted Thatcher; sceptical of the contribution of ACARD, she added: ‘I doubt 
it’.58 Her reviewer of quangos, Leo Pliatzky, suggested giving ACARD two 
more years, after which the case for continuing it would be reconsidered. 
Thatcher agreed.59 Major reports produced by ACARD during the Thatcher 
years included:
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Joining and Assembly: the Impact of 
Robots and Automation
October 1979, published 1979
Computer Aided Design and 
Manufacture
October 1979, published 1980
Technological Change: Threats and 
Opportunities for the United Kingdom
November 1979, published 1980
Biotechnology (the ‘Spinks Report’) Joint with ABRC and Royal Society, 
published 1980
Information Technology August 1980, published 1980
Exploiting Invention December 1980
The Food Industry and Technology July 1982, published 1982
Improving Research Links between 
Higher Education and Industry
Joint with ABRC, June 1983
First Joint Report by the Chairmen of 
the ACARD and ABRC
Joint with ABRC. Published July 1983
New Opportunities in Manufacturing Published in October 1983
Exploitable Areas of Science September 1985. Published in May 
1986
Software: a Vital Key to UK 
Competitiveness
March 1986. Published in June 1986
Medical Equipment Published July 1986
In 1980 the membership of ACARD was freshened up, with the lacklustre 
Menter allowed to retire and the vice-chancellor of Cranfield Institute of 
Technology, Sir Henry Chilver, stepping up from deputy to chair. New 
industrial representatives came from companies such as Unilever and 
Dunlop and, in order to link academic to applied science, the chair of 
the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) was invited on to 
the Council. Thatcher complained that ‘there is no one from the informa-
tion technology area’ (an interesting, early use of the term).60 By 1983 
ACARD was a rather unwieldy committee of 16 members (including the 
chair, Chilver), six ‘assessors’ and a secretariat.61 In November 1985 Sir 
Francis Tombs, who had a background in the electricity supply business 
and was chairman of Rolls-Royce, replaced Chilver as ACARD chair.
ACARD’s reports tended to be detailed and lengthy. Nevertheless, 
the submission of a new report, and other occasions too, permitted the 
chair of ACARD to communicate direct with the Prime Minister and offer 
advice. Sometimes the advice was influential, especially when it aligned 
with senior politicians’ analyses. Such was the case in ACARD’s criticisms 
of the National Research Development Corporation (see Chapter 3). 
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At other times the advice fell on infertile soil, as when ACARD urged, 
in the same report that criticised the NRDC, that the BBC and ITV be 
encouraged to package entrepreneurial tips into its programming ‘rather 
as farming advice used to be given in every episode of “The Archers”’.62 
Thatcher, reading the report, picked out the NRDC criticisms as the ones 
for further action.63
ACARD clashed with the government on science funding. In a 1979 
report, read by Thatcher, ACARD highlighted the fact that ‘in recent 
years R and D expenditure by United Kingdom industry has declined 
disturbingly compared with that of other countries’.64 It contested the 
public statement made by the government in 1985 that ‘the UK’s R&D 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP was sufficient’.65 ACARD was also 
a key proponent of continuing the policy of the UK pursuing an active 
industrial strategy in which public bodies and funding would be coor-
dinated to support promising sectors. This message, for example, came 
through loud and clear in the first recommendation of one of the first 
ACARD reports to be received by Thatcher, Technological Change, in 
November 1979:
The development of technology strategies for different indus-
trial sectors should form an integral part of the [the work of the 
National Economic Development Council] NEDC … The R and 
D programmes of the Department of Industry’s Requirement 
Boards and of Research Associations, and the relevant parts of 
Research Council programmes, should be aligned with these 
strategies.66
Likewise in a 1983 report on links between higher education and indus-
try, ACARD, jointly with the ABRC, called for ways to be found actively 
to channel funding to ‘areas of research which are both academically 
worthwhile and have industrial relevance’; it also called for an ‘indus-
trial seedcorn fund’ to support ‘research that will complement effective, 
industrially-financed applied research’.67 In 1985 – in its most lengthy 
report, produced over two years with funding from ICI and the help of 
academics at the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University – 
ACARD argued that:
There is a thesis, widely accepted in the United Kingdom, that basic 
research cannot be organised to deliver economic return. The the-
sis is not generally accepted in other countries. They believe that 
science is now so important to a country’s future that some attempt 
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must be made to structure support, and achieve more effective 
exploitation of science. …
[S]ome mechanism is needed in the best interests of the coun-
try to prioritise and guide a fairly high proportion of that part 
of the national scientific resource paid for by the taxpayer, and 
to stimulate its effective exploitation to the benefit of the United 
Kingdom.68
In Chapter 3 I will show that in the later 1980s, in order to solve the sec-
ond issue of underinvestment by UK companies in research and develop-
ment, Thatcher chose to cut precisely the type of support of near-market 
research that ACARD had lobbied for. Thatcher’s government therefore 
would sharply diverge from ACARD’s view of how to support industry 
through applied research.
In February 1987 the Chief Scientific Adviser, John Fairclough, told 
Thatcher that ‘We need a renaissance of our industrial prowess through 
the contribution from research and development to again become an 
effective competitor to Japan, Germany and the United States’. He there-
fore proposed moves to streamline and strengthen decision-making 
machinery, notably new Cabinet committees, including E(ST) at the cen-
tre of government. To offer this structure good advice, Fairclough recom-
mended that ACARD:
be extended to cover basic and strategic science in addition to its 
role in applied research and development. This would create an 
advisory body that would look across the whole subject and so bal-
ance our priorities between fields of endeavour which currently 
underlay the current division between basic and applied science.69
In April 1987 Fairclough had a name for the extended ACARD: the Advi-
sory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST).70 E(ST), advised 
by ACOST, would set ‘national priorities for science and technology’ 
and have ‘responsibility from science right through to the exploitation 
stage’. ACOST first met later in the year, and continued to be chaired by 
Tombs. But by then, as I show in the next chapter, science policy had 
radically shifted, and the centralised, informed industrial strategy on 
which E(ST) and ACOST had been called into being had been ended. 
ACOST was now regarded as a quango, second-guessing the market, 
and a symbol of a ‘hankering after some bureaucratic direction of 
research’.71 When ACOST suggested, as ACARD had done before it, that 
the government should increase science funding, it too was told in no 
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uncertain terms that such advice was neither welcome nor expected.72 
Even though Thatcher would occasionally chair ACOST (for example, 
on 11 May 198873 and 14 March 1990)74, the ground had been cut from 
beneath ACOST’s feet. In July 1990, when Tombs finished his role of 
chair of ACOST, he used his final meeting with Thatcher, with Guise 
present, to complain about the ending of governmental support for 
applied R&D.75
Advisory Board for the Research Councils
The second important central committee, the Advisory Board for the 
Research Councils (ABRC), gathered together academic scientists, chief 
scientists from the departments and the Central Policy Review Staff (in 
effect, chief scientific adviser to the government), the chair of ACARD 
and the heads of the research councils. It was chaired until January 
1983 by the physicist and vice-chancellor of Bristol University Sir Alex 
Merrison, and thereafter by the Professor of Molecular Biophysics at the 
University of Oxford, Sir David Phillips – a figure ‘very powerful through 
the ’80s and very good’, according to a former chief scientific adviser.76
The ABRC had been established in 1972 with terms of reference to 
advise the Secretary of State for Education and Science on ‘his respon-
sibilities for civil science’ and the ‘allocation of the Science Budget’, and 
to ‘promote close liaison between the Councils and the users of their 
research’. In 1982 it had published its advice for the first time, revealing 
a view that a supposed ‘swing away from “big science” … had gone as far 
as it could if Britain was to maintain a stake in high energy physics and 
astronomy’.77 Like ACARD, the ABRC published reports, based on the 
findings of working groups, an example being A Study of Commissioned 
Research led by Sir Ronald Mason, published in November 1983; it was 
critical of the practice, if not the ‘logic’, of the Rothschild customer/con-
tractor approach, and recommended that the ABRC be strengthened ‘by 
giving it enhanced authority and responsibilities’.78
The chairs of the ABRC and ACARD began issuing joint periodic 
reports on the state of science and technology in the United Kingdom 
from 1983. The ABRC report that gathered the most public comment 
and debate was A Strategy for the Science Base, published in 1987; this 
was assumed to be influential, or even a statement of UK science policy.79 
However, as I show in the next chapter, government science policy moved 
in a quite different direction. Following the establishment of ACOST, the 
ABRC was eventually, in 1990, given a slimmed-down role and needed 
fewer members.80
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Chief Scientific Adviser
ACARD, ABRC and later ACOST were the leading bodies for collective 
provision of advice. However, for much of the postwar period, a single 
individual has played an important, central role in the provision and 
organisation of scientific advice. The role has changed over the years, 
shaped by circumstance, personality and policy. Chief scientific advisers 
will make many appearances in the following chapters, so it is valuable to 
trace how the role developed in some detail.
Individual scientists, such as Henry Tizard and Frederick Lindemann 
(Lord Cherwell), had advised the centre of government in the 1940s, 
but in the 1950s and early 1960s a more distributed model of the provi-
sion of scientific advice had prevailed. The return to the individual role, 
and indeed the official inauguration of the title ‘Chief Scientific Adviser’ 
to the government, occurred in 1964. Solly Zuckerman was a South 
African-born zoologist who had conducted the gory but necessary work 
of investigating the effects of explosives on bodies; he also carried out 
statistical assessments of bombing operations during the Second World 
War.81 He was a trusted, independent insider. Zuckerman had already 
served in many capacities in government before he was appointed Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence in late 1959.82 ‘No one ever 
more completely stormed every bastion of the British establishment,’ 
observed Roy Jenkins.83 Interestingly Zuckerman insisted on a change 
of name from ‘Chief Scientist’ (‘inappropriate’, he thought, ‘for someone 
who knew as little as I did about the “hardware” side of things’) to Chief 
Scientific Adviser.84
Zuckerman repeatedly stressed the requirement of an adviser 
to challenge received opinions and entrenched interests. His views 
could be ‘heterodox’, rejecting battlefield nuclear weapons, for exam-
ple, against the view of chiefs of staff. In 1964 Harold Wilson wanted 
to make Zuckerman a minister of state, leading on disarmament issues. 
Zuckerman declined. But his role as CSA for MoD was also untenable, 
perhaps because the Minister of Defence Denis Healey and Zuckerman 
never quite saw eye to eye. The role of Government Chief Scientific 
Adviser (GCSA) was therefore created for him. He also, and he never 
tired of telling people of the fact, was made Head of the Scientific Civil 
Service, a managerial responsibility for 10,000 people – larger than the 
body of 3,000 administrative civil servants.
As GCSA, Zuckerman advised on large defence projects – including 
controversial cancellations, for example the RAF’s ‘pet project’, the super-
sonic, low-flying, multipurpose TSR-2 aircraft.85 He was instrumental 
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in recruiting the cosmologist Hermann Bondi to review the UK’s space 
policy in the late 1960s.86 Environmental issues were increasingly prom-
inent, and Zuckerman’s advice included responding to immediate crises 
(such as the giant Torrey Canyon oil spill off Cornwall in 1967)87 as well 
as instituting longer term bureaucratic mechanisms for collating infor-
mation and reviewing courses of action, notably the Royal Commission 
for Environmental Pollution in 1969–70.88 Other issues included London 
flood planning (leading to the Thames Barrier) and the panic over the 
migration of scientific talent labelled the first ‘brain drain’. He also 
attempted to review R&D spending across departments, through a new 
Central Advisory Council for Science and Technology, set up in 1967, 
which brought him into conflict with ministers.89
Zuckerman retired in 1971, but he continued to chip in his views 
about science and government right up through the 1980s (indeed he 
retained rooms in the Cabinet Office, and advised on the badger/bovine 
TB issue during the Thatcher administration). His style was to be the 
trusted consultant, the challenger of received views, and he relied on 
good, wide, informal networking. Zuckerman’s list of attributes of an 
ideal GCSA can be extracted from his comments in speeches and private 
correspondence. An ideal GCSA would:
1. offer up sensible, reasoned, informed advice;
2. be independent of vested interests;
3. keep in touch (inwards, with the civil service, and outwards, with 
the scientific community);
4. answer requests for information (CSAs play this role in 
departments);
5. anticipate information that will be needed, and therefore commis-
sion research if necessary;
6. sometimes manage staff;
7. should not be excluded from key discussions;
8. be personally trusted by the Prime Minister; and
9. be personally trusted by the Cabinet Secretary.90
The technocratic Heath government brought in the era of the Central Pol-
icy Review Staff (CPRS), the think-tank assigned the general task of wide 
and deep critical review. It was led by a scientist, Victor Rothschild. There-
fore it was a moot point whether there should be another chief scientific 
adviser to the government after Zuckerman. The Treasury was against; 
so was Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, who smoothly said Zucker-
man was ‘sui generis’; Zuckerman insisted, arguing that since ‘Permanent 
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Secretaries do not reproduce themselves from the same mould’ neither 
should the next GCSA be expected to have the same background and 
experience as the last.91 In the event Alan Cottrell, a science adviser to 
the Ministry of Defence and ‘the outstanding physical metallurgist of the 
twentieth century’ was appointed – albeit, as Zuckerman noted, at a rank 
‘one pip lower than mine’.92 Cottrell also threatened to resign if, instead 
of being retained as an independent GCSA, he had been placed under 
Rothschild.93 Nevertheless during the 1970s it was the CPRS – a team of 
talents – rather than the individual GCSA that mobilised specialist exper-
tise for the guidance of government.
When Cottrell became full GCSA in 1971, the division of labour 
was, in effect, split three ways. The CPRS led on any issue, including sci-
ence-based issues, that took its interest and Zuckerman, although retired, 
retained a role advising on nuclear weapons matters – leaving Cottrell 
with a rump including civil nuclear policy, space policy, the environment, 
communications and Europe. The ‘scientific role’ of the CPRS was ‘that of 
asking the fundamental or innovatory question and of undertaking cer-
tain studies or projects which are best conducted or led from the centre’, 
while the GCSA’s role was primarily one of coordination.94 Nevertheless, 
Cottrell did make substantial contributions at the interface of science 
and government. He was instrumental in the decision to deepen the UK 
Government’s horizon scanning work, exemplified by the establishment 
of the Cabinet World Trends committee, part of a complex response to 
the well-publicised computer simulations of the Club of Rome.95 He was 
most effective, however, on an issue that directly demanded his exper-
tise. The choice between types of reactor for civil nuclear power was a 
fraught one, with the candidates for the second, post-Magnox genera-
tion including British Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs), American 
Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR), a Steam-Generating Heavy Water 
Reactor (SGHWR, based on a Canadian system) and fast reactors that 
transmuted uranium to plutonium. Cottrell weighed in against the 
Central Electricity Generating Board’s choice, the PWR, warning that 
its large reactor pressure vessels were liable to sudden, brittle fracture.96 
The result was considerable, further investigation.
A second major issue of the Cottrell years was the content and con-
sequences of the Rothschild report of 1971, a green paper that introduced 
the ‘customer-contractor’ principle to guide the relationship between 
government departments. While Cottrell seems to have suggested this 
principle to Rothschild, the ‘issue … caused quite a furore, and much of 
Cottrell’s time in late 1971 and early 1972 was spent “clearing up the 
mess”’.97 One strategy to smooth ruffled feathers was to insist, in a draft 
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White Paper,98,that the principle marked ‘not an arms-length contractual 
arrangement, but a partnership between the Research Councils and the 
executive Departments, held together financially’; in addition, depart-
ments would be urged to appoint chief scientists ‘with responsibilities to 
make the partnerships work effectively’.99
Alan Cottrell resigned in April 1974 to become Master of Jesus 
College, Cambridge, and he, although less often than Zuckerman, occa-
sionally contributed to the national debate about science policy there-
after.100 His responsibilities were taken over by Robert Press. Press had 
worked as Assistant Chief Scientific Adviser, Nuclear, in the Ministry of 
Defence from 1964 until 1967 when he became Chief Scientific Officer 
in the Cabinet Office Science and Technology Group, also specialising 
in nuclear matters. His formal position, after Cottrell left, was Deputy 
Secretary, Science and Technology, within the Cabinet Office. Press 
advised on nuclear security, the disposal of radioactive waste and the 
supply of uranium for the nuclear projects.101
The diffusion of advisers encouraged by the Rothschild reforms, 
and the continuing greater influence of the CPRS, when combined with 
the temporary and lowly status of Press, means that he can barely be 
considered to be the successor to Cottrell at all. Zuckerman had a jaun-
diced view of Press, describing him as ‘really a note taker … kept on to 
deal with nuclear weapons matters’ and in doing so ‘merely became the 
mouthpiece of the Aldermaston interests’.102 Unlike both his predeces-
sor and successor, Press had neither academic professorial rank nor was 
made a Fellow of the Royal Society.
Beginning in 1974 there was considerable debate about what to do 
after Cottrell. This intensified when Press too retired in 1976. In 1974, 
and again in 1976, Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary, had framed the 
debate by offering a three-way choice.103 The first was to ‘go for a replace-
ment at the same level’ as Cottrell. But ‘following the appointment of 
more Chief Scientists in Departments and the increasing emphasis on 
the customer/contractor relationship’, he felt there ‘was no need for a 
full-time [GCSA] job in the Cabinet Office’. Hunt claimed that, in 1974, 
Sir William Armstrong (head of the Home Civil Service), Zuckerman, 
Rothschild, Bondi and Cottrell himself had ‘all agreed with me on this’. 
The second option was not to appoint a GCSA, but instead disperse the 
staff, ‘putting their “advice” responsibilities with the CPRS and inte-
grating their “secretarial” responsibilities with the rest of the Cabinet 
Secretariat’. ‘However,’ Hunt noted, presciently, ‘it seemed difficult pres-
entationally to disband Cottrell’s unit.’ The third choice was a ‘short-term 
expedient’: to appoint someone at lower level and not with the title of 
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GCSA, ‘who might be more successful in co-ordinating the scientific 
machine than Cottrell had been’; this optionhad the ‘additional advan-
tage in that it could be adapted in light of experience’. In 1974 this third 
option had been followed with the appointment of Press. Now, in 1976, 
Hunt urged Prime Minister Harold Wilson to go the whole hog and end 
the GCSA role permanently:
I am sure that we were right to give up the CSA post: and all 
those whom I have consulted agree that of we were to revert to 
it on Dr Press’ retirement we should only be looking for trouble. 
We would not want a second-rate CSA, and if we get someone 
first-rate he would either become frustrated or get in the hair of 
the Departmental Chief Scientists like Hermann Bondi or Walter 
Marshall. In other words the days when a Solly Zuckerman could 
virtually direct all our scientific activities from the centre have gone 
for good.
Indeed, Wilson agreed with his private secretary’s view – and this speaks 
to the relative insignificance of the GCSA post at this time – that the post 
could be usefully sacrificed to counter impressions of empire building 
around the Prime Minister.104 In Wilson’s and Hunt’s eyes, the CPRS was 
enough.
But word leaked out. There was a concerted campaign to reverse the 
decision from MPs on the Science and Technology Select Committee, the 
Labour MP Tam Dalyell and the President of the Royal Society.105 ‘Clearly 
reflecting the views of senior fellows’, Alan Hodgkin raised the issue in his 
retirement speech as President, invoking an imaginary rabies epidemic to 
show what would be missed without a GCSA.106 Stung, Wilson agreed an 
avowedly ‘cosmetic change’: a new appointment, John Ashworth, could 
be called ‘Chief Scientist, CPRS’.107 The job was not considered, at least by 
the Cabinet Secretary, as equal to a ‘full’ GCSA.
John Michael Ashworth had studied chemistry and biochemistry 
at Oxford before completing, in 1965, a PhD at Leicester University.108 
He briefly joined the ‘brain drain’ of scientific talent to the United States 
before returning to the United Kingdom to take up academic posts – first at 
Leicester in 1967 and then, from 1973, at the University of Essex. He took 
a secondment in 1976 from being Head of the Department of Biology to 
take up the new appointment. As Chief Scientist, CPRS, Ashworth played 
much of the GCSA role, but he was also only second-in-command in the 
organisation, deputy to Sir Kenneth Berrill, an economist who had taken 
over from Lord Rothschild as head of CPRS.
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Nevertheless, in practice, Ashworth grasped the ‘opportunity for a 
different kind of influence’ to that operated by the Chief Scientist, CPRS 
being the centre of a Venn diagram of overlapping bodies.109 First, at 
CPRS he carefully avoided ‘being seen to set up a sub-unit within the 
CPRS’. Ashworth, as an integrated member of the think-tank there-
fore contributed to the general reports on issues submitted to Cabinet. 
Second, the CPRS ‘got more than another scientifically qualified mem-
ber with a fancy title’ because of his membership of two committees, one 
attending to internal issues and the other to external matters. The Official 
Committee on Science and Technology (STP) committee, a committee 
of chief scientists (including Ashworth) and permanent secretaries, 
chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet, was tasked with ‘co-ordination’. 
‘To help them and to provide a needed interface between Government 
and organisations outside Government’ ACARD had been established in 
1976, serviced by the Cabinet Office. Third, a link to the research coun-
cils under the Department of Education and Science was made through 
the invitation to the Chief Scientist, CPRS, to attend the ABRC. Fourth 
and last, the Chief Scientist, CPRS, also took on international represent-
ative roles, such as being the UK chair to the body advising the Council 
and Commission of the EEC. In summary, these intersecting roles meant 
that the Chief Scientist, CPRS, possessed influential links to the worlds of 
industrial (ACARD), academic (ABRC), governmental (STP) and inter-
national science.
The issues Ashworth influenced were therefore numerous. They 
included industrial policy (especially microelectronics, the subject of the 
first ACARD report110 and a controversial topic stoked by a very effective 
BBC Horizon programme, ‘When the chips are down’, in 1978), a review 
of the Scientific Civil Service,111 UK–USSR scientific relations, the defini-
tion of ‘genetic engineering’ in a context complicated by the threat of clo-
sure to the Microbiological Research Establishment, and anthropogenic 
climate change.112 Climate change (discussed in Chapter 7) was raised 
in Ashworth’s first meeting with Thatcher, which did not take place, 
the biographers tell us, until 1980. Thatcher stopped him mid-flow and 
asked Ashworth ‘incredulously, “Are you telling me I should worry about 
the weather?”’.113
Ashworth continued until September 1981, when he took up the 
offer of the Vice-Chancellorship of Salford University. Again there was 
a transition point, when what the chief scientist should be was open 
to renegotiation and change. Robert Armstrong raised the issue with 
Margaret Thatcher in April 1981. ‘Dr Ashworth has done the job admi-
rably, with energy and drive as well as good sense,’ he wrote, adding that 
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it was ‘no reflection on him when I say that I think that we are not quite 
strong enough on the co-ordination of scientific policy and the provision 
of scientific advice at the centre; indeed, it is partly his particular personal 
qualities that have masked what is, I believe, a deficiency in organisa-
tional terms’.114 But Armstrong did not think it was possible ‘to go back 
to having a Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government’; science-based 
decision-making was now too widely distributed ‘down the line in 
Departments’ and, furthermore, ‘we can no longer hope to find, or would 
want to have, a “political” scientist like Lord Cherwell or Lord Zuckerman’. 
But the ‘centre, and particularly the Prime Minister’ still needed ‘access to 
scientific advice over the whole range when necessary’. Armstrong there-
fore proposed two new developments: first, identifying ‘a small number of 
scientists of the highest eminence’ who, by ‘informal arrangement’ could 
be tapped by the Prime Minister, and second, keeping a Chief Scientist, 
CPRS, but upgrading the post to Deputy Secretary level.
Part of the context for this discussion was increased lobbying for 
upgrading the status of scientific advisors to government – the latest 
instance in the century-long ‘neglect of science’ complaint. The key link-
age here was between the Royal Society and the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology, with Lord (Alexander) Todd, 
recently retired Royal Society president, as the linchpin. The Royal 
Society submitted evidence to the Select Committee’s inquiry that called 
for enhanced status of chief scientific advisers.115 Armstrong read it as 
a desire ‘to go back to the good old days of a Minister for Science and a 
Council of Scientific Advisers’.116
Thatcher’s first response was vehement. Should the provision 
of scientific advice to the centre be strengthened? ‘No,’ she wrote, ‘the 
advice available through the ABRC should be available to me and it is 
much more varied than that of any one scientific adviser.’117 In discussion 
she relented, slightly, saying that she had no objection to the appoint-
ment of a new Chief Scientist, CPRS, ‘provided there was an off setting 
reduction of a scientific post in the same grade elsewhere in govern-
ment’.118 Armstrong and the director of the CPRS, Robin Ibbs, began the 
search. When the Cambridge professor of engineering Michael Ashby 
declined for ‘personal reasons’, the outstanding candidate became Robin 
Nicholson. 
Suggested by the new Royal Society president Andrew Huxley as 
his ‘first choice’, Nicholson was 47, a Cambridge-trained metallurgist 
who had worked both in academia (he had been professor of metal-
lurgy at Manchester) and industry. Indeed, as managing director of Inco 
Europe Ltd and co-chairman of Biogen, he possessed, wrote Armstrong 
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to Thatcher, ‘from our point of view, the great advantage of having seven 
years in industry, and having a strong interest and experience of the appli-
cation of science in industry’. He had, declared Armstrong, a ‘lively mind 
and attractive personality’.119 Thatcher had indicated that she wanted a 
scientist with experience of industry and also the mark of scientific status 
that came with being a Fellow of the Royal Society.120
Yet even then Thatcher was not happy. She complained she was 
not convinced that the CPRS needed a chief scientist, and wondered if 
Nicholson might work better at Number 10. The deeper issue here was 
the CPRS itself.121 Thatcher rapidly developed an extreme antipathy to the 
role and products of the think-tank. So while Nicholson was first indeed 
appointed as Chief Scientist, CPRS, she was ready to accept the urging 
of the Select Committee on Science and Technology when it called, in 
December 1981, for the development of the post of Chief Scientist, CPRS 
‘into a post of Government Chief Scientist’.122 Nicholson was also given ‘the 
right of direct access to the Prime Minister’.123 With the bloody demise of 
CPRS in 1983 Nicholson became Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office, a 
title Thatcher had rejected emphatically one year previously.124
Nevertheless, it was from this unpromising beginning that the cur-
rent GCSA role became entrenched. At his first meeting, Thatcher asked 
Nicholson to advise her on the feasibility of a project she had just agreed 
with President Mitterrand: a fixed Channel link. ‘My jaw dropped,’ he 
later recalled, ‘I knew nothing about bridges and I knew nothing about 
tunnels.’125 Yet he immediately drew on networks of contacts to gather 
informed advice that satisfied the Prime Minister – a good illustration of 
how a single individual chief scientific adviser, who could only ever be 
an expert on a fraction of the topics demanded, could perform a general 
function. However, that the role became entrenched at all was largely a 
result of the strong relationship between Nicholson and Thatcher, one 
based on shared ideological convictions. (Perhaps this is what Armstrong 
had signalled when he had written to Thatcher of Nicholson’s ‘attractive 
personality’.) When the Select Committee on Science and Technology, 
for example, produced a report on engineering R&D in 1983 calling for a 
‘national strategy for technology and manufactured products’, Nicholson 
led the charge that it ‘was not work of the highest quality’, and ran ‘com-
pletely counter to the Government’s view that market considerations 
should guide the support of technological developments’.126 Likewise 
his view about academic tenure was that it was anti-market. ‘One of the 
problems for universities … has been their inflexibility in retraining/
hiring/losing the appropriate staff,’ Nicholson wrote to Keith Joseph. 
He added: ‘the tenure system means that universities can simply not 
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respond in the way a business can to changes in demand for teaching 
and research’, a system that ‘greatly hinders any rational response to the 
market’.127 Nicholson shared with Thatcher a faith in market solutions. In 
a discussion of defence R&D, Nicholson argued that the present situation 
of government-funded research and industrial development ‘under con-
tract and at no risk to the company’ was the cause of the low level of civil 
spin-off. He continued:
Frankly I believe that a significant improvement will only occur if 
defence procurement changes radically from the present system 
where Government pays first for the research, then for the develop-
ment and finally for the equipment, to a more normal commercial 
arrangement where Government buys defence goods at a price which 
allows the manufacturer to carry out and pay for his own R&D.128
This policy of privatisation of defence research would indeed be fol-
lowed, albeit at a later date.
Nicholson reserved particular venom for other organisations. The 
British Technology Group, which had been formed in 1981 out of the old 
Attlee-era National Research Development Corporation, was described 
as having ‘all the sloth and leaden-footedness characteristic of a state-
owned monopoly’ whose ‘eventual reward for success must be privati-
sation’.129 The European high energy physics facility, CERN, was another 
subject where Nicholson and Thatcher shared views. Thatcher, in a meet-
ing with Keith Joseph, Secretary of State for Education and Science, had 
described CERN as ‘extravagant’ and its UK funding open to review.130 
Nicholson’s advice again chimed with his Prime Minister’s view:
Withdrawal from CERN must be contemplated as one option … I 
personally doubt it will come to that. More likely will be recommen-
dations to improve the cost-effectiveness of CERN (you’ve seen the 
gold plating yourself) and, crucially, to slow down the pace and 
hence the rate of spend on this area of research. There is no rea-
son why the tax-payers of Europe and the USA should have to fund 
a private race between two scientific cliques carried out at a pace 
determined largely by their own curiosity and arrogance.131
This discussion was occurring during the time between 1983, when 
CERN discovered the W boson particles, and 1984, when CERN scientists 
won the Nobel Prize for Physics for their discovery.
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In summary, when Nicholson became, quite contingently, Chief 
Scientist, Cabinet Office on the demise of the CPRS, he was able to 
develop a free-standing role that re-established the full GCSA model. 
Like Zuckerman, he expressed his views with admirable pungency and 
force. Like Ashworth, he was effective by having influence on many 
issues. However, the added difference, indicated by his being granted the 
right of direct access to the Prime Minister, was a personal rapport with 
the most influential figure of all.
In 1984 Nicholson’s attention was drawn to another major state-
funded institution concerned with nuclear research: the UK Atomic Energy 
Authority. In March the Secretary of State for Energy, Peter Walker, started 
a comprehensive review of the activities and role of UKAEA, and asked for 
Nicholson’s participation.132 The state provided half of UKAEA’s funding, 
with the rest coming from the electricity utilities and British Nuclear Fuels 
Ltd. Thatcher’s Private Secretary (Economics) suggested that a review was 
certainly ‘overdue’. He asked: ‘Has the nation got value for money? Or is it a 
producer dominated organisation? Does it need to be financed so much … 
by the taxpayer or could its customers … contribute more? Has one branch 
of science absorbed too much of our research effort?’133 When it emerged 
in August, the report concluded that continued government support of 
nuclear R&D was justified.134 But it is clear that Nicholson wanted to go 
further. In his view, UKAEA’s 30-year history had seen the ‘UK slide from 
first rank to second rank position in civil atomic energy’, in which the cus-
tomer (CEGB) had been forced to buy the wrong reactors, export had been 
negligible, taxpayers’ money had been wasted and ‘by virtue of the interest 
of its research and its employment conditions, [UKAEA had] creamed off a 
significant slice of the UK’s R&D talent’.135 While this talent had produced 
a ‘substantial technological asset’, the ‘contribution of this technological 
asset to the wealth-creating sector of the economy had been negligible’.
In the words of Nicholas Owen, of Thatcher’s own think-tank, the 
Number 10 Policy Unit:
Robin Nicholson has reminded us that some of the best scientific 
brains of a generation have been squandered on misdirected work 
on civil nuclear power. Since our scientists are among the ablest in 
the world, the finger points to political misjudgements and inter-
vention over a long period. Can we do better over the next 30 years?
Our priority should be to develop a framework for nuclear 
research which allows the maximum role for the market and lit-
tle at all for political interference. The best solution would be to 
 privatise the AEA.136
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By April 1985, in fact, so involved did he feel about the issue that 
Nicholson entered into discussions about becoming the new chair of 
UKAEA. ‘We need somebody who can combine a reputation for scien-
tific excellence with determination to improve the Authority’s com-
mercial performance,’ wrote Peter Walker.137 On being called in to a 
Friday meeting with the Prime Minister, Thatcher had told Nicholson 
that ‘Ministers would very much like Sir Robin to take over the Chair-
manship’. Nicholson replied that he was ‘interested but that he was by 
nature “a private sector man”’; his decision would depend ‘on what he 
was being asked to do’.138
Disagreements subsequently emerged about what UKAEA might 
be expected to do in the future: Nicholson wanted UKAEA a free hand 
to enter non-nuclear manufacture, to better exploit its assets, while 
Thatcher thought this would be ‘inconsistent’ with her government’s 
‘policy on the role of public sector bodies and would be bound to create 
difficulties with private sector companies’. Nicholson let it be known he 
was being headhunted for a post at the glass company Pilkington, per-
haps a ploy to put gentle pressure on Thatcher.139 But Thatcher in June 
1985 decided not to appoint Nicholson as chair of UKAEA.140 Left in the 
breach, Nicholson soon ended his career (which was renewable on a two-
yearly period) as Chief Scientific Adviser.
The new Chief Scientific Adviser was John Fairclough. He was 
described as ‘the first industrialist’ to take up the position (although, as we 
have seen, Nicholson had considerable business experience).141 He was 
also the first, indeed the only, GCSA not to be a Fellow of the Royal Society 
(excluding Press). Born in Yorkshire, Fairclough had joined the computer 
department of Ferranti in 1954, where he worked on the design of the 
Ferranti Pegasus mainframe computer. He joined IBM in 1957, where he 
was instrumental in the design of the influential, inter- compatible fleet of 
computers, the System/360.142 By the time of his appointment as GCSA 
Fairclough had risen to be Director of Manufacturing and Development 
and Chairman of Laboratories for IBM (UK). The choice of a computer 
expert as GCSA in the 1980s is no surprise. Information technology (IT) 
had become one of the central targets for policy as well as a prominent 
area of technological change, associated with the spread of small office 
and home computers, many of which were brought to market by UK 
entrepreneurs. But the choice also reflected Thatcher’s preference for 
industrial innovators over pure research scientists. Fairclough found the 
job ‘a very different sort of experience from the work and environment I 
was used to in IBM … a mixture of daunting freedom on the one hand … 
and a lack of specific budgetary responsibility on the other – I have no 
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responsibility for any individual science and technology programme, no 
laboratories in which to test out my advice’.143
Fairclough’s career as GCSA has been associated, for example by 
Edgerton and Hughes, with the distinction drawn between ‘near-market’ 
and ‘far-market’ research, in which the former should be organised and 
funded by industry, while the government retained responsibilities for 
public funding the latter.144 Indeed, government funding would be ‘con-
fined to areas where the market would “fail to operate to produce maxi-
mum benefits to the economy as a whole”’. Such a decision led, according 
to one group of academic analysts, ‘to the withdrawal of most govern-
ment support for civil near market and single company R&D, the main 
exception being in aerospace’.145 However, I show in the next chapter that 
the drive for this new science policy did not come from Fairclough, but 
rather from the Number 10 Policy Unit.
The Number 10 Policy Unit has been created to serve Harold Wilson 
in 1974. Like the CPRS, it contained a small staff of bright insiders and out-
side talent. Unlike the CPRS, it served the Prime Minister, not the Cabinet 
as a whole. When the CPRS was demolished, the Number 10 Policy Unit 
became ever more influential; it was led by Ferdinand Mount (1982–3), 
John Redwood (1983–4) and Brian Griffiths (from 1985) not least as a 
formidable and caustic source of Thatcherite advice. In 1986 the Unit 
had eight members, each with an area of specialisation. One newcomer 
was George Guise, described by his fellow Unit member David Willetts as 
‘on secondment from Consolidated Gold Fields: specialising in industry 
and research and development’.146 As I show in the next chapter, it was 
Guise who persuaded Thatcher to follow the new science policy.147 Guise’s 
rhetorical method was surprisingly anecdotal, but then again, as Willetts 
noted, the Policy Unit was not ‘objective’ in a straightforward sense.148
I show that Fairclough was essentially sidelined, and a new science 
policy introduced, during a period of months when Thatcher hardly spoke 
to her Chief Scientific Adviser. The new science policy was able to be 
driven through, however, by a centralisation of science policy-making that 
was promoted by Fairclough – notably a strengthened Cabinet committee 
system – and which was described as being inspired by his experience of 
IBM’s directed management of research.149 Ironically this system enabled 
the unpicking of the UK’s industrial strategy for research.
The following year, in 1989, Fairclough ‘also restated the customer–
contractor principle with the aim of encouraging development of an inter-
nal market in which public sector research providers would compete for 
public funds for R&D’.150 Privatisation was seen as taking the ‘customer/
contractor principle to its logical conclusion’.151 It was in this context that 
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he oversaw the setting up of government research establishments as Next 
Steps Agencies. The approach was encapsulated in so-called ‘Fairclough 
Guidelines’.152 In September 1990 Fairclough left his GCSA position and 
became chair of NM Rothschild and Sons’ venture capital arm.
The new GCSA was Professor William Stewart. A Scot, raised 
on the island of Islay, Stewart was an academic ‘biologist with envi-
ronmental interests’; he had built a strong life sciences department at 
Dundee University, become an FRS at the age of 42 and in 1987 been 
headhunted to lead the Agriculture and Food Research Council.153 It 
is clear that Thatcher had Stewart in mind for the GCSA as early as 
1989 as, when his name was mentioned in connection with a more 
minor appointment, she ruled it out, noting ‘we have other plans for 
him’.154 His environmental credentials, exemplified by a 1983 Royal 
Society report on nitrogen in the environment and work for the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, appealed to Thatcher during 
her late Prime Ministerial green pivot.
At her first meeting with Stewart she told her GCSA that her main 
concerns were that the apparatus for scientific advice and for research 
funding were too bureaucratic, that Big Science was too greedy of 
resources, and of uncertainties and gaps in the scientific evidence for 
global warming.155 Stewart replied that he ‘shared many of these con-
cerns’. (Interestingly, in an oral history interview Stewart later recalled 
that when ‘I turned up as the new CSA her first two sentences to me 
were: “Good morning Professor Stewart” and “Sort out intellectual prop-
erty”.’)156 However, two months later Stewart was officially advising a 
new Prime Minister, although John Major, with less interest in science 
than Thatcher, did not meet his GCSA until 1991.157
Parties and Parliament
Despite its significance, science was never a major component of party 
politics in the 1980s. The 1979 election manifestos made barely any 
reference to science or technology;158 the Conservative manifesto of 
1983 promised to ‘accelerate the transfer of technology from univer-
sity laboratories to the market place’ by encouraging Science Parks 
as well as funding for ‘new blood’ in higher education, while Labour 
promised a reversal of Tory cuts and vague support for new sci-
ence-based industries (the new Liberal–SDP Alliance merely promised 
raising school standards).159 The 1987 manifestos reflected, without 
fanfare, the great shift in science policy, with a statement that the ‘task 
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of government is to support basic research and to contribute where 
business cannot realistically be expected to carry all the risks’. Labour 
proposed a new Ministry of Science and Technology to coordinate gov-
ernment activities and budgets, while the Liberal–SDP Alliance prom-
ised to reform A-Levels to heal the ‘arts-science divide’, suggesting that 
their science policy thinking was stuck in the times of C. P. Snow.160 
Nevertheless, science-based issues (such as climate change) were 
sometimes viewed through the prism of party presentational tactics. 
More importantly the debate around science and industrial strategy 
was, as I show in Chapter 3, deeply freighted by ideology. Otherwise, 
in a parliamentary context, science featured in certain prominent 
debates and in the multi-party work of select committees and individ-
ual Members of Parliament.
Debates in the Houses of Parliament could influence government 
thinking. One example was the 10 February 1984 debate in the House of 
Lords on science funding, in which concerns about the effects of cuts were 
raised and debated (see Chapter 3).161 Lord Flowers had concluded, in a 
speech that was brought to Thatcher’s attention by William Waldegrave:
It is often said that we produce more Nobel prizes per head of pop-
ulation than any other country, so that there can be little the matter 
with the level of support that we give to science. I am sad to have to 
say that I doubt whether that is any longer the case. Our research 
facilities in general no longer bear fair comparison with those of 
similar countries such as Germany, France and the United States. 
It seems to me that our research is no longer held in quite the same 
high esteem internationally as it once was … . Much of the blame 
must fall on the decline of the dual support system and the resulting 
stifling of initiative.162
Such debates, therefore, were avenues by which concerns over the effects 
of cuts in public expenditure on science were articulated.
Rarely, parliamentary debate could be a prime mover on a whole 
area of science policy. An outstanding example of this proved to be the 
embryology debate around the Warnock report, discussed in the coda 
to Chapter 3. However, such an example was very much the exception.
Parliamentary select committees were also an important cog 
in the science policy machine, examining witnesses and generating 
reports to which the government had to respond. Particularly important 
was the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
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(established after the House of Commons equivalent was wound up in a 
reorganisation of Parliamentary structures), while the Select Committee 
on the Environment appears in Chapter 7. The annual reviews of R&D 
and the periodic joint reports on the state of UK science and technology 
by the chairs of ACARD and ABRC were both instituted in 1983 as part 
of the government’s response to a House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology’s report.163 Likewise, the establishment of a 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office in 1983, when the CPRS ended, 
was also cast as a response to this Committee’s report, although a parallel 
call for a Minister of Science was rebuffed.164
Thatcher’s decision to reserve the right to respond to science ques-
tions created awkwardness when it came to the work of select commit-
tees. Since select committees called witnesses to scrutinise the work of 
government, a science select committee could reasonably ask to hear 
from the minister responsible for science. For example, the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology pointed out, in 1986, 
that since ‘you [Thatcher] have accepted responsibility for co-ordinating 
questions on science and technology, they feel it would be discourteous 
not to give you the opportunity to come to give evidence’.165 In the event, 
citing busyness and on the advice of her Cabinet Secretary and her Chief 
Scientific Adviser, Thatcher sent her secretaries of state.
Finally, individual Members of Parliament could take an influ-
ential interest in science matters. Jeremy Bray, for example, was a 
mathematical economist who paid attention to technical matters, such 
as computer modelling of the economy and the environment in the 
1970s, and was Neil Kinnock’s Opposition spokesperson on science 
and technology after 1983. However, the outstanding case was the 
Labour MP for West Lothian (1962–83) and Linlithgow (1983–2005), 
Tam Dalyell. Dalyell was independent-minded, and fiercely criticised 
both Conservative and Labour governments on a range of issues, 
including the sinking of the Belgrano in the Falklands War and the ‘dos-
sier’ on weapons of mass destruction integral to the second Iraq con-
flict. While his education was in history and economics, he watched, 
critiqued and published on science policy, and contributed a column 
to New Scientist.166 Dalyell was a skilled parliamentarian, and treated 
as a gift Thatcher’s statement that she might be responsible for sci-
ence issues. Thatcher would receive letters from Dalyell that began ‘As 
you are responsible for science, I wonder if I can ask … ?’, to which a 
response had to be made; he also made use of Parliamentary Questions 
to press the government.167
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External bodies
So far I have reviewed the work and roles of the bodies that made sci-
ence policy within government – ministers and prime ministers, civil 
servants in Whitehall, chief scientific advisers, and the members and 
committees of Parliament. I have also noted the influence of industry 
through ACARD. Bodies external to Westminster were also important. 
These bodies included academies, campaigning groups and journalists. 
Many of these will be introduced in the appropriate place in the following 
chapters.
The Royal Society, the elite academy of science, worked to promote 
and protect the interests of UK science while also working, in parallel to 
the Foreign Office, to support the UK’s international scientific standing. 
For much of the twentieth century, the presence of the Royal Society 
close to Parliament and Whitehall (before the Second World War in 
Burlington House and afterwards on Carlton House Terrace looking over 
the Mall), enabled both formal and informal exchanges of views (the lat-
ter sometimes at the Athenaeum, a private club with shared membership 
of senior civil servants and fellows of the Royal Society) with govern-
ment. By the 1980s this cosy, gentlemanly relationship had become less 
straightforward.
In May 1986 the President of the Royal Society, George Porter, facil-
itated by Lord Rothschild, secured a meeting with Thatcher. Porter used 
the access to pitch two ideas. The first was that there should be a new 
‘National Science Advisory Council’ of independent ‘practising’ scientists. 
This should be chaired, he thought, by the Prime Minister, and able to 
take a considered, long-term view, a ‘proper perspective of the depend-
ence of the nation’s prosperity’ on science and technology; it would thus 
provide ‘a channel for scientists to make an input to Government policy- 
making at a high level’.168 The second idea was higher salaries to ward 
off the ‘brain drain’ of talented scientists to the United States. Both ideas, 
but especially the first, were given short shrift. Significantly, one reason 
given by Fairclough, then Thatcher’s GCSA, was that Porter was unaware 
of the new mechanisms of science decision-making that had been put in 
place (see Chapter 3).169 The Royal Society’s knowledge of science policy-
making was not necessarily intimate nor complete.
However, the episode also reveals other aspects about science poli-
cy-making. First, Porter had been moved to write to Thatcher partly because 
of the establishment of the campaigning group, Save British Science, 
launched, as we saw in Chapter 1, in January 1986 to protest against cuts 
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in university science; it had received the support of 100 Royal Society 
Fellows.170 Porter had hoped that a National Science Advisory Council 
‘would improve morale generally in the scientific community, and take 
off some of the pressure generated by such movements as “Save British 
Science”’.171 The ‘real concern lying behind Sir George’s proposal is his feel-
ing that the presentation of the Government’s science policy is not as good 
as it should be’, one Thatcher’s advisers noted, adding that a ‘great deal of 
good work is going on, but it is difficult to publicise it, and the “Save British 
Science” lobby is accordingly able to capture support’.172 This occasion was 
one of the very few moments that the arguments of Save British Science 
were raised – and even then only obliquely and mediated by the Royal 
Society’s own interests, at the heart of government. Yet Save British Science, 
from the point of view of an external witness to the politics of 1980s science, 
was highly vocal in the public sphere. It is surprising how little it was heard 
from within the decision-making centre of the state. Second, Fairclough, in 
conceding that there was a presentational problem, and that ‘we need to 
quieten this lobby if we are to be able to get a sensible discussion’ on science 
issues, did note that one ‘obvious vehicle for presenting the Government’s 
science policy’ would be a prime ministerial speech. This thought, under-
lined by Thatcher, may have been one origin of her famous 1988 speech on 
science, environment and curiosity-driven research.
The Royal Society did shape debate on specific issues, such as 
acid rain (see Chapter 7). There were plenty of other organisations, 
large and small, that sought to influence UK science policy. The impact 
of campaigning groups, such as the UK branches of Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth, will be shown in the chapters on nuclear and 
environmental issues. Individuals, too, could occasionally pitch sci-
ence policy ideas that reached Number 10, such as the case of David 
Horrobin, who argued that ‘any reading of scientific history indicates 
that leading experts can almost never be trusted to make decisions 
about what basic science is worth supporting’ and wanted to ditch 
research councils for prizes. His idea reached the Prime Minister after 
the Vice Chancellor of the High Court happened to be having dinner 
with Thatcher at Lincoln’s Inn.173
Yet in general, gaining the ear of the Prime Minister was very hard; 
those around her acted as gatekeepers, who might only open the gate 
when outside views aligned with hers or theirs. In Chapter 6 I will show 
that Charles Powell was the gatekeeper for missile defence research. 
George Guise, in the Number 10 Policy Unit, was also a gatekeeper. It 
was Guise, for example, who shot down Horrobin’s plan, but also chose 
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to forward her the science funding statistics of Terence Kealey because 
they were seen as undermining the pleas for more government funding 
made by Save British Science.174 And it was Guise who, as I will show, 
outmanoeuvred ACARD, ABRC and the GCSA to reshape science policy 
in the late 1980s.
Finally, contemporary reportage and commentary on science pol-
icy was the product of highly able academic science policy units, at the 
universities of Sussex and Manchester in particular, and especially of 
a growing number of skilled science journalists. Nature and the Times 
Higher Education Supplement carried news and editorials on the state 
of British science, the BBC’s Horizon television programme made occa-
sional but important interventions and New Scientist was in a golden era 
of reporting on the intersections of politics and science. Their output 
was sometimes more than the first draft of history175 – on several cru-
cial issues we will see central government absorbing and responding to 
media commentary on British science and science policy.
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The central debates on science 
and innovation
In this chapter I will show that there was a reversal in science policy and 
industrial strategy in 1987. The result was deep cuts in government fund-
ing of ‘near-market’ research and, in what I demonstrate was a flip side 
of the same coin, celebration of non-market-oriented ‘curiosity-driven’ 
research. The change came after years of growing tensions around gov-
ernment schemes to support research-intensive industry, cuts in pub-
lic expenditure and their effects (especially on academic science), the 
perception of a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, the preponderance of 
defence research and onerous subscriptions to European collaborative 
programmes, specifically CERN. It is a long chapter, partly because all 
of these issues were intimately intertwined but need to be unpicked in 
detail. While the change in science policy was noted by commentators 
then and since, its causes and protagonists have been misunderstood – 
precisely because opposing policy aspirations have been conflated. 
Remarkably, Thatcher’s change in policy was largely the result of influ-
ence of a single political adviser and made in the teeth of opposition from 
her science advisers.
Industrial strategy
Thatcher’s government inherited numerous schemes that supported, 
directly and indirectly, what came to be called ‘near-market research’; 
further proposals were made and adopted in the early 1980s.1 Further-
more, in other promising areas, such as biotechnology, discussed below, 
Thatcher’s government continued, and even expanded, ‘pump prim-
ing’ – in other words, the provision of considerable public funds as part 
of a strategy to create conditions for new industry to grow. However, one 
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sector where Thatcher’s approach to industrial policy was tested early was 
microelectronics. Under the previous Labour administration a policy of 
selective support had been adopted. The world microelectronics market 
was expected to be £10 billion per annum by 1985 and to be a substantial 
manufacturing sector in its own right; it would be pervasively applied. 
Yet, as a Department of Industry analysis, supported by ACARD, showed, 
only 5 per cent of British firms were active in microelectronics applica-
tions (notably Plessey, Ferranti and GEC), while 50  per cent declared 
that they were ‘not sufficiently aware’ even to assess opportunities and 
threats.2 In response, in 1978 Labour had announced a Microprocessor 
Applications Project (costing £55m over three years), which aimed to 
encourage firms to apply microelectronics, and a Microelectronics Indus-
try Support Programme (£70m over five years), which aimed to encour-
age the development and manufacture of microelectronic devices in the 
UK. Furthermore, the National Enterprise Board had funded Inmos, a 
company formed in 1978 by the British ex-Elliott Automation computer 
scientist Iann Barron with two American semiconductor experts, to the 
tune of £25m and rising.
Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Industry, wrote to Thatcher 
a month after she took office. ‘Micro-electronics is of crucial importance 
to our future industrial and economic performance,’ he argued, adding 
that in its way ‘it is likely to be of the same sort of importance as was 
the steam engine with the difference that (a) it will be even more per-
vasive and (b) we are not in the forefront of the development’.3 While 
he was ‘in principle strongly opposed to support of this kind’, Joseph 
thought the continued injection of considerable public funds was ‘jus-
tified’. Thatcher’s response was hostile. She demanded evidence that 
British industry would not embrace the technology as rapidly as compet-
itors (‘!!! Who said?’), and objected strongly to Joseph’s proposal that the 
schemes ‘be allowed to continue on broadly its present lines’ (‘No’). The 
‘whole area of policy’ was to be discussed.4
Two responses are interesting, partly for what they reveal about 
paths not taken. First, on the back of consultancy produced by the 
Stanford Research Institute for the Department of Industry, civil servants 
wondered aloud whether a Californian model was worth pursuing:
why not … convert [MAP] project support into a special fund for 
stimulating start ups and small firm growth in micro applications – 
the UK version of Californian venture capital. It is no use saying this 
is for the City or someone else in the financial world. This is not 
happening now and time is of the essence.5
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The suggestion was not pursued. Second, when Kenneth Berrill, the 
economist and head of the CPRS, offered his advice to Thatcher, he intro-
duced her to a new term: ‘information technology’:
The government needs to discuss microelectronics in a wider con-
text. The potential market for microelectronic equipment is very 
large and growing rapidly, but the interesting point is the break-
down of this market. No less than 60 per cent of sales are expected 
to be in ‘information goods’ … It is not for nothing that the French 
talk of Information Technology rather than microprocessors. 
Approaching advanced electronics in terms of information tech-
nology creates a new perspective and the MAP/MISP/Inmos group 
of policies appears as only one part of the required response. If we 
have bottlenecks on the widespread use of the new ‘information 
technology’, our success in the microelectronics field is bound to be 
severely limited.6
It was necessary, said Berrill, to consider under this ‘broader “informa-
tion technology”’ approach such things as the ‘crucial importance of 
having an adequate communications network inside the United Kingdom 
(and hence the vital role of the Post Office)’, the securing of access to 
frequencies and satellites, the ‘many domestic and international issues in 
the fields of privacy, copyright, compatibility in data transmission’, and 
the use of IT in the public sector.
On the specific subject of microelectronics, Thatcher’s attitude 
hardened:
She had very grave doubts about assisting the production of 
micro-electronics devices, and in particular the INMOS project. But 
she also questioned the support for applications. Her own view was 
that British industry was very ready to apply this technology, and 
that finance was not a constraint; where industry was not applying 
it, it was because of trade union opposition.7
Her doubts were shared by her chief scientific adviser.8 INMOS continued 
amid arguments over the location of any manufacturing facility (Cardiff, 
Bristol or a venue in Scotland) and an opportunistic proposal from Lord 
Weinstock that it might be absorbed as a ‘cottage industry’ in the ‘GEC 
Empire’.9 It produced the innovative but loss-making ‘transputer’ chip.
However, ‘information technology’ became a major frame and object 
of government promotion in the 1980s. 1982 was named ‘Information 
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Technology Year’, and programme of events under the IT82 banner was 
marked at its end by a speech at the Barbican Centre by Thatcher, who 
noted that the proportion of the population that had heard of ‘informa-
tion technology’ had increased over the year from 2 in 10 to 6 in 10.10 
In the same year the home computer market boomed, with consumers 
buying products from not only US but also UK manufacturers, not least 
Sinclair’s ZX81 and, under the BBC’s Computer Literacy Project, Acorn’s 
BBC Micro. While the broadcaster’s educational project had been con-
ceived independently of the government’s plans, it nevertheless, as Tom 
Lean notes, ‘fitted well’.11 Microcomputers entered government offices 
as well as schools with 600 microcomputers being delivered across 
Whitehall.12
During IT82, and in response to the Japanese announcement of 
its Fifth Generation computer initiative, the government also commis-
sioned and received a report from a group, mainly industrialists, chaired 
by the BT board member John Alvey. In the summer of 1982 the Alvey 
Committee recommended massively supporting IT research in universi-
ties in collaboration with industry (which would provide some match-
ing funds) – £350 million would be spent by 1987.13 This was a clear 
industrial strategy, informed by experts: committees (SERC and ABRC 
had identified information technology as critical, another expert group, 
Alvey had set out a detailed plan), supported by joined-up government 
actions (one government department, Keith Joseph’s Department of 
Education and Science, created new posts and a supply of trained tal-
ent, while another, the Department of Industry, worked with its clients 
to exploit them: ‘Our hope and expectation’, the minister for the first 
had written to the minister of the second, ‘is, naturally, that our push 
will be matched by your pull’).14 The GCSA, Robin Nicholson, supported 
the plan (so long as the new posts were not tenured, which was also 
Thatcher’s concern).15 In January 1983 the IT Advisory Panel, con-
cerned that the government had not announced its response to Alvey, 
urged the Prime Minister that the ‘national interest urgently needs the 
formulation, publication and vigorous implementation’ of a ‘national 
strategy for Information Technology’, if the UK was to keep up with the 
Japanese and the French.16
Consultation on the Alvey proposals continued over the next few 
months. Lord Weinstock was concerned that his mighty company, GEC, 
would not benefit as much as smaller competitors. Nicholson used this 
intervention to frame the Alvey programme to Thatcher in an acceptable 
way: GEC and large companies might lose out, but that would mean small 
entrepreneurial companies and innovative academic units would gain.17 
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Yet big industry pressure allowed multinational companies to partake in 
the Alvey programme, which was finally agreed by the Prime Minister 
and her ministers in March and April 1983. Brian Oakley, secretary of 
SERC, was appointed the director (interestingly the future Chief Scientific 
Adviser John Fairclough was one of four other candidates considered). 
Thatcher was not enthusiastic, but permitted this sizeable government 
injection of cash into industrially relevant research and development to 
go ahead. Her main complaint was that the staffing of the directorate was 
too large (a ‘bureaucrat’s paradise’).18 Even the free-market Economist 
welcomed the Alvey idea, while noting the ‘scepticism’ of ‘that former 
research scientist, Mrs Thatcher’, in an editorial titled ‘Government can 
help’:
The sort of government money to avoid is the kind that tries to 
pick winners, or, as happened with the Inmos microchip company, 
tries to catch up on the world with one great subsidised bound. 
Government helps best in technology by getting a starter or two in 
time for the race.19
So in the early 1980s an industrial strategy of government funded 
near-market industrial research directed at areas selected by experts was 
acceptable to Thatcher and her administration. 
During IT82 Kenneth Baker, as Minister of Information Technology, 
framed what was happening in terms of the ‘knowledge industry’ and 
the ‘information revolution’.20 Work would become cleaner, more flexi-
ble, less subject to unionisation. ‘Flexi-working’ hours would be shorter 
and interspersed with leisure time and continuing education. Politically, 
the Orwellian surveillance society could and would be avoided, argued 
Baker:
Will the day come when the technology will not only allow the 
sending of messages along the cable to the home but also the spying 
on the recipient without his knowing it? … Such a state of affairs 
however will only come about if people allow it to come about. It 
can’t happen surreptitiously and it can and must be resisted. Data 
privacy legislation which we will be introducing as soon as possible 
is essential … We should also engender a less deferential attitude 
to the state.
This in turn was linked, by Baker, to a necessary hostility to nationalisa-
tion and the welfare state:
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We should be jealous of the inquisitive nature of the State; we 
should resist the encroachments of the State into the economic and 
social domains that are best left to the individual; we should reject 
the all too popular and lazy reaction that the State should take upon 
itself an ever increasing responsibility for the welfare of the citizen. 
We should enhance the opportunities of private ownership for what 
the State owns it has to control.
In other words the information technology revolution, and a broad indus-
trial strategy, could be hitched to the broader Thatcherite programme 
of privatisation and the freedom of the individual. Baker stated that he 
did not ‘share the Orwellian nightmare because the microchip revolu-
tion through its pervasiveness and its cheapness can increase the area 
of human awareness and choice’. Books could be burnt or banned, but 
it was ‘rather more difficult to cut off the wave bands’. Stopping the ‘free 
flow of information’ would be ‘ruinous’, if possible at all. In conclusion, 
so long as the political system could be robust enough not to succumb to 
‘push-button politics’ or a ‘continual series of referenda’, Baker promised 
a rosy digital future:
The Information Society will be better informed and also I suspect 
more relaxed, less formal, more mobile, less enamoured with struc-
ture, more skilled and less ridden with class and social difference 
and full of scope for more individuality.
Yes, on balance, it will be a better place.
Commercial exploitation of academic science
A second area of science policy of considerable tension and attention 
during the 1980s, in which questions of industrial strategy and the role 
of the state were central, was the commercial exploitation of academic 
science and inventions. University scientists were allowed to charge 
for consultancy and to exploit their research for commercial gain (a 
right extended to local authority colleges and polytechnics in 1984,21 
this decision being taken after two years of discussion, in which the 
desire to ‘encourage enterprise and economically useful enquiry’ was 
balanced against the ‘accountability safeguards’).22 However, individ-
ual entrepreneurial activity was affected by the presence of an alter-
native model for exploiting academic science. Under Attlee a collective 
instrument had been organised: the National Research Development 
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Corporation (NRDC), which had the right to first refusal to patent 
Research  Council-funded inventions, and received further public funds 
to exploit them.23 The NRDC’s record was patchy, with failures (hover-
craft, computers) and successes (pyrethrin), one problem being that the 
NRDC had little control over its commercial partner firms’ choices: time 
and after time the firms took a narrow, understandably self-interested, 
short-term approach to development.24
In 1980 Margaret Thatcher visited Cambridge. She returned deeply 
angry. She had been told two stories that she read as catastrophic failures 
of commercial exploitation: an image intensifier developed at the Mullard 
radio astronomy observatory and monoclonal antibodies, discovered at 
the MRC’s Laboratory of Molecular Biology. She asked her Chief Scientist, 
CPRS, John Ashworth for immediate advice. César Milstein and Georges 
Köhler had pioneered the monoclonal antibody technique in 1975 by 
fusing antibodies with a myeloma cancer cell to produce an immortal 
hybridoma that would continue to secrete antibodies when placed in a 
mouse – thereby turning the mouse into an immensely productive anti-
body factory. Monoclonal antibodies would subsequently become the 
workhorses of biomedical diagnostics and therapeutics.25 The NRDC had 
been offered the chance to ensure the patenting of Milstein and Köhler’s 
process, but had declined on the grounds that it was being published. 
However, a more assertive NRDC could have delayed such publication 
while patenting took place. Milstein later said that he did not regret the 
NRDC’s decision, since, without a patent, ‘it allowed him greater free-
dom to publish and share his results, and to get on with his research’.26 
Nevertheless, in 1979 Nature had reported the issue, asking pointedly 
whether ‘Britain [had] lost large potential royalties through a failure to 
recognise the commercial potential of antibodies’.27
‘First there is no doubt’, wrote Ashworth in response to Thatcher’s 
request, ‘that either Cesar Milstein, the MRC or the NRDC (or some com-
bination thereof) failed lamentably when they omitted to file a patent.’28 
But in terms of lessons to be learned, Ashworth’s suggestions were mainly 
targeted at NRDC. As also shown by its attitude to biotechnology, the ‘fun-
damental problems’ were, first, that NRDC had ‘monopoly rights over the 
results of the Research Councils’ and, second, that by restricting its role 
to that of ‘honest broker’ it had failed to provide ‘a ‘technology transfer’ 
service.29 NRDC may make a profit, but that was ‘a consequence of their 
cautious and risk averse policies’. Ashworth suggested the establishment 
in the UK of ‘an entrepreneurial company along the lines of those estab-
lished in Europe and the United States … which make a commercial busi-
ness out of technology transfer’; it would have a ‘privileged relationship 
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with the MRC’, which would ‘de facto break the NRDC’s monopoly’. This 
would be a twist on Celltech, the government-backed biotech firm already 
announced. With respect to individual research workers, Ashworth 
praised the Wolfson Industrial Units – a ‘private initiative’ that not only 
benefited universities financially, but was also interesting for the effect on 
other university researchers.
The financial benefit of such units to the Universities can be con-
siderable (I know that the units at the University of Southampton 
earned an income of over £1 million last year, for example) but even 
more impressive has been the effect on the attitudes of the staff of 
the University of seeing some of their colleagues engage in this kind 
of activity – and earn significant consultancy fees in consequence.
Such incentives of ‘greater financial rewards to academic entrepreneurs’ 
were good, wrote Ashworth, but there also needed to be a stick, perhaps 
‘discrimination against those who do not become entrepreneurial’. Per-
haps if such sticks and carrots were in place then the radio astronomers, 
thinking about the other story told to Thatcher, ‘would have gone off to a 
garage somewhere and set up their own little firm designed to sell image 
intensifiers’. ‘The question to ask,’ summarised Ashworth, ‘is why the 
environment in Cambridge, Mass., encourages such behaviour and that 
in Cambridge UK inhibits it?’
ACARD, the voice of business in UK science policy, had urged 
 similar measures ‘to make it easier to found new businesses in the UK’.30 
In December 1980, in a report commissioned on Thatcher’s request based 
on her hearing the two Cambridge stories, ACARD reiterated the point: 
‘the creation of an environment that favours entrepreneurial activity 
requires, we think, more radical changes, particularly in the attitude to 
business found in parts of United Kingdom society (notably higher edu-
cation) and in the worth of intellectual property compared with physical 
property’.31 ACARD offered criticism (more muted than Ashworth’s) of 
the NRDC: it should continue, with government loans where necessary, 
but in return its monopoly right should be removed.32
Another immediate response was the organisation of a reception 
for inventors and innovators, held in January 1981. Thatcher addressed 
a gathering of small-scale garage inventors and owners of small tech busi-
nesses. A few had been assisted by the NRDC, but most had not. The mes-
sage was that this latter class of innovator had her government’s support.
The NRDC was merged with the National Enterprise Board in 1981 to 
form the British Technology Group (BTG). Initially BTG continued to have 
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the monopoly of first refusal on patent rights arising from publicly funded 
research; it took under its wing, for example, the intellectual property on 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). But Thatcher remained unhappy. In 
Spring 1983 she mooted the abolition of BTG, while Patrick Jenkin, her 
Secretary of State for Industry pushed back, arguing that ‘a body is still 
needed in the public sector to deal with the difficult and staff intensive task 
of identifying ideas, occasionally providing pre-development finance and 
of patenting and licensing those which have the promise of commercial 
success’.33 The Conservative Party manifesto for the June 1983 election 
contained a commitment to ‘accelerate the transfer of technology from 
the University laboratory to the market place’. Returned to power with a 
resounding victory at the polls, BTG reform was soon on the agenda. The 
removal of BTG’s monopoly rights were part of a wider vision in which 
private capital would directly respond to new inventive ideas from public 
sector, allowing the BTG to focus either on technology transfer (not large-
scale investment) or wither away as the market took hold – or at least act 
more commercially as it was forced to compete unprotected by monopoly 
rights. The status quo was not an option. The Chief Scientific Adviser Robin 
Nicholson told his Prime Minister that
In the past BTG has shown all the sloth and leaden-footedness char-
acteristic of a state-owned monopoly. To convert it into an enterpris-
ing and dynamic organisation is a formidable, but not impossible, 
task. But BTG will need to be freed from the previous restrictions in 
order to exploit fully its skills and expertise. …
BTG’s eventual reward for success must be privatisation rather 
than elimination …34
In Autumn 1983 ministers ‘announced with a great flourish’ that BTG’s 
first refusal of patents would be removed, while at the same time Thatcher 
‘laid … emphasis on the need for research activities to produce a com-
mercial benefit to the UK economy’; these actions, worried the Treasury, 
created ‘expectations of a brave new world where the results of research 
will show up bigger and faster than before’.35
The wrangle over NRDC/BTG prompted by Thatcher’s response to 
the non-patenting of monoclonal antibodies took place in the context 
of the changing expectations of commercialisation of the life sciences 
associated with genetic engineering. The ways that the patenting of 
recombinant DNA techniques sparked a ‘social transformation’, in which 
molecular biologists ‘formerly cloistered in academe, developed close 
ties with private industry as equity owners, corporate executives, and 
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consultants’, are familiar to historians of science.36 The entrepreneur-
ial culture had developed very rapidly – indeed the outrage felt in 1980 
over Milstein’s decision to not seek a patent for monoclonal antibodies 
in 1975, when non-patenting was unexceptional and unremarkable, is 
an indicator of the rapidity of this change. British biotechnology trailed 
the American lead, in terms of research, investment and industrial devel-
opment.37 In both countries a regulatory system was put in place in the 
late 1970s that permitted research to be conducted at different levels of 
 biosecurity containment.38 In April 1980 ACARD, the Advisory Board of 
the Research Councils (ABRC) and the Royal Society published a joint 
report (the ‘Spinks report’), to which the government responded, in which 
many measures to support a biotechnology industry were accepted.39 
These included an expectation that private companies, large and small, 
would take the lead, while acknowledging that, given the long-lead time 
for development, some pump-priming and structural support was never-
theless to be provided by the government. Thus the overall aim might be:
The Government’s economic policies are designed to create a cli-
mate in which industry can take long-term risks with confidence. In 
this kind of environment companies are prepared to accept the high 
cost of investment in research and development and in the introduc-
tion of new technology and are able to generate the necessary funds 
to make this investment possible. The development of biotechnol-
ogy will provide the private sector with new scope to exercise its 
enterprise and initiative. There will be opportunities for small and 
new companies as well as large and well-established ones.40
But in the interim, the NEB and NRDC would continue to invest (£1.5m 
up to 1980, with a further £1m under consideration, despite Thatcher’s 
distaste for the two bodies).41 By 1982 the level of BTG support was £13m, 
with the funds supporting (alongside private investment) ‘nearly forty 
biotechnology initiatives, mostly small and university based’.42 Of these 
initiatives Celltech was the largest enterprise (employing 100), and then 
Speywood (employing 40 scientists). These initiatives attracted public 
attention while the activities of large international pharmaceutical com-
panies’ activities (which included their own R&D teams as well as con-
tracts in universities) were less visible.
The fraught issue of the commercial exploitation of academic sci-
ence created some remarkable contradictions under Thatcher. We can 
see this clearly: first, in the paradoxical notion that free, individual 
academic recipients of public research council funds might be directed 
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to be more entrepreneurial, and second, in Thatcher’s insistence that 
arrangements such as the NRDC/BTG infringed individual researchers’ 
rights.
Nicholson ordered research into whether a minister had ‘powers 
to direct the nature and scope’ of the Research Councils’ research pro-
grammes. This constitutional investigation concluded that this breach-
ing of the so-called Haldane rule was acceptable.43 One Treasury official 
wondered if such ‘stick [should be] applied to them because they had not 
done as much as they reasonably should of their own free will, to ensure 
that the economy in general and the taxpayer in particular can see some 
practical benefits for the funds he provides’.44
By 1984, after extensive discussions, Keith Joseph was ready with 
new proposals on the exploitation of Research Council funded inven-
tions. Interestingly (given that he had the reputation as an ideologue), 
he tried to pull back from full liberalisation:
I wondered if we should just have a free for all, allowing every 
researcher to do as he or she saw fit. Somewhat reluctantly, I think 
not – at least not yet. Public money is involved and there are statu-
tory and other legal requirements to accommodate. Many research-
ers do not have the skills to pursue exploitation themselves; the 
incentive to develop such skills needs time and encouragement to 
grow.45
Likewise, Joseph said, he could not ‘tell [universities] how to run their 
internal affairs’. Nicholson, this time, backed him up:
Like the Secretary of State, I had originally been in favour of new 
arrangements in which authority and accountability were more 
fully devolved to the individual researcher. But, again like him, I 
have become convinced that such an enormous step from the pres-
ent protective bureaucracy would not be wise and might, indeed, 
jeopardise the whole process of liberalisation of exploitation of 
research through the occurrence of a few ‘scandals’.46
Thatcher was not pleased with this back-sliding. ‘Why?’ she scribbled 
next to Nicholson’s comment, adding:
No – I see no reason why an individual researcher should be denied 
the right to develop his own research in this country if he wishes. 
We can meet the public funds point by demanding a royalty.47
 THE CENTRAL DEBATES ON SCIENCE AND INNOvATION 73
Joseph came back with the details of arrangements to succeed the ending of 
the NRDC/BTG monopoly in March 1985.48 This draft reflected Thatcher’s 
‘wish that [Joseph] should go further towards devolving rights in research to 
the individual researcher’.49 Thatcher was now ‘delighted’.50
In October 1987 the BTG chair Colin Barker proposed, and min-
isters approved, privatisation by means of a management-backed buy-
out. Quite unexpectedly, in July 1988 Coopers & Lybrand, invited by 
the  government to conduct a feasibility report, recommended that BTG 
stay in the public sector. The BTG management promptly commissioned 
their own report from Lazard Brothers, which, less surprisingly, came 
to an opposite view. The DTI brought forward the formal proposal for 
privatisation in December 1988, and it was eventually privatised under 
the Major government in 1992. Nicholson’s prediction to Thatcher that 
privatisation, for BTG, would be the ‘eventual reward for success’ came 
belatedly to pass.
Cuts in the science base
The Thatcher administration’s ambition to cut public spending notori-
ously impacted on British science, but its causes and consequences have 
been misunderstood. Rather than a simple story of cuts provoking outrage 
and response (in the organised form of Save British Science, established 
in late 1985), this crucial episode of British science and science policy 
was formed from several intersecting issues – notably the proper bal-
ance of support for defence and civil science, the relationships between 
science and innovation and of universities to industry, the question of 
British membership of European scientific organisations and the forms 
of scientific advice, as well as broad aims of reducing public expenditure.
R&D was an early target of Derek Rayner’s ‘crusade against waste 
and efficiency’, as Peter Hennessey describes the quick but deep reviews 
of civil service work conducted by the Marks & Spencer executive much 
admired by Thatcher.51 This programme of scrutiny was outlined to 
Cabinet in 1980, trialled on statistical services and then turned on R&D 
in government laboratories, quickly followed by many others (130 by 
1982).52 Thatcher approved the review in January 1981, writing that she 
was ‘glad we are to embark on this scrutiny’, emphasising that investiga-
tors should pay special attention to ‘return on investment … especially 
important in def[ence] case’.53 After ministers put in special pleas for cer-
tain favoured laboratories to be avoided, Rayner chose his case studies 
and his team went to work. Covering two-fifths of all government R&D 
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staff, Rayner’s team identified savings of 1,518 posts and £14 million a 
year, as well as overprovision of services, ‘waste of land and buildings’, 
‘unrealistic charges’, ‘lack of cost-awareness’ and ‘too much bureau-
cracy’.54 ‘Once again we have seen unnecessary bureaucracy and costs 
which call for a determined effort to demonstrate that economy and effi-
ciency matter,’ Rayner told Thatcher. Thatcher responded that she was 
‘appalled that after all our efforts such gross inefficiency exists’. As one 
minister put it, Rayner had ‘found widespread opportunities to reduce 
costs in the support “tail” without damaging the research “teeth”, and 
that there is scope to continue with excellent research at less cost’.55 Yet 
while the Rayner review shows that government science was not being 
treated differently from other parts of the civil service, the wider aim 
of reducing public funding certainly did raise concerns about blunted 
research capability.
The Rayner cuts affected science spent by government departments 
in support of government work. A much more extensive and notorious set 
of cuts concerned public funds that were spent outside of government, 
especially in universities. At an official level, the impact of cuts in public 
spending on research and development was watched. The newly consti-
tuted Official Committee on Science and Technology, a monster of 28 rep-
resentatives, chaired by Cabinet Secretary Robert Armstrong, noted in its 
first meeting that the ‘aggregate effect … on British science’ of all the ‘deci-
sions taken by spending Ministers in the light of the reductions in planned 
public expenditure’ were ‘likely to be substantial’, and inter-departmental 
study was required in order to inform ministers.56 A ‘quick, broad study’, 
led by the Department of Education and Science, with contributions from 
the CPRS, was initiated, although not until May 1980.57
In February 1981 Thatcher could state in a speech to the 
Parliamentary and Scientific Committee that ‘we have kept up spend-
ing on the Science Vote, which supports research through the Research 
Councils and the universities’.58 Under the ‘dual-support’ system the 
Department of Education and Science channelled money through the 
research councils, which supported research projects, institutes and lab-
oratories, and postgraduate training, as well as international subscrip-
tions such as CERN. Under the other half of the duality the University 
Grants Committee funded the universities, in particular staff salaries and 
university facilities.
The major cuts (primarily in the UGC block grants) were brought in 
by the March 1981 budget.59 The line of the Royal Society was to: ‘accept 
the fact of the cuts, at least in public; to press for them to be implemented 
selectively so as to protect the best research; and to advocate maintenance 
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of the dual-support system’.60 Informally, the Society would put pressure 
on the Chief Scientific Adviser.61 Nevertheless, by 1982, severe problems 
due to cuts were evident. As the White Paper on Expenditure, covering 
1981–2 to 1983–4, explained, ‘the Government wishes to give protec-
tion to the support of basic science by ring-fencing the real value of the 
five Research Councils’.62 But the university funding, through the UGC, 
was to be cut substantially: ‘savaged’ was the description in The Times.63 
Research funded by the Leverhulme Trust found that spending cuts were 
severely hitting British universities, and that, along with other pressures 
(for example, more time absorbed in preparing grant proposals, the 
research councils becoming ‘increasingly dirigiste’), was causing plum-
meting morale.64
In October 1982 the Advisory Board of the Research Councils, led 
by the vice-chancellor of Bristol University, the nuclear physicist Alec 
Merrison, called for an increase in research funding, targeted at bio-
technology, remote sensing, information technology, marine resources 
and neuroscience.65 (He was still smarting from being told by Thatcher 
to earmark a modest increase in funds, following the Falklands War, for 
the British Antarctic Survey at the expense of what he considered ‘other 
and better science’, discussed in Chapter 7.66) In response, Keith Joseph 
stated that money should be shuffled away from the Social Science 
Research Council and asked for a further report on setting priorities.67 A 
joint ACARD/ABRC report agreed that research spending should be more 
selective.68 Meanwhile, the Times Higher Education Supplement began to 
speak of a ‘crisis of science’.69
On 28 February 1983 the BBC science series Horizon broadcast an 
episode titled ‘British science – on the wrong track?’. Introduced by Gavin 
Scott, the programme asked why British science’s successes (illustrated 
by footage of Aaron Klug and John Vane’s recent Nobel awards) did not 
translate into commercial successes; the monoclonal antibodies story 
was rehashed, with both the cuts in universities and the preponderance 
of military research criticised.70 Thatcher saw the programme and was 
‘much disturbed’ (monoclonal antibodies hit a particular raw nerve); she 
believed that it had presented ‘a biased and one-sided picture, and she 
wished the record to be put straight’.71 Her dissatisfaction had ‘intensi-
fied’ when she learnt that the BBC had interviewed her Chief Scientific 
Adviser, Robin Nicholson, for three-quarters of an hour, but had not used 
the material. Thatcher instructed Bernard Ingham to ‘let the BBC know 
of her reaction to the programme’. She also immediately decided to chair 
a public seminar and reception on science, technology and industry at 
Lancaster House, at which she would give a speech.
76 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
Ferdinand Mount, Head of the Number 10 Policy Unit and one 
of Thatcher’s inner circle of advisers, warned that there were dangers 
in such a move – it ‘must not be allowed to degenerate into an anti- 
Government rally’ and ‘both your colleagues and the participants are 
likely to try to use the seminar as a forum for extracting commitments 
for more Government money. However, Thatcher insisted, declaring ‘I 
am not thinking of a mass meeting, only about 150–200 scientists’.72 
It was to be a direct encounter. Bumped from May because of the ulti-
mately triumphant general election, the public seminar took place on 
12 September 1983. With BBC and ITN cameras present, Thatcher’s 
speeches topped and tailed the event, with talks by ministers and indus-
trialists (including Clive Sinclair and Lord Weinstock) in between. She 
spoke of high levels of spending of science and the way that fundamen-
tal science led to applications, promised to protect intellectual prop-
erty and remove monopolies (recalling BTG), recalled the ‘long and 
brilliant record’ of Britain’s science and engineering, listing the names 
of Newton, Faraday, Darwin and Fleming, Stephenson, Brunel, Royce 
and Barnes Wallis, and urged her present audience of fundamental 
researchers to be ‘alert to its possible applications’. She recollected the 
application of science in her early career, but also how this process had 
speeded up:
Ours is not only an age of discovery. It is an age of application – 
devastating in its swiftness; enthralling in its surprises; remorse-
less in its competitiveness.73
Her final words of the day were:
I stress the point of the seminar is positive from the beginning to 
enable us all to do two things, to create new business and industry 
and to expand existing business industry. And as Professor Kingman 
[chair of SERC] said, always, because many of us are scientists, to 
reach out to the unknown, to try and unlock the secrets of nature 
which we have not yet solved, and to try always to meet the chal-
lenge of our times, which is the creation of new wealth and new 
business.74
Thatcher’s science seminar, which in turn had, remarkably, been 
prompted by her furious reaction to a television programme, re-energised 
science policy discussions within government. Robin Nicholson penned 
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a wide-ranging response, summarising key points and necessary actions. 
One point was that the display of attention had been vital: there was 
‘unanimous agreement from both individuals and the media that the most 
important fact was that the seminar happened and that the Prime Minis-
ter and her senior colleagues, and senior people in industry, finance and 
academia demonstrated their interest in the subject’.75 For ‘morale’, the 
message of success must be maintained. A second point, among many anx-
ieties expressed, however, was that with regards to the otherwise ‘strong 
UK science base’, which was ‘seen as an essential UK asset by industry’, 
there was ‘evidence that the strength is slipping’. These were bold words 
from science adviser to prime minister. Nicholson’s proposal was: ‘identify 
constraints on the science base and restore to health by better allocation 
of public funds and more use of private sector funds’.
Mount was correct in his prediction that colleagues would use the 
seminar to ask for more funds. The Secretary of State for Education, 
Keith Joseph, immediately wrote to Thatcher on the subject of ‘main-
taining the strength of the science base’.76 (Officials in the Department 
of Education and Science were already concerned about the ‘plight of 
research in UK basic science and the risk of having to withdraw from a 
major undertaking if the Government did not provide some real growth 
of funding, certain and sustained, over several years’.)77 Informed by 
conversations with David Phillips, chair of the ABRC, Joseph argued that 
even after ‘some economies and consequent redeployment of resources 
within the science budget’ (which would be made after investigation by 
Sir Ronald Mason), there was ‘need for some more money … to main-
tain the existing range of research’ and, furthermore,  ‘modest extra 
resources to enable research into whole new areas of science recently 
opened up’.78 One possibility, suggested Joseph, was that extra money 
should be transferred from the defence research and development 
budget.79 In the meantime David Phillips commissioned research in 
to the ‘decline of basic science’ from the Royal Society.80 The pressure 
to continue to cap the Science Vote came from the Number 10 Policy 
Unit81 and the Treasury, which had threatened extreme measures – 
such as a Star Chamber – to reduce R&D expenditure.82 As a basis for 
argument, the government began annual reviews of R&D, starting in 
1983.83 ‘The 1984 Review will be an essential database for a general 
critique of Government spending on R&D,’ the Cabinet Secretary had 
told Thatcher, adding ‘the urgent need for which the Chief Secretary, 
Treasury spoke about at your meeting with the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science on 19 October [1983]’.84
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Unresolved tensions over defence R&D and CERN
Between late 1983 and early 1985 the ministerial tussle over science pol-
icy focused on two components of the science budget: defence R&D and 
the UK subscription to CERN, around which there was a wider debate 
about choosing priorities, all under the heading of ‘maintaining the 
science base’. Let us examine each focus in turn. The UK spent about 
£1,900m on defence R&D, of which the bulk (83 per cent) was classed 
as development. Of the £330m on research, £141m was spent in industry 
and only £9m in universities.85 Michael Heseltine, Minister for Defence, 
immediately responded to Joseph’s suggestion of redeploying defence 
funds. He was ‘very happy to look at the scope for increasing the propor-
tion … placed in the Universities’, but any straight ‘transfer from defence 
R&D to “pay for” increases in the science budget would in practice repre-
sent a cut in the defence budget and would have to be justified’.86 Robin 
Nicholson, on the other hand, agreed with Joseph, and, indeed told 
Thatcher that the risk to UK science was very high:
the excellence of our science base is starting to be eroded through 
insufficient funding … It is tempting, of course, to postpone the 
increase in the Science Vote until the year when savings can accrue. 
I believe that this would be a disastrous course of action. It will be 
much harder (and more expensive) to restore the quality of our sci-
ence once it has started to erode rapidly; we must act quickly now 
to maintain its quality.87
Nicholson did think there was scope for ‘offsetting savings’, which he 
expected to find in the atomic and defence sectors (‘it seems unlikely that 
it will be possible to find arguments to sustain the privileged position of 
the Ministry of Defence and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Author-
ity’). Ferdinand Mount agreed: ‘Our whole economy is distorted by the 
present preponderance of research on defence’.88 The Prime Minister and 
key ministers met on 19 October 1983. On the broad point of maintain-
ing (or even increasing) the science base, Robin Nicholson recalled:
the Prime Minister who had, I felt, decided against the bid before 
entering the room, on the grounds of the current state of the criti-
cal discussions on public expenditure, said: ‘I believe in science and 
technology but they cannot be set up on a pedestal with a private 
pipette to the Treasury (her phrase). … ’89
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On the narrow point of defence research, it was agreed that universities 
should be able to compete with the private sector for work, ‘on the under-
standing that they would be contractors’. On the general point, however, 
Joseph’s plea for extra funds was rejected:
In discussion it was argued that the Science Budget … was already 
very large; that if difficult choices on priorities had to be made, 
this was equally true in other areas both in the public and private 
sectors; that the UK had for years financed fundamental research 
generously but with poor results. The priority now was to boost the 
commercial exploitation and application of technology. …
Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the case for expand-
ing the Science Budget had not been made out. It should be pos-
sible to absorb the proposed additions within the existing Budget. 
The priority was to achieve commercial exploitation of technology 
rather than expand fundamental research.90
Joseph and Heseltine rejoined battle over scraps of defence R&D funds 
in the following year, when the ABRC was concluding its annual review 
of government R&D.91 Joseph had persuaded Thatcher that a transfer of 
funds might be worth considering, on the new grounds that universities 
were more likely to offer a range of routes to further application and com-
mercialisation. A figure of £20m was proposed.92 Heseltine now rejected 
the idea: defence science was best done by defence scientists who knew 
the Services’ needs, taking money out would damage long-term intramu-
ral research at defence research establishments and removing the work 
to universities would distance it even further from applications.93 Joseph, 
unsurprisingly, was in favour of an addition to the Science Vote (albeit, he 
noted, ‘relatively small sums’) to support certain ‘strategic research’ disci-
plines (therefore not closely tied contracts) that together would lead to a 
‘reinforcement of the science base that can be expected to benefit defence, 
and other industry more widely, in ways that cannot be foreseen at the 
outset’.94 He listed an indicative set of ‘disciplines’ (specialties, really). 
The final choices would be made after ‘close collaboration between MOD 
and the Councils),’ noted Joseph. Such an approach, he added, ‘would 
accord well with the plans I am working with the UGC, the ABRC and the 
Research Councils, to bring about greater selectivity in the UGC funding 
of research’.95 Henry Chilver reported his ACARD group’s conclusion that 
the UK’s comparatively high defence R&D spend carried perhaps unjusti-
fiable opportunity costs.96 The Chief Scientific Adviser also weighed in on 
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the side of Joseph and Chilver, but again set the issue in a wider context 
of perilous trends in science policy. On current plans MoD would increase 
its spending on R&D by 1 per cent, while at the same time ‘expenditure on 
advancement of science will have declined by 3% in real terms … These 
trends are in the wrong direction’.97 Nicholson continued:
I support ACARD’s view that there is a high opportunity cost asso-
ciated with pre-empting an ever-increasing fraction of the nation’s 
R&D resources in defence technology. The ratio of £1 spent on R&D 
for every £3 spent on purchase of equipment is absurdly high. I have 
the impression that the MoD is feeding a leviathan with an insatiable 
appetite for R&D resources … This trend must stop eventually and I 
think there is a case for examining the consequences of a reduction 
of the MoD R&D spend to roughly half its present value over a period 
of 5 years … and a switch of the R&D resources thereby released to 
areas with a greater influence on the economic health of the country.
In February 1983 Lord Whitelaw had drawn to the attention of Cabi-
net colleagues ‘widespread concern on the health of basic and strategic 
research’ following a debate in the House of Lords.98 Thatcher had asked 
how such problems might be solved ‘without spending more money’. This 
in turn had prompted the search for solutions from ‘improved efficiency 
and selectivity in basic research’. Now, however, Nicholson urged some-
thing more radical: ‘the answer lies in re-allocating funds from other parts 
of Government’s R&D spend such as defence’. In general, he said, ‘we are 
over-committed in R&D for defence, agriculture and nuclear energy and 
under-committed in basic research and in strategic research for areas 
such as the environment and manufacturing industry’. The  government 
should transfer (not simply cut, but also not provide an overall increase, 
as per Thatcher’s instruction) funds, otherwise:
There is real damage being done to our University and Research 
Council research. Although it is true that the past excellence of this 
research seems to have had little influence on the economic perfor-
mance of the country, one does not solve that problem by reducing 
the excellence of basic research. At a time when the Government’s 
policies have led to encouraging progress in the application of our 
scientific and technological skills to producing marketable goods and 
services, it would indeed be ironic if the same Government was to 
damage irreparably the very source of those skills and so inhibit the 
development of a strong science- and technology-based industry.99
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On the specific question of what to do next about transferring £20m in 
defence R&D funds, Thatcher followed Nicholson’s advice.100 Nichol-
son rejected Heseltine’s view that there was ‘minimal overlap’ between 
MoD- and DES-funded work, while transferring funds would inject 
‘vigour and scientific competition’, not least in the defence laboratories 
which he viewed as lethargic.101 Accepting these arguments, Thatcher 
asked Nicholson ‘with the aid of the Chief Scientific Adviser, MOD and 
the Chairman of the ABRC’ to ‘examine the proposal more closely’ with 
a view to ‘clarifying the way in which a transfer of responsibility for 
research could be carried out’.102
Between September 1984 and February 1985, the issue was further 
explored. The Ministry of Defence, stating that the cut would remove 
basic research from the defence laboratories, pushed back – commission-
ing, for example, a report on the Royal Signals Research Establishment’s 
impact on the economy.103 The scrutiny did reveal a patchy record of mid-
1980s defence-civil research connections in the UK.104 Nevertheless, the 
end result was that there was no transfer of £20m of funding; instead 
measures to improve links between MoD and the wider scientific com-
munity, such as collaborative research grants and joint MoD and research 
council activities, were proposed.105 Nicholson regarded the response as 
inadequate.106
Yet the issue of the damaging externalities of the UK’s commitment 
to defence research did not go away. For example, Thatcher was advised 
in February 1986:
UK public expenditure on R & D as a proportion of GDP is simi-
lar to that of other major industrial countries … but it is strongly 
skewed towards defence. Defence R&D in 1985–86 (at £2,300 
million) accounts for 52.7 per cent of total Government R & D 
expenditure. The defence industrial complex appears to be largely 
insulated from the ordinary pressures of the market economy, 
and pre-empts scarce scientific resources, especially in electronics 
and information technology, to the detriment of the rest of the 
economy.107
An ad hoc Cabinet committee of ministers (MISC 119), dominated by Hes-
eltine, proposed to resolve this by setting up a new ministerial committee 
structure to review priorities across all government science, supported 
by a substantial ‘R & D Evaluation Unit’ in the DTI, another of Heseltine’s 
ideas. But Brian Griffiths of the Number 10 Policy Unit attached this plan 
‘to second-guess the private sector’ as ‘Heathite Corporatism’.108 ‘A more 
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useful approach would be to distinguish between applied research done 
by the private sector and pure basic research funded publicly,’ argued 
Griffiths. He went on to make four recommendations to the Prime 
Minister:
1. Defence R&D should be cut.
2.  Tax incentives should be used to encourage innovation and com-
mercial risk-taking in privately funded R&D.
3.  Accordingly, public funds for R&D should be directed away from 
applied commercial research and towards basic research and ini-
tial support for diffusing information about new technology.
4.  For grant-aided university research, a market-responsive system 
should be developed whereby the brightest talent is drawn to the 
most fertile areas, at the same time attracting private venture cap-
ital and industrial support.
Crucially Heseltine resigned in January 1986 over the Westland affair, 
and so the option of a ‘Heathite’ industrial strategy receded, while the 
Griffiths argument would be successfully taken up and pushed through 
by a new man in the Number 10 Policy Unit, as will be shown below. 
Somewhat ironically, a ‘Science and Technology Assessment Office’ 
under the Chief Scientific Adviser in the Cabinet Office was indeed set up 
(announced in July 1986), even though its immediate raison d’être disap-
peared.109 For now it should be noted that the UK’s over-commitment to 
defence research – as a percentage of GDP it was nearly half again more 
than the French and six times West Germany’s – was a major tension in 
science policy under Thatcher.
The other topic of disagreement, the UK’s involvement in CERN, 
was more controversial, but ultimately also of little apparent outcome. In 
October 1983, reviewing the implications of cutting defence R&D, direct 
civil R&D support (ie grants) or central facilities, John Kingman had 
considered the possibility of cutting the Spallation Neutron Source, just 
then being completed at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, Harwell.110 
He did not mention CERN. At the meeting of ministers in October 1983 
Thatcher had (after declaring that science and technology must not be 
put on a pedestal with a ‘private pipette to the Treasury’), taken a swipe 
at CERN:
The Science Vote and the Research Councils have been protected for 
10 years, but have done nothing to manage their cash limits. There has 
been no real shift towards useful science and money is still lavished 
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on grand but useless projects such as CERN. At the same time other 
nations have benefited from our science because our University sci-
entists are too toffee-nosed to get involved in applications. We can no 
longer afford to do science for prestige, it must be science for economic 
benefit.111
Nicholson listed actions that DES could take, one of which was ‘Make a 
serious study of withdrawal from CERN’. In January 1984 Keith Joseph 
raised informally with Thatcher the suggestion, now apparently originat-
ing in David Phillips and John Kingman (the chairs of ABRC and SERC, 
respectively), that the UK’s £30m funding on high energy physics, pri-
marily for CERN, ‘could be spent more productively elsewhere within the 
science budget’.112 Joseph claimed he was ‘initially sceptical, suspecting 
that the Professors might have been putting forward the most controver-
sial option for cuts’, but had come round to the view that there should 
be a review, not least because ‘there might be substantial support within 
the scientific community for this switch in emphasis’. The Prime Minister 
agreed: ‘she felt that CERN, in common with many collaborative projects, 
was extravagant’. All this was only a year after one of CERN’s greatest 
triumphs: the discovery of W and Z bosons as predicted by electroweak 
theory. The molecular biologist John Kendrew was assigned the task of 
the review.
CERN management were depressed by the news, as diplomats 
reported, fearing that it was a ‘preliminary step to almost certain UK 
withdrawal’, which in turn might encourage other countries to take simi-
lar action.113 The view from Bonn was that withdrawal would be met with 
‘some dismay’, as well as ‘evidence of penny-pinching unenthusiastic atti-
tude to collaboration within Europe’.114 Since the UK had no indigenous 
facilities approaching CERN’s power, Germany saw such an action as ‘a 
confession by the UK that we rank ourselves with those smaller powers 
who can no longer afford to play a role in the significant science of the 
twentieth century’. Withdrawal, said diplomats, would also ‘go down 
badly with France’, not least with Mitterrand.115 (Thatcher, writing on 
the telegram, was unimpressed: ‘Of course [Mitterrand would complain] 
the Lep ring is largely on French soil’.) Withdrawal would mean unem-
ployment for 330 British scientists and technicians, as well as loss of £5m 
in high technology contracts with British industry. Geoffrey Howe raised 
these European relations aspects directly with Joseph, who in turn  copied 
Thatcher in.116 At least some of the pressure to review, and perhaps end, 
the UK’s financial contribution to CERN came from British non-high- 
energy-physics scientists. Reassurance was sought, and received, that any 
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saving would be returned to the Science Vote.117 At this point, Thatcher’s 
advisers made comments. The Political Adviser Oliver Letwin, while stat-
ing that the Conservative administration ‘should certainly contain – and, 
if possible, reduce – spending on science’, agreed that the review should 
not be a vehicle for such an aim.118 Likewise Thatcher’s Chief Scientific 
Adviser, Nicholson, supported redeploying money ‘towards priority 
growth areas in science’, although he doubted the review would recom-
mend UK withdrawal:
Withdrawal from CERN must be contemplated as one option 
on completion of the study – it would be unreal to exclude it. 
Personally I doubt that it will come to that. More likely will be 
recommendations to improve the cost-effectiveness of CERN 
(you’ve seen the gold plating yourself) and, crucially, to slow 
down the pace and hence the rate of spend on this area of 
research. There is no reason why the tax-payers of Europe and 
the USA should have to fund a private race between two scien-
tific cliques carried out at a pace determined largely by their own 
curiosity and arrogance.119
Kendrew’s working party studied the issue between March 1984 and June 
1985, and reported to the ABRC and SERC.120 Kendrew recommended a 
25 per cent reduction in expenditure on CERN (quite dramatically, but 
only after the completion of the LEP in 1989), and only UK withdrawal if 
such a reduction could not be negotiated.121 By the international agree-
ment governing CERN any reduction would have to be accepted by and 
applied equally across all member states. Prominent scientists attacked 
the Kendrew recommendations.122 Nicholson complained to Thatcher 
that DES’s summary of the report omitted ‘the important conclusions 
that expenditure on particle physics is too high irrespective of the current 
financial problems of the Research Councils’.123 After going through the 
accounts with CERN’s director, Professor Herwig Schopper, Nicholson 
concluded that a 15 per cent cut was the maximum attainable.124 Reac-
tion from other countries was mixed, some signalling support for a review 
and others sceptical.125 An international review working group was set 
up, chaired by the French physicist Anatole Abragam.126 In November 
1986 Thatcher’s new Secretary of State for Education, Kenneth Baker, 
reported that the Abragam review was going slowly, which meant at least 
a year’s delay; any UK withdrawal from CERN would be pushed back to 
1988.127 ‘The time taken is so long that we can only think the delay is 
deliberate,’ wrote Thatcher. ‘It is grossly inefficient.’128
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Meanwhile, in 1986–7 the UK was embroiled in lengthy diplomatic 
negotiations over the size of the first European framework for funding 
R&D. Thatcher was deeply sceptical and insisted on capping the budget at 
4.2 billion ECU.129 Other countries, as well as the European Commission, 
wanted a much larger budget. Thatcher’s intransigence on the issue frus-
trated other ministers, who argued that the United Kingdom was a net 
beneficiary of such European research spending.130 This European tussle, 
seen by Thatcher as a matter of financial discipline principle and by the 
other governments as a Eurosceptic ‘imperilling [of] Europe’s ability to 
match the growing high technology challenge’, pushed the CERN ques-
tion to the back burner.131
Here is where a shift in influence among the advisers was ultimately 
critical. Nicholson, who was often sceptical of CERN’s benefits, moved 
on,132 to be replaced by John Fairclough in June 1986. Furthermore, 
George Guise joined the Number 10 Policy Unit and was soon paying 
close attention to science and technology policy.133 Guise had come from 
the business world, specifically Consolidated Gold Fields, where he had 
been an Executive Director since 1981.134 The policy on CERN would ulti-
mately be settled in the wake of a fundamental reframing of science and 
technology policy that occurred in 1987 as Guise’s arguments prevailed 
over Fairclough’s. I will now trace this reframing as all the frustrations 
and tensions of policy came to a head.
A third area of active policy-making that should be briefly men-
tioned before returning to the core argument concerned the provision 
of trained engineers for industry. Keith Joseph proposed a ‘switch’, 
spending £42 million over three years to produce 600 more graduates 
and 500 more postgraduates each year in engineering and technol-
ogy, the ‘skills of tomorrow’.135 Peter Warry and Oliver Letwin in the 
Number 10 Policy Unit were sceptical since there was no increased 
market demand, as measured by university applications, the crea-
tion of new jobs or engineers’ salaries.136 Nicholson, however, sup-
ported Joseph, although he also argued that a condition must be that 
the private sector ‘make a full contribution in cash and in kind’.137 
Consultation followed with, for example, Lord Weinstock of GEC writ-
ing to Thatcher about shortages not just in new graduates but also 
the need to fund re-training in a fast moving field.138 The Engineering 
and Technology Programme was announced in March 1985. Thatcher 
hosted a meeting with industrialists on 21 May 1985, at which they 
were told their support ‘in cash or kind’ was expected. Summing up 
the meeting, Thatcher sounded underwhelmed by the industrialists’ 
contributions:
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industry sometimes needed to adopt a wider concept of  self-interest. 
Unless private enterprise was willing to ensure enough was done 
to encourage engineering and technical education and training, 
Government would have to step in. But they could never do the job as 
well as industry itself. … The Government had already done a good 
deal, however, and nearly every school, including primary schools, 
now had a microcomputer … Of course, more needed to be done and 
that was where industry came in. The UK’s record on the research side 
was a good one; it was the practical application of research which we 
needed to concentrate on now.139
Risk-averse industry?
Frustrations at the centre of government were now building up in three 
areas: a defence industrial sector that absorbed too much R&D resources 
and was unresponsive to the market, the lack of entrepreneurial spirit 
among researchers and the perceived lukewarm willingness to contrib-
ute by industry. The argument that British industry and commerce were 
risk averse when it came to exploiting R&D was supported by two more 
documents we know that Thatcher read. First was a blunt letter from Sir 
Henry Chilver, chair of ACARD, who, ‘alarmed’, wrote of
UK companies … avoiding high risk investments such as develop-
ing new products from R&D programmes and introducing new 
manufacturing methods resulting from technological advances … 
despite the fact that innovative products and services are vital to 
ensure competitiveness in the longer term and adoption of best 
practice can give current products a competitive edge … Until we 
have correctly identified the inhibiting factors, and found solutions 
to them, Government must not assume that setting an economic cli-
mate which encourages companies to make a profit is sufficient to 
ensure national prosperity in the long term.140
The second document was written by Sir Douglas Hague, chair of the 
ESRC. Drawing on arguments from SPRU’s Keith Pavitt, Hague argued 
that the expense of science demanded that it be tied to national objec-
tives, particularly ‘increasing the efficiency and competitiveness of the 
British economy’, while the government must provide financial support 
because
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British firms appear to underinvest in basic research and training, 
because of relatively short time horizons, risk aversion, and (most 
important) the fact that the responses of competitors will make 
it impossible for them to obtain all the potential benefits of their 
investment.141
Thatcher underlined risk ‘aversion’ in both documents. Interestingly, 
Hague called for a clear, functional and locational separation of research 
and development: ‘the rule should be that basic research be done in 
universities and Research Council laboratories, and development in 
firms, when this is concerned directly with the promotion of economic 
development’.
When in 1985 the DTI ministers Geoffrey Pattie and Norman Tebbit 
wanted to extend government support for industrial R&D, the proposals 
were attacked by the Number 10 Policy Unit: ‘All discretionary finan-
cial support to industry is suspect. Little money tends to go to projects 
that would not otherwise have been undertaken, and many of the large 
projects are ill founded’.142 Thatcher agreed: ‘I am not enamoured with 
this idea of support for everything. There is a lot we should refrain from 
doing because the money is ill-spent’.143 Meanwhile, Nicholson, ACARD 
and leading ministers (such as Geoffrey Howe and Keith Joseph) were 
all expressing alarm that UK R&D, compared to that of other coun-
tries, was being cut, generating ‘a great threat to our future economic 
prosperity’.144
In early 1986 Nicholson began promoting the establishment of ‘a 
scheme to promote better “pulling-through” of outstanding advances in 
our science and engineering research base to provide new products and 
services to be sold profitably by UK industry’.145 The plan initially had 
Thatcher’s support.146 Fleshed out, it was a proposal, by the name of LINK, 
for all Departments with significant research programmes and all Research 
Councils to reallocate money to provide a pot (£210 million in early plans) 
that would be more than matched by contributions pledged by industry 
(£400 million). It would complement existing schemes in information 
technology and offshore energy technology, and in the first instance tar-
get advanced electronic materials and molecular electronics. Fairclough, 
the new Chief Scientific Adviser, supported the industrial strategy plan. He 
hoped to complement the programme with another seminar
on Priorities for Science and Technology … which will be 
designed to get across to scientists, industrialists and the city the 
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Government’s commitment to research and development which 
will lead to greater wealth creation. The City in particular remains 
woefully short-sighted in its attitude towards investment in R&D.147
Guise, Fairclough and the 1987 reversal of UK science policy
George Guise, the new voice in science and technology advice, had a word 
in Thatcher’s ear.148 He supported the objectives but not the methods of 
LINK, and made two trenchant criticisms. First, the departments which 
paid for their own R&D, in particular defence, would pay it only lip  service. 
‘Indeed,’ he said:
the lack of commercial spin-off from the enormous volumes of defence 
R&D which have already been spent is something of a national dis-
grace. In terms of the investments this country has made there should 
be a thriving computer industry, a silicon chip industry, extensive 
developments in solid-state physics such as lasers, and a strong radio 
industry. In fact, the radio industry has declined to nothing.149
Second, without ‘effective people with strong commercial connections’ 
governing LINK, its objectives would not be met. Fairclough, he advised 
Thatcher about her Chief Scientific Adviser, should ‘be pressed’ on this 
issue. Guise proposed Sir Alistair Frame (of Rio Tinto Zinc) as chair and 
his suggestion was successful.150
Fairclough himself, in February 1987, with eight months experience as 
Chief Scientific Adviser, now felt able to offer ‘a considered judgement about 
the issues and opportunities we face in securing greater economic contribu-
tion from our research and development activities’. His aim was bold:
We need a renaissance of our industrial prowess through the con-
tribution from research and development to again become an effec-
tive competitor to Japan, Germany and the United States. I offer 
the thought that this goal should be championed by yourself and 
become central to your future policies as you have already champi-
oned the control of inflation. We need a culture change in industry, 
science and the Ministry of Defence … Your personal identification 
with this goal will be critical to such a task.151
Specifically, he called for the role of ACARD to be ‘extended to cover 
basic and strategic science in addition to its role in applied research and 
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development’. It would advise and balance priorities. By examining the 
‘whole environment’ it could help with problems such as underinvest-
ment in research by industry, the choice of which areas to invest to make 
‘world class science’ (‘we cannot afford … to engage in world class sci-
ence in every subject and every University’) and encourage privatisation 
of defence research. Guise, whose advice on science and technology was 
beginning to receive closer attention from Thatcher than Fairclough’s, 
supported the Chief Scientific Adviser’s proposal to simplify the ‘struc-
tural tangle’ of R&D funding policy.152 He observed that Fairclough ‘is 
asking for an annual science plan, analogous to a nationalised indus-
try’s corporate plan, which would be settled annually and run for sev-
eral years ahead … [the internal Cabinet committee] E(RD) and ACARD 
would become the overlords of Government R&D expenditure’.
Guise wanted to go further, however. In particular, going beyond 
Fairclough’s call for privatisation of some defence research, ‘there is a 
strong case for privatisation of the Government Research Laboratories 
which would take the contractor/customer principle to its logical con-
clusion’. (This is an important point. Some commentators have taken 
the Rothschild principle as merely an arrangement for relabelling 
the relationship between government department and its research. 
Here we see that the ‘logical conclusion’ of market language is private 
markets.) Guise, too, thought Fairclough’s plan, if it was to succeed, 
needed Thatcher’s personal strong backing.153
Thatcher backed Fairclough to the extent of asking for a more 
detailed proposal.154 After consultation (with ministers, the Cabinet 
Secretary, Nicholson – now in the private sector at Pilkington – and Lord 
Dainton), Fairclough’s proposals remained largely unchanged. However, 
he now had a name for the newly extended ACARD: the Advisory Council 
on Science and Technology (ACOST).155 The proposals were made pub-
lic in a response to a report of the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology.156 Again Guise praised Fairclough’s plans as far 
as they went, but argued that they did not go far enough:
There is much evidence that British R&D suffers from mismanage-
ment … By far the greatest culprit is private industry which refuses 
to put risk capital into maintaining a modern technological base, as 
long as the Government is prepared to do it for them. …
We cannot improve industrial R&D by central edicts about 
annual reports. What is needed is an efficient Government struc-
ture for allocating public funds which addresses the balance of 
responsibility between industry and Government. The first step 
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and one within the Government’s grasp is a strong attack on the 
methods by which public research funds are allocated and subse-
quently managed …
Fairclough’s paper does not address many of these issues. It con-
centrates on how Government can take a lead by getting its own 
house in order.157
At a meeting on 29 April 1987, with Fairclough, Brian Unwin, Robert 
Armstrong and Guise, Thatcher agreed to Fairclough’s plan. It was a cen-
tralisation of the mechanisms for making science policy. A cabinet com-
mittee E(ST) – the Ministerial Steering Committee on Economic Strategy 
Sub-Committee on Science and Technology, a renamed, strengthened 
E(RD) chaired by Thatcher – would ‘determine priorities in terms of 
functional spending’; this would extend even to the Research Councils, 
‘possibly to the extent of requiring expenditure of a particular sum in a 
particular area of research’.158 E(ST) had its first meeting on 1 July 1987, 
soon after the general election. The new ACOST, which would retain 
Tombs as chair, would advise.159
Meanwhile, in July 1987 – at the invitation of E(RD) to consider 
the ‘case for a stronger centralised management of the activities of the 
Research Councils’160 and at a time when the Councils were regarded as 
being in ‘serious difficulties’161 – the ARC published A Strategy for the Science 
Base.162 In public this science policy document was the one that was fiercely 
debated, especially its proposal to separate out a class of research-active 
universities that would receive most research funds.163 While rejected, the 
subsequent compromise on university funding led to a beefed-up Research 
Selectivity Exercise (1989) as a mechanism for guiding the allocation 
of funds (a key moment in the trajectory that has led to the prominence 
of the cycle of Research Assessment Exercises and Research Excellence 
Frameworks in today’s UK university system).164 Nevertheless, despite this 
public acrimony, within the private discussions around Number 10 the 
ABRC’s Strategy for the Research Base was also, ironically, the document 
that Thatcher’s science policy would shift in opposition to and away from.
With the central machinery streamlined, George Guise could now 
pitch his big vision for science policy.165 It would prove to be a deeply 
influential document. One small measure of this influence was the fact it 
started with an anecdote that Thatcher, having read it, would repeat in 
speeches and memoirs:
When Gladstone asked Faraday whether electricity might ever have 
a useful purpose, he replied ‘Yes, Sir. One day you will tax it’. By 
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contrast, Rutherford claimed in the 1930s that ‘anyone who expects 
a source of power from the transformation of atoms is talking moon-
shine’. The prescience of Faraday is rare. Most people working in 
fundamental science, as well as those who fund them, have no idea 
what economic benefit the work will bring.166
At the heart of Guise’s pitch was an attack on what he saw as a wide-
spread and conventional understanding of the role of government (and 
especially public money) in supporting science:
There exists in Government and industry a general mood which 
stresses the economic rather than the intellectual value of science and 
hence that resources should be shifted from pure science to  technology. 
This attitude underlies the recent ABRC proposals and is endemic at 
the DTI, who continually confuse value for money with return on cap-
ital. It is actually a form of national short-termism and reeks of state 
intervention in industry. This philosophy  misunderstands both the 
contribution of science to economic progress and the proper role of 
the public sector in stimulating it.
Guise then listed six examples that showed, he said, that the ‘greatest 
economic benefits have always resulted from advances in fundamental 
knowledge rather than the search for answers to specific applied prob-
lems’. Specifically: transistors were not ‘discovered by the entertainments 
industry seeking new ways of marketing pop groups’, but by ‘people 
working on wave mechanics and solid state physics’; computer logic cir-
cuits were not built by accountants; nuclear energy was not discovered 
by oil companies; the induction coils of in motor cars came from Fara-
day, not the transport industry; while electronics and electro-magnetic 
waves were the result of the work of Thompson [sic], Lorenz, Maxwell 
and Hertz, not the manufacturers of ‘televisions and cellular telephones’.
Guise claimed that ‘each’ of these examples served to describe ‘a 
basic scientific discovery whose application has proved, in the narrow-
est of economic terms, hugely profitable’.167 Scientific inquiry ‘without 
economic direction, over the past centuries has formed the bedrock of 
a modern economy’. Yet the consensus now was that ‘public sector funds 
should be directed towards specifically applicable research projects’. (As 
well the DTI and the ABRC, Guise aimed his ire at the head of the ESRC, 
Douglas Hague, as an example of the class of economists who held this 
view. The Alvey and LINK programmes discussed above also exemplified 
it.) Guise wanted ‘precisely the reverse of the policy’.168 Alvey had been 
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the flagship component of the early 1980s industrial strategy. Now, Guise 
said, any further Alvey work, if at all, should merely coordinate and not 
spend public money when industry should be paying for research.169
In short: Guise persuaded Thatcher that her government should 
cut funding from near-market research, because only then would prof-
itable companies step up and fund more of their own R&D.170 As Guise 
pointed out, this was the science policy that would truly resonate with 
Thatcherite policy; it was the one ‘consistent with our long term goal 
of minimising State intervention’. For industrial research the ‘proper 
role for Government’, according to Guise, was one restricted to ‘co-or-
dination, information dissemination and the reduction of bureaucratic 
impediment’. ‘Basic research’, on the other hand, was ‘essential to 
long term national prosperity and its funding is a primary function of 
Government’.171 It was ‘organically part of the national interest and … 
the route to success is to back individuals and teams’ (and to do so in an 
unashamedly elitist way; to spread the jam widely was ‘a diluted form of 
socialism’) and not to set ‘remote goals which pre-judge the outcome of 
work’. The extent to which Guise’s framework became the strategy for UK 
science policy can be seen in the first instance in the fate of Fairclough’s 
new arguments for technology policy. Fairclough, the Chief Scientific 
Adviser, wanted to argue that Guise’s paper was
only about science and the Government role there. The Government 
also have a crucial role in funding technology … if scientific discov-
eries are to be properly exploited.172
In particular, a ‘discovery becomes economically significant only when 
the science of how and why it works is sufficiently understood for it to 
be embodied in the design of an artefact or a process’. In other words, 
science was still needed in the ‘intervening process between discovery 
and exploitation … the science phase does not come to an end and the 
exploitation stage take over’. Fairclough cited the ‘the new warm super 
conductors … materials [that] could be as important as the transistor 
to economic progress’ as a case in point. He wanted government depart-
ments to have the strength and the funding to ‘focus on priorities for 
technology and sponsor selected new emerging technologies’.173
Fairclough’s proposal that the Government’s ‘role to support the 
development of technology’ be recognised (and funded) was immedi-
ately criticised by Guise. ‘Government should fund basic science, but very 
little technology except where it is the user,’ he wrote, as point 1 of his 
summary of key points.174 Such a separation was essential:
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Fairclough mentions a ‘transitional’ phase where the science is 
‘becoming’ exploitable technology. Once the science is properly 
understood then the routes to technological development are clear 
and can be costed. If economic benefit may be derived from pursu-
ing such development then private sector business should fund it.175
Again the warm superconductor was a case in point (and it is telling that 
advisers could write to their Prime Minister about ‘zero point energy’ and 
assume that they would be understood):
The warm superconductor … is a phenomenon which is not yet fully 
understood. The concept of zero point energy, which comes directly 
out of fundamental quantum theory, has been known for decades 
and accounts for the superconducting behaviour of metals near the 
absolute zero of temperature. By contrast, the statistical behaviour 
of electron groups several hundred degrees higher, at room tem-
perature, is not understood in fundamental terms. Therefore, the 
behaviour of certain ceramics which appear to display supercon-
ductivity at higher temperatures needs further work to establish 
fundamental theory.
Rather than step in and fund technology, the government should restrict 
itself to funding basic research. Even where government had a customer 
role or an ‘operating function’ (such as ‘the provision of a health service, 
a defence service or an adequate road network’), work should not be 
placed intramurally – that was ‘the old centralised control philosophy 
and has led to much inefficiency’. Instead it ‘should be put into the private 
sector as fast as possible’.176
With the science policy reversed, the question of subscription or 
withdrawal from CERN could be resolved. Guise received a leaked sum-
mary of the Abragam report, via his friend, the Oxford particle phys-
icist Christopher Llewellyn Smith (an adviser to Abragam who would 
also become Director General of CERN in 1994). Guise agreed with 
and repeated the arguments of Llewellyn Smith (and indeed Abdus 
Salam, who had visited Guise and the Number 10 Policy Unit) that 
the UK should now remain in CERN: it had pressed for the Abragam 
review which had delivered the assessment that CERN’s administration 
and funding should be overhauled, and that remaining at the forefront 
of particle physics was a historic British necessity.177 Fairclough also 
offered support for CERN, conditional on the Abragam proposals being 
followed through.178
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Edgerton and Hughes argued that ultimately Thatcherite science 
policy was about the extension of control.179 We can see elements of this, 
but ultimately it mistakes the part for the whole. There was a move to 
extend control, that is what Fairclough’s reform of the machinery was 
about, extending ACARD’s work into basic science (making ACOST), set-
ting up an expanded, more powerful, internal cabinet committee E(RD) 
with the Minister in the chair. But this was merely a step to an end. The 
end was indeed ideological – the minimisation of State intervention – and 
this was expressed by the out-manoeuvring of Fairclough, once his work 
was done, and the implementation of the Guise reforms. The point is that 
research at CERN could be firmly classified as ‘fundamental sc.[ientific] 
endeavour’, as Thatcher wrote, and within the proper role of government 
to fund.180 When the director general of CERN presented the arguments 
to Thatcher, she, now, would write back in relatively supportive terms.181
Thus when, in December 1987, the government heard of a threat by 
‘some, perhaps all, of the independent members’ of the ABRC that they 
would resign if CERN was not funded, the result was not alarm since the 
issue was in fact more or less already resolved,182 although the threat 
remained.183
What is becoming clear from my historical study of 1980s UK sci-
ence policy is that there was a sharp shift in science policy – one that 
separated Thatcher’s early and late years as Prime Minister. Early on, 
say between 1979 and 1987, there were increasing frustrations with the 
unresponsiveness of both civil and military science to markets, and ris-
ing anxieties among ministers about maintaining the state of the ‘science 
base’ as state funding was cut back. Then there was a crystallisation of 
policy: government funding for near-market research was abruptly cur-
tailed (because private industry should step up), and, to balance this, the 
science base, especially ‘curiosity-driven research’ was heralded.184
The details of this history are convoluted, but the proximate steps 
towards the ascendance of ‘curiosity-driven research’ in UK science pol-
icy were as follows. In the early 1980s the common division of science 
into kinds or types had been threefold. As her Chief Scientific Adviser 
Robin Nicholson had briefed Thatcher in 1984:
Basic research is that undertaken primarily to acquire new knowl-
edge, without any particular application in view. Strategic research 
covers the area where basic concepts are established, but where it 
is not yet possible to identify specific products or processes. Applied 
research is directed towards a specific practical aim, such as the 
development of new products or processes.185
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Curiosity in this first phase of Thatcher’s administration was barely men-
tioned. When it was, indeed, the reference was as likely to be derogatory 
as otherwise – such as when, quoted above (p.84), Nicholson had argued 
that, in the context of arguments over CERN, ‘the tax-payers of Europe 
and the USA should have to fund a private race between two scientific 
cliques carried out at a pace determined largely by their own curiosity 
and arrogance’.186
In December 1987 the eminent Cambridge molecular biologist 
Max Perutz laid into the ABRC report A Strategy for the Science Base in 
an article for New Scientist magazine titled ‘How to stifle innovation’.187 
The attack received a warm and immediate reception from the advisers 
closest to Thatcher, notably George Guise, because it squared with the 
new science policy of curtailing near-market research. (It was neverthe-
less criticised, paragraph by paragraph, by others less close.188) Thatcher 
herself read the Perutz article, as we can tell by the blue ink.189 It might 
have particularly provoked her with its mention of monoclonal anti-
bodies – the exemplary case for her of British science’s failure to make 
profits. Thatcher, again, underlined these words in blue. Perutz attacked 
mission-oriented science. He gave a list of great innovations, stating that 
they ‘all arose from basic, curiosity-motivated research’.
Perutz’s arguments in the New Scientist had been prefigured almost 
word-for-word in a September 1987 letter he had written to the leading 
figure of Save British Science, Denis Noble.190 It has the same list (and 
more) of innovations, and the same claim that they ‘all arose from basic, 
curiosity-motivated research’. Noble’s Save British Science, as the adver-
tisement that I quote at the beginning of this book shows, channelled 
anger among academic scientists that ‘basic’ science was in a crisis of 
underfunding. Save British Science’s narrow focus on protecting basic 
science blinded it to the (probably unanticipated) rhetorical support 
its arguments might lend to those seeking the dismantling of support 
for near-market research. Fascinatingly, Perutz went on to hold up his 
own Laboratory of Molecular Biology, under his direction (from 1962 to 
1979) as an exemplar:
My laboratory is often held up as a centre of excellence, but this is 
not because I ever ‘managed’ it. I tried to attract talented people by 
giving them independence, listening to them and taking an interest 
in their work, helping them get what they needed for it and making 
sure they got the credit afterwards. … Had I tried to direct peoples’ 
work, the mediocrities would have stayed and the talented ones 
would have left. The laboratory was never ‘mission-oriented’.
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The brilliance of British science is one of the country’s greatest 
cultural achievements, if not the greatest, but it is a fragile flower 
as I know from Austria, my country of birth. Once destroyed by bad 
politics it cannot be restored.
One of the extraordinary discoveries to have come out of the LMB under 
Perutz was Milstein’s monoclonal antibodies. The story Thatcher was told 
about monoclonal antibodies at Cambridge, the one that she repeated so 
often to illustrate a failure in academic science–industry relations, was 
here presented as a parable of the freedom of the individual – which 
must, ironically, include the freedom to choose not to patent – which in 
turn led to the unfortunate decision on near-market research.
The rejection of government funded near-market research was 
made public in January 1988, when it informed the white paper DTI – the 
Department for Enterprise.191 It was implemented on a department-by-de-
partment basis, for example they were known as the ‘Barnes cuts’ in 
government agricultural research after the person in charge.192 They 
amounted to a removal of 30 per cent of funding by government depart-
ments for science.193 A remarkable feature of this shift in science policy 
was that it was carried out in opposition to the direction of advice coming 
from the two, heavyweight advisory bodies, the ABRC and ACOST. When 
the ACOST (the successor, recall, to ACARD) had written its first commu-
nique to the Prime Minister, it seriously mistook its function. ‘ACOST’s 
starting point,’ wrote the chair Francis Tombs, ‘is that the overall total 
of UK expenditure on civil R&D must be raised over the next 5 years’ – 
not least because ‘other countries are well advanced in their plans for 
increased, targeted government expenditure and incentives to industry to 
capture growing world markets for goods and services based on advanced 
technologies’.194 This, wrote a Number 10 staff member to Thatcher, was 
a ‘most unhelpful letter’. In no uncertain terms Tombs was told that his 
and ACOST’s role was not to advise on overall funding levels, but on pri-
orities. A chastened Tombs came back with a report on ACOST’s work on 
priorities.195 Likewise the ABRC had produced its report A Strategy for the 
Science Base in May 1987. From the outside this might have been taken as 
a statement of the direction of UK science  policy (as the Financial Times 
and Edgerton and Hughes did).196 From within Number 10, however, it 
was precisely the opposite. We have already seen Guise’s complaint about 
the ‘attitude [that] underlies the recent ABRC proposals’ above, and how 
it galvanised the shift in science policy. This is one demonstration of how 
access to previously private primary sources can change what we thought 
we knew.
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A second feature of the shift in science policy was that it was scaf-
folded by anecdotal history of science. It was George Guise who urged 
Thatcher that the end to government-funding of near-market research 
was the right approach to science policy. In March 1988 he was com-
plaining to Thatcher:
Despite the intellectual turnaround of the past few years, despite the 
public rejection of government-funded near market research in the 
recent DTI White Paper, and despite all the talk of ceasing to try to 
pick winners, there is still much muddled thinking both in the ACOST 
letter from Tombs … and in the ABRC strategy for the science base. 
If Ernest Rutherford couldn’t anticipate nuclear fission as a practical 
form of power generation as late as the 1930s, how can ACOST or 
any other quango predict the economic benefit from basic science?197
He cited the JET fusion programme and the fast-breeder project at Doun-
reay as two examples where the ‘real culprit was the intellectual arro-
gance of the whole centralising, long-range winner picking philosophy’.
The same features can be seen in the discussions over the proper 
role, location and funding of the new Interdisciplinary Research Centres 
(IRCs), which had been proposed by the ABRC’s A Strategy for the 
Science Base and backed by ACOST and the Department of Education 
and Science. Thatcher disliked them in practice, considering them too 
bureaucratic; she asked why it ‘should be necessary to set up a new mech-
anism to force scientific disciplines to work together’ and ‘why, if IRCSs 
were successful, they had not been introduced before?’.198 Guise thought 
ACOST and DES displayed the same ‘confused’ and ‘muddled’ thinking. 
Despite the debate being 2,000 years old (Guise cited Plato’s Republic),199 
he could see a clear resolution: government would fund curiosity-driven 
research (which could either be basic200 or, as in the IRCs, ‘strategic and 
exploitable’); technology would be funded by industry; industry would 
not shape (but could fund, in a hands-off manner) the former and gov-
ernment would keep out of the latter. IRCs should be centres of clusters, 
but industry should not seek to direct research, and certainly not ‘seek 
specific answers for an immediate benefit’:
It is … good that industry be encouraged to support IRCs and it is in 
industry’s own general interest to do so. A strong national science 
base, well managed as opposed to economically directed, auto-
matically contributes to high industrial productivity and national 
return on capital. The proximity of the top research establishments 
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in California to Silicon Valley and in Massachusetts to Route 126 
[sic] are not coincidental. Much academic research is funded by 
industry and many of the industrial leaders have their educational 
roots in proximate academies. This partnership did not, however, 
flourish through industry attempting to pre-ordain the outcome of 
the research and pushing funds into what some committee foresaw 
to be commercially exploitable! It was based on identifying and 
supporting high quality team leadership, setting a budget, and then 
leaving well alone – the Perutz approach rather than that of David 
Phillips and Francis Tombs.201
Even Silicon Valley, Guise wrote, implausibly, was the result of curios-
ity-driven research.202 The critical point was that Guise and Thatcher 
regarded State intervention as deeply undesirable, and this included 
public funding for near-market research. The ideological desire to 
remove the State’s role from funding much applied research was the 
obverse of the new enthusiasm for ‘curiosity-driven research’. They were 
two sides of the same science policy coin. ‘Curiosity’, especially since the 
late 1980s, in contrast to how it is often perceived – a neutral, child-
like motivation common to scientists – had become a term wielded for 
 political purpose.
Thatcher’s new policy was fully expressed in her famous Royal 
Society speech of 27 September 1988. In the crucial months lead-
ing up to the speech, it is clear that the Chief Scientific Adviser, John 
Fairclough, had far less access to and influence on the Prime Minister 
on science  policy matters than had Guise; he was ‘excluded, apart from 
written  comments’ for a crucial six months.203 Thatcher’s speech, which 
took place in the Fishmongers’ Hall in the City of London rather than at 
the Society’s headquarters, is remembered today primarily for her call to 
arms on anthropogenic climate change. (That, discussed in Chapter 7, 
by the way, was another abrupt turn for Thatcher; there is documentary 
evidence to suggest she was a leading sceptic in 1979).204 But the other 
important announcement was on curiosity:
Of course, the nation as a whole must support the discovery of basic 
scientific knowledge through Government finance. But there are 
difficult choices and I should like to make just three points.
First, although basic science can have colossal economic rewards, 
they are totally unpredictable. And therefore the rewards cannot be 
judged by immediate results. Nevertheless the value of Faraday’s 
work today must be higher than the capitalisation of all the shares 
on the Stock Exchange!
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Indeed it is astonishing how quickly the benefits of curiosity 
driven research sometimes appear. …
Second, no nation has unlimited funds, and it will have even less 
if it wastes them. …
So what projects to support? Politicians can’t decide and heaven 
knows it is difficult enough for our own Advisory Body of Scientists 
to say yea or nay to the many applications. I have always had a great 
deal of sympathy for Max Perutz’s view that we should be ready to 
support those teams, however small, which can demonstrate the 
intellectual flair and leadership which is driven by intense curiosity 
and dedication.205
She concluded:
Mr. President, this country will be judged by its contribution to knowl-
edge and its capacity to turn that knowledge to advantage. It is only 
when industry and academia recognise and mobilise each other’s 
strengths that the full intellectual energy of Britain will be released.
It is this speech that gives us the modern prominence of curiosity-driven 
research, a survey of a large corpus of literature shows a sharp inflexion 
in frequency of use on the late 1980s and a subsequent tenfold rise.206
After the reversal
In late 1988, science policy discussions in Number 10 continued to be a 
pattern of Tombs (as chair of ACOST) and Fairclough (as GCSA) seeking 
influence while Guise acted as a critical gatekeeper to Thatcher. Topics 
under debate included the Isis neutron facility at the Rutherford Appleton 
Laboratory, defence research and priorities in the science base. On Isis, 
Fairclough gave an upbeat report on the Isis facility (previously Spallation 
Neutron Source), which had been opened by Thatcher in 1985. It was, he 
wrote, ‘a world class instrument … acknowledged as the best pulsed neu-
tron (and muon) source in the world … supporting basic research in the 
core sciences. It is backing good people and ideas, with no pre-set selec-
tion by subjects … [while] the bulk of the work is in those strategic areas 
of chemistry, physics and materials science which in the long term could 
be of interest to industry’.207 Users were scientists from the UK (nearly 60 
per cent), but also from other countries, which contributed financially. He 
added that demand for beamtime outstripped supply. But to Guise this 
was evidence that ‘foreign users do not pay their own fair share’:
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If ISIS were a facility in the private sector with such an enormous 
backlog of unsatisfied demand, there would probably be a clamour 
for Government to regulate it in order to prevent monopoly profits! 
The back of commensurate foreign revenues at ISIS is typical of the 
reluctance of scientists to think about financial efficiency. … The 
whole history of ISIS shows how naïve Britain can be when turning 
its leadership to financial advantage.208
On defence R&D (last an issue troubling Number 10 in the proposal for 
a modest reallocation from defence to civil budgets and in the SDI pro-
posals), Tombs reported ACOST’s latest analysis.209 The concern again 
was how to obtain greater benefits for the civil economy. But now the 
argument focused on the proportion of ‘dual-use’ R&D, the meaning of 
which here was ‘enabling’ research that could equally well find civil as 
defence applications. ACOST had found that only one-fifth of UK defence 
R&D was dual-use in this sense. More would benefit the civil economy 
(through spin-offs) but also the military (who would benefit from com-
petition from more providers). There was also a problem in the ‘absence 
of an organisation to provide and be accountable for the technological 
oversight of the overall process of translating Services’ needs into opera-
tional systems’.
On the science base, Fairclough sought a meeting with Thatcher 
to discuss various next steps (rearranging and even unifying research 
councils, encouraging the civil research establishments to be more 
competitive and flexible, allowing ACOST to ‘develop a more respon-
sive role to Government in order to balance its other more wide rang-
ing and long-term work’).210 Guise was critical and, given that Thatcher 
had ‘made the Government’s position crystal clear’, doubted even that 
a meeting between Prime Minister and her Chief Scientific Adviser was 
a ‘necessity’.211 He declared that ACOST ‘continues to live in a world 
favouring centralised action by UK Ltd to ensure that the country is 
competitive in its innovation policy’. It hankered after government sup-
port for technology. And it barely commented on science. ‘Perhaps it 
should be renamed ACOT’, he joked. ‘ACOST,’ he went on, ‘ought to be 
thinking of questions like:
 (i) In which sciences in Britain ahead of the world?
(ii) How is such a ranking measured
- by usefulness?
- by Nobel Prizes?
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- by number of papers published?
- by numbers of university departments?
(iii)  How do we reconcile the Perutz principle of supporting indi-
viduals and small teams who are making breakthroughs with 
the principle of concentrating funding in areas where Britain is 
already ahead?
(iv)  How can the value for money in basic science be measured if com-
mercial exploitation is not a key parameter? (Has ACOST ever 
thought about how many telescopes British astronomy should sup-
port? The astronomers will want one for every hill in Hawaii while 
the non-astronomers will regard all of them as a colossal waste of 
money!)
(v)  How do we ensure that organisations like the Rutherford Apple-
ton laboratory or CERN or the Laboratory of Molecular Biology at 
Cambridge which produce excellent science are run efficiently?212
On the civil research establishments, and Fairclough’s call for sup-
porting more managerial flexibility, Guise responded that it was ‘well 
intentioned but naïve’:
It is fine to set up certain specific activities as prototype businesses, 
and research establishments are ideal candidates, provided that the 
ultimate goal is privatisation. However they should become agen-
cies only for a clear defined bridging period and not as a perpetual 
limbo where their costs will go out of control. The litmus test of 
whether an organisation is truly subject to the raw, real forces of 
competition is whether it can go bankrupt. All else is mimicry of the 
true market world of the private sector.213
All these points were made in the run up to E(ST) Cabinet committee 
meetings, the central forum for decision-making in UK science policy in 
this period. Guise worked hard, even when Thatcher wobbled. In Janu-
ary 1989 he wrote
you expressed your concern about Government policy on science 
… You were also worried that by championing basic science and 
totally renouncing near market research, Government may fur-
ther harm the nation’s competitiveness. My belief is that we have 
already done harm to British innovation by removing much of the 
R&D burden from industry since the war. That which is not paid for, 
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or earned, is rarely valued and the poor status of engineers today is 
in part because industry has not had to pay for and nurture them in 
order to stay ahead in the market place.
Meanwhile, the engineers and would-be technical innovators 
have formed cabals whose prime purpose is to get money out of 
Government for technical research. …
Unless the managements of our businesses face the raw, real forces 
of competition, and accept that they cannot win without developing 
and paying for technical research themselves, Britain will continue 
to underperform.
It is a vicious circle. The more Government featherbeds technical 
research, the less top management will value it and the lower our 
innovative standing will be. Those in ACOST and ABRC and the 
endless quangos who lobby Government for technical support will 
continue to present this as evidence that more money is needed. 
The cure has been exacerbating the illness!214
Guise urged Thatcher to be resolved. ‘Among the basic science community 
your standing is extremely high,’ he said, adding that this was because 
‘You are regarded as an ally against the forces of bureaucracy and cen-
tralisation’. Against ACOST and ABRC was, suggested Guise (again going 
back to Perutz), the individual:
We have all fallen into a logical type confusion about ‘picking win-
ners’. What we should foreswear is the picking of winners by rank-
ing the potential economic benefit of basic work … We shall always 
have to pick individuals and decide how their efforts can best be 
financed. It is this kind of individual winner that you need to see …
The Cabinet Secretary attempted to heal the rift between the sides of 
Thatcher (and Guise) on the one hand and ACOST, ABRC and Fairclough 
on the other. ‘The Government – you, John Fairclough and ACOST – are 
struggling to make a big change in the Government’s R and D priorities; 
and by past standards big changes are being made,’ he noted, inclusively; 
ACOST were
not, in my view, ‘picking winners’ in the sense of super-imposing 
their view on those of the scientists and enforcing their view by the 
allocation of funds: they are recommending priorities and encour-
aging industry and research to come closer together with a more 
deliberate aim.215
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‘Fairclough and ACOST want very much to help,’ he emphasised, urging 
Thatcher to meet with her Chief Scientific Adviser. (‘He is the only Chief 
Scientist we have for the time being and if he is to be effective he needs to 
know, from you, how you think.’ chipped in Thatcher’s Principal Private 
Secretary.)216
Thatcher did begin to meet again with her GCSA, Fairclough and 
her chair of ACOST, Sir Francis Tombs. She was briefed by Fairclough 
about ACOST and met Tombs, prior to Thatcher herself chairing a meet-
ing of ACOST, held on 1 February 1989. She raised with Tombs a number 
of concerns: she felt money was going to the ‘big battalions’ rather than 
individuals (‘the people most likely to make scientific breakthroughs’; the 
IRCs were ‘too bureaucratic’; ‘industry was still not undertaking enough 
near-market and product research’ (despite the ‘salutary effect that could 
often follow when Government-funding was reduced’); Britain was fall-
ing behind on Nobel Prizes; and whether enough research was being 
undertaken on the environment.217 Tombs replied that ‘ACOST would 
welcome suggestions from the Prime Minister on issues and areas of 
work that she would like to be pursued’. Thatcher said she would give it 
further thought, but did make one suggestion (ironically one that would 
be the centre of a major controversy for her successor): ‘we seemed to be 
entering a period of much greater difficulty over bacterial disease in food 
production and preparation’.
ACOST offered its first set of advice on national priorities in 1989, 
although it took the government until the following year to respond. The 
topics addressed energy R&D, increasing the level of civil R&D, increasing 
the number of science and mathematics teachers, deepened analysis of 
industrial R&D and manpower, a more active role for the DTI, continued 
support for LINK and EUREKA and more support for global environmental 
research. Many of the suggestions were incremental, and even then some of 
these were declined in the government’s response.218 The response was very 
much in line with the government’s core science policy strategies of reining 
in government funding of near-market research, discouraging government 
departments to take interventionist leads into matters appropriate for pri-
vate industry and reducing bureaucracy. For example, ACOST’s request to 
deepen surveys of industry’s expenditure on ‘technologies and on qualified 
scientific and engineering manpower’ – information necessary to a more 
interventionist industrial strategy – was rebuffed with the explanation that 
the government did not want to increase the ‘form-filling burden on firms, 
particularly small businesses’.
Thatcher also complained of bureaucracy and waste in another pro-
ject. In March 1989 Kenneth Baker wrote to her expressing his support for 
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a major new capital project from the Medical Research Council. This pro-
ject was to move the Clinical Research Centre to the Royal Postgraduate 
Medical School, creating a new National Centre for Clinical Research and 
Training, built in Hammersmith, London, at an estimated cost of £48.5 
million. The MRC considered this weaving together of basic science, clin-
ical research and teaching essential to reverse a declining trend. ‘The 
amalgamation would produce more than the sum of its parts,’ argued 
Baker, because it would ‘bring together on one site in multidisciplinary 
groups and in a clinical research environment the top scientists, clini-
cians and teachers’, and thereby ‘enhance the cross-fertilisation of basic 
research and work with patients and speed up the clinical application of 
scientific advances’.219 The influence would be long term. It would ‘mould 
our future leaders in academic clinical medicine who will in their turn 
train our next generation of doctors and researchers, who will then go 
on to disseminate the new approach and establish centres of excellence 
throughout the UK’. The ABRC also backed the plan.
Thatcher hated it. ‘A total and deliberate waste of money designed 
to pre-empt a decision which must not be taken’, she wrote of Baker’s 
allocation of seed money, adding:
No – this will be £2m wasted. The excellence of research does not 
depend on the extravagance of the building. You will be stopping 
an overwhelming amount of research by spending this amount of 
money on bricks and mortar. What a waste.220
The proposal was subsequently watered down, although the Prime Min-
ister remained hostile.221
Distaste for bureaucracy also probably contributed to Thatcher’s 
approval of a rearrangement of the research council system in the late 1980s. 
In 1988 the ABRC had begun a review to examine overlapping responsibili-
ties, initially restricted to the biological sciences, which were seen as of grow-
ing importance. However the outcome, the ‘Morris’ report of April 1989 
(named after its chair, the head of the engineering company Brown and 
Root), went further. It called for a single National Research Council, with six 
only ‘semi-autonomous’ divisions, ‘overseen and co-ordinated by a holding 
Board and Director-General’.222 In parallel, the suggestion that the AFRC and 
NERC be merged was made by the House of Lords Science and Technology 
Select Committee. Since the single National Research Council would require 
substantial legislation, while parliamentary time was scarce, the Morris 
proposal was not followed (if it had been, then something very similar to 
today’s UKRI would have been established). Instead an alternative plan 
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was offered: slim down the ABRC (from 26 to 14 members), but strengthen 
the secretariat and give the whole a ‘more explicit remit to improve coor-
dination and joint working’ among the research councils, and approve the 
merger between AFRC and NERC.223 Subject to her stipulation that NERC’s 
distinctive polar and climate model work was protected, Thatcher approved 
the reconstitution of the ABRC and, perhaps significantly, gave the reduc-
tion in membership an emphatic blue tick.224 The merger of AFRC and NERC 
however immediately ‘produced much steam from Departments’, and Guise 
advised that Morris’s call for a single National Research Council had ‘con-
notations of centralisation and enhanced bureaucratic control’ – even (and 
here he quoted Max Perutz) ‘Kremlinisation’.225 Nevertheless it represented a 
‘healthy piece of fresh thinking’, for shaking up science’s bureaucracy. Guise 
also suggested that Sir David Phillips, as the continuing head of the reconsti-
tuted ABRC, should be ‘given a private but clear remit to develop within two 
years practical proposals for pushing down the allocation of research funds 
nearer the workface’.
Thatcher chaired another meeting of ACOST in March 1990, and 
in preparation carefully read and annotated reports on ‘adaptive biology’ 
(how evolution of organisms might be affected by climate change), for a 
meeting that also discussed the science base and advanced manufactur-
ing technology. While relationships between Prime Minister and advisers 
settled down in 1990, it was still the case that the Number 10 Policy Unit 
and ACOST were, in a sense, competitors in shaping science and industrial 
policy. A case in point was with advanced manufacturing. ACOST pointed 
to the low increases in productivity in the UK since the 1960s and called for 
modest initiatives to enhance industry awareness of advanced manufac-
turing technologies, but also advocated for the establishment of a national 
centre.226 Guise thought these were ‘the same old thinly disguised argu-
ments for near market research funding by Government’. He backed this 
up by circulating to Thatcher the views of the professor of manufacturing 
systems at the University of Warwick, S. K. Bhattacharyya – closely aligned 
to those of Guise.227 Thatcher visited Bhattacharyya and Guise continued 
to hold him up as an exemplary figure, one who ‘doesn’t want or use any 
Government funding’.228 (For Guise on climate change, see Chapter 7.)
In July 1990 Thatcher met Lord Tombs, the chair of ACOST again. 
Fairclough and Guise were both present. Tombs pushed for an extra £100 
million for basic science, half to renew increasingly ‘badly run down’ 
equipment, and half to be used by heads of department to support young 
scientists.229 Fairclough described the case for the extra cash as ‘compel-
ling’, but also noted that ACOST ‘did not face up to the question of where 
the money should be found for this top priority if the public expenditure 
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situation did not permit additional funding’.230 He thought it should be 
transferred from defence R&D and from the Department of Energy’s 
nuclear research budget. Guise supported such a transfer, because it rep-
resented a ‘re-allocation to basic science from applied and defence R&D’. 
But he was much more concerned about continued foot-dragging on the 
broader issue of principle. ‘There remain backwoodsmen in the DTI,’ he 
informed Thatcher, ‘who never really accepted the policy of Government 
being the principle supporter of basic science with industry funding near 
market research.’231 Later in the year Guise could be heard complaining of 
ACOST’s continued backing of government funding for advanced manu-
facturing research (‘the whole things read like Wilsonian plans from the 
sixties’), while warning that an initiative from Peter Lilley to assist inno-
vation in small and medium-sized businesses ‘smells like near-market 
research’.232 Perhaps, wondered, Guise, ACOST should abolish itself?
By September 1990 Fairclough had departed. He was replaced as 
GCSA by Professor William Stewart. Tombs also went, and in returned 
Robin Nicholson, the ex-GCSA now chair of ACOST. On 28 November 
1990 Thatcher, too, had gone. Guise followed her soon after.
Conclusion
The major finding of this chapter is that there was a profound shift in 
science policy and industrial strategy in 1987, in which near govern-
ment-funded near-market research was cut and curiosity-driven basic 
science championed. This was driven by the arguments of the Number 
10 Policy Unit, specifically those of George Guise, in opposition to tradi-
tional, long-standing sources of advice. The contrast is stark. At the pub-
lic seminar on science, technology and industry on 12 September 1983, 
Thatcher had proudly spoken in her opening speech of how ‘we [the gov-
ernment] spend money to stimulate the development of science-based 
products, and to help bring them to the market-place. Spending on 
this has increased by nearly 20 percent in real terms over the past four 
years’.233 Tension over science policy had built up through the 1980s and 
had played out in fierce internal arguments over issues such as defence 
research, cuts to the ‘science base’ and CERN. By 1984 there was a feel-
ing of stalemate. The Chief Scientific Adviser considered the science base 
to be in danger of fast erosion, the debate over small sums of defence 
research for universities had become a distraction and there was a grow-
ing conviction, exemplified in Thatcher’s mind by the case of monoclonal 
antibodies, that the root problem was a failure to translate basic research 
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into commercial products. For example, at a meeting on the science 
budget on 3 May 1984 it was recorded that the ‘Prime Minister said it was 
unsatisfactory that Britain had made such advances in basic science but 
had failed to develop profitable applications’.234 The new research policy 
after 1987 resolved some of this tension, while being aligned to broader 
Thatcherite ideological commitments to privatisation and a reduced role 
of the state.
All this happened largely behind closed doors. The public debate 
centred on the decreasing morale of scientists, risks of a new brain drain 
and the threat to ‘basic’ research that came from the cuts in university 
funding. This public debate peaked between the rebellion of the scientists 
under the Save British Science banner in January 1986 and opposition to 
the ABRC’s A Strategy for the Science Base in 1987. Narrowly focused on 
protecting basic science, and with a unsophisticated model of innovation, 
this movement provided unwitting cover for the reversal in science pol-
icy – and occasionally, as in the case of Perutz, lent it valuable ammuni-
tion. The institutions that sought entry to express the scientists’ voice at 
the heart of government – whether elite and traditional, as in the Royal 
Society, or grass roots, such as Save British Science – struggled, or in the 
case of the latter were rebuffed.235 Likewise the public debate around the 
reorientation of university funding – the University Grants Committee 
was replaced in 1988 by a University Funding Council, ‘a body numer-
ically dominated by people from commerce and industry, with only a 
sprinkling of academics’236 – focused on a perception of centralisation 
and direction, when in fact the private decisions show that possibility of 
industrial direction of basic science was being denied.
It is important to note that alternative models were articulated in 
competition right at the heart of government. One example was ACARD’s 
plan, the product of several years’ work, put forward in its 1985 report on 
‘exploitable areas of science’.237 This plan called for the prioritised areas 
to be supported and efforts ‘to guide a fairly high proportion of that part 
of the national scientific resource paid for by the taxpayer’. Technology 
was the ‘bridge’ between science and the production of goods; it needed 
to be studied in depth, supported and built well. Therefore ACARD called 
for a centre for comprehensive science and technology assessment to 
provide and share ‘a broad view of the inter-relation of developments 
in scientific knowledge and market trends’ to provide the knowledge for 
such wise steersmanship. Such centres, it was claimed, could be found 
in economic rivals Japan, France and the United States. Academics at 
SPRU produced working examples of what foresight would look like.238 
The then Chief Scientific Adviser, Robin Nicholson, had supported the 
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plan to forecast and guide, and had tried to reassure Thatcher that it 
was ‘not about bureaucrats telling scientists what basic research to do’, 
it was ‘not about “coordination” to remove decision-taking responsibil-
ities from where they properly belong’ and ‘most emphatically, it is not 
about bureaucrats “picking winners”’.239 He protested too much. It was 
precisely this comprehensive industrial strategy for exploiting science 
that, once Nicholson had gone, his successor John Fairclough sidelined 
and that, once Guise had Thatcher’s ear, would be rejected.
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Coda
AIDS and bioethics
In her first term as Prime Minister, Thatcher was confronted first by AIDS, 
a new, devastating and rapidly spreading disease for which there were 
few, if any, precedents and second by a crisis point in how society should 
regulate biomedical research, especially the use of, and research on, 
human embryos. In both the AIDS and bioethics cases Thatcher inter-
vened only occasionally, and her responses were often moralistic in tone: 
a survey should be stopped because it offended and intruded into peo-
ple’s private lives, specific types of embryo research should be prohibited 
because she found them repulsive in character. In neither case did she 
invoke her reserved right to answer questions on ‘science matters’ – nor 
did her central advisers or external parties approach her, as they some-
times did, as I have shown, ‘as a scientist’.
Commentators have suggested a connection between policies pur-
sued and a broader Thatcherite ideology in both instances: in the case of 
AIDS in terms of traditional or even ‘Victorian’ family values, and in the 
case of bioethics in a rejection of self-regulating professional expertise. 
There is something in both of these positions, as I explore, but there is 
also a sense in which neither of these science-related issues was at all 
typical of how science policy was developed under Thatcher. While to the 
public AIDS and embryo research were perhaps the two most high-profile 
science-related issues of the 1980s, to the government, in the ways they 
were deliberated and handled, they were exceptional and atypical.
AIDS
The realisation that young, urban, homosexual men in the United States, 
presenting symptoms including various infections, loss of weight, fever, 
enlargement of lymph glands and rare cancers, were cases of a new 
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disease happened in 1981. First labelled gay-related immune deficiency 
(GRID), the condition was given the name of Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS) in August 1982. Once recognised, earlier cases 
began to be identified and, over time, a pattern of transmission from 
Africa was traced. Pictures of the spread of the disease are therefore time 
dependent. In 1985 it was thought that in 1979 there were 11 known 
cases, 10 in the United States and one in the United Kingdom. In Brit-
ain the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre, a body with its roots 
in the late nineteenth century1 and part of the Public Health Laboratory 
Service, began national surveillance of AIDS in 1982, part of an interna-
tional network. In 1983 French and American scientists independently 
isolated a virus as the cause. In early UK official documents the virus 
was first referred to as HTLVIII (the name used by one of the American 
teams, under Robert Gallo). For clarity, however, I will use the name HIV 
(Human Immunodeficiency Virus) that became the international taxo-
nomic standard in 1986.
In the mid-1980s it was thought that the first reported case of 
AIDS in the UK was in 1979, and that by July 1985 this had risen to 196, 
of whom 110 had died. The Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson, 
estimated that there were 10,000 people infected with HIV, while up to 
2,000 cases of the fully developed disease were expected within three 
years.2 ‘The majority of these persons are in London and the number is 
increasing perhaps at the rate of 50–100 per week,’ reported Acheson. 
‘People infected with [HIV] … are usually free of symptoms for many 
months or years, are unaware of their infections, but are neverthe-
less infectious … [An] exponential increase in the number of infected 
persons can be expected.’3 London hospitals became the main centres 
of treatment, notably St Mary’s (Paddington), St Thomas’ (Lambeth), 
Middlesex (Fitzrovia) and St Stephen’s (Chelsea). While homosexual 
men were the main group, other ‘at risk groups’ were identified as 
cases became known: haemophiliacs (also almost exclusively male) 
who were treated with repeated injections of the Factor VIII clot-
ting agent, intravenous drug users, recipients of blood transfusions, 
female partners of homosexual and bisexual men, children of infected 
mothers and health care workers. There was no cure or vaccine. ‘Plans 
should be based on the assumption that no means will be available to 
prevent the disease by immunisation in the next five years,’ warned 
Acheson.
Measures instigated by the government in response to AIDS 
included formulating and distributing centralised expert advice, gen-
eral public education and specific information campaigns, targeted 
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biomedical research and a reorganisation of blood donation and trans-
fusion services. The government also considered screening visitors from 
Africa and the United States, starting with students coming to the coun-
try on British Council schemes.
An Expert Advisory Group on AIDS was established in February 
1985, chaired by Donald Acheson, to watch and comment on all 
aspects of the disease, while an interdepartmental group of senior civil 
servants was later established to advise a Steering Group of ministers 
on the wider implications (‘for employers and employees, life insur-
ance, education, certain occupational groups, and so on’).4 Examples 
of the issuing of advice from the centre included such acts as the Chief 
Medical Officer sending a letter to all doctors in England on matters of 
‘information on groups at risk, clinical presentation and diagnosis and 
measures to prevent the spread of the infection’, or the Chief Nursing 
Officer contacting professional nursing organisations, and then on to 
members, about community care of AIDS patients.5 Government fund-
ing went into general information campaigns, for example Some Facts 
about AIDS from the Health Education Council – a body that was inde-
pendent of government, but had members that were appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Health and a budget that was largely supported 
by public money.6 There were also pamphlets on specific aspects, such 
as being a haemophiliac or a blood donor.7 Counselling, such as that 
developed and provided through the Terrence Higgins Trust, also 
received government funds, for example £10,000 in 1985 and £25,000 
already given.
The biomedical research effort was coordinated and funded by the 
Medical Research Council, starting in mid-1983, with contributions from 
the Department of Health and Social Security. About £430,000 was spent 
by 1985. The MRC requested and received an extra £1 million to spend 
over 1987/88. Most AIDS research was funded and carried out by private 
pharmaceutical companies. However, it was also the case that research 
funding for AIDS was judged against other claims. In particular, when a 
small tranche of extra research funding (£15 million) was made availa-
ble to British science in 1985, the ABRC advised
That it would not be appropriate for any of the new money … 
to be diverted to the epidemiological research programme [on 
AIDS]. We understand that the additional £15m was secured 
to meet the twin objectives of sustaining strategic research of 
industrial relevance and helping to halt the brain drain of tal-
ented British scientists. The Board could not advise that the AIDS 
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epidemiological research would have a high priority against 
these criteria.8
While the point was partly tactical, to pressure DHSS to provide more of 
its own funds, it also reveals the middling priority given to AIDS research, 
compared to the issues of industrial strategy considered in the Chapter 3, 
even as the full-scale AIDS crisis was emerging.
Blood supply was systematically reorganised. Groups at risk were 
discouraged from donating blood. Intensive effort was made to find tests 
for HIV in order to screen donated blood passing through the National 
Blood Transfusion Service. These tests were expected to be in operation 
by October 1985, although the question of whether the results of tests 
should be made known to donors was yet to be resolved. Haemophiliacs, 
by their nature likely to be frequent recipients not only of donated blood, 
but also of extracted blood products such as the blood-clotting protein 
Factor VIII, were a particularly problematic group. In 1985 the plan was 
to heat treat Factor VIII for haemophiliacs, but also take steps to ensure 
that the UK was self-sufficient in blood products, necessitating a major 
£38 million expansion of the Blood Products Centre at Elstree. In 1987, 
against the wishes of John Major, then at the Treasury, the government 
offered compensation to haemophiliacs infected with HIV by the Factor 
VIII injections.9
Much of this government activity was led by the Minister of State 
for Health, Barney Hayhoe. Thatcher was kept informed, by reading doc-
uments and a briefing from Acheson, and she occasionally asked to see 
scientific papers on AIDS.10 She also did not think that the administrative 
machinery needed to be brought into the Cabinet committee network, as 
Robert Armstrong had suggested, so that the Prime Minister might ‘keep 
on eye on what is going on’, but could be serviced at a distance from the 
centre by the Department of Health and Social Security.11 Hayhoe’s pub-
lic stance was largely to be reassuring:
The Government fully understands the public concern about AIDS. 
We are tackling the disease on a broad front and, with the contin-
uing co-operation of those in the at-risk groups. I am hopeful that 
we will be able to control the spread of the disease and reduce the 
appalling suffering which accompanies it.12
‘We have to walk a difficult tightrope between being accused of bureau-
cratic inertia and being so active as to whip up public hysteria,’ David 
Willetts of the Number 10 Policy Unit advised Thatcher. ‘Barney Hayhoe’s 
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announcement gets it about right.’13 But Willetts also wondered whether 
Thatcher might want to open the new Elstree centre. ‘It combines attrac-
tive themes,’ he said, explaining that these included ‘high quality British 
science, action to protect innocent [sic] victims of AIDS and spending on 
health infrastructure’. Mark Addison, Thatcher’s private secretary, also 
equated haemophilia with innocence and purity (and therefore, implic-
itly, homosexuality with guilt and impurity):
The lab will ensure that haemophiliacs can be supplied from our 
own pure sources with special blood plasma, to protect them from 
becoming innocent victims of AIDS. … My own feeling is that the 
Prime Minister should stay clear of AIDS (!), even when it is a ques-
tion of opening laboratories to help innocent victims. If she is going 
to do a medical visit, I should prefer to suggest opening a hospital, 
or a home for children with incurable diseases, etc.14
Thatcher’s direct interventions into AIDS policy were not about the sci-
ence, high quality of otherwise. Instead, they became more motivated, it 
seems, by moral revulsions, public perceptions of the role of government 
and her understanding of concerns about family and privacy. I will give 
two examples.
The first related to advertisements that Norman Fowler, a minister 
at DHSS, intended placing in Sunday newspapers in February/March 
1986. They were ‘explicit and distasteful’, thought Willetts, but the AIDS 
‘problem [was] … now so serious that we must do as he proposes’.15 ‘Do 
we have to do the section on risky sex?’ queried Thatcher. ‘I should have 
thought it could do immense harm if young teenagers were to read it.’16 
On this occasion Acheson, Chief Medical Officer, refused to back down. 
He argued that the ‘passages … contained the essence of the message 
that he needed to get across; and that in his professional judgement their 
inclusion in the publicity was vital’.17 Thatcher then wondered if it might 
breach the Obscene Publications Act. Yet a conviction under this Act 
required that a publication had to tend to ‘deprave and corrupt’ and the 
Act also contained an exemption on grounds of ‘public good’. The Home 
Office did not think the publication of the advert would be obscene. 
Thatcher responded again:
I remain against certain parts of this advertisement. I think the 
anxiety on the part of parents – and many teenagers who would 
never be in danger from Aids – exceeds the good it may do. It 
would be better in my view to follow the ‘VD’ precedent of putting 
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notices in public lavatories etc. But adverts where every young 
person could read and learn of practices they never knew about 
will do harm.18
Thatcher finally relented when the words ‘and should be avoided’ were 
added after the line ‘Rectal sex involves the highest risk’. The adverts 
appeared in all national Sunday and daily newspapers on 16 and 17 
March and 6 and 7 April 1986. Not a single public complaint was lodged. 
The ‘Don’t aid AIDS’ adverts were followed by a leaflet, AIDS: Don’t Die 
of Ignorance, which was sent to every household in the UK, at a cost of 
£2 million. Thatcher initially opposed this mail drop, which was delayed 
until January 1987.19 When it eventually happened it was accompanied 
by poster and television campaigns, but Thatcher ruled out use of a Cate-
gory 1 Ministerial broadcast – a rare public emergency measure, last used 
under Callaghan.
If some in government thought the government’s own public edu-
cation campaigns were distasteful, then this was revulsion was doubled 
when some of the more independent AIDS advice was reviewed. The 
completely explicit National AIDS Manual, produced by the National 
AIDS Trust (funded in part by the Home Office) and written by Peter 
Scott, was described by Professor Brian Griffiths of the Number 10 Policy 
Unit as ‘pornographic … this material legitimises all kinds of deviant 
 behaviour’.20 Thatcher agreed that the ‘borderline between the permis-
sible and the pornographic would seem to have been crossed’ and felt 
‘strongly that a publication of this sort should not be financed from 
Government funding’.21
The second intervention concerned a survey. In February 1989 the 
H(A) Cabinet committee had agreed that more information was needed 
about the population’s sexual attitudes and behaviour to inform further 
AIDS campaigns. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and 
the Health Education Authority (formerly Council) explored what an 
arms-length survey might consist of: both bodies expected the results to 
make an important contribution. In July 1989 David Mellor, successor but 
one to Barney Hayhoe as Minister of State, Health, therefore proposed 
a large-scale survey, saying that government ‘need[ed] information for 
forecasts of the likely future spread of the HIV epidemic’.22 The expert 
committees, as well as Acheson, the Chief Medical Officer, agreed that 
there was a ‘scientific case for a survey on the scale proposed … anything 
smaller would not include sufficient numbers from relevant sub-groups in 
the population to provide the information for forecasts which is needed’. 
The survey, judged Acheson, would significantly narrow statistical 
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predictions of the number of AIDS cases, allow mathematical models to 
look further ahead, enable forecasts of HIV positives to be made (‘none 
currently exist’) and forecasts of heterosexual spread, again ‘where none 
exist at present’.23
The government, Mellor proposed, because of the interest of the 
departments of Health, should directly provide £200,000 out of a total 
cost of £810,000. The rest would be research council funding and there-
fore the ESRC’s responsibility. Mellor, recognising that there might be an 
adverse public reaction to the government asking 20,000 people about 
their sexual practices, suggested finessing the presentation, a sort of dis-
cretion by omission:
Health Departments’ interest in the survey would not be printed 
on the questionnaire, nor would people be told about it in the 
interview, unless they asked. If they did ask then they would be 
told that Government were providing some financial support for 
the survey and the reasons for this would be given. Respondents 
would also be assured that their individual anonymity would be 
guaranteed.24
Thatcher, however, was against the survey in any form. ‘I doubt the need 
for this survey,’ she wrote. ‘I should have thought that there is so much 
information available now from the US that we could use that. Also – 
we have been severely criticised for some of the things we have done in 
this programme [to curb AIDS]’.25 She also thought respondents’ answers 
would be unreliable. When it was suggested that US data could not be 
read across to describe the UK’s sexual behaviour, Thatcher gave her 
third reason to rule out the survey:
I think people rightly would be deeply offended by questions of 
this kind and I do NOT think we are entitled to intrude into their 
privacy. Neither Government, nor Government money should be 
involved in any way – if this survey goes ahead.26
‘The decision not to put any Government money into the survey will 
be very controversial,’ noted a DHSS civil servant, ‘and the announce-
ment will require very careful planning and handling.’27 Yet when it was 
announced, the Wellcome Trust stepped in to cover the missing funds. 
The Wellcome funding story was scooped by the Independent before the 
Trust’s courtesy heads up had reached the Prime Minister, to the charita-
ble foundation’s embarrassment.28
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Overall then the AIDS issue was one in which the Prime Minister 
did not invoke her right to respond on science-related matters. In the 
case of the public education campaigns she regarded the explicit detail 
with distaste, citing the innocence of teenagers. In the case of the survey, 
she intervened to prevent direct government money going towards the 
gathering of factual data that her expert advisers regarded as very impor-
tant, although she made no attempt to interfere with the choices of the 
research council involved (it was therefore not a breach of the so-called 
Haldane principle, as has been implied).29 Rights to privacy and concern 
for adverse public reaction (which would have been led by criticisms in 
the right-wing press) were the two reasons she gave. Despite the immen-
sity and suddenness of the AIDS crisis it was not, for Thatcher, one of 
major science issues of her term.
Bioethics
Historian Duncan Wilson locates the origin of the term ‘bioethics’ – in the 
sense we use it today, as the ‘ethical scrutiny of specific problems raised 
by medicine and the biological sciences’ – to the work of the Dutch obste-
trician André Hellegers and the political activist Sargent Shriver in the 
very early 1970s.30 The persuasive view was that bioethics could not be 
left to medical practitioners or biomedical scientists alone, but rather that 
policy should be formed by a wider range of people. While it flourished 
in the United States and other countries, Wilson notes that bioethics, ‘did 
not gain currency in Britain until the 1980s, when increasing numbers of 
philosophers, lawyers and theologians became actively involved in the 
public discussion of medicine and biology, the teaching of professional 
ethics and the development of regulatory guidelines’.31
The period of Thatcher’s prime ministership is therefore the context 
for the entrenchment of bioethics in Britain. Indeed Wilson goes further 
and links the ideas and influence of two key bioethicists to Conservative 
values and projects. First, the academic lawyer Ian Kennedy, ‘who was the 
most high-profile advocate of the approach he explicitly termed “bioethics” 
… was influential because [his endorsement of bioethics] dovetailed with 
the Conservative government’s neoliberal belief that professions should 
be exposed to outside scrutiny to make them publicly accountable’.32 
Kennedy called for ‘outside scrutiny’ of medicine by a supervisory ‘board of 
committee’ in his BBC Reith lectures in 1980, and followed it up with the 
observation that ‘only someone who is free from any claims which med-
ical professional loyalty may make on his objectivity … can successfully 
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examine the institution of medicine’.33 Second, the philosopher Mary 
Warnock, who would lead the most important political and ethical inter-
vention into regulating biomedicine, specifically embryo research and IVF, 
in Britain in the 1980s, also chimed with ‘how the Conservative govern-
ment prioritised “non-expert” involvement in public inquiries into science 
and medicine during the 1980s’.34 Specifically Warnock, Wilson reveals, 
rejected the view that authority trumped arguments from moral prefer-
ences and sentiment, an argument that there ‘cannot be moral experts’ 
leading to a position that was aligned to ‘the neo-liberal emphasis on indi-
vidual autonomy and echoed Margaret Thatcher’s belief that ‘“choice is 
the essence of ethics”’.35 When writing his book, essential to understanding 
bioethics in Britain, in the early 2010s Wilson was able to access depart-
mental and research council files – DHSS and MRC – but not the central 
government, notably the Number 10, files. So, with these files now avail-
able, we can explore how his argument fares in the light of new evidence.
When in vitro fertilisation (IVF) was first used successfully in 
humans with the birth of the ‘test tube baby’ Louise Brown in July 
1978, the initial public response was very positive. However, by the 
early 1980s Conservative politicians and the right-wing popular press 
increasingly regarded the technique as intensely problematic, a threat 
to the ‘traditional’ nuclear family and wasteful of the life of embryos. 
But ‘most controversial’, judges Wilson, was research on embryos 
in vitro. IVF generated more embryos than were used in implanting, 
and experimentation on this material was of great interest and use to 
 scientists. (The list of techniques being called into question compiled by 
the government overlaps, but was not identical with those highlighted 
by the press.)36 Wilson regards the controversy over IVF as being not 
only a matter of the resurgence of ‘Victorian values’ under Thatcher, 
but also because ‘criticism of these practices … reflected and bolstered 
growing calls for external involvement with scientific and medical eth-
ics’.37 This pressure for external scrutiny, a product of academic debate 
and Conservative scepticism of autonomous professional experts, was 
the reason why the appointment of the philosopher Mary Warnock to 
lead a wide-ranging inquiry into IVF was particularly significant.
Thatcher’s ‘initial view’ was that ‘some form of independent inquiry 
into these ethical issues’ [of ‘in vitro pregnancies’] was ‘necessary, in view 
of the growing public concern’.38 Shirley Williams, the ex-Labour minister 
and co-founder of the Social Democratic Party in 1981, had written to 
Thatcher suggesting that the form of such an inquiry should be a Royal 
Commission. Williams had, in the 1970s, once agreed that the medical 
profession should regulate itself, but had begun to move towards the 
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principle of wider viewpoints shaping regulation. Writing to Thatcher, 
Williams argued that a Royal Commission ‘would enable those with vary-
ing knowledge and experience to contribute to a significant assessment of 
the issues and to make recommendations for the future – and its members 
should be drawn not only from scientists and the medical profession, but 
also those with understanding of the law, theology and education’.39 Leo 
Abse, the Welsh Labour MP and no friend of Thatcher’s (he later wrote 
an unflattering psychoanalytical biography of her), made a similar sug-
gestion, which he pursued through Parliamentary mechanisms.40 Norman 
Fowler, minister at the DHSS, supported the idea of a wider inquiry, if not 
a Royal Commission:
The Department’s position until now has been that it was best 
to have the views of the medical bodies concerned – the General 
Medical Council, the British Medical Association, the Medical 
Research Council, and the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists – before reaching conclusions on the nature of any 
wider enquiry … But the fact is that the issues go way beyond purely 
medical questions, and involve much wider considerations, as well 
as very specific and detailed legal problems. It may well be, there-
fore, that further action should not wait on these bodies: there are 
indications that the profession themselves [sic] share this view.41
Fowler therefore instructed his officials to prepare advice on the form 
that a wider inquiry might take. This proposal was run past Thatcher, 
who, although she underlined sections, offered no specific comment. By 
April Fowler was convinced that an ‘official’ ‘Committee with an outside 
Chairman and members’ should be established, with the following terms 
of reference.
To consider recent and potential developments in medicine and 
science related to human fertilisation and embryology; to consider 
what policies and safeguards should be applied, including consid-
eration of relevant legal matters, and to make recommendations.42
Fowler thought the membership should consist of ‘doctors, scientists, law-
yers, persons with a background in marriage counselling and in theology 
as well as four or five non-experts’, while as ‘Chairman’ a judge would fit 
the bill. At this point Thatcher did intervene: the inquiry did not call for 
a judge.43 Baroness Young, a leading Conservative figure in the House of 
Lords, suggested amending Fowler’s terms of reference from ‘relevant 
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legal matters’ to ‘relevant legal and ethical matters’; this change, she said, 
‘would put beyond doubt what we intend’.44
Perhaps this insistence on the ethical was influential, since by May 
1982 the DHSS had decided that an ethics philosopher, Mary Warnock, 
was their favoured choice as chair, although they carefully ran the names 
of Warnock and a short list of another three candidates past Robert 
Armstrong in the Cabinet Office.45 Warnock, Fowler told Thatcher, was 
‘an experienced and capable Chairman of proven ability and we think 
that that is an important attribute where such a breadth of interests and 
complexity of issues will need to be involved’ in an inquiry ‘which will be 
important and intellectually difficult, raising social and moral issues’.46 
Thatcher simply wrote ‘Yes’.
Warnock had attended Oxford (studying Classics) at the same time 
as Margaret Thatcher,47 but they did not meet until the 1970s.48 In 1974, 
when Warnock had returned to Oxford to teach philosophy, Thatcher 
invited her to chair an inquiry into teaching children with special edu-
cational needs. In 1977, although Warnock had switched from Labour 
to Conservative supporter in the mid-1960s, the Labour government had 
asked her to join an advisory committee on one of the key areas of bio-
medical ethical debate, animal experimentation.49 ‘Applied ethics’, a rel-
atively new philosophical field, was split at the time between those, such 
as Richard Hare, who argued that philosophy could reconcile different 
groups by identifying good and bad arguments, and others, such as A. J. 
Ayer and Warnock, who thought such reconciliation could not be forced 
by reason.50 She brought this experience to the inquiry, which sat for two 
years.
The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (the Warnock Report) finally arrived in midsummer 1984.51 
With chapters on artificial insemination, IVF, egg and embryo donation, 
surrogacy, sex selection, the freezing and storage of eggs, embryo and 
semen and the regulation of scientific research, it contained 63 recom-
mendations. The most general recommendation was that the govern-
ment should establish a new organisation that could both advise and have 
the executive authority to grant licences, including for research. Such a 
body should have ‘substantial lay representation’ and a lay chairperson. 
Warnock managed the problem of arriving at recommendations despite 
fiercely conflicting views first, by championing philosophical pluralism 
and second, by allowing the inclusion of three expressions of dissent. 
Wilson links the philosophical pluralism to a rejection of the overriding 
authority of moral experts and thence on to Thatcherite individualism. 
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But pluralism was also perhaps the only pragmatic position that was 
likely to lead to a useable report and recommendations.
Following the report was six years of public debate. The statutory 
regulating and licensing body, the Human Fertility and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA), was finally established by an Act of Parliament in 
1990, coming into effect in 1991. I will comment on three aspects of this 
period: the role of Parliament, the role of Thatcher’s science advisers 
and, finally, the role of Thatcher herself.
First, the Parliamentary debates were unusually intense, unprece-
dentedly so for a science-related issue in the 1980s. The main debate, on 
23 November 1984, was opened by Norman Fowler, who acknowledged 
‘the extremely strong feelings which the issues covered by the [Warnock] 
report both here and among the public’.52 The Speaker of the House of 
Commons limited Members’ contributions to just 10 minutes each from 
11.30 am to 1 pm, and urged those ‘fortunate enough to be called before 
11.30 to bear in mind that many other colleagues are waiting to take part 
in this very important debate’. The debate itself ranged across abortion 
(not covered by the Warnock report), Jesus’ virgin birth, Down’s syn-
drome, the status and beginning of personhood in the embryo, the blight 
of miscarriage, commercial surrogacy, the regulation of experiments on 
embryos, matters of conscience and religion, infertility, Galileo, Sigmund 
Freud, congenital diseases in Wales, interspecies fertilisation, the freezing 
of embryos and the right to have children. ‘We must settle those matters,’ 
argued Sir Gerard Vaughan (MP for Reading, East), upholding the role 
and capability of Parliament, adding: ‘We must not wait for the medical 
profession or public opinion to move one way or another’.53 Frank Field 
(MP for Birkenhead), inveterate contrarian, thought that as the debate 
‘progressed I have become more, not less, confused’, although that was 
‘not because of contributions by hon. Members, but because it is difficult 
to think coherently about the issues’.54 There were statements from inflex-
ible moral positions and calls for the need to have minds open to reasoned 
debate. If there was a consensus it was around an insistence that this issue 
should be subject to Parliamentary free discussion and decision, and that, 
as Kenneth Clarke, Minister for Health, said on closing the debate:
One has to decide to what extent it is legitimate to carry out research 
upon [the embryo] while treating it with respect, and whether the 
bounds can be set within which research can properly be toler-
ated. Those bounds cannot just be left to the medical and scientific 
establishment.55
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Further intense Parliamentary debates occurred, notably when Enoch 
Powell attempted to pre-empt Warnock legislation by introducing an 
Unborn Children (Protection) Bill in February 1985, during which the 
Speaker again invoked a 10-minute speech restriction.56 The Bill would 
have made in vitro creation of embryos illegal for any purpose, notably 
research, other than to enable a named woman to bear a child.57 Heavily 
supported by pro-life MPs, the Bill dismayed scientists – including Anne 
McLaren, the developmental biologist who had been most influential on 
the Warnock committee.58
Second, embryo research was an issue, again unusually, where 
Thatcher’s central advisors – the Chief Scientific Adviser and the Number 
10 Policy Unit – played a secondary role compared to the Parliamentary 
process. Nicholson advised that the Powell bill would create ‘untenable’ 
problems for researchers, and told Thatcher that the government should 
‘stress the importance to medical research of allowing embryo experi-
mentation to continue’; on the question of the form of a statutory body he 
supported a ‘Standing Royal Commission on Bioethics’, although his first 
preference was ‘professional self-regulation’.59 Fairclough, Nicholson’s 
successor, proposed a purely advisory ‘National Bioethics Commission’, 
independent of government, in November 1987, involving professionals 
and others.60 Nicholson and Fairclough also advised on the minor issue 
of which experts to send to international bioethics conventions – con-
vened by the Prime Minister of Japan in 1984, the President of France in 
1985, the Chancellor of West Germany in 1986, and the Prime Minister 
of Canada in 1987.61 Members of the Number 10 Unit worked on the 
commercial surrogacy issue (David Willetts preferred a ‘total ban’) and 
generally supported the pro-life side.62
Third, Thatcher herself, while expressing her moral views, did 
not play the scientific expert card on the issue of embryo research. She 
objected to 28-week abortions (‘strenuous efforts are made to save such 
premature children’)63. She supported the Powell bill, although not in 
Parliamentary vote.64 She met with a delegation of pro-life MPs while 
simultaneously responding sympathetically to the anti-abortion and 
anti-embryo research campaigning group LIFE.65 She agreed that her 
Chief Scientific Adviser’s arguments supporting embryological experi-
mentation displayed ‘a touch of casuistry’ when he had argued that ‘all 
that can be said is that fertilisation brings into existence a genetically 
novel kind of cell, and that this cell has the potential … for becoming 
a human individual’.66 She hoped ‘we can prohibit the storage of frozen 
embryos’, while she also intervened to insist that ‘genetic engineering’ of 
embryos (an issue that arose post-Warnock), ‘should be forbidden’.67 On 
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Warnock’s central recommendation, on the question of the need for the 
statutory authority, she rejected her Chief Scientific Adviser’s preferred 
choice of professional self-regulation. Interestingly this insistence, while 
in line with Wilson’s argument that Thatcherites rejected professional 
self-regulation (although Nicholson therefore was an important excep-
tion), was not justified by her ideologically, but rather by the specific, 
unusually emotionally fraught aspects of the issue: the same reasons that 
made it unusually an issue for authentic Parliamentary deliberation and 
decision-making:
Yes [let the Cabinet H committee consider self-regulation as an 
alternative to a statutory body] – but it will be difficult to leave 
such emotionally important matters – such fundamental matters to 
self-regulation.68
Thatcher also rejected Fairclough’s idea of an independent, advisory com-
mission, declaring that ‘the assumption he makes that the problems – all 
of them – can be resolved by the setting of an Advisory Committee … is 
not our experience’.69 The reason we are ‘finding it difficult to legislate’ 
after Warnock, was not lack of such advice but ‘because of genuine dif-
ferences of view on quite fundamental things’. Again, interestingly, her 
reasons are not quite what one would expect – for example, she dismissed 
Fairclough’s argument that a mixed-membership commission would pos-
sess the ‘ability to look out for new problems on the horizon’: ‘No’, she 
wrote, ‘this comes from the professionals who know about it’.70 
Public consultation ended in July 1987, and a white paper, pro-
posing a statutory licensing authority, was issued in November 1987.71 
Royal Society pressure (Thatcher held a meeting there in February 1988, 
meeting the President, George Porter, along with Anne McLaren and 
the embryologists Christopher Graham and Richard Gardner) stabilised 
the chosen course rather than steered it.72 With Cabinet and Parliament 
split, and the post-Warnock Report legislation regarded as ‘nothing 
but trouble’,73 Thatcher’s government edged slowly from 1986 to 1990 
towards the establishment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, guided on one hand by the Warnock recommendations and on 
the other by fine judgements on what legislation would pass a free vote 
in Parliament. These twin poles – both external to executive government 
– were more important than Thatcher’s own position as a moral agent or 
ex-scientist, and more important than her central advisers’ advice.
I have described the policy responses to AIDS and embryological bio-
ethics as exceptional and atypical in comparison with other science-laden 
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issues confronted by the Thatcher government. AIDS was an emergency 
with little precedent, at least in the postwar era. Embryology was subject 
to unusually intense Parliamentary debate, unrivalled by any other sci-
ence-related controversy. Thatcher, unlike the cases of nuclear projects, 
missile defence, climate change or acid rain, did not invoke the privilege 
of responding to either AIDS or embryology as science questions. She 
intervened, certainly and occasionally, but on moral grounds, such as to 
prevent what she saw as intrusive and distasteful inquisitiveness by pub-
licly funded researchers into sexual behaviour (in the case of AIDS) and 
to listen to anti-abortion campaigners and to forbid the unlikely step of 
genetically engineering embryos (in the bioethics debate). These were 
not science-laden issues where Thatcher took command.
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Power/leaks
The combined civil and military nuclear projects were perhaps the most 
consequential of all postwar British scientific and technological endeav-
ours. However, while the science was a mixture of basic, applied and, as 
privatisation was considered as a goal, what would begin to be called 
‘near-market’ research, the deep commitment to nuclear for reasons of 
deterrence and national status meant that nuclear policy could never 
be just science policy. Margaret Thatcher was a committed supporter of 
nuclear power and the nuclear deterrent. ‘Nuclear power,’ notes Dieter 
Helm, ‘held a fascination for her: as a scientist, for its technical achieve-
ments; as an advocate for a strong defence policy; and, as an opponent of 
the miners, in the form of an insurance policy’1
In Chapter 6 I will examine aspects of the military nuclear pro-
ject through an examination of Thatcher’s engagement with Ronald 
Reagan’s plans for missile defence. Here I begin a study of the civil 
nuclear side. In particular, I trace Thatcher’s publicised visits to UK 
nuclear establishments, especially Dounreay in Scotland and Sellafield 
in Cumbria. I will argue that these visits were productive and recipro-
cally supporting encounters between two forms, at the highest levels in 
postwar Britain, of contained power: one political and one technical. 
The ‘Prime Minister’ is an office invested with extraordinary political 
power, especially when the individual in place commands confidence 
and authority. Such authority was ‘lent’, by choreographed shows of 
association and support, to shore up struggling nuclear projects. In 
return Thatcher could also benefit – although not in an unproblem-
atic way, given heightened anxieties about the nuclear in the 1980s – 
from imagery that presented her in a white coat against a backdrop 
of iconic modern technology. However, as I explore in the second half 
to this chapter, such power was also undermined by ‘leaks’ and other 
instabilities of various kinds.
140 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
Britain’s nuclear landscape
Britain’s nuclear projects were developed behind barbed wire in 
 laboratories, factories and field testing establishments dotted across 
the land. At the foot of the North Wessex Downs, due south from 
Oxford, was the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell. 
The first reactors on British soil, GLEEP and BEPO, were built here 
in the late 1940s. Fifteen miles further in the same direction, across 
the Downs, lay the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment, Alder-
maston. These two were the major United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) laboratories for civil and military nuclear research 
respectively through much of the Cold War.2
Britain had detonated its first atomic device, on the Monte Bello 
Islands, off the coast of Western Australia, in 1952. Its manufacture had 
required the rapid construction of a network of facilities, including reac-
tors and plutonium processing at Windscale in Cumbria, a factory working 
with uranium at Springfields in Lancashire, with headquarters at Risley, 
further south in the same county, a gaseous diffusion plant for extracting 
fissionable material at Capenhurst in Cheshire and huts for final assem-
bly at Foulness on the Essex coast, prior to shipping to the other side of 
the world. Britain’s full-scale nuclear weapon production required two 
further major facilities in the UK, built at the Royal Ordnance Factories at 
Burghfield (near Aldermaston) and Cardiff, Wales, as well as test sites in 
Australia. Thermonuclear weapons were detonated, too, from 1957, begin-
ning with the Grapple tests conducted on remote islands in the mid-Pacific.
Next to the Windscale factory was Britain’s first nuclear power 
plant, Calder Hall, which opened in 1956. It produced electricity for the 
civil grid and plutonium for atomic weapons. Calder Hall possessed four 
Magnox reactors, a design that was developed and deployed a further 24 
times at power stations commissioned from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s and located on the coasts of England, Scotland and Wales. In 1965 
the Wilson government ordered a second wave of nuclear power stations, 
choosing the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) design based on a 
prototype built at Windscale. Seven twin AGRs were installed, starting 
with Dungeness B, which produced power from 1983, and ending with 
Torness 2, online from 1989.
Meanwhile the government had invested in further experimental 
nuclear concepts. First, the fast-breeder reactor promised greater effi-
ciency in fuel use at a time when supplies of fissionable material seemed 
likely to become scarce.3 The fast-breeder reactors consumed uranium 
(including depleted uranium from Capenhurst), produced plutonium 
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and were cooled by the circulation of tons of liquid sodium. Hopes for 
this UK-led technology were sky high: ‘once fast-breeder reactors have 
been successfully developed to the commercial stage, we can be assured 
of cheap power for hundreds of years with no fear of electricity costs ris-
ing due to shortage of fuel,’ the Prime Minister had been told in 1969.4 
UKAEA began its experimental Dounreay Fast Reactor, with its iconic 
steel sphere, in the mid-1950s. The Prototype Fast Reactor was built at 
the same site on the Scottish north coast from the 1960s, producing elec-
tricity from the mid-1970s. Second, the idea of producing energy from 
nuclear fusion, as opposed to fission, was pursued. In 1958 hopes were 
raised and then dashed as the Zero Energy Toroidal Assembly (ZETA) 
experiment seemed to be producing unexpected energy. Nevertheless, 
the government acquired a new site, Culham, not far from Harwell, 
where ZETA had been built. It became the home of the largest European 
science project on British soil, the Joint European Torus (JET), funded 
through the European nuclear energy community, Euratom.
In the mid-1970s, dissatisfaction with the AGR design led to a debate 
about choosing a third design for civil nuclear power stations in Britain.5 
Initially the government favoured its steam-generating heavy water reac-
tor (SGHWR) design, prototyped at Winfrith in Dorset, over the American 
company Westinghouse’s pressurised water reactor (PWR) design. But in 
the economic troubles of the mid-1970s the SGHWR contracts were ter-
minated. Instead, the Callaghan Labour government announced that it 
would greenlight the final AGRs (at Torness and Heysham) and support 
the construction of future PWRs. In late 1979 the new Thatcher adminis-
tration decided that a PWR should be built.6 However, with the uncertain-
ties provoked by a new design, the PWR at on the Suffolk coast at Sizewell, 
alongside ageing Magnox reactors, would only begin after a public inquiry, 
which opened for evidence and testimony in 1983. The Sizewell decision 
would be one of the major nuclear policy moments of the Thatcher years.
Throughout the late 1970s into the mid-1980s, however, the two 
major customers for nuclear power plants continued to articulate and 
lobby for different designs. The Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) wanted a ‘minimum family’ of four PWRs. While not ruling out 
further AGR systems, it considered PWR to have ‘substantially lower cap-
ital costs per unit of electricity than AGR’ and to be ‘capable of generating 
cheaper electricity’; they also perceived PWR to be ‘proven mainstream 
worldwide technology with some 150 reactors in operation worldwide, 
compared to 5 AGR stations exclusively in the UK’.7 The South of Scotland 
Electricity Board, on the other hand, argued that AGR performance was 
improving and disputed the CEGB’s economic assessments.
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Britain’s nuclear project had begun under a government depart-
ment, the Ministry of Supply. As it expanded, new agencies, notably the 
UK Atomic Energy Authority, had been set up – along with company-like 
entities, such as the consortia that merged in 1971 to produce the National 
Nuclear Corporation – to oversee construction of power stations and nego-
tiate with its customers, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
and South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB). In the same year, the 
production side of UKAEA had been split off to form further company-like 
entities: British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), to handle and manage fuel and 
waste, and the Radiochemical Centre at Amersham, the subject of the pri-
vatisation story told in the Chapter 5. At Windscale the creation of BNFL 
split the site. Parts remained with UKAEA and other parts, notably the 
Calder Hall power station and the Magnox reprocessing plant, came under 
BNFL. To the latter was soon added, after a public inquiry, a Thermal Oxide 
Reprocessing Plant (THORP), envisaged to take oxide fuel from home AGR 
and foreign reactors.8 In 1981 the BNFL side was renamed ‘Sellafield’, 
partly to escape association with the infamous 1957 Windscale fire. In 
1984 BNFL became BNFL plc, although its stock was wholly owned by the 
government. By 1979, therefore, the nuclear landscape of Britain, both in 
terms of organisations and sites, was dispersed, complex and expensively 
maintained.
Throughout the history of the British nuclear project there have 
been opposing anti-nuclear voices. In the late 1950s, drawing on older 
traditions of anti-militarism in the Labour movement and the church, 
anti-nuclear protest became organised on a considerable scale, exem-
plified by the establishment of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) and its protest marches directed at Aldermaston.9 Its momentum 
dwindled from the mid-1960s. However, anti-nuclear movements gath-
ered force globally from 1975, partly as the end of the Vietnam War redi-
rected activists’ energy and partly as environmental concerns became 
stronger.10
As Cold War tensions increased, and NATO decided in 1979 to 
deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe, including the UK, 
so anti-nuclear protest expanded. CND, led by the charismatic Monsignor 
Bruce Kent, campaigned against the neutron bomb, circulated leaflets 
and petitions, and screened the terrifying nuclear war  docudrama The 
War Game (1965, but banned by the BBC) for students. The British branch 
of Friends of the Earth led an articulate critique of nuclear power, not 
least via the 1977 Windscale inquiry. Friends of the Earth also acted to 
publicise leaks of radioactive material. In 1981 the Greenham Common 
Peace Camp began to protest against the arrival of US cruise missiles.  The 
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women developed an extraordinary feminist culture of protest.11 In April 
1983 the Greenham Common movement attracted 70,000 supporters to 
form a human chain from Greenham to Aldermaston and Burghfield, an 
effective way of making the British nuclear landscape visible. In general, 
the anti-nuclear movement offered the public a critical view against the 
British nuclear projects’ claims for modernity, safety and peaceful intent.
Contained and constrained: powers meet
In contrast with other chapters, where I trace Thatcher’s engagement 
with science mediated by the memoranda, files and the other paper 
technologies of bureaucracy, here I will follow the Prime Minister as she 
encountered the UK’s greatest postwar science project – that of nuclear 
power – face to face.
Thatcher visited Dounreay in 1979 and Sellafield in 1985. These 
were events that combined ceremony, publicity, information gather-
ing, witnessing, discreet lobbying and displays of contained power and 
authority. Furthermore, as a cultural contact between powers, they invite 
and deserve a thick description; small details had larger resonances and 
meanings that together can be reconstructed, almost anthropologically, 
to understand how both political and technical power intertwined and 
operated. However, I will also argue that the containment and display of 
power had limits, and these will be explored through the metaphor and 
the actualities of ‘leaks’.
Thatcher was not the first prime minister to visit Dounreay. 
Edward Heath had visited briefly in 1973, but a more substantial visit 
was made by his predecessor.12 In July 1969 Harold Wilson had flown 
to Wick airport and then been driven to the nuclear site. Even before he 
arrived he had been contacted by staff representatives anxious about 
recession in Caithness triggered by a run-down in staff at the region’s 
largest employer.13 At its peak 2,500 people had worked at Dounreay, 
while the nearby town of Thurso had been transformed with 1,500 new 
houses, new schools, a technical college and upgraded amenities. The 
‘stimulus of new people with new ideas has given the area a new confi-
dence and hope for continued growth,’ Wilson had been briefed.14 The 
local MP, Robert Maclennan, had warned him that ‘your every word 
about the future of Dounreay will be hung upon, analysed and inter-
preted with the closeness of a medieval theologian by my constituents 
and by the press’.15 Following a lunch of salmon steaks, cheese and beer, 
and an hour’s tour of Dounreay’s two fast-breeder reactors, journalists 
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at the Inverness press conference had indeed probed Wilson on employ-
ment questions.
Ten years later, Thatcher’s visit was not framed primarily by a sin-
gle issue. Avowedly pro-nuclear, she had in her in-tray a decision to take 
about new nuclear power stations and their designs. Visiting Dounreay 
was an opportunity to associate herself with what was still being pre-
sented as a world-leading and distinctively modern technology, but it 
was also conducted in the context of UKAEA proposing ‘the next stage in 
fast reactor development’: a full-size, 1250 MWe commercial demonstra-
tion fast reactor (CDFR). The focus of this piece of public ritual was a sin-
gle moment: Margaret Thatcher would press the button that would start 
the reprocessing unit at Dounreay in front of the gathered press. ‘This is 
a very important stage in the closing of the fast reactor fuel cycle,’ briefed 
the press release. It explained that this was to be an international ‘first’ – 
one ‘in which fuel is “burnt” in the reactor to generate electricity, taken 
out of the reactor, reprocessed to separate the plutonium, which is sent to 
Windscale to be refabricated by British Nuclear Fuels Limited, into fresh 
fuel for the reactor’.16 The closed cycle, instigated by the Prime Minister, 
was a demonstration of contained power and control, both technological 
and political. Yet neither cycle was hermetically sealed. The risks of a 
breach in the uranium–plutonium cycle of processing were the subject of 
debate. The political cycle of credit was opened when the press witnessed 
the pressing of the button. Neither cycle could be fully controlled. Power 
generated by the cycles could leak.
On the evening of 5 September 1979 a Queen’s Flight Andover air-
craft landed at Dounreay Aerodrome. Mr Beaumont flicked a switch and 
temporary floodlights illuminated the party as it stepped down from the 
plane and walked towards a convoy of two UKAEA and three Northern 
Constabulary cars. Security was on edge, not least because of the assas-
sination of Lord Mountbatten a week before. Margaret Thatcher’s party 
of seven – comprising herself, her husband Denis, the MP Ian Gow (her 
Parliamentary Private Secretary), her press officer Henry James, her 
civil servant private secretary T. Lankester, a personal secretary Mrs J. 
Humphris and two personal detectives – were welcomed on the tarmac 
by Clifford Blumfield, director of Dounreay. The convoy then whisked the 
party to the Royal Hotel, Thurso, where they spent the night.
After breakfast the next morning, the Prime Minister’s party were 
issued passes and the convoy set off on the 20-minute ride to the nuclear 
site, accompanied by a police escort.17 With passes checked at the main 
gate, AEA police signalled for the inner gate to be opened. The convoy 
proceeded to the Prototype Fast Reactor building. Here they were greeted 
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by Sir John Hill, chairman of UKAEA, alongside Dr Tom Marsham, head 
of the Nuclear Directorate of UKAEA, and Blumfield – the trio of nuclear 
managers who would accompany Thatcher for the rest of the day. Taking 
the stairs to the PFR Exhibition Room, the Prime Minister, her husband 
and Gow signed the visitors’ book. Hill then spoke on the fast reactor con-
cept, while Marsham and Blumfield followed with a review of Dounreay 
projects. Now issued with even higher-level passes and donning white 
coats (including one which was the Prime Minister’s ‘special size’), the 
party passed the security turnstile, and began a tour of the PFR Control 
Room, the reactor top and then, through an air-lock, to a lift, which 
ascended to the fourth floor and enabled a view of the Turbine Hall.
Retracing their steps, the party was taken by car to the D1200 build-
ing – the fuel-reprocessing plant. After another tour, and the unveiling 
of a plaque by the Prime Minister, she then pressed the button initiat-
ing reprocessing. There had been some concern that the press photogra-
phers, admitted to the small control room, might have to take turns, 
meaning that the button would have to be pressed multiple times. Henry 
James, the press officer, explained to local organisers that ‘although the 
Prime Minister did not like “faking” events of this kind she would proba-
bly agree to pressing the switch more than once’.18
With the images of Thatcher, scientist and prime minister, taken, 
the party discarded the white coats and overshoes, washed, had their 
hands and feet monitored for radiation and then walked across to the 
Director’s Dining Room for a lunch of Scottish fayre: cock-a-leekie soup, 
local Strathy salmon salad, strawberry shortcake and Scottish cheese 
and biscuits. While Mr Wilson had been given beer, Mrs Thatcher had the 
choice of chilled orange juice or apple Shloer. She sat between Sir John 
Hill on her right hand and Blumfield on her left. On the dining table fresh 
flowers replaced plastic plants for the day.
After lunch, more senior Dounreay management joined the group, 
along with representatives of the Staff Side and trade union, for ‘informal 
discussions’. Behind the scenes, much of the work and organisation of 
Dounreay had been rearranged for the day, as the site went into pres-
entation and high security mode. Police were dotted around the route 
from Thurso to nuclear plant; on site, telephones were disconnected, 
tannoys suspended and even the regular PFR tea run was re-routed. A 
special female toilet was designated in the reprocessing building, com-
plete with female attendant. The visit was to be smooth, discreet in the 
right places and professional. The publicity was carefully corralled and, 
despite worries that the press might baulk at a trip to a remote location, 
photographers duly snapped the expected pictures. At the end of the visit 
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the Prime Minister fielded questions at a 20-minute press conference. She 
was asked about the future of Dounreay, whether she was in favour of the 
fast-breeder reactor and the British nuclear programme more generally, 
and the question of local jobs. Thatcher said that, while not pre-judging 
the results of an inevitable enquiry, she
personally would like to see it go ahead. … You know my personal 
view – I have always been interested in more R&D and for Britain to 
keep ahead. The French are building Super Phenix – at one time we 
were ahead in the early stages of the fast breeder. I do not share the 
fears that some people have of nuclear power.19
The Daily Express (but not the official notes) records her as saying that 
Dounreay was ‘absolutely safe’.20 Thatcher spoke about the Magnoxes, 
AGRs and PWR to meet the demand for electricity, as well as of the need 
for a strategy in which the ‘alternative supply’ (to oil and coal) was ‘con-
tinuous, which will not run out like fossil fuel’ – the ‘obvious’ one being 
‘the fast breeder’.21 She cast the closed cycle as a prudent use of resources:
I pressed the button on the fuel reprocessing plant today … No-one 
else in the world has one of these. You generate fuel for the next 
round. Not like Windscale. They are taking fuel from Magnox 
reactors and extracting plutonium, which cannot be used again in 
Magnox reactors. The worst thing that you can do with plutonium 
is to leave it lying around. The best thing is to burn it – the safest 
thing is to burn it in a fast-breeder reactor. Oil, gas and coal will not 
last forever – some of these things should be conserved as a source 
material for chemicals. The chemical industry depends on coal, gas 
and oil. If you can find a different source of fuel you can put oil and 
gas to better uses in the future. I happen to be a conservationist of 
natural materials.
The containment of plutonium at Dounreay as part of a closed system 
of ‘burning’ and reprocessing was therefore an important justification 
for the fast-breeder programme. Publicly the politics of nuclear power 
depended on the extent to which this claim of control was believed. 
Thatcher had been briefed on environmental aspects, including the con-
trolled release of gases, but the parallel control over the encounter with 
the press ensured that she was not pressed on the issue.22
Such choreographed meetings with the press are, of course, part of 
the routine presentational management of politics. Within a few weeks 
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Thatcher would be opening Milton Keynes shopping centre and answering 
press questions at the John Lewis store. But for all the meticulous plan-
ning, the attempt to control the news cycle could be interrupted. A case of 
this eventuality happened after Dounreay. The white-coated Thatcher had 
posed for various photographs, not least the  button-pressing centrepiece, 
but one image caught her on her knees examining a cavity in the reactor 
top. New Scientist repurposed the image for satire: ‘And this is the drain the 
microprocessor industry went down’.23
Control – of image and isotopes – was also the theme of Thatcher’s 
visits to other nuclear sites, especially Sellafield. In October 1984 Con 
(Coningsby) Allday, chairman and CEO of British Nuclear Fuels plc (as it 
had just been made a public limited company), invited Thatcher to open 
two new and expensive facilities: Pond 5, a plant for receiving, storing 
and reprocessing Magnox fuel that had cost £315m and SIXEP, an ion 
exchange plant for effluents that had cost £126m.24 Thatcher had not vis-
ited Sellafield since 1978, when she had been leader of the opposition, 
and had stalled a previous request to open a new building at Risley in 
the election summer of 1983. Since then, however, Sellafield, despite the 
change of name from ‘Windscale’, had become the focus of considerable 
public concern. In October 1983 the Yorkshire Television documentary 
Windscale, the Nuclear Laundry had reported increased local leukaemia 
cases and plutonium dust in nearby homes. In November radioactive 
ruthenium and rhodium had been found on Cumbrian beaches, which 
were subsequently closed to the public. BNFL would be prosecuted and 
fined on six counts and, with public and private expressions of reluc-
tance, required to invest in SIXEP to clean discharged liquid waste.25
So the invitation of 1984 presented a quandary: Sellafield was 
in disgrace, but it was also being moved towards privatisation and in 
need of a demonstration of political support from the top. The advice 
of the Minister of Agriculture to Number 10 was that while a visit would 
help ‘rehabilitate Sellafield following the damaging aftermath of last 
November’s incident’, the Prime Minister should at least wait until the 
court case against BNFL had concluded.26 But Robin Nicholson, her Chief 
Scientific Adviser, suggested that she accept the invitation, in part because 
‘she would find it of very great scientific interest’, but also because
the successful operation of reprocessing activities at Sellafield, 
and the public acceptance of them, is an essential component of 
our nuclear power programme. The morale of BNFL has dropped 
considerably over the last year or so, following management 
changes, operational failures leading to accidental discharges, the 
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uncertainty about elevated incidences of childhood leukaemia in 
parts of Cumbria and the Government decision to introduce tighter 
controls on discharges. A visit by the Prime Minister would be taken 
as an indication of Government confidence in the Company and in 
the nuclear power programme.27
The visit was therefore delayed until November 1985, but when it hap-
pened it was to be an expanded, large-scale and well-publicised series of 
events. Rather than just visit Sellafield, Thatcher would spend a day, fer-
ried by helicopter, tracing the nuclear fuel cycle, with each stage empha-
sising the control of isotope and image.
She started at Capenhurst, the site near Ellesmere Port where ura-
nium was enriched. It was also the location of URENCO, a UK–Dutch–West 
German collaboration that in the 1960s had developed a commercial gas 
centrifuge technique, in contrast with French and US diffusion methods. 
The project had been a diplomatic manoeuvre for Harold Wilson, under-
mining French leadership in Europe while straining relations with the 
United States, and this demonstration of an alternative path for Europe 
might have appealed to Thatcher.28 There was also talk of the Chinese 
buying licences for the gas centrifuge technique.29
The improbably named Neville Chamberlain, BNFL’s director of 
enrichment, guided Thatcher around the site, donned in the regulation 
white coat (with blue BNFL badge) and cloth overshoes, with press pho-
tographers present on arrival. She saw ‘three generations of centrifuge’: 
the first entirely British, the second having some Dutch and German com-
ponents, and the third, still in its early stages, representing a completely 
collaborative project between the URENCO partners. In Capenhurst’s 
Cascade Hall Thatcher saw the ‘serried ranks of centrifuges spinning 
away silently at about three times the speed of sound and without main-
tenance for at least 10 years’. She was invited ‘to roll out a 2-tonne holder 
of enriched fuel, which represents £½m worth of Capenhurst product’ 
(‘on a hover’, her press officer reassured her, ‘not heavy’). With more 
press photographs taken it was a ‘good opportunity, early in the day, to 
get on lunchtime bulletins and into evening papers’.
Then it was back in the helicopter to fly north to the next stage of 
the cycle: Springfields, to see the fabrication of Capenhurst-enriched ura-
nium into fuel rods, for use in Magnox stations, and fuel assemblies for 
AGR, Dounreay PFR and the old SGHWR at Winfrith. Springfields also 
made the uranium hexafluoride (HEX) that went back to Capenhurst. 
Again Thatcher pulled on a white coat and posed for photographs. 
There was space too for a heart-warming visit to the Apprentice Training 
 POWER/LEAkS 149
School, which not only turned 55 school-leavers a year into fitters, turn-
ers, machinists, electricians and even a blacksmith for the nuclear  sector, 
but also ‘did up’ cycles for handicapped children, wheelchairs for ex-ser-
vicemen and ‘multi-activity toys’. ‘Press photographers here,’ her press 
officer, Jean Caines, advised.
The next stop was Heysham (‘pronounced Heesham by the locals’) 
II, Britain’s fifth AGR, the power station south of Morecambe Bay where 
some of Springfields’ fuel assemblies would be burnt. In 1985 it was a 
massive construction site. ‘I managed to walk the course in high heels, 
but I felt precarious and was clucked at by the male population,’ noted 
Caines, adding that a ‘hard hat and anorak are the order of the day’.30 
Here Thatcher would be joined by the CEGB chairman Lord Marshall, 
who was expected to take the opportunity to lobby her on the Sizewell 
question.31 Indeed, while on the press tour of nuclear sites, with the 
Sizewell inquiry ongoing, Thatcher was lobbied by both sides in the AGR 
vs PWR debate. She was briefed on the arguments of both sides, but was 
advised to ‘avoid being drawn into discussion as the matter is under con-
sideration by the Sizewell Inspector’.32
And finally on to Sellafield. The continued growth of the UK’s 
nuclear power capacity was, as Thatcher’s Chief Scientific Adviser had 
emphasised, ‘desirable for reasons of both energy production (in par-
ticular, the projected decline in fossil fuels from the North Sea) and 
environmental protection (the contribution of fossil fuels to air pollu-
tion [at this stage, acid rain] damage’.33 He also warned that Sellafield 
was ‘the “Achilles heel” of the industry … [because of] uncontrolled 
escapes of radioactive materials’. The anti-nuclear environmental 
groups publicised these leaks and made them the focus of campaigns. 
Jilly Perry, a Friends of the Earth supporter, teacher and daughter of a 
local farmer, recalls that when the 1983 radioactive pollution showed 
up in lobsters ‘we had a big lobster costume that we launched on the 
beach at Sellafield. We took our petition to 10 Downing Street, with our 
lobster’.34
Thatcher’s words to the press were made this time on arrival ‘in 
order to be sure to make the evening news’. After the unveiling of a 
plaque she visited the Fuel Handling Plant, admiring the ‘enormous pond 
in which spent fuel rods are stored’, the politically important environ-
mental fix of SIXEP, the work in progress on the £1.3 billion Thermal 
Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) and the exhibition centre. She then 
attended a attending reception for industrialists and local VIPs, at which 
she also spoke about each of sites to the editor of BNFL’s house journal, 
BNFL News.
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Altogether there were 10 separate, planned photo calls and three 
opportunities to speak to the national press, including television.35 
Throughout the whole day a special press helicopter, paid for by BNFL, 
shadowed the Prime Minister’s own. Bernard Ingham prepared draft 
responses to possible press questions.36 The charge of overly cautious 
environmental protection was to be defused by a parallel drawn between 
the nuclear industry and early rail:
Your question reminds me so much of the days when the railways 
were being developed and men were required to walk before the 
engine with a red flag. Contrast that with the recent record break-
ing run between London and Newcastle at an average speed, I 
believe, of over 125 mph! Railways are undoubtedly one of the 
safest forms of travel but people were naturally very, very careful 
about the first iron horses. It is therefore only natural – and indeed 
sensible – that we should develop nuclear power’s future with care 
and due caution.
Likewise, anti-nuclear campaigners were dismissed: ‘I think the opposi-
tion is understandable and perhaps inevitable but at the same time irra-
tional and misguided … [The] kind of opposition we see to nuclear power 
is certainly irrational when, for example, you think of the appalling death 
toll over the years in the coal mines’. (The miners’ strike had ended only 
months before.) She was briefed to add: ‘I think we resist change and 
scientific progress at our peril’.
There were plenty of subsidiary messages – on European collabo-
ration (of a selective and anti-French type), BNFL’s corporate responsi-
bility and commercial trade opportunities – as well as many moments 
for nuclear managers to press informal political points, such as Marshall 
on Sizewell, or BNFL on the modernity of its technology. However, the 
main public message was to be that the nuclear industry was safe, effi-
cient, competitive and successful. In Ingham’s draft wording suggested 
for Thatcher: ‘Britain needs a thriving nuclear industry and is fortunate 
in the one that it has already got. As a scientist, I profoundly believe that 
to be the case’.37 The identification of Thatcher, scientist, with the UK 
nuclear project was designed into the whole day, with the multiple pub-
licity images of her in a white coat and her helicopter flight tracking the 
nuclear fuel cycle (although not right to the end – she would have had to 
be either buried or dumped at sea).
These highly public visits to Dounreay and to the UKAEA sites cul-
minating in Sellafield were highly constrained and contained events. 
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Although involving months of preparation they were curiously static: 
over in a day, ritualistic and designed to project singular messages. They 
were also moments of gift exchange. The gift of public prime ministerial 
attention strengthened a nuclear industry that was under attack from 
environmental and anti-nuclear campaigners. The gift of photo opportu-
nities in nuclear sites nevertheless enabled the Prime Minister to project 
a scientific image, and to associate with a project that was still a symbol, 
for some, of postwar progress, energy and modernity: it was also, signifi-
cantly, ‘not-coal’. The visits were powerful in proportion to their contain-
ment of power: the figure of the powerful Prime Minister travelling by 
helicopter, posing for photographers, pushing buttons to start controlled 
processes.
The dynamics of nuclear policy-making, however, took place else-
where. Aside from the military nuclear issues (discussed in Chapter 6), 
I will show that three intersecting civil nuclear matters for decisions 
requiring Thatcher’s attention in the 1980s all illustrate the limits of con-
straint, containment and certainty. Each of them served to complicate 
the message projected via the public visits: the questions of waste and the 
possibility of a link between radioactive leaks and clusters of leukaemia 
cases, and, pre- and post-Chernobyl, the possibility of privatisation.
Waste, leaks and leukaemia
‘Radioactive wastes arise at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle,’ noted 
the Department of the Environment in 1979.38 Waste – ‘material of no 
commercial interest’ – was produced by reactors as spent fuel elements, 
gaseous discharges and, in the future, through decommissioning. Spent 
fuel rods would be placed in a cooling pond, which in turn had two out-
puts. Liquid effluent would be treated and then either authorised for ‘dis-
charge’ or turned to solid waste and stored for eventual ‘disposal’. The 
cooled fuel elements would be passed on for reprocessing. Gaseous dis-
charge from reactors would be filtered, with some products treated for 
disposal and others discharged to the atmosphere.
Reprocessing, as we have seen at Sellafield and Dounreay, was 
another complex industrial process. It involved further cooling in ponds 
(producing more liquid waste for turning to ‘sludge’ for storing or dis-
charge at sea), decladding of the fuel elements, recladding of ‘hulls’ and 
processing the spent fuel producing a range of outputs – including useful 
recovered isotopes, gases discharged to the atmosphere, low active liq-
uid waste discharged to the sea and highly active liquid waste that was 
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stored prior to a future process of vitrification, storage again, and then 
‘disposal’. In 1976 there were 1,530 cubic metres of highly active liquid 
waste at Windscale (Sellafield) and Dounreay, as well as a further 7,000 
cubic metres of highly active solid waste in the form of fuel cladding.39 
On top of this were 11,000 cubic metres of sludges, 3,000 cubic metres 
of plutonium contaminated wastes and 20,000 cubic metres of wastes 
stored at power stations. These figures were expected roughly to treble 
by the year 2000. The discourse was of containment and management – 
the latter ‘used as a broad term to describe all or part of the process of 
minimising the creation of waste and the subsequent sequence of its con-
ditioning, storage and disposal’.40
In 1979 the low active waste was disposed of by pipelines to seas 
and rivers (such as from Aldermaston to the Thames) or by annual dump-
ing at sea. The highly active waste, with the liquid material locked in 
glass through vitrification, awaited a decision on the form of final dis-
posal. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution had, in Lord 
Flowers’ report of 1976, called, first, for a review of the adequacy of the 
research into disposal options and, second, for the establishment of a 
‘Nuclear Waste Disposal Corporation’.41 The Callaghan government had, 
in response, granted the first request in its White Paper Nuclear Power 
and the Environment.42 For example, Michael Heseltine, then Minister for 
Environment, had announced (via a reply to a Parliamentary Question) 
a series of test drillings in Scotland, Wales and England to investigate 
the geological suitability of certain areas for radioactive waste disposal.43 
(Thatcher read the reply in draft and judged it ‘very interesting – but I 
doubt whether it will allay fears!’)44
Yet by December 1981 the research drilling was suspended, as the 
government rethought its waste management policy.45 Specifically, in 
explicit rejection of the Royal Commission’s second request, for waste 
to be managed by a ‘Corporation’ – in other words, a public interest 
body akin to the BBC or the NRDC – the government announced, via a 
new white paper, that it was endorsing a ‘Nuclear Industry Radioactive 
Waste Executive’ – NIREX (the ‘W’ for waste, perhaps subconsciously, 
was suppressed) – formed by the nuclear industry and the generating 
boards. ‘Definite role for the private sector. NIREX preferred to the Royal 
Commission’s Nuclear Waste Disposal Corporation’, as a summary of the 
main points of the white paper that was shown to the Prime Minister 
noted.46
NIREX faced considerable public opposition in the two areas it 
named as being possible locations: Billingham, in Cleveland, where there 
was a history of large-scale ICI chemical engineering, for deep storage, 
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and Elstow, in Bedfordshire, for shallow storage.47 With a commitment 
made that the Sizewell Inquiry should have an up-to-date statement 
of waste management strategy, the Minister for Environment sought 
Thatcher’s approval, in July 1984, for a procedure that involved the iden-
tification of at least six sites followed by a single major inquiry.48
Like the siting of underground waste storage, the dumping of waste 
at sea was, in the government’s eyes, to be underpinned by scientific evi-
dence and rationality. Britain dumped low-level radioactive solid waste 
500 miles southwest of Land’s End, a site recommended by the OECD. 
Greenpeace, which had already protested at Windscale and Capenhurst, 
and occupied the parts of the Torness power station construction site, 
made the annual dump, now the responsibility of NIREX, a target of 
environmental campaigning. In 1983 they won an effective ally to their 
cause: the National Union of Seamen, with support from other unions, 
instructed its members not to sign on for the dump ship, MV Atlantic 
Fisher. The drums of waste, containing mostly concrete and steel packag-
ing as well as radio-isotopes from medical uses, power stations, civil and 
military establishments, sat on trains parked in Bicester (near Harwell), 
Thatcham (near Aldermaston) and Winfrith (the site of UKAEA reactors). 
‘If the dump is prevented this year, it will be almost impossible to resume 
next year,’ warned one civil servant to another, adding that ‘Greenpeace 
will consolidate a victory won on non-scientific grounds’.49 Yet, with 
strong support for the action shown at the Trade Union Congress, the 
block of the 1983 dump was indeed successful.
The government’s attempt to contain the issue was hampered 
severely by leaks. Greenpeace received a document from an interdepart-
mental meeting concerning dumping at sea of plutonium waste, and 
immediately publicised it at a press conference on 1 September 1983. 
This was the start of a mode of challenging government authority by the 
means of leaks: the following month the FCO civil servant Sarah Tisdall 
leaked the arrival dates and Heseltine’s publicity handling tactics of the 
US cruise missiles at Greenham Common (she would be sentenced to six 
months in jail in 1984), while in March 1984 Clive Ponting passed to Tam 
Dalyell two documents on the sinking of the Belgrano (and successfully 
pleaded public interest – the jury did not agree with the judge’s instruc-
tion that ‘the public interest is what the government of the day says it is’). 
With the support of Robert Armstrong, Cabinet Secretary, investigation 
of the leak of the sea dumping documents was handed over to the police 
and the Director of Public Prosecutions.50
Also, as the Minister for the Environment complained, the appeal to 
science was faltering:
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There is some prospect of changing the TUC’s attitude and I am 
meeting them for that purpose … But this could not be achieved 
before next year at the earliest and might have to await comple-
tion of the further review of scientific evidence within the London 
Dumping Convention [the international framework under which 
dumping was permitted]. Of course, the unions’ view is completely 
unsupported by scientific evidence.51
There was a faint hope that conceding dumping at sea in favour of dis-
posal on land would ‘give a fairer wind’ to NIREX’s land-based propos-
als, ‘which are vital to the continuing credibility of nuclear power in this 
country’.
This situation of leaks, controversy over sea dumping and concern 
about public credibility was the context in which news of the  unauthorised 
discharge from Sellafield in November 1983 became public. Ministers 
fielded questions in Parliament with four investigations ongoing: the 
Sizewell inquiry, one from the Radiochemical Inspectorate of the Ministry 
of Environment and one (unpublicised) from the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate of the Health and Safety Executive, both into Sellafield 
discharges, plus a fourth one on leukaemia clusters to which I will turn 
shortly. The first two concluded with the Sellafield management being crit-
icised and the case being turned over to the Director of Public Prosecution 
– the body now pursuing two Sellafield cases, one relating to the leak of 
documents and the other against the management that had allowed up to 
4,500 curies of radioactive material to be discharged down the pipeline to 
the Irish Sea and the beaches of Cumbria.52
The public contradictions drew press comment. A particularly 
amusing one came from John Twidell, a physicist at the University of 
Strathclyde, who wrote to The Times pointing out that in consecutive sen-
tences Patrick Jenkin, Minister of Environment, had told Parliament that 
the radioactivity of the beach effluent was below the level that would 
constitute ‘any hazard to the general population in the area’ and that 
the handling of such substances ‘could exceed the annual dose limit for 
the skin’.53 ‘Obviously 1984 has arrived,’ said Twidell, invoking George 
Orwell; such ‘statements are a clear case of 2 + 2 = 5’. Remarkably, 
Jenkin replied with his own letter to The Times editor, saying that he had 
meant it: the radioactive material was safe to the general public, unless 
the public actually handled it.54
The fourth ongoing investigation was by Sir Douglas Black into clus-
ters of childhood leukaemia. Black was a prominent physician and pre-
viously had authored a 1980 report into health inequalities that had not 
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been warmly welcomed by Thatcher’s government. Following the airing 
on 1 November 1983 of the Yorkshire Television programme Windscale – 
the Nuclear Laundry, which suggested the ‘possibility of a link’ between 
an apparent cluster of cancer cases, particularly five cases of leukaemia 
in children, to Sellafield,55 Black was appointed to lead a working group 
investigating the issue. Their task was to examine the evidence of clus-
tering of cancer cases, consider the need for further research and make 
recommendations.
The group collected and read existing studies (of which there 
were nine, from the 1950s to the 1980s) that rested on data from var-
ious sources, including an Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 
examination of death certificates in the Copeland District (the south-
west administrative area of Cumbria around Sellafield), and both the 
Manchester and Northern Children’s Tumour Registries. In July 1984 
government received Black’s report.56 The result was consternation. 
Black had concluded that there was unusual, statistically significant 
incidence of leukaemia in the village of Seascale, but also that the 
incidence could not be explained by the combination of background 
radiation and known discharges from Sellafield. Furthermore, as the 
Secretary of State for Energy, Peter Walker, told his Prime Minister: 
‘Black’s conclusions imply the possibility of some kind of link for which 
there is no evidence (an unplanned emission which was undetected by 
the monitors and affected the population by an unsuspected route)’.57 
(Indeed the committee set up to investigate the clusters further soon 
received evidence of discharges that had not been known to Black’s 
group.)58
Walker was concerned that publication ‘could provide a propa-
ganda success for opponents of nuclear power’; Number 10 civil serv-
ants described the report as ‘imprecise and not at all reassuring’ and a 
‘an unsatisfactory outcome which will not reassure public opinion’.59 
Three observations can be made of the government’s initial response to 
the Black report. First, while seen as imprecise and unhelpful, no attempt 
was made to suggest that Black, whose politics ran counter to Thatcher’s, 
had politicised his science. Second, the appeal to scientific evidence did 
not settle the issue and the significance of clusters would remain contro-
versial into the 1990s.60 Third, the empirically justified uncertainty in 
Black’s results could not only be seen as potentially undermining public 
confidence, but also deployed to perform an opposite action. Thatcher, 
for example, was briefed before her Sellafield visit that an ‘independent 
inquiry by Sir Douglas Black into claims about an increased incidence of 
cancer in the vicinity of Sellafield found no evidence of any general risk to 
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health for children or adults living near the plant when compared to the 
rest of Cumbria and gave a “qualified reassurance” to the local people’.61 
The  science was Janus-faced.
Margaret Thatcher chaired the meeting at Downing Street on 24 
July 1984 to discuss the interconnecting issues of Sellafield, health and 
waste strategy. Present were all the relevant ministers, as well as her 
Chief Scientific Adviser, Nicholson. Rather than poor management, it 
was now the age of the Sellafield plant that was seen as the root cause 
of ‘current levels of discharge … higher than those from any other repro-
cessing plant in the world’.62 They noted Black’s recommendation of a 
critical review of the need for discharges at their present level, but also, 
responding to their constituents’ concerns, the pressure from backbench-
ers for action. Yet there was also frustration expressed at the mismatch 
between scientific advice and public concern:
On the one hand, it was argued that there was no scientific case for 
any further reduction, since discharges were already comfortably 
within the agreed international standards, which were themselves 
very low. There were many alternative uses for the money which 
would make a higher contribution to the nation’s health. On the 
other hand, it was argued that international standards were vir-
tually certain to reduce further … ; that questions of public confi-
dence were just as important as scientific facts; …
Thatcher paid great attention to Nicholson’s advice, and subsequently 
also asked and received from him a separate briefing on the ‘distinction 
between alpha, beta and gamma radiation … [as] this is fundamental to 
the strategy for reducing discharges’.63 However, with public confidence 
judged to be a more important factor than science, the meeting endorsed, 
said Thatcher, the introduction of the relatively modest, although still 
expensive, remedial technologies – the ones she would see and open at 
her Sellafield visit, described above.64 They would be announced as part 
of a deliberately low-key response to the Black report. On the broader 
question of the storage of waste the meeting lost its nerve, accepting the 
point that ‘a major change in the Government’s approach in these mat-
ters’, such as the multi-site inquiry that NIREX had proposed and Jen-
kin supported, ‘required further and deeper consideration. There was a 
danger that by multiplying the number of sites the Government would 
simply multiply the opposition to any land disposal of waste: an alterna-
tive approach would be store waste only at existing nuclear sites’ (Lord 
Marshall promoted this option).65
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Decision was pushed back, again, by months. In December 1985 
further ministerial exchanges on the selection of four sites for fur-
ther investigation took place, with a possible view of proceeding with 
one or, given defence interests in a coastal site, two. Sites mentioned 
were Elstow (Bedfordshire) again, Fulbeck (Lincolnshire, not far from 
Thatcher’s birthplace of Grantham), Bradwell (on the Essex coast), the 
privately owned Woburn Estate near Ridgemont (also Bedfordshire) and 
later South Killingholme (also coastal, in Lincolnshire).66 Investigation 
of all except Woburn proceeded. In March 1986, the Prime Minister 
was fending off local MPs with binders of angry letters from constitu-
ents complaining specifically about NIREX’s high-handed attitude, but 
more generally that nuclear waste might be stored in their backyards.67 
However, within days a much more serious challenge to the nuclear 
 project erupted.
Chernobyl and Sizewell
On 26 April 1986, reactor no.4 at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
 ruptured during a system test, explosively starting a fire in its graphite 
core.68 Plumes of radioactive material rose high and drifted westwards. 
Outside the Soviet Union, Swedish nuclear scientists first raised the alert 
on 28 April when their monitors detected the radioactivity. In London, 
Whitehall began to buzz with hurried intelligence briefings and telegrams 
sent back and forth detailing evacuation plans for British nationals. On 
2 May 1986 Thatcher, who was in Seoul, read two lengthy documents of 
advice, both sent by emergency telegram, the first from Lord Marshall, 
the leading figure in the UK nuclear industry, and the other from her new 
Chief Scientific Adviser, John Fairclough.69
Marshall compared the Chernobyl design to those of reactors in 
Britain. ‘The reactor it least resembles is the PWR which we are propos-
ing to build at Sizewell,’ he noted, of his favoured project.70 The one most 
similar was the SGHWR – like Chenobyl it was a boiling water, pressure 
tube design, but it used heavy water rather than graphite to moderate 
the chain reaction – that had been ‘passionately advocated’ by Marshall’s 
rival, Frank Tombs, as well as the South of Scotland Electricity Board. 
Marshall reminded Thatcher that the SGHWR had been abandoned by 
the Labour government, on Marshall and John Hill’s advice, because it 
‘failed to pass British safety rules’. In other words: a ‘very much better 
reactor concept failed to get safety approval in the United Kingdom, but 
the poorer Russian design got safety approval in Russia and 27 reactors of 
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that type are now operating in Russia’. Marshall suspected that the devas-
tating but secret nuclear accident in Kyshtym in 1957, almost coinciding 
with the Windscale fire, was of a similar type.
‘I am sorry to tell you,’ Marshall also informed Thatcher, ‘that, this 
morning, for the first time, we detected fall-out from the Chernobyl reac-
tor with our monitoring instruments in Kent.’ While he thought the ‘levels 
of contamination are, of course, very low and do not pose a health hazard 
to the population’, their ‘psychological effect will, however, be very large’. 
Indeed, it was public perceptions that commanded Marshall’s attention:
Clearly this is a big setback for nuclear power. In my public speeches 
I am stressing the difference between our safety rules and that of the 
Russians and I am using the SGHWR story … to demonstrate that 
my arguments are not based simply on assertion but are based on 
historical fact. I have been pleased by the way people have received 
my arguments. I believe informed commentators and opinion 
formers think it is intrinsically plausible that the Russians have dif-
ferent and lower standards than ourselves. I am therefore hopeful 
that a massive public presentation campaign with the support of 
Government will retain the overall tolerance of the British public. 
However, we must expect greater local resistance to the siting of 
power stations …
Fairclough, on the same day, told Thatcher that the ‘Chernobyl accident 
provides an opportunity to test existing models of reactor safety, and 
the effects of a major accident, against real data’, so long as the Soviets 
could be persuaded to release technical information.71 He could add to 
Marshall’s Kentish evidence the news that ‘monitoring in East Anglia has 
today picked up increased levels of radioactivity in the grass and there 
may be further fall-out with some contamination of food crops and water 
supplies’. Fairclough, like Marshall, also noted that there was ‘certain 
to be an adverse effect on public attitude to all issues of nuclear power, 
including radioactive waste management’, and the Government would 
want to ‘reassure the public’. But, he strongly urged, ministers must ‘resist 
the temptation to make any categoric statements such as “a similar acci-
dent could not possibly happen in the UK”’, while the data was missing.
But the British areas of contamination from Chernobyl followed the 
contingencies of where rainfall, carrying the radioactivity down to earth, 
happened to be heaviest as the plumes passed. By chance, one such major 
area was Cumbria, around Sellafield. News of the high Cumbrian meas-
urements travelled from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
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Incident Room to Thatcher on 5 May: ‘This is not to do with Sellafield. 
It is the result of the Chernobyl incident’.72 ‘But who will believe this?’ 
Thatcher has written by this comment. Restrictions on the movements of 
milk, water and sheep seemed imminent.
The first days of the government’s response to fall-out were, as a 
hurried review admitted, uncoordinated and unedifying.73 Senior figures, 
including Thatcher and her press secretary Bernard Ingham, were in the 
Far East. Whitehall had plans for an emergency arising from a UK nuclear 
installation, but not for one arising from a foreign source. ‘Anxious tele-
phone callers inundated MAFF and seriously hampered communications’ 
while ministers squabbled; one of them, William Waldegrave, gave out 
the number for the Department of the Environment car pool on Radio 4, 
mistaking it for the emergency information hotline. A Number 10 Policy 
Unit adviser concluded that the ‘ill-coordinated nature of the informa-
tion and advice aroused rather than calmed public anxiety’. While the 
‘nuclear professionals’ (perhaps thinking of Lord Marshall) ‘performed 
satisfactorily’, it was noted that ‘without careful translation [their] lan-
guage can be confusing and sometimes alarming to the public’.74 One 
particular pair of contrasting statements exemplified what was seen as a 
failure of public understanding of science:
Many people don’t understand statistical probability, especially of 
very low order. For example, on the day that Kenneth Baker assured 
the public that the risks from the Chernobyl fall-out were insignif-
icant, John Dunster, Head of the National Radiological Protection 
Board, was saying that the death toll in the UK would run to tens of 
people. Both conclusions derived from the same assumptions and 
analysis. Dunster was quantifying what he regarded as an insignif-
icant risk. The next day he had to explain that the tens of deaths 
would arise over the next 30–40 years, during which time millions 
would die from cancer wholly unconnected with the Chernobyl 
incident.75
‘Now that the initial pressure over Chernobyl is beginning to die away,’ 
wrote a Number 10 official to the Department of Energy in early June 
1986, barely a month since the accident, ‘the Prime Minister has asked 
if your Secretary of State could consider how best to counteract the 
mistaken impressions which the affair has left about nuclear power’.76 
‘Timing is of great importance,’ Peter Walker, Minister for Energy, told 
Thatcher, ‘and one of the major impacts upon timing is our receipt of the 
Sizewell Inquiry Report within the next three months’, while ‘campaigns 
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mounted without knowing the contents of that report might have prob-
lems’.77 Nevertheless, he promised coordination and a ‘major and effec-
tive longer term campaign’ featuring a ‘major think-piece speech which 
will put these matters into the correct historic and long term perspec-
tive’ and mobilised through a gathering of ‘all the nuclear interests into a 
major group to discuss … public relations and advertising’. The Number 
10 Policy Unit argued that evidence showed the most effective, practical 
way of ‘winning public confidence’ was ‘to take people literally around 
the nuclear power stations’.78
Bernard Ingham, Thatcher’s trusted adviser on public presentation, 
set out the general problems that were ‘intensified’ but ‘not changed’ by 
Chernobyl:
1.– winning and maintaining confidence in a fuel with, by defini-
tion, uncertain long term effects on people – but effects which 
could produce a painful, lingering death and/or, it is believed, 
deformities in the unborn;
2.– coping with well-organised pressure groups whose aim is not to 
improve the safety of the industry but to close it down.
He noted that these were ‘complicated in this country’ by, among other 
factors, ‘the dominance in the nuclear power and reprocessing indus-
tries of scientists who have a passionate belief and confidence in their 
fuel and an insensitivity to public concern’.79 The charge of insensitivity 
was unfair. Within UKAEA the ‘need to consider the effect on the public 
image of the Authority as a consequence of (a) the Chernobyl accident, 
(b) concerted attempts by some groups to denigrate the Nuclear Industry 
and (c) the media’s occasional one-sided and exaggerated view of minor 
incidents often because of leaked comments … ’ was a topic of urgent and 
anxious discussion.80
Extensive past initiatives of public relations were reviewed81 and 
new actions proposed. Both in terms of the media and in terms of reac-
tor safety, nuclear industry staff, from Lord Marshall through to the 
UKAEA press officers, believed the key word was containment. Not only 
‘Chernobyl’, but also the ‘apparent reduction in status of politicians, sci-
entists, technologists … are all part of the problem of convincing the 
media and through them the public that nuclear power is essential for 
the wellbeing of the country,’ argued the UKAEA. ‘This note compares 
the containment features of different types of reactor systems,’ wrote 
Marshall, ‘We hope that this will reassure the public about the safety of 
our own reactors.’82
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This intuition – that the problem was a combination of the falling 
status of scientists and the solution was clearer public communication – 
was the core of the new public understanding of science (PUS) movement. 
However, it is an open question whether this political and technical crisis 
encouraged it at all. A committee under Walter Bodmer had reported on 
PUS in 1985, having begun deliberations as early as 1983, while in 1986 
the UK’s key institutions – the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science, the Royal Institution and the Royal Society – were beginning 
to discuss PUS initiatives.83 It is striking that this activity was completely 
below the political horizon viewed from Number 10 or the commanding 
heights of the nuclear industry, despite apparently similar deep concerns 
about public confidence.
Ingham had thought that it did not make sense to plan a major 
public confidence campaign until the Sizewell Inquiry had reported. 
Interestingly, he added ‘I assume that post-Chernobyl we shall not feel 
able to go ahead with PWR’.84
Thatcher received the draft Sizewell Inquiry report in December 
1986. While she herself did not read the 13 volumes and 109 chapters 
her staff did, and they summarised them for her. Frank Layfield, the main 
author and chair of the Inquiry, had concluded that there were no seri-
ous doubts about safety; the economic benefits and security of energy 
supply justified the irreducible risks of building Sizewell B and that they 
outweighed environmental detriments. ‘An accident at Sizewell B would 
almost certainly have tolerable consequences, at worst requiring meas-
ures such as the banning of milk near the station,’ wrote Layfield in the 
draft report. He added ‘Theoretically possible accidents which could 
cause hundreds or thousands of deaths would almost certainly not occur’ 
and ‘It can be inferred that Sir Frank would endose the CEGB’s contention 
that a chain of shortcomings akin to that which led to Chernobyl would 
never happen here’.85 ‘The Sizewell Inquiry Report’, one of ‘record-break-
ing duration and detail’, as Thatcher was informed, ‘justifies the wait’.86
Overall, the report was read with relief (the historical judgement 
has not been so kind).87 The nuclear project was important for many rea-
sons, and intersected with other issues, such as the action on acid rain 
discussed in Chapter 7.88 The only gloomy note was that Layfield sug-
gested that the construction of any further PWR station would have to 
be preceded by a further expensive inquiry. Indeed in 1988, when the 
question of a new PWR programme was being considered, the question 
of inquiries, their cost and public attitudes following Chernobyl were 
interlinked. ‘Had Chernobyl not happened’, then cheap, local inquir-
ies, starting with Hinkley Point C, might have proceeded, considered 
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Norman Fowler. However, because of ‘Chernobyl, it appears that the 
nuclear safety issue must have another public airing’.89 With regards to 
the Sizewell report, publication was set for January 1987. Peter Walker 
was ‘anxious to prevent leaks before publication’; he was ‘maintaining the 
tightest security in his Department and proposes similar highly- restricted 
circulation’ elsewhere.90 Government approval for Sizewell B was given 
in 1987 and the reactor started in 1994.
Conclusion
This chapter has had two contrasting halves. The first tracked the visits 
of Margaret Thatcher to UK nuclear sites, one to the Scottish fast-breeder 
project at Dounreay and the other a multi-site encounter transported 
by helicopter. The main point is that these were displays of contained 
power: the technical, engineering control of the nuclear cycle and the 
controlled public representation of a prime minister at the peak of her 
political power. Each gave something to the other: the pro-nuclear 
Thatcher gave support to a controversial project, while the nuclear indus-
try provided the backdrop for press photography of Thatcher in a white 
coat. The identification between the two was tight: the helicopter flight 
tracked the cycle of nuclear material, while the photograph of her press-
ing the button to start reprocessing combined engineering and political 
control in one image. But we might wonder just how much autonomy 
does even the prime minister have within these tightly closed cycles of 
public representation and nuclear engineering?
In the second half of the chapter, I have stressed the limits to this 
control. Leaks undermined the message of safety, photographs were 
repurposed as satire, issues of waste disposal and disease were not settled 
by appeals to science and campaigning groups and unexpected external 
events, not least Chernobyl, challenged the containment of messages 
about safety and policies for future nuclear expansion.
For Anthony Giddens, writing in 1985 in The Nation-State and 
Violence, perhaps the most influential political sociology text written in 
Thatcher’s Britain, power, metaphorically, was something contained. 
Furthermore, the containment of power was linked to ‘locales’: ‘the settings 
of interaction, including the physical aspects of setting – their ‘architec-
ture’ – within which systemic aspects of interaction and social relations are 
concentrated’.91 So while, for example, castles, manorial estates and cities 
had performed the role in earlier societies, now business firms, schools, 
universities, hospitals, prisons and, above all, the nation-state were the 
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‘power containers’ of the modern world. What was distinctive about the 
nation-state, said Giddens, was that the nation-state power container was 
a bounded and unified one, in which the ‘administrative purview corre-
sponds exactly to its territorial delimitation’.92 Within its boundaries power 
was ‘generated’ by a number of distinctive mechanisms.93
The overriding image is of the nation-state as a battery, driven by 
cells of power – or even, when, in his magpie-like way Giddens picks up 
Talcott Parsons’ notion of ‘power deflation’, perhaps a gasometer that 
is powerful when at full capacity but becomes less governable when 
dissipated.94 Parsons developed a particular theory of power: one that 
attempted to show that power could be both consensual and coercive, 
could be produced anew rather than merely being a ‘zero sum game’ and 
was a symbolic medium whose structural role was to enable effective col-
lective action.95 As a systems theory it was a product of twentieth-century 
engineering, with a dash of 1960s cybernetics. But Giddens also pointed 
to some significant features of power that will interest us here: that it 
is a symbolic system and that political leaders were the creators of new 
power in a manner analogous to a sound bank issuing new credit. It was 
symbolic power that was dispensed, and to some extent earned, in the 
visits to nuclear sites by Thatcher.
The identification of Thatcher with nuclear power stands in a much 
longer tradition of political machinery. I have traced elsewhere how 
the nineteenth-century journalist Walter Bagehot, in his 1867 classic 
The English Constitution, likened the political system to a steam engine, 
with ‘regulators’ and ‘safety valves’ ultimately powered by the ‘potential 
energy’ of Queen Victoria.96 Before Bagehot, checks and balances and 
automata provided mechanical metaphors for different forms of politi-
cal power. Energy, power and waste were concepts that developed both 
as political and technical languages. Containment, whether mundane as 
in a battery cell or large-scale and modern as in a nuclear plant, was a 
twentieth-century variant, particularly prominent during the Cold War, 
as historian Paul Edwards has argued.97 When containment at Chernobyl 
failed it was read as a metaphor for a crumbling Cold War superpower.
Commenting on Giddens’s notion of contained power, the geogra-
pher Peter Taylor noted that the container in the 1980s was leaking.98 He 
was thinking of the nation-state, and how it was being challenged from 
without by supranational entities such as the European Community and 
from within by the withering of state power through Thatcherite  policies 
such as privatisation. But we have seen in this chapter how, despite the 
efforts to shore up and contain both political power and the nuclear 
 project, they were seen to be undermined by leaks.
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A touchstone belief of the protagonists of the UK nuclear project 
was that the technology was controllable, under expert command, and 
therefore safe to deliver power to the nation. ‘The principal problems 
of nuclear power,’ declared UKAEA chief Sir John Hill in 1977, ‘are not 
now engineering or technology but problems of political will and public 
acceptability.’99 He would later guide Thatcher around Sellafield.
Thatcher’s visits to nuclear sites were choreographed displays of 
political will conducted in the name of public acceptability. Sociologist 
Brian Wynne, in his ground-breaking study, began with this quotation 
from Hill; he went on to argue that public inquiries, such as those into 
Windscale and Sizewell, were rituals that sought to delimit public debate 
to matters of fact rather than allow expression of the full range of social 
and emotional responses.100 Inquiries were intended, says Wynne, as 
tools to control and contain public discourse in the face of anti-nuclear 
opposition. But control had its limits. Neither Windscale nor Sizewell 
inquiries settled the nuclear question. On a smaller scale, I have shown 
how Black’s inquiry into the evidence for leukaemia clusters, the geo-
logical surveys into potential waste disposal sites or the attempts to save 
dumping at sea, while all appealing to the rationality of science, did not 
serve to close these controversies.
Despite all the efforts to exert control, the public acceptability of the 
nuclear remained volatile. The public understanding of science move-
ment, whose growth in the 1980s I have noted, conceived the general 
issue as one of a deficit of knowledge among the public. Lord Marshall, 
after Chernobyl, thought that public acceptance could still be won by 
a controlled, expert delivery of facts. I will give one more example. In 
1987, and again in 1988, when ‘the subject certainly has increased per-
tinancy following the PM’s recent Royal Society address’, a Dr Eric Voice, 
resident of Thurso, wrote to the UKAEA with a proposal.101 ‘What sin-
gle factor operates against the harmonious adoption of nuclear electric-
ity generation?’ Voice asked, rhetorically, before giving his answer: ‘It is 
obvious that this factor is neither technical nor economic … but rather 
the world-wide public perception of risk’. Voice suggested an experiment:
There is a large literature … on the possibility that radiation 
around ‘background’ is not only harmless but positively beneficial, 
and even essential, for healthy life. If such a fact could be estab-
lished with wide media publicity, the greater part of public oppo-
sition to nuclear power would vanish. To this end, take a large and 
well-characterised group of experimental animals (several thou-
sand mice?), let half the group live and breed for generations in a 
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‘normal background’ environment, let the other half live and breed 
… within a deep cavern in limestone or chalk, and on a diet contain-
ing only isotopically-separated 39K.
With the fact of healthy, long-living radiated mice established and publi-
cised, Voice argued that the informed public would accept nuclear power. 
It might cost £500,000, but, as Voice put it: ‘Half-a-million to start the 
swing of public opinion in Britain and world-wide in favour of nuclear 
power and waste disposal? It would be the most worthwhile sum that the 
UKAEA could ever spend’. Voice received a rejection letter, but a polite 
one – not least because he was so evidently pro-nuclear.
Perhaps Voice’s suggestion was not so far-fetched. Plenty of money 
was expended in the 1980s to produce matters of fact about nuclear 
safety, and there was a widespread belief that an absence of public knowl-
edge was a cause of the problem. But ultimately it was not to be facts 
about safety, nor the stemming of leaks, that settled the future nuclear 
project, but rather the corrosive effect of a different kind of calculative 
rationality: the economic assessment of costs that were disclosed during 
moves towards privatisation, the subject of the next chapter.
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Radioactive privatisation
Privatisation
In 1979 nationalised industries contributed 10 per cent of the Gross 
Domestic Product. Privatisation, for Thatcher, was justified both eco-
nomically and ideologically, making industry more efficient by increas-
ing exposure to the market and rolling back socialism in the name of 
freedom. Major privatisations include the return into private hands of 
the recently nationalised British Petroleum (reducing government-held 
shares by 5 per cent to 46 per cent in October 1979), British Aerospace 
(51 per cent of government shares sold in  February 1981, remaining 
shares sold in 1985, retaining a single ‘Golden Share’), Cable & Wire-
less (nationalised in 1947, half of the government’s share was sold in 
November 1981), the Radiochemical Centre (sold as Amersham Inter-
national in February 1982), the British Transport Docks Board (sold as 
Associated British Ports in February 1983), Jaguar cars (August 1984), 
British Telecommunications (the telecoms side of the Post Office had 
been split off as BT in 1981, and over half of the government’s shares 
sold in December 1984), British Gas (December 1986), British Airways 
(February 1987), Rolls-Royce (May 1987), the British Airports Author-
ity (July 1987), British Steel (December 1988), the many regional water 
companies (December 1989) and regional electricity boards (a month 
after Thatcher’s resignation, December 1990. Non-nuclear electricity 
generation followed in March 1991, with PowerGen and National Power 
being carved from the Central Electricity Generating Board).1 Research 
and development was integral to many of these companies.
Privatisation was an issue for very small as well as medium and 
large science-based organisations. For example, the National Collection 
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of Industrial and Marine Bacteria (NCIMB) was one of 15 national col-
lections of microorganisms. With origins in the 1950s, the NCIMB was 
held at the Torry Research Station in Aberdeen. The marine side of the 
collection was closely connected to Torry’s work, including bacteria that 
spoiled fish or caused fish diseases, as well as marine microbes of gen-
eral interest. The industrial side contained bacteria relevant to the rest 
of the food sector. With the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
being asked to identify staff cuts, a proposal emerged to make the NCIMB 
a private company owned by the University of Aberdeen. Tam Dalyell, 
responding to an alarm raised by the United Kingdom Federation of 
Culture Collections, who were ‘concerned about a transfer to a private 
company of national assets worth about £1 million’, wrote to Thatcher 
directly, citing her statements, discussed in Chapter 2, of her being 
‘responsible for science’.2 In this case, the government’s response was 
delegated back to the ministry, but it is a good example of how her res-
ervation of responsibility shaped the political response in practice. The 
privatisation was completed in 1982 when the NCIMB was transferred to 
the University of Aberdeen, and was much later spun out as an independ-
ent company in 2000.3
In this chapter I will explore how the policies of privatisation 
and those for science and innovation intersected through two case 
studies. The first takes a long view of the Radiochemical Centre. This 
example stands out because it was in many ways a trial of the policy of 
privatisation as a whole: it was early, it was completed smoothly (to 
produce Amersham International Ltd), it was a first full privatisation 
(although the government retained a sole ‘special share’) and lessons 
were learned for the much larger, flagship privatisations that fol-
lowed. I show that, while the Radiochemical Centre had already taken 
steps towards the market in preceding decades, not least by operating 
a trading fund, privatisation involved a market economy disrupting 
other economies of exchange. Amersham is also intriguing, in the con-
text of this volume, as an experimental privatisation because it was of 
a science-based body.
The second case study examines the faltering steps towards priva-
tisation of other, larger parts of the British nuclear project, including the 
UK Atomic Energy Authority and the nuclear power bodies. I will suggest 
a possible influence of the shift in science policy, identified in Chapter 3, 
on the course taken. Privatisation of the nuclear also clashed with some 
of the environmental aspirations discussed in Chapter 7. In particular, 
following the vision set out in Thatcher’s 1988 Royal Society speech, 
the desire to make commitments to stabilise carbon dioxide emissions 
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at 1990 levels conflicted with the planned privatisation of the electricity 
industry, since it would add costs and make the shares less attractive to 
investors.4 Privatisation was not a science policy per se, but consequences 
flowed in both directions.
Amersham
Radium was discovered by Marie and Pierre Curie in 1898. A power-
fully radioactive element, which on decay produces radon, which is also 
radioactive, radium was soon used in a wide range of medical applica-
tions, from tumour treatments to more dubious quack medicines. It was, 
however, a very expensive substance. In 1929 a National Radium Trust 
and a National Radium Commission were established to build and coor-
dinate radiotherapy centres across Britain.5 With the establishment of 
the National Health Service, these functions would be taken over by the 
Ministry of Health. Typical prewar radiotherapy took the form of either 
the insertion of ‘radium needles’ carrying small quantities (1–5 mg of 
radium) directly into the tissue) or the use of ‘mass radiation units’, in 
which large quantities (5–10g of radium) generated wide beams of radi-
ation in a fashion similar to x-ray tubes. Radon for tumour therapy was 
produced from radium in the form of capsules (known as ‘seeds’) that 
could be implanted in patients.
Before the Second World War radon was made at a local 
level, within hospitals, or by the Radon Centre at Barton-le-Clay in 
Bedfordshire. Radium sources later manufactured at Amersham for 
industrial radiography were typically mid-sized (250–500 mg). Finally, 
scientific research created a demand for more specialised radium prod-
ucts: as an ionising agent, as a radiation standard (1 μg and 500 mg) 
and as a source of neutrons (radium mixed with beryllium). These com-
plemented the supply of other research sources – polonium, mesotho-
rium and radiothorium.
Medical radiotherapy was practically suspended during the Second 
World War. Indeed, as one official wrote in 1940, ‘the requirements of 
public safety have made it necessary to bury a large proportion of the 
radium stocks in this country’.6 Instead a new demand for radium came 
from its use in luminescent instrument dials in military aircraft. But 
radium supplies from abroad could not be relied upon. It was in this con-
text that the Ministry of Aircraft Production contracted Thorium Ltd to 
start a small radium refinery.7
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In 1940 Dr Pat Grove, a chemist, had founded a private company 
called Thorium Ltd in the Buckinghamshire village of Amersham.8 The 
company refined radium and produced for the Ministry of Supply lumi-
nescent paint for tank and aircraft instrument panels. By 1943 the labo-
ratory was producing ‘mesothorium, radiothorium, radium D, polonium, 
etc’, in addition to ‘large quantities of radioactive luminous compound’.9 
The wartime rate of radium refining was about 10 g per annum. After the 
war ‘several grammes of radium were recovered from surplus radioactive 
luminous compound and old aircraft instruments’.
In 1946 the Ministry of Supply purchased the assets of Thorium Ltd, 
appointing the company as managing agents, and the Radiochemical 
Centre was established ‘as a commercial enterprise under public own-
ership’.10 Expansion and rebuilding of the site, using the Mobile Labour 
Force of the Ministry of Works, took place between March 1947 and 
March 1949. This expansion included the installation of radon extraction 
equipment, which used four grammes of radium, in operation by October 
1948. Initially it was hoped to move to bigger site, but increases of cost 
(additional building space, equipment, accommodation and conformity 
to health standards)11 forced a decision to stay and adapt at Amersham. 
The Council, concerned for its leafy, suburban location and fearing a fac-
tory, objected to any ‘large scale production’; the government promised 
only ‘laboratory scale production’ would take place.12
In 1948 medical provision in England and Wales was centralised under 
the umbrella of the National Health Service. Under the National Health 
Service Amersham, charged to ‘acquire and hire out the radium already in 
the UK’, supplied radon to many hospitals (48 in 1949), where previously 
the radon had been made in-house.13 The larger radium beam units were 
supplied to a more select list, mostly specialist cancer hospitals. A conse-
quence of the transfer of control of hospitals from local to a more centralised 
form of authority was that the organisation of a centralised supply of key 
materials also needed to be rearranged. The following year, therefore, the 
Radiochemical Centre became the central node in the network of radium 
and radon supply – part of a material, but not necessarily market economy. 
By 1949 the number of scientific and administrative staff employed stood 
at 70 people, up from 12.14 Amersham also produced sources for industrial 
radiography, used for inspecting metal castings and forgings.
The transfer of radium from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry 
of Supply (ie to Amersham) raised two financial questions: what should 
happen to the National Radium Trust funds and what should be charged 
by Amersham to resupply the hospitals of the National Health Service? In 
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winding up the National Radium Trust it was capitalised at £180,000.15 
The rate for hire for radium from Amersham in 1949 was £225 per gram 
per annum. Radon (presumably as ‘seeds’) was available at between 6 
and 18 shillings (under the prewar Medical Research Council arrange-
ments it had been 1 to 2 shillings, the former for hospitals and the lat-
ter for private patients, per millicurie)16. When supplied by the Radon 
Centre at Barton-le-Clay, the ‘receipts covered the cost of Radon made for 
sale, but the receipts did not cover the whole cost of the Centre’.17 Radon 
for research was supplied free of charge. In other words, radon supply 
(like radium) was subsidised.
The arguments made by the Treasury were that the supply of 
Amersham radium and radon should be financially self-supporting, 
while the supply of isotopes should either be charged to the Ministry 
of Supply or ‘put on an economic basis as they emerge from the exper-
imental stage’.18 Subsidies to the National Health Service, furthermore, 
should not be concealed.19 The economy of radioisotopes was brought 
to the surface – made visible – in a move that was, ironically, triggered 
by the arrival of the NHS. Indeed there had been nominal charging even 
before the NHS – there was always money in radioactivity. But what was 
new was the move to charge to cover costs, essential to later conceptions 
of Amersham as a potential trading company or even potential private 
entity.
As the factories and laboratories of the atomic state came into oper-
ation, so Amersham also deepened its role in the processing of radioiso-
topes. The Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell built atomic 
piles that substantially increased the supply of radioisotopes; it also 
trained scientists in radioisotope techniques.20 In response to increasing 
medical and industrial demand, Amersham did much of the work prepar-
ing and distributing sources. These included carbon-14, radiophospho-
rus and radioiodine.
Over the years products have also included, in addition to radium 
for the NHS and other radioactive sources for medical uses, highly radi-
oactive substances such as cobalt-60 for irradiation and neutron triggers 
for starting nuclear reactions. Amersham acted as the distributing agent 
for these materials on behalf of the Medical Research Council. The prod-
ucts of Amersham were also sold abroad, especially to the United States, 
bringing much needed dollars back in return. In the 1950s Amersham’s 
materials were even exported to the Congo – a radioactive equivalent of 
coals to Newcastle. In 1954 Henry Dale opened new, remote-controlled 
facilities for the production of radioisotopes (carbon-14 and refined fis-
sion products from reactors). These were described by the Financial Times 
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as a vast improvement on the previous mere ‘enlarged laboratory equip-
ment’, meriting the label of being a full ‘chemical production plant’.21 
Also in 1954 the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) was 
set up. It took over formal responsibility of the Radiochemical Centre, 
alongside its much larger military and civil nuclear programmes. A fur-
ther £250,000 expansion of Amersham was requested in 1957.22
In 1964 the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority put the 
Radiochemical Centre under its trading fund, along with what would 
become British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). The director (Grove) oper-
ated under a Board of Management, responsible to UKAEA and chaired 
by a UKAEA Member. By then the Radiochemical Centre catalogue 
contained over 2,000 items, ‘mainly based on artificial isotopes pro-
duced using irradiation in reactors and cyclotrons’.23 Since many other 
countries also had such facilities by the mid-1960s, work at Amersham 
increasingly focused on isotopes and compounds that were more sophis-
ticated and more difficult to produce. Orders were greater than 50,000 
and income was £2m per annum, half of which came from exports 
(mostly to the United States via an entity called Nuclear Chicago). 
Total staff in 1965 was 450, of whom 120 were professionally qualified 
scientists. Following the Atomic Energy Authority Act of 1971 UKAEA 
was split. UKAEA continued research at Harwell and Aldermaston; the 
Radiochemical Centre Ltd (TRC) and BNFL became separate entities, 
while remaining wholly owned subsidiaries. UKAEA, noted a civil serv-
ant, ‘will expect the company [TRC] to act commercially and to have as 
a principal objective the earning of an adequate commercial return on 
its capital employed’.24
While the Radiochemical Centre charged for its products – and 
indeed, as I have noted, the advent of the National Health Service made 
this accounting more visible – monetary payments were not the only 
forms of exchange that shaped the TRC under public ownership. We 
can see this clearly in the case of blood products. The principle of freely 
donating blood was essential to the British system. In 1967 the LSE social 
policy researcher Richard Titmuss had surveyed nearly 4,000 blood 
donors, asking after their motivations. The results, published in The 
Gift Relationship (1970), showed that altruism was the leading reason 
to donate.25 Titmuss’s aim was to counter the free market ideology ema-
nating from the gathering force of the Institute for Economic Affairs.26 
Blood moved through a gift relation, freely given between strangers and 
with consequent expectations of free use – no charging for blood prod-
ucts. Such a system, argued Titmuss, worked far more effectively than 
the market systems for blood supply found in the United States.
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The Radiochemical Centre was at the edge of this free, gift exchange 
system. From the early 1950s it received specially purified proteins (albu-
min and fibrinogen) from the publicly owned Blood Products Laboratory 
and labelled them with radioisotopes to produce a diagnostic tool. The 
Radiochemical Centre had agreed that the donors’ gifted origin of the 
proteins required it to label the tool clearly with the phrase ‘“Human 
albumin [or fibrinogen] provided free of charge by DHSS” [in order] 
to avoid any misunderstandings by donors that their blood was being 
sold’.27 TRC was allowed to sell the excess product overseas.
However, even though the arrangement created overheads for both 
the Blood Products Laboratory and the Radiochemical Centre, this gift 
exchange principle of supply free of charge was confirmed in the late 
1970s.28 Requests coming from for-profit, private companies for supplies 
from the Blood Products Laboratory were denied, on the same reason-
ing.29 Such altruistic relationships would be ended by privatisation. The 
standard work, Parker’s two-volume official history of privatisation, 
misses this dimension of moral economy.
One reason why the Radiochemical Centre seemed to Thatcher’s 
administration a good candidate for an early trial of privatisation was that 
not only was the Centre small and had been instructed to act commer-
cially, but also that increased exposure to the market had been discussed 
for a decade. The Heath government considered selling shares in TRC in 
1971 and invited N. M. Rothschild & Sons to advise.30 Tie-ups to big com-
mercial companies, singly or as a consortium – British Oxygen, Wellcome 
Burroughs, Beecham, ICI, Glaxo and Fisons were all mentioned – were 
also considered.31 The Radiochemical Centre, under Grove, resisted such 
moves, feeling that ‘participation by private industry was not in the com-
pany’s best interests’; he believed it would ‘damage the independent and 
impartial image which they enjoyed among customers’ and have ‘harm-
ful effect on their overseas sales since their distributors might be compet-
itors’ of the firms involved.32 In 1972 Rothschilds nevertheless suggested 
a sale of 49 per cent of the government-owned equity, combined with 
‘a firm declaration of the Government’s readiness to undertake a public 
flotation within 2–3 years’.33 The government announced its preference, 
a public flotation with sale of a minority of shares, in 1974, to be carried 
out at a time dependent on ‘general business and market conditions’. This 
would have made TRC a publicly owned company, but one with a sub-
stantial minority private stake.
In July 1979, two months after Thatcher’s general election victory, 
David Howell, charged with reviewing which nationalised industries to 
‘dispose of’ within the financial year, wrote to Nigel Lawson. He picked 
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out the Radiochemical Centre Ltd, by then a company with a turnover of 
£39 million, as a leading candidate for privatisation:
The position is different with TRC, a small but rapidly expand-
ing company which has a first-rate record in its business pro-
ducing radioactive materials for use in medicine, industry and 
research.34
TRC and UKAEA had yet to be consulted (Sir John Hill, of UKAEA, 
objected and TRC’s long-standing director, Grove, promptly retired). 
Ministerial approval to legislate on disposal of shares in TRC was 
given by a Cabinet subcommittee within the month.35 Some issues, 
such as pension rights, needed resolution. It was not until late 1981, 
after an initially preferred option to sell to a single corporate buyer 
failed,36 that the sell-off of a rebranded TRC, Amersham International, 
through public flotation on the Stock Exchange, was announced. The 
sale took place in February 1982. It was massively oversubscribed, 
as was internally admitted, and Labour accused the government of 
underpricing its assets – indeed the official historian has called it ‘the 
largest mis-pricing of a privatisation issue during the first Thatcher 
government’.37 Nevertheless, the Conservative government regarded 
Amersham as a successful experimental trial of privatisation, with 
added significance here for being a privatisation of a science-based 
venture under a science-trained prime minister. 
In one sense, the sale of the Radiochemical Centre Ltd to become 
the fully privatised Amersham International was simply the final step into 
the marketplace of an already commercial outfit. But a more nuanced 
view notices the disruption of other non-marketbased relationships. One 
concerned the gift relationship of blood products. While a minor product 
for the Radiochemical Centre, isotope-labelled albumin and fibrinogen 
diagnostic tools were made from gifted material. In 1980, with privatisa-
tion looming, the Blood Products Laboratory sought approval to charge 
for the production of fibrinogen. This proposal was accepted by 1982, 
although it also sparked a request for back payments and a court case was 
threatened.38 One consequence of the privatisation of Amersham, there-
fore, was that it encouraged the blood donation sector – the exemplar of 
an altruistic, even socialistic gift culture within the health service – also 
to think and act in more marketised terms. Another non-market relation-
ship was that of the circulation of scientific information and knowledge, 
which would certainly have been threatened if a single corporate buyer 
had been found. As was noted in the Financial Times:
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Amersham has established close links with the research centres of 
all major drug companies and regards these links as vital to a com-
pany operating at the frontiers of medical science. If one [corpo-
rate buyer] gained control, access to the others would cease. ‘The 
day we cut off our flow of information, we’re dead,’ says Dr Stuart 
Burgess, managing director.39
The government was obliged by market rules to disclose information 
that was price-sensitive. There was also an obligation to mine opposition 
statements for information about any proposed re-nationalisation. This 
kind of knowledge had previously been held discreetly. Now it too had 
a price. There was therefore a changing information economy in addi-
tion to exchanges in the marketplace or by gift. Furthermore, privatisa-
tion itself raised the prospect of commercial secrecy as a more general 
obstacle to the flow of information. This became an issue in the run-up 
to privatisation, as the government had to decide what and how much 
price-sensitive information to release.40 After privatisation, commercial 
secrecy became the norm.
I think it is useful to picture Amersham as a centre of interconnecting 
flows. One flow is of material: radioactive outputs from reactors at Harwell 
and elsewhere entering Amersham, along with blood sera and proteins, 
plastics for packaging, paper for documentation and so on. At Amersham 
these materials were transformed into products, which were shipped nation-
ally and internationally through distribution networks. Radioactive effluent 
and waste also flowed outwards, for disposal on land, in rivers and sea – for 
comparison, Amersham created more radioactive waste than the Dungeness 
power stations.41 The Thames was the conduit for Amersham’s radioactive 
tritium.42 A second set of flows was of information: accounts to government, 
scientific knowledge in and out. Only some of these movements were regu-
lated by the market, even when the Radiochemical Centre was instructed to 
act commercially. Others – notably waste – proved resistant. Products might 
be sold at profit or at cost. Inputs might be bought or gifted. Privatisation 
decisively shifted these relationships toward a market form.
The constraint of the market: the faltering privatisations 
of the nuclear
Privatisation was an ideological aim of the Thatcher government, 
although the justifications shifted over time.43 While, as we have seen, 
the isotope production arm of UKAEA, as Amersham International plc, 
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had been a successful, path-breaking privatisation, the other, substan-
tially larger components of UK nuclear industry – UKAEA, BNFL and the 
nuclear power stations of the Central Electricity Generating Board and 
the South of Scotland Electricity Board – would provide far more difficult 
challenges. While there exist excellent historical analyses of the priva-
tisation of nuclear power, not least Dieter Helm’s Energy, the State and 
the Market and Parker’s official histories, the proposed privatisation of 
research has not received close attention.44
In March 1984 Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, launched 
a ‘comprehensive review of the activities and role’ of UKAEA, with the 
‘objective of establishing a long-term framework for the Authority’s 
activities and for public expenditure in this area’.45 The review would 
involve consultation with a large number of bodies, each with different 
interests, notably industry (CEGB, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, 
BNFL), the Treasury, Ministry of Defence (which had ‘sizable repayment 
contracts’), the Department of the Environment, the Department of 
Education and Science and the Research Councils, in addition to UKAEA 
itself. As Andrew Turnbull, Thatcher’s private secretary responsible for 
economics advice, noted, seeking her consent for Walker’s plan:
A thorough review of UKAEA must be overdue. We have employed 
15,000 people for 30 years but has the nation got value for money? 
Or is it a producer dominated organisation? Does it need to be 
financed so much (50 per cent) by the taxpayer or could customers 
(the electricity utilities and BNFL) contribute more? Has one branch 
of science absorbed too much of our research effort? Content?46
‘Yes’ was Thatcher’s immediate response. Keith Joseph wanted the 
inquiry to ask whether more research to support the nuclear project 
should be done by universities and polytechnics (an issue from the 
debates I discussed in Chapter 3).47 The review was completed in August 
1984. Chaired by an insider, Ivor Manley, a civil servant at the Depart-
ment of Energy and a UKAEA Board member, the report listed reasons 
why privatisation of UKAEA ‘while possible in principle’ was ‘not in prac-
tice’. These included the fact that its ‘monopoly status in the core nuclear 
programmes, particularly the fast reactor … means there is no early pros-
pect of competition and the operation of market forces’, the unlikelihood 
of a sale coming close to recouping the book value of the net assets of 
£154 million, the Authority’s ‘major continuing liabilities, for example 
in radioactive wastes and decommissioning’ and a ‘public concern over 
nuclear issues which might make it inappropriate to seek to launch this 
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key element of the nuclear industry at this time’.48 The review did, how-
ever, recommend that a step towards a customer/contractor approach 
would be to establish the UKAEA as a trading fund, which would require 
all work to be accounted for on a ‘fully commercial basis, impose addi-
tional discipline through the requirement to meet financial objectives, 
create financial flexibility between years, highlight major issues which 
need to be dealt with on commercial terms, and facilitate eventual 
privatisation’.
Robin Nicholson was scathing. In its 30 years’ existence, he told 
Thatcher, the UK had slid from ‘first rank to second rank position in civil 
atomic energy’, CEGB, UKAEA’s ‘main customer’, had been ‘forced to buy 
reactor types other than those it would have chosen on technical, oper-
ational and commercial grounds’. In addition, UKAEA had contributed 
‘negligible export of reactors’ while consuming £5 billion of taxpayers’ 
money.49 Furthermore, there had been an opportunity cost in research:
During most of this period the UKAEA has, by virtue of the inter-
est of its research and its employment conditions, creamed off 
a significant slice of the UK’s R & D talent and created a sub-
stantial technological asset. Because of the failure of the civil 
nuclear programme and the small amount of technology transfer 
to non-nuclear activities, the contribution of this technological 
asset to the wealth-producing sector of the economy has been 
negligible.
Nicholson argued that the review had failed to address this ‘dismal 
record’ – largely because, with its terms of reference and working group 
composition, ‘the voice of the status quo dominated’. The Number 10 Pol-
icy Unit agreed with the Chief Scientific Adviser’s assessment. Nicholas 
Owen said he had
reminded us that some of the best scientific brains of a generation 
have been squandered on misdirected work on civil nuclear power. 
Since our scientists are among the ablest in the world, the finger 
points to political misjudgements and intervention. … Can we do 
better over the next 30 years?
Our priority should be develop a framework for nuclear research 
which allows a maximum role for the market and little at all for 
political interference. The best solution would be to privatise the 
AEA.50
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Both Nicholson and Owen supported the trading fund idea, as a step 
towards the private sector.
Some ministers pushed back. Patrick Jenkin, speaking for 
Environment, supported minor changes in the funding sources of 
research, but warned that ‘furthering commercial exploitation of waste 
management’ must ‘avoid creating barriers to the free interchange of new 
ideas and technologies in a field where public safety is of such paramount 
importance’. Addressing the subtext of the review, he said that ‘it would 
be unrealistic to go for privatisation at the present time, not least because 
of current public sensitivities in this field’ (a year after the Sellafield leak 
and during public outcry, led by environmental groups, against dump-
ing at sea).51 Nevertheless, two main points were carried forward, and 
confirmed in Cabinet committee.52 First, the issue of nuclear research 
should be framed by the customer–contractor principle and second, that 
this framing was seen as another step towards privatisation that would 
complement the transition to trading fund status.53 Hopes were delayed 
in 1985, however, when a short Atomic Energy Authority Bill, necessary 
to implement the trading fund policy, was crowded out of the 1985/86 
Parliamentary programme. The situation was further complicated by 
the question of whether Nicholson should be appointed the new chair of 
UKAEA, as I have discussed in Chapter 2.
In April 1986 the Secretary of State for Energy sounded out Lord 
Weinstock (GEC) and British Nuclear Associates about the possible 
sale of the UKAEA shareholding in the National Nuclear Corporation. 
This semi-privatisation was already regarded as a matter presenting 
‘formidable practical difficulties’ before the Sizewell report; following 
Chernobyl it became ‘even more difficult’.54 Any sale had to be further 
delayed.55
Nuclear power was getting ever more expensive. This increase was 
due to a combination of factors that went beyond mere rising costs, but 
also included changing regulation frameworks, attitudes to next gener-
ation and experimental projects, choices made between paths to priva-
tisation and, in a connected way, the increasingly hard-headed use of 
cost–benefit accounting that began to dislodge other ‘strategic’ commit-
ments. First, even relatively small regulatory changes, such as the new 
unwillingness to dump waste at sea, added extra costs.56 Second, minis-
ters increasingly baulked at the rising expense of the more experimental, 
research-laden, next generation nuclear projects. The fast-breeder pro-
jects were assessed and found wanting in 1988. Likewise, early in the 
same year the future of the fusion project was in doubt, both as an exten-
sion to JET and a possible Next European Torus (NET), and, beyond that, 
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the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) were 
questioned by ministers and advisers.57
The issues were both local and continental: at one level, South 
Oxford District Council might refuse permission (since decommission-
ing to a green field would be delayed by 200 years), while at a European 
level the UK wanted Europe to pay more, by cancelling the ‘host country 
premium’ and by contributing to spiralling decommissioning costs.58 ‘The 
economics have changed radically since the project was agreed,’ George 
Guise informed Thatcher, adding that the ‘decommissioning costs are an 
order of magnitude higher than originally proposed whereas the economic 
case for a fusion reactor is weaker’.59 With a review of fast-breeder policy 
also underway, the question for Thatcher was to ‘ask whether we need 
expenditure on both the fast breeder and fusion’, or indeed on either?60
Third, the cost of future inquiries was rising – not least with the 
realisation, post-Chenobyl, that a second (or more) PWR inquiry could 
not be restricted to just the local specific issues not covered by the 
Sizewell B inquiry. Fourth, it was not only the costs of inquiries, but also 
what might be included in inquiries that added financial uncertainties. 
For example, when, in 1987 ACOST delivered a review on the industrial 
impact of Sizewell, while there was some relief that it was ‘better than it 
might have been, given Sir Francis Tombs’s opposition to the PWR and 
Lord Flowers’ stance on environmental aspects of nuclear power’, there 
was also consternation that the draft contained:
two difficult issues which will be important at the next PWR inquiry 
(Hinkley Point). The issues are first, how far cost benefit analy-
sis can be applied to safety assessment criteria; and second, how 
a more prescriptive approach by the NII [Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate] could be introduced into safety assessment, and 
whether it is an essential prerequisite of privatisation.61
The Chief Scientific Adviser, Fairclough, helped to negotiate the removal 
of the offending passages.62 But the significance was that measures to 
ensure safety might add costs which conflicted with a desire to move 
nuclear power into the private sector.
The fifth factor was therefore that choices had to be made between 
paths to privatisation. In late 1988 Thatcher’s government announced 
that the CEGB would be split to form three new utilities: National Power 
and Powergen, both responsible for power stations, and the National Grid 
Company, responsible for electricity transmission and owned by the 12 
regional electricity distribution companies. The South of Scotland Electricity 
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Board, with its nuclear and non-nuclear power stations, remained, for the 
moment, intact. But investors were deeply unwilling to buy into the priva-
tisation while there was unresolved, and indeed unresolvable, uncertainty 
over the costs of nuclear waste disposal and decommissioning.
In 1990, in what was to be the last year of Thatcher’s prime min-
istership, the nuclear parts of National Power and the SSEB were thus 
separated, forming the corporations Nuclear Electric and Scottish 
Nuclear respectively (they would combine under a holding company, 
British Energy). The Secretary of State for Energy, John Wakeham, had 
announced this move in November 1989, and one implication was a mor-
atorium on the construction of new PWRs. Lord Marshall, who had moved 
from CEGB to be chair of National Power, promptly resigned, attacking 
the government for being driven by short-term market considerations.63 
Another implication was the diminished support for the fast-breeder 
programme, ultimately leading to the end of Dounreay.64 As I traced in 
Chapter 4, Thatcher had visited Dounreay in 1979; now in 1988 she was 
considering closing the plant. ‘Closure of [the Prototype Fast Reactor] 
and the reprocessing plant would mean the loss of 1,500 out of 2,000 
AEA jobs at Dounreay,’ Cecil Parkinson warned her. ‘The total effect on 
the Caithness economy would be very severe.’65 In 1991 the government 
sold its majority stake in National Power (now free of the nuclear costs) 
and in Powergen. In 1995 a final examination of the options for privatisa-
tion of nuclear power concluded that although the most modern nuclear 
power stations might be put into private hands (with the establishment 
of British Energy, responsible for the eight AGR stations and the Sizewell 
B PWR), the public purse would not support a new PWR programme and 
plans for Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C were stopped.66 Meanwhile the 
old Magnox stations, which had been removed from privatisation plans 
in 1989, were folded into BNFL. UKAEA, which had eventually become a 
trading fund in 1986, was made a plc in 1996.
In following this tortuous path to privatisation, one effect was the 
light that was shed on some of the obscurities of ‘nuclear economics’.67 
The secrecy over the cost of the nuclear programme could not be hidden 
from the market. Highly critical economic analyses were conducted by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, and subsequently by the Public Accounts 
Committee and the Select Committee on Energy in 1984. In another exam-
ple, in 1988 the Non-Fossil-Fuel Obligation – essentially a requirement 
that the newly privatised electricity companies should be required to buy 
the output of nuclear power stations, balanced by a Fossil Fuel Levy on 
all electricity bills – has been described as ‘a tacit recognition by the gov-
ernment of the extra cost of nuclear power’; the minister, Cecil Parkinson, 
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observed that ‘for the first time, as a result of our proposals, the public is 
being told what nuclear costs are’.68 Likewise, National Power could only be 
privatised once its hidden nuclear costs had been removed. And again, the 
ways in which BNFL’s costs were calculated were changed, moving from 
costs-plus to fixed price, so the risks moved away from private sector to the 
BNFL rump, which in turn became even less attractive to private investors. 
And again, British Energy’s decision in the mid-1990s not to build PWRs 
‘reflected the judgement that private investors would not be keen to invest 
in a company that would build new nuclear plants’.69
Finally, there are suggestions of a connection between the rad-
ical shift in science policy identified and described in Chapter 3 and 
the withdrawal of direct government support for nuclear projects. The 
Government ‘still recognised the long-term need for fast reactors, [but] 
it believed that the technology had been proved,’ noted BNFL energy pol-
icy analysts Judd and Ainsworth of the 1988 decision drastically to cut 
back R&D expenditure at Dounreay, and ‘Consequently the responsibility 
for further development should be taken by private industry on a strictly 
commercial basis, and there was no longer a place for nationally funded 
activity’.70 This argument is precisely that of George Guise’s persuasive (at 
least, to Thatcher) attack on near-market research that I have uncovered 
in detail. The research-laden parts of the nuclear project were especially 
vulnerable. If this connection holds – and it is not the reasoning offered 
by the Secretary of State for Energy,71 so the connection, if present at all, 
would have to be in Thatcher’s own mind, as part of her new understand-
ing of the place and role of government-funded R&D – then it is an exam-
ple of nuclear policy being shaped in the late 1980s not only by market 
reasoning, or deepened critical economic analysis, but by a science policy 
that had been derived largely by anecdote and ideology. Amusingly, at 
the time of the fast-breeder reactor research decision, Guise was writing 
to Thatcher that ‘cold fusion could even become the greatest economic 
benefit from particle physics!’72
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6
The Strategic Defense Initiative 
and the politics of research
America does possess – now – the technologies to attain very 
 significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, 
nonnuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, 
we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may 
have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.
As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize 
that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter 
attacks against them. Their vital interests and ours are inextricably 
linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology 
can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor 
our commitments.
I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and 
raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive 
systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and 
no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I 
call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave 
us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of 
mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these 
nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and 
recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m 
taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and 
intensive effort to define a long-term research and development 
program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the 
threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way 
for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. 
We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our 
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only purpose – one all people share – is to search for ways to reduce 
the danger of nuclear war.
My fellow Americans, tonight we’re launching an effort which 
holds the promise of changing the course of human history. 
There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can 
do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your 
support.1
Even before March 1983, when Ronald Reagan called upon the ‘scien-
tific community … those who gave us nuclear weapons’ to turn their 
‘great talents’ to the task of strategic defence, laser weapons were a 
topic on which Britain’s new, science-trained Prime Minister took a 
personal interest.2 ‘This,’ Margaret Thatcher would later recall, was 
‘one of those areas in which only a firm grasp of the scientific concepts 
involved allows the right decisions to be made,’3 And ‘As a scientist I 
shall understand this better than any of my ministers and therefore I 
am the one that the Americans should be talking to’ was how her Pri-
vate Secretary recollected her first instinct.4 Indeed, the archives show 
that space-based missile defence – what the Americans called the Stra-
tegic Defense Initiative (SDI) – was indeed an area in which Thatcher 
‘ran’ policy directly. While Thatcher’s biographer, Charles Moore, con-
cludes, on the basis of a later interview with her Cabinet Secretary, 
that Thatcher’s scientific background contributed to her being sceptical 
about SDI, the primary source evidence, presented here, shows she was 
in fact distinctly more favourable to the project than her key ministers 
and advisers.5
In the first months of office, a document warning of Soviet devel-
opments was placed in Thatcher’s box of working papers. ‘Specifically, 
the Soviets are in the process of creating a prototype space laser capa-
ble of knocking out any land- or sea-launched ballistic missiles,’ the 
author wrote, adding that ‘American scientists consider the coming 
breakthrough in laser technology to be as important as were the devel-
opment of atomic and nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles in their 
day’.6 Such laser weapons (‘the death ray of science fiction’) would chal-
lenge the ABM Treaty of 1972 and fall outside the proposed Article XI 
of the draft SALT II Treaty, in which signatories undertook not to place 
into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, as well as ‘make the American concept of Mutual Assured 
Destruction … technologically obsolete’. Thatcher underlined much of 
this document and requested advice from the Ministry of Defence, specif-
ically from its chief scientific adviser, Ronald Mason.7
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The Ministry of Defence took a month to reflect on the request. The 
advice, when it came, was sceptical: while a laser powerful enough to 
damage a guided weapon was experimentally possible, there were ‘major 
practical difficulties to be overcome before such a system could be devel-
oped as an effective weapon’.8 Fog and cloud would reduce range signif-
icantly and immense energy was needed for operation: ‘large quantities 
of heat, of the order of a megawatt or more, and waste gases would have 
to be dissipated’. This might be possible on board a ship or on land. In 
space, while the range might increase, any installation would be ‘more 
complex and probably highly vulnerable’. The Russians, it was known 
from intelligence sources, were nevertheless committing $300 million a 
year to research and development of laser damage weapons, apparently 
‘with some success’; in a passage underlined in Thatcher’s blue pen, the 
Ministry noted ‘uncorroborated evidence that they have been examining 
the feasibility of locally heating part of the re-entry vehicle of a ballistic 
missile … so as to make it unstable … and to miss the intended target’. 
Finally, it was noted that any deployment would also contravene the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty.
Prime ministerial interest rested for a year.9 In January 1981 stories 
carried by the New Scientist and The Times caught her eye.10 The latter 
story, by Reuter’s Washington Correspondent, speculated that the new 
space shuttle might perform pointing and tracking tests for lasers.11 The 
former story reported an MIT study that said that space laser weapons, 
while theoretically possible, were ‘not technically feasible in the real 
world’; they could be jammed or triggered to fire at the wrong target.12 
Significantly, it was the ‘theoretically possible’ aspect that attracted her 
rather than the grounds for doubts. It is a feature of the SDI question that 
leading politicians, not least Reagan and Thatcher, were far more cred-
ulous than experts or journalists. The Ministry of Defence reported that, 
even in the eyes of the US Department of Defense’s scientific expert who 
coordinated the programme, ‘no application had yet been found for laser 
damage weapons’.13 Yet the Minister of Defence would write to Thatcher, 
on top of the same advice, that
Sooner or later there will be a breakthrough in research on these 
weapons and it is important that we keep track of what is happen-
ing. The implications for eg Trident could be considerable. For the 
moment, however, nothing startling appears to be imminent.14
Thatcher firmly underlined the first, alarming sentence, but not the keep-
calm-and-carry-on sentiment of the last.
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Then, in March 1983, Reagan made his dramatic speech. The 
key moment came at the end of the half-hour televisual address to the 
American people, in which he asked citizens to oppose cuts to the defence 
budget. Having castigated the previous administration for running down 
the armed services, alarmed his audience with the scale of Soviet mil-
itary expansion and revealed satellite photographs of MiGs on Cuban 
airfields and an immense new runway built in Grenada with communist 
cash for a Caribbean state with no air force, Reagan began to speak on a 
different register. ‘I’ve become more and more deeply convinced that the 
human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations 
and human beings by threatening their existence’, he said, looking the 
camera in the eye. The President then added that even if arms control 
reductions should succeed:
it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on 
mutual threat. And that’s a sad commentary on the human condi-
tion. Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we 
not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying 
all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stabil-
ity? I think we are. Indeed, we must.15
Was there an alternative? Yes, according to the President. ‘I believe there 
is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. 
It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet mis-
sile threat with measures that are defensive … [turning to] the very 
strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that 
have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.’ It might take years, with 
failures along the way, but ‘tonight we’re launching an effort which holds 
the promise of changing the course of human history’. And to do so, the 
President reached out to ‘the scientific community … those who gave us 
nuclear weapons’ – was there in that phrase a tone of invited redemp-
tion? – ‘to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world 
peace’.
Reagan’s public speech, which was reaffirmed by a strong pri-
vate message from the President to the Prime Minister, was imme-
diately recognised in the Ministry of Defence as being of ‘potentially 
crucial importance’.16 What should the UK response be? In particular, 
given that this might be a research and development programme of 
immense scale and resources, what were the consequences and oppor-
tunities for scientists in Britain? For UK interests more broadly, four 
questions of concern were identified: ‘the questionable validity of the 
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technical proposals’; ‘the possibility [given a shift of emphasis from 
deterrence to defence] that any nuclear exchange would be confined 
exclusively to Europe while both superpowers remained immune 
behind the shield of their improved ABM defence’; the ‘credibility of 
the United States’ commitment to arms control, particularly in rela-
tion to the 1972 ABM Treaty’; and, last but not least, ‘the future of the 
British independent strategic nuclear deterrent’. The last alone would 
force a choice between confronting the United States on the feasibil-
ity of SDI or admitting that Trident would be redundant if SDI was 
successfully built and replicated on the Soviet side.17 The question-
able validity of the technical proposals, examined specifically by the 
Defence Scientific Staff, could likewise be broken down into areas of 
concern: deployment would be at least 30 years away, would require 
diverting the Shuttle programme, present ‘considerable command 
and control difficulties’ and be vulnerable to Soviet anti-satellite and 
other countermeasures.18 Nevertheless, noted the Defence Scientific 
Staff, while there was ‘nothing in the laws of science which says that a 
space based directed energy weapon system for ABM defence cannot 
be built … it is clearly a greater challenge than the US project to land 
a man on the moon’.
In the United States, an inter-agency group spent the six months 
following Reagan’s speech on reviewing possibilities.19 Its conclusions, 
reported by diplomatic telegram, were that there was ‘a good deal of 
momentum in favour of a substantially expanded research and develop-
ment programme’, one which would have ‘implications … for Britain and 
French systems’.20 It was suggested that Thatcher take the ‘opportunity 
during her talk with the president to emphasize that US exploration of 
this area of technology is of direct concern to us’.
The discussion in the UK took place in the context of a European 
interest in taking positive action towards arms control – of anti-satel-
lite systems in the shorter term and under the influence of SDI in the 
long term. In February 1984 the French, backed up by the Germans, 
emphasised their analysis of military developments in outer space at 
a Western European Union ministerial meeting. They expressed the 
belief that there was a danger of a new arms race and that European 
allies should take a view on arms control options.21 Geoffrey Howe, the 
Foreign Secretary, would have wanted to support this position, but felt 
constrained not to say anything while Ministry of Defence’s views were 
yet to be circulated in Whitehall. When these were finally expressed in 
June, they were, thought senior diplomat Percy Cradock, especially 
critical of SDI:
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the longer term issue, SDI, is much more diffuse and worrying. In 
essence it involves US research into the possibility of a multi-lay-
ered system of ballistic missile defence (BMD) capable of destroy-
ing incoming missiles at various points in their trajectory. It is highly 
speculative, would be horrendously expensive and it is hard to see 
how a flawless system providing 100% cover could be devised. It 
could also be highly destabilising in terms of the super power [sic] 
balance. Research and testing would eventually contravene the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.22
Yet a president would nevertheless be tempted to develop a defence that 
could ‘at least reduce the prospect of a total holocaust’.
In September 1984 a wide-ranging set of consultations with 
Western European allies took place at the Pentagon and the US State 
Department. While no substantial new information about SDI was 
shared, UK observers nevertheless took home two messages. The first – 
‘very welcome’ – was that the Americans were now more willing to think 
of SDI as concerning the ‘defence of the alliance as a whole (not just 
continental United States)’. The second was the revelation that while 
there was ‘scepticism among some senior US officials as to whether a 
comprehensive strategic defence system will ever be deployed, if only 
for resource reasons’, there was equally a ‘feeling that there may be val-
uable spin-off from the research along the way and that the scale and 
effort going into the President’s initiative of strategic defence has at the 
very least made a strong impression on the Russians, which may be no 
bad thing’.23 With a US election fast approaching, after which President 
Reagan might be expected to commit fully to SDI, the pressure was on 
for the UK to agree a firm line of response. Geoffrey Howe and Michael 
Heseltine, Foreign Secretary and Minister of Defence respectively, 
teamed up to persuade Thatcher. In a jointly signed letter the duo, high-
lighting both the technical problems and the doubts,24 urged, on the 
basis of a substantial review of policy, that the ‘key question is whether 
at this important juncture the Government should be willing to engage 
with the Americans in serious discussion of the underlying arguments 
for and against such a concept’.25
SDI, with its mixture of scientific research and drive from the 
highest levels of political leadership, was an area where the Prime 
Minister was indeed ‘running … policy directly’.26 Thatcher, aided 
by points made by Charles Powell, her Private Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, resisted Heseltine and Howe’s assault. Crucially, 
the counter arguments rested on an assessment of scientific research. 
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In particular, a point from Powell received a big blue tick from 
Thatcher. It was that:
not enough weight is given in [Howe and Heseltine’s argument] to 
Soviet potential and capabilities … [they are] ahead of the US in 
important areas of research. Given what we know the Soviet Union 
are up to, it seems to me that the Americans have no option but to 
push ahead in this area.27
Powell’s next point is underlined:
The paper underestimates the dynamics of scientific progress. You 
can’t disinvent DEW or KEW [directed energy and kinetic energy 
weapons] technology. There’s no question of choking BMD at birth 
as the paper seems to suggest. The goal should be to manage the 
new technology in as economical way as possible to add to the 
West’s overall security.
In late 1984 Thatcher met successively the new Soviet general secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the re-elected President Reagan. She assured the 
latter that the former would not be allowed to drive a wedge between 
the UK and the US via the issue of SDI. She also ‘told the President’ of 
her ‘firm conviction that the SDI research programme should go ahead’.28 
At the same time the public debate on SDI and arms control heated up. 
Four veteran heavyweights of US foreign policy – Robert McNamara, 
McGeorge Bundy, Gerard Smith and George Kennan – authored a paper 
in Foreign Affairs that argued that SDI and arms control were incompat-
ible.29 This argument was rejected by Thatcher and the American Secre-
tary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger.30
The winter of 1984–5 saw high-level diplomacy between the United 
States and the Soviet Union grappling, or perhaps rather posturing, over 
the arms control issue, including control of space weapons. At one stage, 
on the latter, the Soviets were accused of ‘not taking yes for an answer’. 
Yet suddenly the ground shifted. Margaret Thatcher received a briefing 
on developments at Geneva, where George Schultz and his counterpart 
Andrei Gromyko met in January 1985. Robert ‘Bud’ McFarlane, Reagan’s 
National Security Adviser and leading advocate of SDI, was accompanied 
by a team including the US ambassador when he briefed Thatcher; she in 
turn was accompanied by a top UK diplomatic team. While ‘no-one knew 
for sure what had persuaded the Soviet Union to return to serious negoti-
ations’, McFarlane was convinced that ‘above all it was the US decision to 
 THE STRATEgIC DEfENSE INIT IAT IvE AND THE POLIT ICS Of RESEARCH 195
pursue research on the Strategic Defense Initiative’.31 Elimination of the 
SDI research programme had been the constant demand, filling the first 
day of the Schultz–Gromyko talks. Thatcher wrote personally to Reagan 
to thank the President for keeping her, and the UK, informed, adding 
pointedly that the Alliance stood the test of ‘serious problems over the 
past year in the arms control field’ precisely because ‘intensive consul-
tations’ encouraged cohesion.32 Meanwhile the Soviet ambassador reit-
erated to Malcolm Rifkind, junior minister at the Foreign Office under 
Howe, that Soviet aims were the ‘non-militarization of outer space’, 
including a ban on the ‘development, testing and deployment of “attack 
space weapons”’, which in turn were a condition on further progress in 
other arms control areas.33
It was in this context that a particularly powerful reframing of SDI 
formed within the highest UK government circles, one that put the poli-
tics of research at its centre. On 20 February 1985 Margaret Thatcher was 
scheduled to hold a ‘seminar’ in Washington on SDI. A scheme for a coup 
de theatre was carefully plotted. It was noted that at an earlier meeting, 
held at Camp David in December 1984,34 Thatcher had achieved consid-
erable impact on the President when she spoke beyond the content of the 
pre-circulated papers and addressed Reagan with a fresh directness. The 
old President had perked up and listened attentively. With this lesson 
learned, the plan was to prepare for the Prime Minister ‘something new 
and important to say when she meets the President, in order to make the 
maximum impact … with ideas which have not been pre-digested by his 
advisers’. It was in this spirit that the British ambassador to the United 
States, Oliver Wright, made a clear and crucial suggestion.35 Thatcher had, 
at Camp David, made a ‘very helpful distinction’ between SDI research and 
SDI development.36 This had, said Wright, ‘made possible the armistice’: 
it drew support from other European governments and ‘ensured that we 
were not on the side of the Russians in opposing SDI’. But now there was 
an opportunity to go further. Wright put the point as follows:
So far so good. Except on one point. This concerns our unwilling-
ness to involve ourselves in the research programme now picking 
up steam under the SDI rubric. My Defence Staff and my Chancery 
have received repeated overtures from General Abrahamson, the 
energetic Air Force General running the SDI programme, about 
the possibility of his visiting the UK to brief British industry. So 
far the decision has been not to pick up the offer.
I think this is wrong. It is also inconsistent with our policy of 
approving research.
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Furthermore, argued Wright, the ‘SDI under the President’s inspiration 
has fired the American imagination’ with the result that its ‘popularity 
now extends widely throughout the relevant branches of the Administra-
tion, the US armed services, and Congress, who will in my judgement vote 
at least the funds to whether it will work’. He observed that ‘SDI is one of 
the things, perhaps the most important, that Ronald Reagan wants to be 
remembered by, like Jack Kennedy and putting a man on the moon’. As 
with Apollo, it represented the ‘American “can-do” spirit, something to 
aim at’. Therefore, asked Wright, the key question was, given this momen-
tum, ‘are we going to exclude ourselves from the revolution in defence 
technology that the SDI research programme is likely to ignite?’ ‘If we 
continue to spurn US interest in involving us,’ Wright warned, ‘I see a real 
danger of our missing the bus.’ Past and present examples were brought 
forward to back up the point that investment now would save money later:
If we indeed miss the bus, as we missed the space bus,37 we shall 
only have to instigate, in 10–20 years time, another Alvey catch-up 
operation in order to stay in the field of nations competent in the 
most advanced technologies. Isn’t it better to get in on the ground 
floor? Isn’t there high grade employment here for a lot of British 
brains? Isn’t there work for eg Plessey, British Aerospace, Racal, 
GEC? And shouldn’t our defence scientists be given a chance to 
remain up with the US front-runners?
The conviction here was that involvement in research would lead to spin-
offs, both military and civilian, provide business opportunities for ‘enter-
prising British companies’ and be a window of influence on American 
‘policy decisions on testing and deployment issues if we know what we 
are talking about’. So, urged Wright, Thatcher should tell the President 
‘of our interest in the research programme and our wish to take up the US 
offer of a piece of the technological action’.
Here was the ‘something new and important to say’. Powell 
included the proposal to ‘volunteer to participate in SDI-related 
research’ as the first point of discussion at the pre-meeting at 
Chequers, where main UK positions would be agreed prior to depar-
ture for Washington; he thought it ‘could have considerable political 
impact, above all with the President’.38 The drawback, what he saw 
as the likely MoD and FCO response, was that such a bold embrace 
of SDI research ‘would identify us publicly with the SDI, which they 
would see as a mistake in itself and likely to cause problems in the 
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Alliance’ (that is to say, with Western European states). Again a divid-
ing line was being drawn with Reagan, pro-SDI US officials and gen-
erals, Thatcher and Powell aligned on one side, and the FCO and MoD 
(represented by Howe and Heseltine) and France, Germany and other 
Western European allies on the other.39
When Thatcher met Reagan on 20 February 1985 it is clear that 
she did indeed offer UK research for SDI. Direct evidence – the record 
of the meeting – is unfortunately still retained. But subsequent enthu-
siastic, even frantic, exploration of what level of research might be 
funded is supplementary evidence. Furthermore, that Wright’s spe-
cific proposal was closely read by Thatcher is shown not only by the 
blue ink underlining parts of his letter to Howe, and the opinion of 
her adviser Charles Powell,40 but also in the echoes of Wright’s lan-
guage in Thatcher’s personal message to Caspar Weinberger: ‘I was 
and remain very impressed by the vigour and ingenuity which is going 
into tackling the immense technical problems in the best American 
“can do” manner’.41
Before turning to the British attempt to secure considerable 
research funding for SDI from the United States, we need some sense 
of four aspects of the SDI issue: the visioneering of SDI technology; the 
quality and sources of knowledge about it; the relationship between scep-
ticism and expertise; and the sometimes extraordinary back channels of 
diplomatic pressure to support SDI.
What was SDI? Knowledge, uncertainty and criticism
The SDI project had its joint origins in Cold War science and the science 
fiction imaginary.42 Rooted partly in past and present research pro-
grammes in the US national laboratories but also in technically detailed 
visions of future technologies, what historian Patrick McCray has called 
‘visioneering’, SDI also changed shape over time.43 The Cold War US 
defence research establishment was home to both proponents and critics 
of anti-ballistic missile systems. In the late 1950s and 1960s the Army 
had wanted to install a massive system of ground-based interceptor mis-
siles. As Rebecca Slayton has shown, it was largely physicist-advisers who 
had criticised the Army’s proposal, on the grounds that it would not only 
be expensive and of doubtful effectiveness but would also disrupt deter-
rence.44 She has also shown that this specific, physics-centred exper-
tise did not grasp the other, more computational risks of such systems. 
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Nevertheless, research towards various means of ballistic missile defence 
continued, many encouraged by the influence of Edward Teller, the 
staunchest hawk among defence scientist-advisers.45
By 1981, two years before Reagan’s announcement, various pro-
grammes of research were already underway.46 The Lawrence Livermore 
laboratory in California was investigating accelerators for the Navy, 
funded by DARPA; this was the so-called ‘Chair-Heritage’ programme. 
Los Alamos had a research programme under a Dr Knapp, investigating 
a space-based system. The US Department of Energy had an interest in 
developing technologies suitable for particle beam weapons and the 
Department of Defense had convened a ‘task force’, led by a Dr Franken 
of the University of Arizona. The Department of Defense also had a Laser 
Damage Weapon Programme, coordinated in part by a Dr Richard Airey.
In response to Reagan’s 1983 speech, two investigative surveys were 
commissioned, the second of which, known as the Fletcher report, offered 
a public vision of SDI without releasing sensitive, technical details.47 The 
effort to organise, as well as establish and defend the feasibility of, SDI in 
the United States was led by General Abrahamson. Abrahamson, described 
by one British newspaper as a ‘cherubic Luke Skywalker [who] positively 
exudes good intent,’48 conceived of SDI as a ‘system of systems’, includ-
ing satellites, ground radars and command and control infrastructure.49 
Likewise the UK Ministry of Defence’s new Chief Scientific Adviser, the 
chemist Professor Richard Norman, in his personal briefing of Margaret 
Thatcher on the subject in January 1985, said that ‘a review of all recent 
available evidence showed that the US conception was that of a layered 
system’.50 Elements of these layers included: surveillance and identification 
of Soviet missile launches by eight satellites in distant, geosynchronous 
orbits (36,000 km); tracking of missiles by 20 satellites at 10,000 km, with 
infrared and long-wave radar, and battle station satellites, numbering at 
least 100, probably at low 1,000-km orbits. The attack would be optimally 
made during the boost phase of the ICBMs, when all the parts – missile, 
warhead, decoys – were together before deployment of countermeasures. 
Attack during the boost phase, while desirable, meant that the detection 
and the decision to engage had to be taken extraordinarily quickly.
Norman described the three possible types of weapon: kinetic, direct-
ed-energy and particle beam. Kinetic-energy weapons might take the form 
of small projectiles (5 kg masses, rocket-propelled, travelling at 6 km 
per second), smaller bullets (weighing 1 kg but launched by an electric 
rail-gun and travelling at 10 km per second), or even the form of a tiny 
missile, 10 g in mass, accelerated by an electric rail-gun to speeds of 200 
km per second. Directed-energy weapons were predominantly envisaged 
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to be space-based laser systems, although ground-based lasers, firing at 
space-based mirrors in geosynchronous orbit – that would in turn reflect 
the energy to high-altitude, ground-based ‘flighting mirrors’ 25 m in 
 diameter – were also considered. The types of laser under investigation 
included hydrogen-fluoride infrared devices as well as Teller’s favourite: 
an extraordinary, space-based, x-ray laser powered by a nuclear explosion. 
The giant pulse of x-rays would be split and redirected onto Soviet missiles 
by hundreds of smaller mirrors carried by the satellite. It would, of course, 
work only once. The particle beam option was considered least promising.
Tying these systems together would be the computer and com-
munication networks necessary for ‘battle management’. As historian 
Rebecca Slayton has emphasised, the difficulties regarding software – not 
only making it work, and work fast enough, but also ensuring that the 
programming did not have bugs that would lead to failure or disaster – 
emerged as SDI’s Achilles heel.51 Norman, too, said to Thatcher that the 
United States was:
very advanced on individual components, but not on the man-
agement of the system as a whole. The software which would be 
needed was far beyond anything conceivable in the present state 
of the art. There were also major technical problems in the fields of 
optics and vast amounts of energy needed for laser weapons.
However, knowing what SDI might be was much more difficult than my 
summary of Norman’s briefing to Thatcher has suggested. SDI existed 
as components under past and continuing research, system diagrams 
of the whole that would over-simplify and change over time and future 
projections of technologies that pushed up against, and possibly beyond, 
physical and computational limits. Furthermore, technical information 
about SDI was restricted, even for close allies of the United States. ‘An 
assessment of US attainments and capabilities is, in some ways, more 
difficult to make [than that of Soviet systems]’ ran one complaint. ‘We 
have received a number of US briefings on the SDI programme, but most 
of these have concentrated on strategic and political issues and aims, 
rather than technical ones.’52 The US could – and did – exclude British 
eyes and ears. At a meeting at NATO on SDI by Abrahamson’s team in 
August 1984, for example, the UK ‘was allowed to attend all the briefings 
at Secret level but was excluded from a session involving nuclear devices, 
eg X-ray lasers and high endoatmospheric discrimination’.53 Technical 
details would, even when known, be either classified secret or, if pub-
lished in technical journals, be of unknown reliability.54 Likewise relevant 
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intelligence reports, presumably only of the Soviet side, would also be 
secret. Thatcher, wary of slipping in public, ordered an audit and sum-
mary of what she could tell Parliament about SDI.55 This audit found that 
the ‘few hard facts available in the open literature’ were ‘largely derived 
from “leaks” which have not been confirmed by official sources’.
Knowledge of SDI was therefore incomplete for a number of rea-
sons. This situation meant that all decision-makers, and those who 
would influence them, including critics, worked in conditions of incom-
plete knowledge and uncertainty. Debate, both in and out of government 
circles, relied on incomplete, private briefings and published, limited, 
self-interested documents such as the Fletcher report,56 – and, increas-
ingly, the critical accounts and analyses published, for example, by the 
activist Union of Concerned Scientists.57 Furthermore, newspaper and 
popular science press coverage was also highly influential, not least 
because these were a main source of imagery that visually encouraged 
the view that SDI was feasible (‘how it will work’, captioned once such 
piece in the International Herald Tribune)58 even when the text itself 
might be critical (see, for example, similar imagery of the SDI ‘system of 
systems’ in the Scientific American and the Economist)59.
So in a curious way, the centre – at least the UK centre of government – 
was not much more knowledgeable about what SDI was than were the 
experts and media commentators outside the walls. In the United States, 
the counterattack of criticism against SDI was mounted most promi-
nently by academic scientists such as Hans Bethe of Cornell, Kosta Tsipis 
of MIT, Herbert Lin, also of MIT, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.60 
British scientists who organised against SDI, such as David Caplin and 
Tom Kibble of Imperial College, were just as critical, but had little access 
to technical details or political decision-makers.61 In Whitehall experts, 
as well as officials within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the 
Ministry of Defence, were also sceptical of SDI’s feasibility. ‘The FCO and 
MoD always want you to read the Scientific American article,’ complained 
Thatcher’s gatekeeper, Charles Powell, to his Prime Minister, ‘because 
they agree with it’.62 Such scepticism was echoed, albeit again for differ-
ent reasons, in the public debate on Star Wars in Britain.63
Against such scepticism, one extreme response was to see wide-
spread expert criticism as a positive indicator of radical innovation. Such, 
for example, was the rather significant opinion of Caspar Weinberger, US 
Secretary for Defense. It was expressed at a conference on the US/UK 
Relationship in the Field of Defence and Security, held at Ditchley Park 
in the Oxfordshire countryside, supposedly under the Chatham House 
Rule, reported by Michael Heseltine to Thatcher:
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He had ‘rather complete’ confidence that the SDI would work. Indeed 
he took encouragement from the consensus among scientists that the 
goal was not achievable; Einstein himself had been a lone voice.64
If we put aside the possibility that Heseltine, who, as we will see later, 
may not have been playing with a straight bat in the SDI research debate, 
was here misrepresenting or satirising the views that Weinberger actu-
ally expressed, then this seems a remarkable dismissal of expert opinion 
by the Secretary for Defence. Of course, back in Washington there was a 
small circle of powerful experts, notably around Edward Teller, who had 
promoted and justified extreme military technologies throughout the 
Cold War, from the hydrogen bomb to Star Wars.
Extraordinary back channels
As well as the direct, official US–UK contacts, exemplified at the highest 
level by that between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, US diplo-
macy involved the circulation of views through back channels which, 
of course, were also monitored and weighed at the centre. A curious 
example of these back channels is a breakfast between Lord Thomas 
and Henry Kissinger that took place in February 1985. Hugh Thomas, 
a Foreign Office diplomat-turned-historian, was chair of the Centre for 
Policy  Studies, the free-market, Thatcherite think-tank based in London. 
Kissinger, the distinguished, immensely well-connected foreign policy 
adviser had, under Reagan, no formal affiliation to the President, but 
continued to network, consult, comment and influence.
At breakfast, Kissinger spilled his views on SDI. It was, he thought, 
essential, ‘the only way out of our nuclear dilemma’. In particular, he sus-
pected that, ‘in the long run’, the conviction necessary to the success of 
the policy of deterrence through threatened massive nuclear retaliation 
would be eroded. Any such threat had to be credible. Would any presi-
dent really authorise a nuclear attack on a Russian city in response to a 
conventional attack in Europe? ‘Even now,’ he doubted that
anyone around President Reagan would advise, say, a nuclear 
attack on Kiev in response to a Russian takeover of Berlin: particu-
larly not Nancy Reagan who, in his opinion, would be the determin-
ing voice if she were around at the time when the President had to 
take a decision of this nature (and she would make it her business 
to be around).65
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Aside from this extraordinary glimpse into the imagined dynamics 
of nuclear decision-making, the point had consequences for strategic 
defence. SDI was therefore, for Kissinger, ‘a way of avoiding’ the other-
wise eventual ‘move towards unilateral nuclear disarmament’, as this 
lack of credibility became widely recognised. Russian attitudes to SDI 
were seen as rational and their worries about SDI would drive them to 
the negotiating table. European – that is, French, German – concerns 
were dismissed as ordinary responses to shifts in the balance of power, 
Kissinger’s favourite framework of analysis.
Thomas dutifully forwarded Kissinger’s message to Thatcher.66 
There is no evidence that it played any particular role in shaping poli-
cies, and was probably only read for its amusing tittle-tattle. However, 
its timing – a fortnight before Thatcher’s meeting with Reagan and in the 
moment of decision regarding the pitch for research – certainly did not 
detract from the momentum for support of SDI among Thatcher and her 
closest advisers.
Pitching for research
In the weeks before Thatcher’s critical meeting with Reagan on 20  February 
1985 there were signs that a similar change of heart was occurring 
in other European countries. In West Germany, Helmut Kohl and his 
defence minister Manfred Wörner, softened by the ‘moral/philosophic’ 
framing of SDI – that it was a step towards reducing civilian casualties 
in the instance of a nuclear war – signalled that West Germany was also 
open to European collaboration in SDI research, albeit under ‘certain 
conditions’, including the strong one of ‘no secrets’, or full sharing of 
fruits of research.67 As we will see, one of the motivating factors behind 
the shift in the German position – that, in Kohl’s reported words, the SDI 
programme ‘would give the US a significant technological leap forward 
and the European allies should not become technologically dependent’ 
– was equally at play in British discussions. It was also noted in the 
German press that ‘US offers of research collaboration were designed in 
part to create pro-SDI lobbies in Europe’, a wise cynicism that was not in 
 evidence in London.
At a gathering of defence ministers on 26 March 1985 Caspar 
Weinberger, detecting ‘unanimous support’, announced that a formal 
invitation for European allies to collaborate on SDI research would soon 
be issued.68 Indeed, just such a formal invitation landed on Michael 
Heseltine’s desk that day.69 Similar letters arrived in Bonn, Paris, Rome, 
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Tokyo and Jerusalem. An indication of interest was requested within 
three months. Heseltine’s first response was warmly to endorse the 
suggestion of Lord Carrington, the ex-Foreign Secretary who was now 
Secretary-General of NATO, of putting up a ‘concerted European effort’.70 
For Heseltine such a joint proposal from Britain, Germany, France and 
Italy would have two advantages. First, it would ‘help the process of 
maintaining a shared European approach to the wider strategic issues 
raised by SDI’, not least because it would discipline individual countries 
from over-indulgence – a problem, apparently, ‘because of the lure of par-
ticipation in the technologies of the future’. Yet Heseltine’s second rea-
son addressed precisely this gain: a joint response would mean that ‘four 
major European countries working together could share the benefits of 
their collaboration’. Within this approach it is interesting that Heseltine 
ruled out the ‘CERN model’: some ‘may argue for a European centre of 
excellence … as the mechanism for a joint European contribution’, but 
such an institution ‘would rapidly acquire a vested interest in the pursuit 
of SDI which might not be helpful to our own effort to think through the 
issues in political and strategic terms rather than allow technological and 
industrial factors to dominate’.
Again Thatcher was guided by Powell. ‘Perhaps I am too suspicious,’ 
her adviser wrote:
but it seems to me that one reason why the Defence Secretary pro-
poses a joint European project on SDI research is that he wants to 
build up a body of opinion sceptical of SDI. There doesn’t seem any 
good industrial or scientific reason for a joint response: so it must 
be political.71
Clearly Powell thought Heseltine’s long-term game was undermining SDI 
rather than building European collaboration. Thatcher agreed, rejecting 
the suggestion of a joint European proposal and instead offering mere 
‘coordinated rational responses’, while reserving each country’s ‘national 
freedom of manouevre’ [sic]. In communicating this decision, Powell 
added other reasons – which may originate from him or may come from 
a conversation with the Prime Minister:
She suspects that we would be more likely to lose from it. She 
doubts whether the French would share scientific knowledge or 
technology with us in areas where they are ahead: and we should 
be net contributors of expertise in regard to other European coun-
tries. Politically she sees a risk that a joint response might place an 
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undesirable restraint on the position which we take towards SDI. 
She also thinks that we can reasonably expect to cash in with the 
Americans the credit we have built up by giving a lead to European 
support for SDI research, and can best do so bilaterally.72
Perhaps taking the hint, and perhaps extending it deliberately too far, 
Heseltine’s response would be to attempt to cash in this credit for as 
much as it could buy. With the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on 
balance, in favour, and the Department of Trade and Industry sidelined, 
it was the Defence Secretary who led the negotiations.73 In anticipation, 
much of the necessary bureaucratic machinery was set up, such as a Cab-
inet-level official committee to gather views and coordinate discussion, 
not least on how SDI research might fit more broadly with research and 
development, in policy and in industry.74
The European context for considering SDI research was also 
moving fast. The French very quickly rejected Weinberger’s invi-
tation. On 17 April 1985 President Mitterrand proposed ‘Eureka’, a 
European fund for research that would aim to provide the technolog-
ical boost without the SDI strings.75 He thereby ‘presented himself as 
taking bold action to hasten the “technological renaissance of Europe” 
at a time when the SDI proposal was reminding Europeans of their 
technological weakness’.76 In Germany a split opened up between the 
pro-SDI chancellor Helmut Kohl and pro-Eureka voices both within 
cabinet (such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher) and outside (such as Kohl’s 
predecessor Helmut Schmidt). On 31 May Germany endorsed Eureka. 
The UK soon followed, but, by ambitiously also seeking SDI funds, 
kept two irons in the fire.
Nevertheless, following the rejection of the joint European plan, 
Heseltine seems to have dragged his heels. He met with Weinberger 
and grumbled about potential violations of SALT II, which the US 
Defense Secretary dismissed out of hand.77 The two were said to be ‘at 
loggerheads’.78 When Heseltine reported to Thatcher in late May, two 
months after Weinberger’s invitation, he could not hide the absence 
of progress. ‘The truth is that very little progress has been done,’ 
remarked Powell to Thatcher, who replied, derisively ‘The Germans 
have got further than we have. This won’t do’.79 She demanded action, 
in the form of firm proposals, within three weeks. Geoffrey Pattie, the 
Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology, also com-
plained that the Ministry of Defence were going too slowly, channelling 
UK industrialists’ grumbles that the German government was being 
far more active and supportive.80 Pattie’s claim that the ‘Americans 
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regard SDI as a giant pull through of new technology, whether or not 
the eventual military aims are ever achieved’ was supported by the 
intervention of Thatcher’s Chief Scientific Adviser, Robin Nicholson. 
He, too, argued that ‘whether or not SDI succeeds in its strategic aims, 
the very large US spend will produce technical advances in areas of 
importance to conventional defence and to civil industry’. Indeed, 
since even the United States did not have the resources  – including 
the demand for 40,000 scientists and engineers alone – to pursue SDI 
alone, the UK, despite ‘a real resource cost to the UK’, had, Nicholson 
believed, ‘no choice’ but to contribute, willingly through negotiation 
or unwillingly through a new brain drain.81 Yet Heseltine’s proposals 
were so far ‘very feeble’. The Chief Scientific Adviser’s recommenda-
tion to his Prime Minister was therefore:
We have a unique and hard won position of being the only coun-
try with a respected and trusted position on defence science and 
technology with both the US and Europe. We should exploit this 
position ruthlessly.82
Nicholson was therefore critical of Heseltine’s revised position, as of July 
1985, not only to negotiate bilaterally with the United States, but also to 
share a ‘pool of information’ with European partners, coupled with active 
Eureka participation. So were others.83
Heseltine’s next, bold response would strain relations with 
Thatcher significantly. The Secretary of Defence met his US counterpart, 
Caspar Weinberger, at the Pentagon ‘at short notice’, on 22 July 1985. 
He was accompanied by his private secretary and the British ambassa-
dor. Weinberger brought along Major General Colin Powell. The official 
minute abbreviates the first item on the agenda, on SDI, and turned 
quickly to concerns about early warning systems and armaments sales to 
Argentina.84 The private summary sent by Heseltine to Thatcher reveals 
that the SDI discussion was incendiary.85 Heseltine, claiming the support 
of British industry, told Weinberger that ‘to secure proper British partici-
pation, we needed to put on the table at the outset a bid for our share [of 
SDI research] expressed in money terms’. So
Taking account of the advice from industrialists, I did, however, 
decide to put on the table a figure for the amount of US-funded 
SDI work to be placed in Britain … I decided to pitch this at $1.5Bn 
out of the $26Bn which the US plans to spend over the period 
1985–1989.86
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Heseltine’s stated reasoning was that a smaller commitment would carry 
all the political risks (of criticism from, say, the Labour Party, and of a 
brain drain of the top talent) but few of the benefits (in access to new 
technology, in balance of trade). ‘The scale of our bid,’ Heseltine noted 
with a straight face, ‘clearly came as a surprise’.
The scale of Heseltine’s bid deserves underlining and context. If suc-
cessful, it would have made the US SDI programme a bigger funder of UK 
research than, for example, the Medical Research Council. ‘The Defence 
Secretary slapped a high bid for “5% of SDI work or nothing” which rather 
rocked the Americans,’ glossed Powell to Thatcher. “Bold and I hope not 
intended as a “wrecking” bid.’87 That Powell had to ask suggests that the 
motives of Heseltine were obscure, even to those at the centre of the 
administration. What game was Heseltine playing? Was he bidding high 
because he wanted UK investment and was playing a high-risk strategy? 
Or was he bidding high because he knew it would be refused – in which 
case was this because he did not agree with the aim or approach of SDI, 
or for some other cause?88 We know that his department, the Ministry of 
Defence, like the FCO but for different reasons, had reservations about 
SDI. Also, we can recall Heseltine’s reasons for rejecting the ‘CERN model’ 
for SDI (because it would create a vested interest in the ‘pursuit of SDI’) as 
extra evidence that Heseltine was sceptical of SDI as an end. If he thought 
that the 5 per cent bid could have been successful then he was guilty of 
seeking to create just such an interest. Therefore, if he was not being 
inconsistent, Heseltine probably was indeed offering a wrecking bid.
In April 1985 the Chief Scientific Adviser of the Ministry of Defence 
(Norman) and the Director of AWRE Aldermaston, on a tour of US 
nuclear establishments, had taken ‘the opportunity to have a long explor-
atory discussion with General Abrahamson and his staff on possible 
co-operation in the SDI research programme’.89 The Ministry of Defence 
now began to work out in detail, responding to Thatcher’s demand for 
such evidence, the areas in which the UK could do more than a billion 
dollars of SDI work.
Nearly one-third of this would be straight ‘research’, conducted in 
government labs, universities and industry. Specifically 18 areas were 
identified (see Table 6.1 in Appendix), many of which were in niches 
where UK research was particularly strong, from optical computing and 
lasers to software security and electronic sensor materials. These research 
areas would contribute £250–300 million. They were complemented by 
an smaller but more lucrative set of proposed areas for ‘SDI research val-
idation experiments’ – essentially experimental demonstrations of the 
abilities of parts of the SDI ‘system of systems’ to work effectively (see 
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Table 6.2 in Appendix), conducted largely by private companies. This 
development work would bring in £840 million, making a total of over 
£1 billion (meeting Heseltine’s $1.5 billion bid).90
From this point on, however, the SDI bid began slowly to unravel. 
Some of the problems were due to contradictions internal to UK priorities. 
The DTI expressed ‘pessimism about the ability of UK industry to exploit 
SDI technology’, while the Cabinet Office, at the same time as the MoD 
composed its ambitious list of research and development areas, noticed 
that it begged ‘the fundamental question of whether it would be in the 
UK’s overall economic interest to allocate resources to work of this scale 
and kind’. After all, as I show and discuss in Chapter 3, ‘one of the main 
issues that Ministers are now tackling … . [was the] recommendation that 
defence R & D spending should be progressively reduced so that scarce 
industrial resources, particularly in electronics, can be  re- allocated to more 
economically productive purposes’.91 In other words, tying science policy 
to SDI had considerable, unanalysed opportunity costs, despite the lure of 
immense dollar funding. Nicholas Owen, of the Number 10 Policy Unit, 
wondered aloud whether the $1.5 billion was ‘wishful thinking’, adding 
‘We are pursuing contradictory objectives: straining to secure a substan-
tial SDI workshare, which we cannot afford, and which we probably could 
not deliver, while at the same time, trying to contain or reduce defence 
expenditure, particularly on R&D’.92 Keith Joseph argued that ‘Key skills in 
both UK industry and UK universities and Research Councils would be at 
risk of brain drain’, with the impact on university research teams ‘dispro-
portionately great’.93 Furthermore, commitments to SDI and Eureka were 
being made at a time when, said Joseph, ‘we continue to squeeze funding 
for our science base’ (also a topic addressed in Chapter 3).
Another set of obstacles were in place across the Atlantic.94 The 
American negotiators wanted the ‘smallest acceptable British contribution 
covering technologies of greatest interest to the US, on terms favourable 
to the US and with no commitment beyond the next year or so,’ com-
plained a British official.95 The rules on transferring defence technology, 
which was essential if demonstration experiments would be funded, were 
being interpreted inflexibly and in line with narrow US interests – both 
those of security and those of a ‘Buy American’ protectionist kind. A small 
‘Pathfinder’ programme of work was offered – perhaps £150 million over 
five years and a substantial disappointment. Off the record, at least some 
on the US side thought the British were ‘being greedy’, and briefed that 
the Reagan administration had ‘other fish to fry up on the Hill’.96
Margaret Thatcher had all these arguments before her when review-
ing SDI research policy in October 1985. Her Chief Scientific Adviser, 
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Nicholson, considered the likelihood of spin-off, noting that while some 
of the technologies were ‘likely to be of major importance to civil indus-
try’, SDI participation would ‘naturally direct the technologies towards 
military applications, and UK industry has a poor record of extracting the 
potential civil benefits from military R&D’.97 And her gatekeeper for all 
this advice, the diehard Charles Powell, concluded that if the $1.5 billion 
fixed figure was dropped it should be in return for ‘satisfaction on all our 
other requests’, while urging that, in view of the desire to find cuts in 
defence research, UK ‘participation in SDI research should be an alterna-
tive to not additional to existing defence R&D’.98
Further disappointment, perhaps not unexpected, came when Caspar 
Weinberger informed Heseltine that, due to ‘legal constraints and other dif-
ficulties’, no fixed ‘set aside’ of SDI R&D funds could be allocated to the UK.99 
There would be no $1.5 billion investment. This decision, surely reflecting 
the Reagan administration’s realistic assessment of Congressional politics, 
came despite the UK offering a ‘comprehensive exchange’ of ‘all relevant 
information’, relating to both government defence research establish-
ments and British companies. (Such openness would have been modelled 
on the post-1958 sharing of nuclear secrets that had reversed the heavy 
postwar restrictions of the McMahon Act.) A much more vague but secret 
Memorandum of Understanding was nevertheless drafted – essentially a 
framework for further exploration of the R&D topics identified.100 
Heseltine told the Prime Minister that he thought that ‘the origi-
nal approach of seeking a specific sum’ had ‘played an important part 
in achieving this outcome’. Howe, Heseltine’s supporter in this matter, 
thought the Minister of Defence had done well. So, it seems, did Thatcher. 
However, by November 1985 the prospect of substantial UK SDI 
funding was receding fast. Lord Carrington was told, off the record, by 
Robert McFarlane, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, that ‘any coun-
tries interested in getting some benefits from SDI research should sign 
on quickly because SDI was not going to last’.101 McFarlane thought that 
doubts about the system’s effectiveness, as well as a squeeze on funds, 
would strangle the project. That month Reagan told Thatcher, finally if 
apologetically, that no substantial funding would be available.102
SDI continued to be a matter of high diplomacy, as the endgame 
of the Cold War began. At the summit at Reykjavik in October 1986 the 
Soviet desire to confine SDI to the laboratory was the stumbling block 
that prevented a remarkable proposition to eliminate strategic nuclear 
weapons within ten years. Reagan’s refusal – despite the fact that his 
vision of a nuclear-free world was within grasp – has been interpreted 
very differently: from intransigence to a step ‘crucial to the victory over 
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communism’.103 Confinement to laboratories would be, in practice, pre-
cisely the fate of SDI in the 1990s and 2000s.
Conclusion
The academic analysis of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative has, per-
haps understandably, been dominated by strategic issues. How did SDI 
feature in high diplomacy? Would SDI have upset the balance of deter-
rence? Was SDI a strategy, consciously or by accident, for undermining 
the Soviet Union, perhaps critical to the end of the Cold War? These are, of 
course, important questions. Thatcher considered Reagan’s SDI decision 
‘the single most important of his presidency’.104 The virulence of Soviet 
opposition to SDI, which culminated at Reykjavik, the causes of which 
were unclear at the time,105 now seems to be a recognition, as Thatcher 
also later wrote, that ‘they had lost the game … they could not hope to 
match the United States in the competition for military supremacy’.106 The 
physicist Freeman Dyson once insightfully noted that Soviet leaders such 
as Khrushchev pursued grand defence by bluff, taking high technology 
not as functional but as psychological.107 In the 1980s this is precisely 
what Reagan himself did – SDI worked in, and on, the imagination – and 
the Soviet leaders took it seriously because that was their mindset too.
While in this chapter I have shown that there existed a serious divi-
sion of opinion on the wisdom of SDI, the significance for this book’s 
argument is as a case study of an issue identified by Margaret Thatcher 
as a science-based, high-stakes issue: ‘one of those areas in which only a 
firm grasp of the scientific concepts involved allows the right decisions 
to be made’. She talked directly to Reagan. But her Minister for Defence, 
Michael Heseltine, who had no science background – his education was 
a Philosophy, Politics and Economics degree from Oxford and his work-
ing experience was as an accountant, property developer and publisher – 
negotiated with his American counterpart, Caspar Weinberger. Within 
the context of this slight loosening of prime ministerial control, Heseltine 
pitched for an extraordinarily large sum of research and development 
funding. Science, and science policy, was thus a critical aspect of SDI as it 
related to the United Kingdom.
In 2003 the historian Holger Nehring posed several probing questions 
to a witness seminar held to discuss the British response to SDI, specifi-
cally on the science question.108 Two can now be answered. First, Nehring 
asked: ‘Was British support for the technological side of SDI motivated by 
the perception of Soviet competition in the arms race, or by the desire to 
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boost the economy by establishing SDI-related R&D?’ From the documents 
now released at the National Archives, it is now clear that the contribution 
of spin-off certainly featured in British government discussions, while the 
Russian threat was very much contextual. Yet this is not the full answer.
Retrospectively Thatcher recalled that for her the ‘decisive argument’ 
in favour of SDI was ‘that you could not ultimately hold back research into 
new kinds of offensive weapons. We had to be the first to get it. Science 
is unstoppable: it will not be stopped for being ignored’.109 Again in ret-
rospect, Heseltine stated that he saw the military-industrial arms race as 
unstoppable, and therefore that in his decision to pitch for funding he was 
simply out to maximise the research money that would come from SDI: if 
there was going to be ‘any kind of involvement by the United Kingdom it 
had to be at the research level and we must get whatever we possibly could 
out of it’.110 Both recollections are misleading. Thatcher had indeed made 
the point, during her Camp David discussions with Reagan in December 
1984, that the research should go on, but the reasons for this seem more 
tactical than due to the ‘unstoppable’ nature of science. When Heseltine’s 
bid for $1.5 billion research and development funds failed, it was clearly 
evident that research could indeed be stopped.
Furthermore, Heseltine’s bid for funding was not merely maxim-
ising research income to the United Kingdom. I argued that it is at least 
as plausible – and indeed not entirely contradictory – that Heseltine, 
like Howe, had severe doubts about SDI. Powell and Thatcher certainly 
wondered at the time if his approach was a ‘wrecking bid’. Science policy 
here might even be seen as a move in the game of political rivalry. Within 
months, as the tensions finally surfaced in public, Heseltine would resign 
on another, apparently far less significant, defence technology issue – the 
sale of the helicopter firm, Westland. Perhaps that was the final straw, 
whereas SDI was part of the camel’s main burden.
Putting aside such speculations, the SDI affair, during which civil 
servants and industrial partners conjured up hundreds of millions of 
pounds of potential research and development work, is a rather uned-
ifying sight. The UK was eager for dollar-funded research; it was being 
swayed, dependent on the United States and willing to tear up existing 
important plans for defence research. Recall, as I traced in Chapter 3, 
that these discussions took place at a time when the consensus among 
ministers and the chief scientific adviser was that defence R&D spending 
was far too high and needed to be cut.
Nehring also asks what role did scientific advisers and advisory 
committees play? The answer here is that they played only a secondary 
one. Thatcher listened carefully to Richard Norman, the Chief Scientific 
Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, but her own GCSA, Robin Nicholson, 
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had only a marginal role on this issue. She listened to the US SDI advocates 
(Abrahamson ‘had a regular pass to Number 10 Downing Street for several 
years, to come and tell us about every latest development,’ recalled Powell), 
read the papers Powell fed her and, apparently, ‘devoured’ Aviation and 
Space Weekly.111 She did not listen to academic critics, including hundreds 
of physicists who signed a petition against SDI research on campus. ‘You 
have to remember that we had a government led by a lady who famously 
defied the advice of 365 economists in a letter to The Times about her 
Budget,’ commented Powell, ‘so she was not going to be terribly impressed 
by 365 physicists.’112 Thatcher may have been a scientist-turned-politician, 
but her sense of how science informed politics was her own.
Appendix
Table 6.1 Areas identified for UK SDI research, September 1985. Source: 
PREM 19/1445. Annex A, Mottram to Powell, 25 September 1985. Sciences 
identified by the author.
Research area Description Sciences 
involved
Notes
Item 1. 
Architecture 
study
An ‘examination of the 
requirements for the 
European elements of 
defensive systems’. In 
other words, adapting 
SDI to defend Europe
Organisation 
studies
Operational 
Research
Computer 
science
Electrical 
engineering
Was linked to the 
Test Bed Facility 
proposal
Item 2. 
Directed 
energy 
protection 
programme
An ‘understanding of 
the interaction of new 
forms of directed energy 
with weapons materials’, 
with implications for 
countermeasures.
Material 
science
Physics
Item 3. Elec-
tromagnetic 
launcher tech-
nology
A ‘new approach to high 
velocity missiles’
Physics
Electrical 
engineering
Item 4. Ion 
sources
Building on existing work 
on ‘ion beam generators’
Physics The existing 
work was at the 
Culham fusion 
laboratory
(Continued)
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Research area Description Sciences 
involved
Notes
Item 5. Optical 
computers
Replacing electronic 
signals with light beams 
in computers, promising 
increased speeds
Materials 
science
Physics
Computer 
science
The UK was 
regarded by MoD 
as having ‘first 
class credentials’ 
in this field
Item 6. 
Advanced 
thyratrons
Thyratrons are ‘high 
current switching 
devices, of interest to 
the US in their directed 
energy programme’
Electrical 
engineering
UK, thought 
MoD, was ‘ahead 
of the US’
Item 7. Non- 
electronic 
materials
Generic types of material 
‘applicable to space 
mirrors, to large space 
based structures and 
to structures that must 
survive battle conditions’
Materials 
science
The UK ‘has 
expertise’, said 
MoD
Item 8. Sensor 
package
Materials and devices for 
remote sensing
Materials 
science
Electrical 
engineering
An area of 
‘exceptional 
expertise’ of 
MOD R&D 
establishments
Item 9. 
Terminal radar
‘This is an area in which 
the UK has novel ideas 
for future multi-beam 
radars as well as for 
significantly reducing the 
production costs of more 
conventional phased 
array radars’
Electrical 
engineering
The US were the 
acknowledged 
leaders in 
phased array 
radars
Item 10. 
Terminal 
interceptors
The ‘application of 
technologies for the 
interception of a wide 
range of threat types – all 
of them likely to arise in 
Europe in the next decade’
Electrical 
engineering
An area of 
‘very strong 
UK expertise’
Item 11. Laser 
radar and 
vibrometry
‘New techniques in data 
processing, combined 
with laser radars, 
show promise in early 
identification of threats’
Physics
Computer 
science
UK regarded as 
‘on a par with the 
US in this work’
Table 6.1 (Continued)
(Continued)
 THE STRATEgIC DEfENSE INIT IAT IvE AND THE POLIT ICS Of RESEARCH 213
Research area Description Sciences 
involved
Notes
Item 12. 
Counter-
measures
Defensive 
countermeasures
Various ‘The UK has 
20 years 
experience 
in defensive 
counter-
measures’
Item 13. 
Software 
security
This was ‘concerned with 
the maintenance of data 
processing capabilities 
which are crucial to the 
whole system’
Computer 
science
A ‘particularly 
sensitive area 
in which to 
negotiate 
collaboration’
Item 14. 
Electronic 
materials
The ‘development and 
processing of materials 
for use in the very high 
rates of computing 
demanded by future 
systems’
Materials 
science
‘UK is a world 
leader’. Also, 
this work ‘has 
significant civil 
applications’
Item 15. Phase 
conjugation
‘These techniques apply 
to the modification of the 
properties of mirrors in 
space’
Physics – 
Optics
US ‘probably 
ahead in many 
aspects of this 
work’
Item 16. Battle 
management/ 
command and 
control and 
communica-
tions
The ‘timely processing 
of data relating to the 
management of defence 
assets and the problems 
of command, control and 
communication’
Computer 
science
Electrical 
engineering
Required ‘the 
setting up of 
physical battle 
models’
Item 17. Signal 
processing
‘Modern approaches to 
signal processing open 
up new possibilities for 
target signature analysis, 
decoy discrimination and 
data fusion at extremely 
high rates’
Electrical 
engineering
Computer 
science
‘Considerable 
civil potential’
Item 18. Space 
technology
Problems of materials 
and technologies
Material 
science
Engineering
Table 6.1 (Continued)
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Table 6.2 UK SDI Research validation experiments proposed by the Ministry of 
Defence, September 1985. Source: PREM 19/1445. Annex B, Mottram to Powell, 
25 September 1985.
Research area Description Sciences 
involved
Notes
Item 1. 
Airborne 
sensors
‘Experiments would 
be designed to 
demonstrate the 
capabilities of sensor 
materials and devices, 
for Infra Red and 
visual detection and 
for discrimination 
between threat and 
non threat objects’
£170 million
Item 2. Ground 
based – air 
based radars
Ground and air based 
radars, particularly 
multi-beam phased 
array radar
£120 million An area of 
overwhelming 
US expertise, but 
UK companies 
‘believe they 
have innovative 
approaches’
Item 3. 
Terminal phase 
weapons
Complex interceptor 
weapons
£150 million ‘There are highly 
innovative UK 
approaches’
Item 4. 
Counter-
measures
‘These experiments 
would demonstrate 
the possibilities 
for establishing 
countermeasures to 
BMD systems’
£80 million
Item 5. Optical 
computers
Very fast, non-
electronic computing’
£40 million ‘UK has leading 
work in this area … 
.With very wide civil 
applications’
Item 6. Electro 
Magnetic 
Launcher
A technology for high-
velocity interceptors
£120 million The UK already 
‘has an extensive 
investment’, 
including a ‘fully 
instrumented test 
range … which is 
of great interest to 
both UK and US 
programme’
(Continued)
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Research area Description Sciences 
involved
Notes
Item 7. 
Culham Ion 
Source
An ion source £40 million ‘This technology 
is of great interest 
to the US and 
incorporates a very 
high UK investment 
of intellect. It 
represents a high 
value bargaining 
counter with the 
US’
Item 8 C3 
Test Bed and 
Simulator
C3 (Command, control 
and communication) 
test bed and simulator
£120 million ‘UK expertise is 
extensive in this 
field’
Table 6.2 (Continued)
Notes
 1. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, 23 March 1983. Copy 
of text of speech at: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm.
 2. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins, 1993, p.247.
 3. Thatcher, op. cit., p.463.
 4. Charles Powell, in Michael Kandiah and Gillian Staerck, The British Response to SDI, Witness 
Seminar held in the Chancellor’s Hall, Senate House, University of London, 9 July 2003. Lon-
don: Centre for Contemporary British History, 2005, p.32.
 5. ‘She boasted that her scientific education, contrasted with “Laid back generalists from the For-
eign Office”, enabled her to grasp the [SDI] concept and run with it. She was certainly not one 
of those who were appalled. But the very scientific education which she mentioned led her 
to be “dubious about the practicality”,’ Robert Armstrong recalled. ‘ … I think she instinctive-
ly doubted whether it would be as effective as Reagan seemed to think it would be.’ Charles 
Moore, Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography. Volume Two: Everything She Wants. Lon-
don: Allen Lane, 2015, pp.107–8.
 6. PREM 19/1188. Untitled document, undated (1979). Frustratingly only two middle pages of 
the document have been kept and civil servants at the time seemed to be unsure of its prove-
nance, one adding a note, presumably to Michael Heseltine, asking ‘Did you put this in? I think 
it is from the publication “Transnational Security”.’ I cannot trace a publication of that name 
from that year. Nevertheless, this document, with its handwritten queries from Thatcher, is the 
start of her engagement with laser weapons as an issue.
 7. Also requested was advice on whether Soviet developments in SAM ground-to-air missiles and 
AWAC radar would neutralise the Americans’ cruise missiles.
 8. PREM 19/1188. Norbury to Alexander, 28 January 1980.
 9. Although General Keegan did raise the possibility of a ‘self-resonating collective generator’ in 
relation to a (probably space-based) accelerator for particle-beam weapons in April 1980.
10. The pattern of advice would often start with a news story in the broadsheets or scientific 
press. These would be forwarded to the Prime Minister, who might then ask for internal 
expert advice. Another such episode was from December 1981 in response to Kosta Tsipis’s 
article ‘Laser weapons’ in Scientific American. John Nott, the Junior Defence Minister, asked 
for the Prime Minister to be shown it. The Ministry of Defence took the opportunity, in the 
covering note, to re-emphasise its scepticism. Tsipis called the difficulties of laser weapons 
216 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
‘insurmountable’; this view was said to be ‘very much in line’ with earlier advice and was also 
‘fully supported by Sir Ronald Mason, our Chief Scientific Officer’.
11. ‘US space shuttle to test laser weapons’, The Times, 7 January 1981. For what the UK knew 
about the military space shuttle, see: FCO 66/1545. Cuthbertson to Swift, 19 November 1981.
12. ‘No future for laser weapons in space’, New Scientist, 1 January 1981. The MIT study was 
 Michael Callahan and Kosta Tsipis, ‘High Energy Laser Weapons: a Technical Assessment’, 
 Program in Science and Technology for International Security report no.6. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT, 1980. See, for a contemporary STS view, Kent D. Lee, ‘The role of scientific advisers in the 
Strategic Defense Initiative’, Technology in Society 8(4) (1986): 291–8.
13. PREM 19/1188. Dawson to Alexander, 14 January 1981.
14. PREM 19/1188. Heseltine to Thatcher, 15 January 1981, handwritten on Dawson to Alexan-
der, 14 January 1981.
15. Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, 23 March 1983. 
Copy of text of speech at: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.
htm.
16. PREM 19/1188. Mottram to Coles, 29 March 1983. The private letter is in the Thatcher archive. 
Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/1/29 Part 2 f49 (T37A/83). Reagan to 
Thatcher, 23 March 1983. Copy here: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/131533.
17. PREM 19/1188. Ministry of Defence, ‘President Reagan’s speech on defensive technology’, 
undated (March 1983). For Britain and various arms restriction treaties see: John R. Walker, 
Britain and Disarmament: the UK and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Arms Control 
and Programmes 1956–1975. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012. Jeremy Stocker, Britain & Ballistic Mis-
sile Defence, 1942–2002. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
18. PREM 19/1188. Ministry of Defence, ‘President Reagan’s speech on defensive technology’, 
undated (March 1983). Also: MoD Defence Scientific Staff, ‘Defence against strategic nuclear 
missiles: a technical assessment’, undated (March 1983).
19. There were two reports to the President submitted in October 1983, one on strategy and policy 
(the ‘Hoffman Report’) and one on defensive technologies (the ‘Fletcher Report’).
20. PREM 19/1188. Telegram, Washington to FCO, 27 September 1983.
21. PREM 19/1188. Howe to Heseltine, 14 June 1984.
22. PREM 19/1188. Cradock to Powell, undated (June 1984). On the shorter term, ASAT, issue, 
MoD view was that a ban on ASATS was desirable. Thatcher disagreed with important parts of 
the analysis.
23. PREM 19/1188. Telegram, 18 July 1984.
24. Not least the need to ‘incorporate a hair-trigger response, dependent upon automatic, com-
puter-driven decisions’. The full list of pros and cons is interesting. Pros: ‘ethical merit’ (MAD 
perhaps even replaced by ‘Mutual Assured Survival’), ‘popularity with US public’, ‘strength-
ening of the US guarantee to Europe’, ‘new crisis management options’ (‘As a  deterrent to 
provocative behaviour in periods of tension, US Presidents could formally notify unfriend-
ly states that the BMD system was being switched over to automatic’, ‘strengthening of 
 deterrence’ (by disarming first strike), ‘damage limitation if deterrence failed’, ‘incentives 
for deep cuts in offensive nuclear systems’, ‘nullifying the risk of accidental missile launch’, 
‘avoidance of nuclear threats by small nuclear powers’, ‘the need for a prudent hedge against 
Soviet ABM/BMD efforts’, ‘improved monitoring and verification of Soviet compliance with 
the 1972 Agreement’, ‘comparative US advantage in this area of military competition’, and 
‘achievement of a US lead in 21st century weapon systems and the domination of space’. 
Cons were: ‘the enormous technical uncertainty of the project’, ‘the relative ease and cheap-
ness of countermeasures’, ‘the risk of saturation by increased numbers of offensive systems’, 
 ‘increased dangers of automatic response leading to war’, ‘the danger of strategic destabili-
sation’, the ‘particular dangers of transition from deterrence to defence’, the ‘improbability 
of accidental nuclear release’ (sic), ‘low likelihood of ballistic missile attack by future nucle-
ar states’, ‘the worldwide nuclear threat itself would still remain’, ‘stimulation of a new arms 
race’, ‘arms control’ issues and ‘no hard evidence of Soviet intention to break out of the 1972 
ABM Treaty’. PREM 19/1188. ‘Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD): implications for UK policy 
towards the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)’.
25. PREM 19/1188. Howe and Heseltine to Thatcher, October 1984. The substantial 35-page 
review plus annexes of SDI was ‘Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD): implications for UK policy 
towards the US Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI)’.
 THE STRATEgIC DEfENSE INIT IAT IvE AND THE POLIT ICS Of RESEARCH 217
26. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Thatcher, 28 March 1985. The full quotation is revealing: ‘Particu-
larly in areas such as SDI where you are running our policy directly, it would be really very 
difficult if I could not keep your most senior advisers informed of points of major importance’.
27. PREM 19/1188. Powell to Thatcher, 11 October 1984.
28. PREM 19/1188. ‘Text of Prime Minister’s statement on SDI at press conference in Washington 
on 22 December as agreed with President Reagan’. This was also the occasion of Thatcher’s pro-
posal, and Reagan’s acceptance of the ‘four points’, repeated as the basis of Western views on 
SDI. See: US Information Service, ‘The Strategic Defense Initiative’, 5 June 1985, copy in PREM 
19/1445.
29. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, ‘The President’s 
choice: Star Wars or arms control’, Foreign Affairs 63 (Winter 1984): 264–78.
30. PREM 19/1188. Powell to Appleyard, 12 December 1984, noted that Thatcher ‘does not agree 
with some of its central propositions, particularly the idea that it is impossible to pursue suc-
cessfully both ballistic missile defence and agreement on strategic arms control’. On 19 De-
cember 1984 Weinberger gave a ‘major speech on SDI to the foreign press … This is the most 
forceful and fullest public exposition so far given by a senior member of the administration 
of the rationale behind SDI. Its immediate purpose was probably to refute the arguments, 
 recently put forward in quote Foreign Affairs unquote by McNamara, Bundy, Smith and Ken-
nan’. Telegram, Washington (British Embassy) to FCO, 19 December 1984.
31. PREM 19/1443. Powell to Ricketts, ‘Prime Minister’s meeting with Mr McFarlane: US/Soviet 
talks on arms control’, 9 January 1985. The previous day Thatcher was briefed on UK knowl-
edge of SDI (based on a ‘review of all recent available evidence’) by the chief scientist of MoD, 
the chemist Professor Richard Norman. PREM 19/1444. Powell, ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ 
(note of meeting between Thatcher and Professor Richard Norman, chief scientist, MoD), 
8 January 1985.
32. PREM 19/1443. Thatcher to Reagan, 14 January 1985.
33. PREM 19/1443. Budd to Powell, 16 January 1985.
34. On 22 December 1984, concerning SDI among other topics. PREM 19/1443. ‘Text of Prime 
Minister’s statement on SDI at press conference in Washington on 22 December as agreed with 
President Reagan’.
35. PREM 19/1443. Wright to Howe, 29 January 1985.
36. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, op. cit., p.468, quotes the main text. Moore, vol.2, p.245.
37. Stuart Butler has pointed out to me that there are clear parallels between the offer of US 
SDI collaboration and President Nixon’s offer of space collaboration post-Apollo, which also 
caused tensions in Europe and was ultimately not taken up. See: Stuart A. Butler, ‘National 
prestige and in(ter)dependence: British space researchPolicy 1959–73’, PhD thesis, University 
of Manchester, 2016, p.253.
38. PREM 19/1443. Powell to Thatcher, ‘Arms control: briefing meeting, Chequers, 2 February’, 31 
January 1985.
39. Howe made a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in mid-March 1985 that was 
 interpreted as critical of SDI. In 2003 historian Holger Nehring wondered whether the speech 
might be a more accurate representation of the UK official line than Thatcher’s Camp David 
support. I think it is now clear that there was a split. Holger Nehring, ‘The British response to 
SDI: introductory paper’, in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., pp.17–24.
40. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Mottram, 8 January 1985. ‘The Prime Minister’s inclination will be 
to respond favourably to Sir Oliver Wright’s suggestions’.
41. PREM 19/1444. Thatcher to Weinberger, undated (1985).
42. Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
1992. William J. Broad, Teller’s War: the Top-secret story behind the Star Wars Deception. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1992; Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star 
Wars and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001; Gordon R. Mitchell, 
Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy. East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2000.
43. W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space Colonies, Nano-
technologies, and a Limitless Future. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
44. Rebecca Slayton, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949–2012. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013.
218 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
45. David Baker, ‘The making of Star Wars’, New Scientist, 9 July 1987, is a well-informed long 
history of SDI that locates its origins in Teller and his influence.
46. See also ‘Comparative US and Soviet BMD attainments and capabilities’.
47. The first, the Hoffman report, was more sceptical of Reagan’s long-term goal. See: FitzGerald, 
op. cit., p.253.
48. A British newspaper quotation repeated in Karen DeYoung ‘British seek “Star Wars” answers’, 
Washington Post, 2 July 1985: 9.
49. PREM 19/1444. ‘Record of discussions at the Pentagon on SDI: 17 July 1984’, July 1984.
50. PREM 19/1444. Powell, ‘Strategic Defence Initiative’ (note of meeting between Thatcher and 
Professor Richard Norman, chief scientist, MoD), 8 January 1985. Norman took over from 
Ronald Mason in 1983.
51. Slayton, op. cit., chapter 8.
52. PREM 19/1444. ‘US and USSR BMD programmes’, undated (October 1984).
53. Ibid. The latter refers to discriminating between decoys and warheads in the upper atmosphere.
54. Ibid, p.2.
55. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Mottram, 8 January 1985.
56. The Fletcher report was ‘essentially promotional material, presenting an optimistic picture of 
the SDI concept without giving details’, in the view of Whitehall. PREM 19/1444. Brennan to 
Powell, 31 January 1985.
57. Especially by European allies: PREM 19/1444. ‘Record of discussion at the Pentagon on SDI: 
17 July 1984’. ‘Herr Ruth: … . Within Europe the Report on SDI by the Union of Concern 
Scientists had established itself as one of basic sources in the debate. Had any work been done 
within US Government to analyse and refute it?’
58. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Jastrow, Max Kampelman, ‘Search for security: the case for SDI’, 
International Herald Tribune, 28 January 1985.
59. Hans Bethe, Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry W. Kendall, ‘Space-based bal-
listic-missile defense’, Scientific American 251(4) (October 1984): 39–49. ‘Star Wars’, The 
Economist (3 March 1984): 80–1. Kosta Tsipis, ‘Laser weapons’, Scientific American 245(6) 
(December 1981): 35–41.
60. Slayton, op. cit., pp.186–8.
61. David Caplin, witness seminar testimony in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., pp.93–106.
62. Handwritten note, from Powell to Thatcher, on PREM 19/1444. Brennan to Powell, 31 January 
1985.
63. For example: Les Allen, ‘Star wars: a paradox for our time. Whichever way you look at it, star wars 
doesn’t make sense’, New Scientist, 1 May 1986, pp.53–5. The Labour Party, led by Neil Kinnock, 
attacked SDI. See, for example: ‘Labour opposition to SDI spelt out by Kinnock’, Financial Times, 7 
March 1985; ‘“Star Wars” condemned by Kinnock at NATO’, The Times, 7 March 1985.
64. PREM 19/1444. Heseltine to Thatcher, 15 February 1985.
65. PREM 19/1444. Thomas to Thatcher, 6 February 1985.
66. Ibid. Kissinger, as a vale dictum, also ‘wanted to congratulate [Thatcher] on what he took to be 
the outcome of the miners’ strike and thought it a great victory not only for sanity but for the 
principle of resolution in these matters’.
67. PREM 19/1444. Telegram, Bonn to FCO, 12 February 1985. The conditions related to arms 
control, alliance unity and two-way exchange.
68. PREM 19/1444. Telegram, ‘NATO supports SDI research’, to FCO, 26 March 1985.
69. PREM 19/1444. Weinberger to Heseltine, 26 March 1985.
70. PREM 19/1444. Heseltine to Howe, 27 March 1985.
71. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Thatcher, 27 March 1985, Thatcher’s emphasis.
72. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Mottram, 28 March 1985.
73. The FCO view was that there were obstacles to participation in research (such as Congress’s 
‘Buy American’ preferences, and a technical violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, namely Article 
IX which precluded the sharing of technical descriptions or blueprints of ABM systems by the 
United States or USSR with allies’), but that there was ‘little doubt … that the momentum 
generated by the new US programme will lead to new technologies with far-reaching defence 
implications’. PREM 19/1444. Budd to Mottram, 4 April 1985.
74. This committee was MISC 117. It is referred to in PREM 19/1445. Armstrong to Thatcher, 5 
June 1985 and the minutes and memoranda are contained in CAB 130/1303.
 THE STRATEgIC DEfENSE INIT IAT IvE AND THE POLIT ICS Of RESEARCH 219
 75. John Peterson, ‘EUREKA: a historical perspective’, in John Krige and Luca Guzzetti, eds, His-
tory of European Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Luxembourg: Office for Official Pub-
lications of the European Communities, 1997, pp.323–345.
 76. Peterson, op. cit., p.328.
 77. PREM 19/1445. ‘Record of a meeting between the Defence Secretary and the US Defense 
Secretary, Mr Weinberger at 1400 on 22nd May 1985 in NATO HQ, Brussels’, 23 May 1985.
 78. PREM 19/1444. Powell to Thatcher, undated (March 1985).
 79. PREM 19/1445. Heseltine to Thatcher, 28 May 1985. Powell’s and Thatcher’s handwritten 
comments dated 29 May 1985.
 80. PREM 19/1445. Pattie to Thatcher, 24 June 1985. Pattie, ‘SDI and Eureka’, 24 June 1985.
 81. Solly Zuckerman had offered quick calculations that supported this view. There were also 
European fears of a brain drain, one influence on the launch of Eureka. PREM 19/1445. Tel-
egram, on Genscher’s visit to Paris, 23 May 1985.
 82. PREM 19/1445. Nicholson to Thatcher, 10 July 1985.
 83. Heseltine’s proposals were mauled at the Cabinet OD committee.
 84. PREM 19/1445. Mottram, ‘Record of a meeting between the Defence Secretary and Mr 
Caspar Weinberger, the US Defense Secretary, at the Pentagon on 22nd July at 1230’, 24 July 
1985.
 85. PREM 19/1445. Heseltine to Thatcher, 23 July 1985.
 86. This is the £1.1 billion noted in Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: the Revival of British Foreign 
Policy. London: Macmillan, 1997, p.130.
 87. PREM 19/1445. Powell to Thatcher, undated (July 1985). Powell noted that Heseltine had 
not mentioned a specific figure when the approach was discussed at OD committee.
 88. I have asked Michael Heseltine this question directly, at the Thatcher Network conference 
‘Thatcherism Now’, 5–6 April 2018, but unfortunately his answer, many years of course after 
the date, addressed generalities.
 89. PREM 19/1445. Panton to Armstrong, 30 April 1985.
 90. A published discussion of what research was ongoing can be found in the witness seminar 
testimony of Roy Dommett, in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., pp.37–44.
 91. PREM 19/1445. Unwin to Mallaby, 26 September 1985.
 92. PREM 19/1445. Owen to Thatcher, 25 October 1985.
 93. PREM 19/1445. Joseph to Heseltine, 28 October 1985.
 94. ‘US/UK officials hit snags on SDI co-operation’, Washington Post, 26 October 1985.
 95. PREM 19/1445. ‘Discussions on UK participation in SDI research’, undated (September 
1985).
 96. ‘US/UK officials hit snags on SDI co-operation’, Washington Post, 26 October 1985.
 97. PREM 19/1445. Nicholson to Thatcher, 25 October 1985. Particular areas of spin-off, 
thought Nicholson, were optical computing, electronic and non-electronic materials, and 
software security.
 98. PREM 19/1445. Powell to Thatcher, 25 October 1985.
 99. PREM 19/1445. Heseltine to Weinberger, 30 October 1985. Heseltine to Thatcher, 31 Octo-
ber 1985.
100. CAB 130/1303. MISC117(85)24, 17 December 1985, contains the agreed Memorandum of 
Understanding. CAB 128/81/35. Minutes, Cabinet, 5 December 1985 contains the Cabinet 
approval. CAB 128/81/36. Minutes, Cabinet, 12 December 1985 records Heseltine’s signa-
ture of the Memorandum on 6 December 1985. The Cabinet also discussed Westland plc.
101. PREM 19/1445. Powell to Thatcher, 29 November 1985.
102. Copy of Reagan’s apologetic telegram is here: http://www.thereaganfiles.com/851105.pdf.
103. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, op. cit., p.471.
104. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, op. cit., p.463.
105. See, for example, PREM 19/1444. R. V. Jones, ‘Some thoughts on Star Wars’, 15 March 1985. 
PREM 19/1445. Panton to Armstrong, 3 April 1985, p.2.
106. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, op. cit., p.471.
107. Freeman J. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.
108. Holger Nehring, ‘The British response to SDI: introductory paper’, in Kandiah and Staerck, 
op. cit., pp.17–24.
109. Thatcher, Downing Street Years, op. cit., p.466.
220 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
110. Michael Heseltine, witness seminar testimony, in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., p.32. Hesel-
tine later recalled the initial reactions to SDI: ‘I think that the reaction to the announcement 
was one of despair – Oh Lord! Here we go again, the next escalation in the arms race – and 
then realpolitik – Oh help! What’s this going to do to Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent? 
Then thirdly – and my golly, US$29 billion worth of research, what sort of competitive advan-
tage is that going to deliver to the United States?’
111. Charles Powell, witness seminar testimony in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., p.32, p.51.
112. Charles Powell, witness seminar testimony in Kandiah and Staerck, op. cit., p.72.
221
7
Environment and science
This chapter builds a picture of Thatcher’s response to five major envi-
ronmental issues, all of which intimately involved scientific knowledge, 
either in the framing of the issue or in the articulation of the political 
response. First acid rain, the consequences of pollution of the lower 
atmosphere by sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, became an inter-
national controversy in the 1980s – not least when the leaders of West 
Germany and Norway directly appealed to the Prime Minister to take 
urgent remedial action. Thatcher drew on her experience in chemistry, 
reviewing, for example, the atmospheric chemical reactions involved. 
Like the second issue, the discovery of a ‘hole’ in the ozone layer by Brit-
ish scientists based in Antarctica, the acid rain controversy could not be 
kept separate from other major events of the Thatcher administration: 
the miners’ strike and the politics of coal-fired power stations in the case 
of acid rain, and the significance of science in justifying UK presence in 
the South Atlantic, a factor in the Falklands saga. The third issue, climate 
change, while slower to gather momentum, also had surprisingly deep 
roots, but would be emphasised by Thatcher in her 1988 science speech 
to the Royal Society. The fourth topic is the role of science and scientific 
evidence in conservation issues. These include the Wildlife and Coun-
tryside Act (1981), the disputes over private farming interests and Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest and the development of the World Conser-
vation Strategy. Finally I examine the growing concern over the release 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the environment. The first 
three issues were regarded by Thatcher’s Cabinet as more important than 
the last two, as measured by the prime ministerial and ministerial atten-
tion they received.
222 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
Acid rain
The new environmental movement that emerged in the 1960s led to 
international discussion and limited action in the 1970s. The high-water 
mark for international agreement on global and regional concerns was the 
UN conference on the human environment held in Stockholm in 1972. 
The issues debated included desertification, deforestation and over-ex-
ploitation of non-renewable natural resources, as well as worries about 
the state of the atmosphere – including climate change, damage to the 
ozone layer and the possible harm caused by transport of acidifying air 
pollutants. Between 1955 and 1965 Swedish and Norwegian weather sta-
tions reported a rise in acidity, with similar research being conducted in 
eastern North America a few years later. Also by the late 1970s the fact 
of long-distance atmospheric transportation – of the order of 1,000 kilo-
metres or more – of sulphur, nitrogen oxides, sulphates and nitrates was 
established. While the increasing acidification of lakes was clear – in Swe-
den, for example, the acidity of water in 10,000 lakes had dropped to pH6 
and in the worst-affected 5,000 to pH5 – other chemical and ecological 
effects, such as the mobilisation of heavy metals, effects on plankton and 
the reduced growth of trees were also being reported.
In Geneva in November 1979 ministers of the environment, including 
the UK’s, signed a Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
The convention only dealt with research, monitoring and exchange of 
information, with the development of policies of mitigation or prevention 
therefore dependent on agreed progress in these scientific activities. The 
combined effects of a shift from coal to oil (not least because of North Sea Oil 
coming on stream) and economic recession meant that, in fact, UK sulphur 
dioxide emissions had fallen to 1950s levels in the early 1980s. Nevertheless 
the UK still produced about one-quarter of the European Community’s sul-
phur dioxide, although it deposited proportionately less on other countries.1
Scandinavian countries, disadvantaged by the geographic locations 
of polluting industries and westerly air movements, were particularly 
vocal in arguing that action must be taken against ‘acid rain’. In August 
1981 Anders Dahlgren, the Swedish Minister for Agriculture, invited 
Michael Heseltine, then UK Minister for the Environment, to a confer-
ence, to be held in June 1982, on the ‘various conceivable solutions to 
the problems of … long range transboundary air pollution’.2 ‘Although 
there is no doubt that Scandinavia does suffer from the problems of 
acidification, and although it is clear that the problem is at least partly 
due to sulphur emissions in Western Europe, the scope for action to help 
the Scandinavians is limited,’ noted a civil servant in the Ministry for 
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Environment, adding that achieving a ‘reduction in sulphur emissions 
would be expensive, and would place a substantial burden on the elec-
tricity industry’.3 The Department of Energy, which could be expected 
to protect electricity producers’ interests, took up a posture that was sat-
irised as ‘do nothing, and do it in concert with the other major indus-
trial nations’.4 Therefore a range of departmental and industrial interests 
conflicted and needed to be consulted further. It is among these differ-
ent interests that we can see different interpretations about the need for 
research and the conclusions that could be drawn from research findings.
Indeed, fracture lines among these different interests can be found 
within research (such as that supported by the NERC and that supported 
by industry), between government departments (such as Environment 
versus Energy), between central government and other public bod-
ies (such as the National Coal Board) and between politicians and the 
civil service. Broadly, however, the UK line was that the country’s posi-
tion should be ‘positive, but rigorously logical’ and to be ‘willing to join 
any critical analysis which would allow a sensible weighing up of the 
options and their attendant costs and implications’, while avoiding ‘any 
gesture for gesture’s sake’. Most importantly, a position was sought that 
would avoid the UK being singled out or isolated.5 This balance would be 
tricky to sustain since, as Martin Holdgate, the Scientific Adviser to the 
Department of the Environment, noted, ‘the United Kingdom [was] prob-
ably the largest single foreign source of the sulphuric and nitric acid fall-
ing over southern Scandinavia’. From these overarching aims Holdgate 
concluded that, first, ministerial, not just official, representation was 
desirable in the ‘hot-seat’ of the 1982 conference. Second, the logic of 
the line would depend on the careful deployment of scientific evidence:
(i)  we accept the current scientific evidence that there has been 
an increase in acidity in certain southern Scandinavian lakes 
and river systems (as there has been in Canada where similar 
geological and environmental conditions prevail).
(ii)  we show less willingness to accept the arguments on damage 
to forests and land systems, resting on the various scientific 
reviews that have recently occurred (we shall of course need 
for the meeting a really rigorous scientific brief …)
(iii)  we reaffirm our commitment to the information exchange 
and monitoring component under the ECE [UN Economic 
Commission on Europe] Convention, but stress that for any 
such action to be effective all European industrialised coun-
tries, east and west, must participate vigorously …6
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Any practical action therefore, would then depend on further research, 
working back from Scandinavian targets, calculating degrees of abate-
ment required, ‘work out in reasonably hard scientific terms the key 
factors and thus the areas where a campaign to abate pollution would 
be most likely to succeed’ and only pursue these after ‘economic evalua-
tions’ conducted in such as a way as ‘timescales are taken into account’ – 
 perhaps leading to ‘abatement over a century’ and avoiding a ‘crash 
campaign designed to make a measurable effect within 15 years’, say.
The interests at play in UK research into acid rain were antagonistic, 
although not to the extent that had developed in the United States. Under 
the new Reagan administration a battle over a Clean Air Act had seen 
US environmental agencies and Canadian politicians coming into sharp 
conflict with US industrial interests. The latter, under the banner of the 
‘Coalition for Environmental-Energy Balance’, had organised advertise-
ments that stressed the political action should not be taken while ‘uncer-
tainty’ existed over the causes of acid rain. The Science Attaché at the 
British Embassy in Washington explained that this strategy was aligned to 
the US federal government’s espousal of ‘Sound Science”. By this they seek 
to exploit the uncertainties and apparent contradictions in what is known 
about long range transportation’. He did not pull punches in his analysis:
Compared to the previous Administration’s tendency to legislate 
based on a rumour of possible environmental hazard, it is tempting 
to regard the new US attitude as more balanced and reasonable. In 
my view this would be a mistake for the US has swung through the 
middle ground and is now at the opposite extreme; … each side 
unashamedly collects evidence to support its own case and ignores 
results that run counter to the official line. Committees are staffed 
with ‘scientists’ whose preconceived views are already well known, 
and thus sound science has become a euphemism for numbers 
selected to support a political position.7
In the UK the industrial interests were represented by the Central Elec-
tricity Generating Board (responsible for coal-powered power stations) 
and the National Coal Board (responsible for producing, and promoting 
the use of, coal). An internal strategy document at the National Coal 
Board concluded that the ‘Board’s first line of defence (that the scien-
tific case has not been made) is looking vulnerable to political pressures’; 
it argued that work needed ‘to begin in earnest on a second line’, spe-
cifically cheaper technological options than scrubbing (‘scrubbers’ are 
devices added to power plants to remove pollutants). A CEGB-sponsored 
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meeting of experts on ‘Forests and acidification’ stressed that a decade’s 
research into the phenomenon of acid rain had found that the ‘relation-
ship between air quality and rain on the one hand, and the quality of 
biotic response in surface waters’ was not a ‘simple one’.8 This level of 
uncertainty was not unusual, however, although the extent to which it 
was emphasised or seen as a cause for ‘precautionary’ action mattered 
immensely.
The foremost UK sceptical expert was Peter Chester, director of the 
Central Electricity Research Laboratories.9 Chester’s research papers and 
public talks emphasised the uncertainties over acid rain. For example, a 
1983 speech at the Royal Society of Arts argued that ‘the politics of acid 
rain have run ahead of the science from the outset’.10 Chester wrote to J. 
M. Doderlein of the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (following their meeting at a symposium organised by Exxon). 
Clearly continuing an earlier argument, Chester listed ‘three different 
research findings which separately or together do not support the sim-
ple expectation that a reduction in SO2 emissions in Western Europe 
would bring about a corresponding amelioration of fishery problems in 
Southern Scandinavia’.11 Chester argued that it would be ‘heartbreaking 
for Europe to invest £ billions in measures which then turned out to be 
ineffective’. Norway’s ‘foremost scientific specialist on the acid rain issue’, 
Hans Martin Seip, hit back with a detailed critique of Chester’s data, 
assumptions and argument. He concluded that:
You may find it heartbreaking for Europe to invest an enormous 
amount in measures which turned out to be ineffective. Others will 
find it heartbreaking if nothing is done, and the consequences turn 
out to be as serious as feared not only for aquatic systems but also for 
vegetation and perhaps health … In summary we agree that many 
of the questions you raise are important, but if all details have to be 
cleared up before action is taken to reduce emissions, the damage 
done may become very large and difficult to repair.12
We know about this exchange because the Norwegians alerted and 
shared the correspondence with the Department of the Environment.13 
It was a confirmation of something they already knew: that there was a 
divergence of interests, and conclusions from research, on the acid rain 
issue. The Department of the Environment assumed that CEGB, on the 
basis of another of Chester’s papers, would dispute the Department’s 
statement that ‘evidence, albeit circumstantial [of a link between long-
range transport and acid rain effects] is beginning to accumulate’.14
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The UK response to this division among researchers was to seek a 
balance of bodies. The experts chosen to attend the Stockholm confer-
ence were carefully matched not only to subjects, but also to obtain a ‘rea-
sonable balance’ between government and research council nominees on 
the one hand and CEGB scientists on the other. In so doing they sought to 
ensure that the ‘UK expert delegation does not become CEGB dominated 
while recognising at the same time the important role CEGB scientists 
are playing in the acid rain issue’.15
However, there was a problem. When Holdgate had to assess the 
arguments of Chester he found that there was ‘nobody in Whitehall who is 
competent to give us an authoritative referees report’.16 The Department 
of the Environment had funded research on new abatement technologies 
(to gauge the rate at which they were likely to improve and therefore be 
an option in the future), research on acidity of rainfall,17 research on dis-
persion and research on the relationship between SO2 and NOx emissions 
and damage to vegetation.18 Possible damage to animals and human 
health had not been investigated as it was seen to be less likely. There 
were other gaps too. The Department of the Environment, under pressure 
to cut public expenditure, had reduced funding at government laborato-
ries and universities; the Natural Environment Research Council, one of 
the victims, had warned that the cuts were ‘doing serious damage to the 
credibility of the DOE and the “independent scientists” in Europe and N 
America’.19 Some within the department were comfortable with leaving 
the research to the CEGB. Holdgate warned against this approach:
I do not believe that Government will be comfortably placed if the 
only source of expertise in the country is seen to be the organisation 
with the greatest financial interest in avoiding emission control. … 
I certainly think that we shall be ill-placed to negotiate with con-
fidence in the international world if it is known that all our data 
comes from our public utility (or indeed from any other industrial 
corporation).20
Likewise the NERC agreed: ‘CERL is distrusted here and abroad, however 
much it protests neutrality in science. Lack of DOE support is giving CERL 
a much higher profile at international level which can only be damaging 
to the UK especially in Europe’.21
The UK, then, went into the Stockholm conference on acid rain in 
June 1982 with the line that, while the link between acid rain and envi-
ronmental damage in Scandinavia had become slightly more certain, the 
continuing uncertainty (and the high cost of technological fixes, such as 
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flue gas desulphurisation)22 meant that the policy should still be more 
monitoring and research, even while knowing that the interests behind 
the research were conflicted.23 Heseltine wrote to Lawson confirming 
that the line to be taken by the UK ministerial representative, Giles Shaw, 
was to use science to restrict UK liabilities:
it is important that we should not be carried on a wave of assertion 
about the effects of acid precipitation beyond what the scientific 
evidence establishes. It would be best if we were able to avoid com-
menting on these matters at all, but this may prove to be impossi-
ble. If our delegation is pressed, they might accept the causal link 
between the emission of various gases and the acidity of rain, and 
the capacity of that acidity to cause damage to certain types of 
fresh water system and to alter the chemistry of certain soils. But 
the cause and effect chain is complex … This acceptance might be 
placed in the context that energy, economic and technical issues as 
well as environmental ones must be involved in any attempt to find 
a solution to the acid rain problem.24
Shaw returned from Stockholm to report that the ‘UK achieved its broad 
aims’; a more informal feedback was that ‘the pace is quickening on this 
whole subject’ and what was needed was not only ‘more, and better bal-
anced, research’, but also policies adopted that actually controlled sul-
phur emissions.25
At this point a new configuration of organisations had emerged 
that shaped acid rain research in the UK. In January 1983 Nigel Lawson, 
then Secretary of State for Energy, and Tom King, who had stepped up 
to become Secretary of State for the Environment on Heseltine’s move 
to Defence, invited views on a new review of acid rain policy. Citing the 
Stockholm conference as evidence of growing international concern, the 
joint review aimed to deliver ‘a clearer idea of the controls which the UK 
might accept over the next fifteen years or so, leaving us better placed to 
exercise a constructive influence on international discussions and deci-
sions’.26 The consultation lasted three months.
In this consultation the National Coal Board repeated the view, 
citing Shaw at Stockholm, that ‘“acid rain” and its effect are not prop-
erly understood’ and that ‘the cost which on present knowledge would 
be involved in securing even a measure of reduction in emissions is so 
great that a much more precise evaluation of the effect of such reduc-
tions is essential and they would help in such a study’.27 Walter Marshall, 
FRS, the new chair of the CEGB, turned to the Royal Society to help. In 
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September 1983 the Royal Society (alongside its sister scientific acad-
emies of Norway and Sweden) announced a collaborative programme 
of research into the causes of acidification of surface waters in Norway 
and Sweden and the implications for fisheries. John Mason, who had just 
retired from the Meteorological Office, was to direct. The funders of this 
programme – over £5m – were the National Coal Board and the CEGB.
This unusual combination deserves explanation. In addition to dip-
lomatic pressure from Scandinavia, the CEGB and the National Coal Board 
were certainly under public pressure as acid rain became a matter of pub-
lic controversy. Time magazine, for example, had declared acid rain ‘the 
silent plague’, ‘the scourge’ and the ‘ecological issue of the 1980s’.28 The 
British press offered similar apocalyptic imagery (one example, a Mirror 
editorial of 1983 was titled ‘Death from the skies’).29 Acid rain demon-
strators protested outside the headquarters of CEGB and the Department 
of the Environment in the same year,30 and dumped a coffin of dead fish 
outside the Royal Society.31 The appeal of asking the Royal Society to lead 
the research was that it had the reputation of being, in the words of its 
historian, an ‘honest broker’.32 Indeed the press releases stressed that the 
‘content and direction of the [research] programme will be entirely in 
the hands of the Royal Society and the academies’, while the ‘results will 
be published without restrictions’.33 The trade press Energy Daily called 
bringing in the Royal Society ‘a master stroke of diplomacy’.34
Not everyone was convinced by the Royal Society as honest broker, 
however. Des Wilson, chair of Friends of the Earth, in a letter published 
in the Guardian, cast doubt on the objectivity of the research, remark-
ing that it was ‘extraordinary how often industrially-financed research 
happens to support the view of industry’.35 The Royal Society rejected 
the accusation, citing past examples of industrially-funded research that 
showed ‘no signs of industrial bias’.36 Another factor might be nuclear 
politics: journalists noted that Marshall, the long-standing advocate of 
nuclear power, had emphasised that desulphurisation raised the cost of 
coal power.37
Other acid rain research was expanded in this period, despite the cuts. 
The Department of Energy sponsored research at its Energy Technology 
Research Unit at Harwell.38 The Department of the Environment and the 
Nature Conservancy Council collaborated to ensure that a network of 
monitoring stations to assess the composition of precipitation gave more 
complete coverage of the UK.39 The Nature Conservancy Council also 
commissioned Imperial College to review research and arbitrate between 
two conflicting studies of damage to native tree species by air pollution 
and acid precipitation. The first, conducted by the Forestry Commission, 
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had found little damage. The second, an example of citizen science avant 
la lettre, had been organised by Friends of Earth. Volunteers had submit-
ted observations of yew and beech trees from around the country. The 
Imperial College report made methodological criticisms of both pro-
jects, but concluded that while further research was needed there were 
‘grounds for concern’.40 Like the Royal Society initiative, it was an inter-
esting intervention to attempt to resolve accusations of interest-driven 
research.
As the acid rain controversy rose up the political agenda, so we 
see more discussion at the centre. Furthermore, this discussion played 
environmental issues against other, including party political, concerns. 
The respect within Number 10 accorded to the Department of the 
Environment was not high. Ferdinand Mount, head of the Number 10 
Policy Unit, told Thatcher that it was ‘in reality only a glorified Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government’ and shared William Waldegrave’s 
rating that its environment staff was ‘small and of poor quality’.41 Yet 
Mount also insisted that environmental matters were ‘going to provide 
some of sharpest political challenges in this Parliament’, while worrying 
that ‘the Conservatives tend to be branded as uncaring Philistines [on 
environmental issues] – thus creating a breeding ground for the SDP and 
the Liberals’.
Thatcher was also ‘disturbed about inadequate public understand-
ing of the problem of acid rain’.42 On a Sunday in late May 1984 she 
hosted at Chequers a series of presentations on acid rain for the bene-
fit of her ministers. The aim was ‘to present the scientific evidence’ and 
‘to describe the state of the art … in abatement technology’.43 Her Chief 
Scientific Adviser, Robin Nicholson, spoke on sources of emissions, John 
Mason on chemical changes in the atmosphere, Hermann Bondi on lakes 
and streams, Martin Holdgate on forest damage and Peter Chester on 
abatement technologies for power stations (emphasising the high costs 
and uncertainty of results). Finally Nicholson returned with an account 
of abatement technologies for vehicles (such as catalytic converters, 
already introduced in the US, and ‘lean burn’ engines, favoured by 
Europe-based manufacturers). Thatcher, the former chemist, asked to 
see the chemical equations, which Chester subsequently provided – a list 
of 93, a ‘glance’ at which, he suggested to her, ‘will give you some idea 
of the complexity and the role played by hydrocarbons’.44 Even a list of 
chemicals could serve a political purpose between chemists.
Following the Chequers meeting there was extensive ministerial and 
official discussion of the acid rain issue. Patrick Walker, the Energy Minister, 
wrote that while the CEGB had assumed 10GW – nine Sizewells – of new 
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nuclear power would be in operation by 2000, he now considered four to 
five new stations more likely.45 This would mean that ‘we should be well 
short of achieving a 30% reduction in emissions by 2000’. Yet he also told 
Thatcher that retrofitting large plants with desulphurisation technology 
was too expensive. In the light of ‘current scientific uncertainty’, Walker 
urged a continuation of present policy.
William Waldegrave, the Undersecretary of State for the Environment, 
writing to Thatcher, gave a more substantial set of options for a problem 
he noted had ‘both scientific and political components’.46 He urged reject-
ing three options: the existing policy (‘pursue a vigorous and well pub-
lished research programme … but take no other special action’), the Large 
Plant Directive stemming from the European Commission (in other words 
gas flue desulphurisation) and the one urged by West Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries (join a ‘30% club’ of firm commitments to cut sul-
phur dioxide emissions by this figure). Instead Waldegrave argued that a 
mix of new nuclear (but at least four to five new Sizewells), NOx burners, 
action on vehicle emissions and efforts on sulphur short of the expensive 
refitting would be an appropriate response. Nicholson supported the plan, 
citing ‘scientific evidence’; so did David Pascall, a member of the Number 
10 Policy Unit seconded from British Petroleum.47 The plan was agreed, 
with minor changes, on 19 June 1984. It was the position taken by the UK 
delegation, led by Waldegrave, to the Munich Air Pollution conference held 
later in the month.48
In September 1984 the Select Committee on the Environment 
issued a substantial report on acid rain.49 It was severely critical of the 
government and advocated retrofitting power stations and joining the 
‘30% club’. Nicholson did not think its arguments or evidence would 
have changed the decision taken on 19 June, but also noted that the ‘fact 
that a Committee of MPs has come out so strongly for severe abatement 
measures will increase international pressure on the United Kingdom to 
take more action than is envisaged under current Government policy’.50 
The government’s response largely confirmed the existing policy – in 
particular that the fitting of desulphurisation technologies on coal power 
stations was too expensive.51 Specifically this was justified by an appeal 
to uncertainty and science:
[The Government] does not believe that the very substantial 
expenditure (running into hundreds of millions of pounds) which 
would be required to install flue-gas desulphurisation plant at exist-
ing power stations can be justified while scientific knowledge is 
developing and the environmental benefit remains uncertain …
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Pollution is dealt with by political action, but it is explained 
by science. Science is dynamic, and the policies of this and other 
Governments must evolve to meet new evidence.52
In the more detailed responses to the select committee’s recommenda-
tions, the government again promised more research.53 Likewise the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s 10th Report was met 
with a restatement of ‘pollution control achievements and philosophy’.54
The government was also increasingly feeling the pressure from 
Europe. Jenkin confessed to Howe, the Foreign Secretary, that the UK was 
faced with ‘a difficult and uncomfortable balancing act; we need to avoid 
killing negotiations while making our reservations about a commitment 
clear’.55 ‘We will find it difficult to tie ourselves to inflexible reductions and 
time scales,’ Jenkin wrote. ‘However, we should indicate that we do not rule 
out ultimate consensus.’ John Redwood, then head of the Number 10 Policy 
Unit, was outraged: ‘the “Yes Minister” script of Patrick Jenkin to Geoffrey 
Howe will not do,’ he told Thatcher. What was needed instead, he argued, 
was for the agreed acid rain policy of 19 June to be stuck to and sold:
If we do not come out soon with a clear and forthright statement of 
our intent here in the UK, we will find that the pressures represented 
by the Environment Committee will build up further and may force 
us into a more expensive manoeuvre on Patrick’s high wire …
The Government has to be seen doing more than just singing in the 
acid rain, and if it delays any longer, it will find it too expensive to 
buy an umbrella.56
The international pressure continued when the Prime Minister of  Norway, 
Kåre Willoch, wrote directly to Thatcher, having recently agreed a joint 
declaration with Helmut Kohl of West Germany.57 Willoch, perhaps point-
edly, addressed Thatcher as ‘FRS, MP’. Thatcher replied, restating the UK 
position and adding ‘We shall naturally stand ready to take further action 
in the light of changing scientific evidence’.58 A few months later, in con-
versation in Thatcher’s House of Commons office, Willoch told her that 
‘the United Kingdom argument that there were scientific uncertainties 
about the effects of acid rain did not carry great conviction’.59
The pressure began to tell. German insistence on vehicle emissions 
led to new standards being conceded by Waldegrave in Brussels in June 
1985 (‘a good week for Germans and Japanese,’ wrote an incandescent 
Norman Tebbit).60 Patrick Jenkin raised the possibility of the UK making 
the public act of joining the ‘30% club’, since the likely drop in sulphur 
232 SCIENCE POLICY UNDER THATCHER
dioxide was looking more approachable.61 Nicholson advised that the 
‘scientific understanding of the processes and effects of acid deposition’ 
had shown ‘no significant change’ in the 19 June 1984 ministerial agree-
ment; any commitment to 30 per cent must therefore imply a willingness 
to adopt, if missed, either retrofitting (still regarded as too costly) or an 
accelerated nuclear build (which Nicholson preferred).62 Officials cast 
doubt on whether the decline in sulphur dioxide emissions could be main-
tained – the recent drop was mainly due to the closure of steel works.63
We have now reached the moment of major policy change, one 
which has been described as ‘the first major policy decision on acid 
rain’ and one which ‘represented a complete change in direction in UK 
air pollution policy’.64 What is fascinating to me is that the decision was 
brokered by an appeal to shared scientific understanding between two 
politicians, yet the role of scientific evidence was ambivalent.
In late June and early July 1986 Walter Marshall, recently ennobled 
as Lord Marshall of Goring, allegedly in appreciation of his work to ‘keep 
the lights on’ during the miners’ strike,65 visited Norway and Sweden. 
Here he was the guest of the two academies with which the Royal Society 
was conducting the acid rain research sponsored by the CEGB and the 
National Coal Board. In Norway he met Gro Harlem Brundtland, at her 
request. Brundtland was starting her second term as Norway’s Prime 
Minister, having replaced Willoch in May. Also in attendance was Professor 
Lars Walloe, a close friend, indeed ex-supervisor, of Brundtland, and a 
previous Minister for the Environment under her. 
Knowing about the academies’ project, Brundtland asked Marshall 
about acid rain.66 Marshall replied that he saw two ‘historical reasons’ why 
it was difficult to assess.67 With these resolved sympathetically, Brundtland 
argued that she now thought the ‘Norwegian scientific argument was now 
much stronger and better established scientifically than it was some years 
ago, and she would rely on the British to acknowledge that scientific evi-
dence and take appropriate actions in the near future’.68 Marshall replied 
that he was ‘unable to detect any serious difference in scientific approach’ 
between them, and that the ‘present Joint Research programme was a good 
beginning to getting a fresh understanding between our two countries on 
this important subject’. Brundtland, reported Marshall to Thatcher, ‘was very 
much looking forward’ to Thatcher’s forthcoming visit to Norway, adding:
She was proud of the fact that you both had a scientific training 
before entering politics and said that ‘we scientists must stick 
together and set an example to other people’ [the underlining is in 
Thatcher’s hand].69
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On returning to Britain, Marshall wrote to Peter Walker, Secretary of State 
for Energy. His letter indicated that he was now convinced that there 
must be a ‘fundamental shift in the CEGB’s attitude towards retrofitting 
of emission control equipment in existing power stations’, citing the joint 
academy research as ‘sufficiently convincing scientific evidence’:70
We cannot sustain the position (that scientific evidence was incom-
plete and inconclusive) once the Royal Society has reported to us in 
a year’s time and we see great merit to anticipate that position by 
taking our first steps now.71
Several analytical comments can be made. First, this change of heart by 
Marshall was the new view that triggered the new policy. Second, no other 
agent was responsible for overturning the existing policy (Cabinet  commit-
tee documents that are exactly contemporary show that the intention was 
to defend the existing line.)72 Third, while it was made supposedly in the 
light of the joint academy research, the decisive moment was in advance 
of this evidence being presented and discussed (although interim results 
may have been available). Fourth, since, as Thatcher’s private secretary 
advised, ‘Lord Marshall had not provided the scientific evidence to support 
his change of views and indeed he has not discussed his position even with 
other people in the CEGB; Lord Marshall’s views can and do change and 
could change again’, Marshall’s word alone was not enough to change pol-
icy.73 The extra element, plausibly, was Brundtland’s canny tactic of fram-
ing this decision as one to be taken by a sisterhood of ex-scientists.
The new policy was announced in September 1986, Thatcher hav-
ing accepted Number 10 Policy Unit advice that politically ‘it would be 
dangerous for the Government to do less than endorse the CEGB’s pro-
posal’.74 All new coal-fired stations – and even three 2000 MW of existing 
plant, starting with Drax – were to be fitted with flue gas desulphurisa-
tion, the technology previously deemed too costly to install and unjus-
tified by scientific evidence. A summary of the evidence was prepared 
by the chief scientists at the departments of Energy and Environment, 
and at the CEGB.75 Meanwhile John Fairclough, the new Chief Scientific 
Adviser to the government, gave his Prime Minister his assessment:
Although there has been no dramatic breakthrough, I am satisfied 
that the weight of evidence is now sufficient for action. … Absolute 
certainty is not the currency in scientific issues as complex as this. 
Lack of such watertight certainty should thus not deter us from tak-
ing action .76
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Of course, lack of watertight certainty had indeed been the reason given 
for not taking action before. The announcement took place to coincide 
with Thatcher’s visit to Brundtland in Norway. Her press officer, Bernard 
Ingham, told the Prime Minister that ‘I have been trying to get over the 
idea that … the decision will be based on scientific evidence and not 
because you are visiting Norway or Germany next week’.77
To sum up: acid rain became steadily more prominent as a politi-
cal issue through the 1980s. The government was slowly dragged into 
action, although when the change of policy happened in 1986 it came 
very suddenly. Scientific evidence was cited as a major part of the justi-
fying arguments throughout, both as a reason for resisting major change 
and then, abruptly, for making it. The research led by the Royal Society 
was essential to Walter Marshall’s change of heart in 1986. A shared sci-
entific background was also used by the Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, in persuading Thatcher, at one remove via Walter 
Marshall, of the new acid rain policy.
While the policy changes followed the miners’ strike, there was no 
direct connection. The Times, in an editorial on the event of the publica-
tion of the Select Committee report on acid rain in September, written as 
the strike was intensifying, noted that ‘Curiously enough, the MPs show 
no eagerness to see our highly sulphurous home-mined coal replaced by 
imports or by more nuclear power’.78 Yet there is no evidence that the gov-
ernment used acid rain policy as a tactical option in the miners’ strike – not 
least because there were other reasons for reluctance to promote in public 
a new nuclear build. Nor is there documentary evidence to suggest that 
Chernobyl, by making the policy choice of more nuclear power stations 
less likely, contributed to the acceptance of flue gas desulphurisation as 
the alternative route to lowering sulphur dioxide emissions, although one 
can speculate about Walter Marshall’s reasoning. Acid rain remained a 
European issue after 1986, with further pressure to reduce SO2 (perhaps 
by 70 per cent by the 2000s) and NOx emissions and to adopt the Large 
Plant Directive. But it took second place to other environmental issues, 
even as green politics briefly flourished in the late 1980s.
Antarctic research and the ozone hole
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which froze territorial claims, formalised 
the situation that political influence on the southern continent was con-
tingent on the active conduct of scientific research.79 However, by the 
early 1980s Antarctic research was unloved and, given its expense, an 
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understandable target for cuts in research budgets. Options circulating 
in 1980 included at one extreme the closure of research stations and the 
withdrawal of the research ship John Briscoe.80 In September 1981 the 
Natural Environment Research Council, which had assumed responsi-
bility for the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) in 1967 from the Foreign 
Office, proposed closing the Grytviken base on South Georgia.81 After 
the Foreign & Commonwealth Office expressed alarm, a compromise 
was reached whereby the Falkland Islands Government agreed to pay to 
meet the cost of maintaining ‘a scientific presence’ at Grytviken.82 Nev-
ertheless in December the Advisory Board for the Research Councils, 
being ‘responsible for recommendations on the allocation of the Science 
Budget’ and of the opinion that there should be a ‘curtailment of the most 
expensive areas of science’ at a time when there were ‘numerous claims 
on the science budget’ (see Chapter 3), suggested that NERC might hand 
back responsibility to the FCO.83
On 3 April 1982 South Georgia was seized by Argentine naval 
forces, and ‘the 13 BAS staff present at the station were forcibly removed 
to the Argentine ship Bahia Paraiso’ (a further nine BAS scientists, as well 
as two visiting photographers from Anglia TV, remained at large, hid-
ing out in field huts on the island).84 Thus the Falklands Islands conflict 
began. The reduction in scientific staff had been interpreted in Buenos 
Aires as a signal of diminishing political will to keep Las Malvinas.
Symbolically, then, British Antarctic Survey research had to be 
expanded again. Within weeks of the end of the Falklands War in June 
1982 the Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, proposed a virtual doubling of 
the BAS grant; a Cabinet committee agreed.85 The decision was described 
as ‘purely political’.86 The question was where the money should be found: 
should this be by rearranging priorities, finding additional money (say 
from the contingency fund) or even by effectively abolishing the Social 
Science Research Council?87 Thatcher demanded that she talk to ‘those 
who decide the allocation of the research money’, specifically the chair 
of NERC, Hermann Bondi. In the event Thatcher met with Bondi, Alex 
Merrison (chair of the ABRC) and Keith Joseph, the responsible minister, 
where she opened with the strategic reasons to expand BAS:
the value of the activities of the British Antarctic Survey had not 
been fully appreciated until the Falkland Islands crisis. She had dis-
cussed the work of the Survey with some of its principal scientists 
and she found it very impressive. We needed to ensure that we were 
in the strongest position in the Antarctic region when, in 1991, the 
possibility of modifying the Antarctic Treaty would first arise. The 
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area was one of great strategic importance with extensive natural 
resources. In the past we had followed the policy of backing good 
scientists, for example in the field of nuclear physics. She believed 
that another £5 million should be found for BAS, from either the 
existing NERC budget or from within the total Science Budget. She 
did not wish to become personally involved in discussion of priori-
ties which was for the bodies concerned.88
But with a NERC total budget of only £57.5m, and a total research council 
budget of £234m, neither Bondi nor Merrison wanted to accept BAS activ-
ities in place of research that they considered had higher scientific justi-
fication. Merrison took the opportunity to complain about his research 
council budget declining in ‘real terms’. ‘On scientific grounds,’ he said, 
‘we should, before increasing expenditure on BAS, support new projects 
in areas of greater scientific priority and provide more adequate support 
for existing projects.’ Thatcher in turn insisted ‘we now needed an extra 
£5 million for … work which was of great importance to the country as a 
whole’. When Merrison said that he would accept being told to take ‘stra-
tegic money’ out of the science budget, Thatcher repeated that she did 
not want to do this, but there ‘had to be some means of adjusting priori-
ties to take account of changing circumstances’. The meeting ended with 
Bondi suggesting that the science budget be increased by £5 million, sup-
ported by Merrison. The two went away thinking this had been agreed. 
The misunderstanding was not revealed until August 1982. Then, even 
though Joseph warned that to ‘earmark the money within the Science 
Budget would … run a serious risk of souring relations’ between Govern-
ment and the research councils’, Thatcher did just that: ‘The Government 
will earmark £5 million annually for BAS by setting aside that sum from 
within whatever provision is made for science in our cash plans’.89
The affair is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows that 
Thatcher was willing, despite her opening remarks, to intervene as a pol-
itician on research council priorities. The context here was both imme-
diate (the Falklands War) and strategic (looking ahead to UK interests 
if the Antarctic Treaty was revised). It was a breach of convention – the 
so-called Haldane principle, which stated that politicians should not 
direct research councils’ decisions on research. Nevertheless, it should 
also be noted that this intervention was reluctant and rare. The existence 
of the convention was shown by the breach (witness Joseph’s response). 
Second, notice that the scale was modest. Despite the shock and 
international significance of the Falklands conflict, and its reputational 
implications for Thatcher, and despite the fact that scientific research 
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was essential to being a player in Antarctic politics, the increase in BAS 
activity was relatively tokenistic. More important than either considera-
tion was the commitment of Thatcher’s administration to reducing pub-
lic spending. For this reason even a modest increase in overall research 
council funding was rejected. The political considerations governing sci-
ence policy and funding discussed in Chapter 3 were, when the whole 
is taken into view, more important than the research funding decisions 
raised in this chapter.
In 1981, the areas of Antarctic research that were perceived to be of 
growing importance were first, geology (‘as the search for hydrocarbons, 
metals and other resources will intensify around the world’); second, 
life sciences (the Antarctic, like the Arctic, offered unique and relatively 
closed ecosystems for study); and third, climate, about which ‘concern … 
was increasing all the time’.90 The British Antarctic Survey’s three geo-
physical observatories, at Halley Bay, Faraday and Grytviken, were ‘stra-
tegically placed in a zone which forms a unique natural laboratory for the 
study of many atmospheric phenomena’, not least because of freedom 
from local pollution and access to polar features.91 Under the conditions 
of expanded research, various topics were listed in atmospheric geophys-
ics, such as the interaction of the solar wind with the magnetosphere, 
‘plasma waves, plasma convection and the dissipation of auroral sub-
storm energy’.92
Not listed was the research that led to perhaps the most dra-
matic discovery of the period – one which, although not enabled by the 
post-Falklands expansion, would not have been possible if BAS had been 
shut in 1981 and one which would be folded into Thatcher’s post-Falk-
lands late-1980s embrace of environmental science. Joe Farman was in 
charge of BAS’s Antarctic Dobson meter, which measured ozone levels 
above the Halley Bay base. In 1982, and again in 1983, Farman and his 
junior colleague Jonathan Shanklin noticed abrupt fluctuations in ozone 
readings. On both occasions he checked with NASA, comparing BAS 
findings with their NASA satellite observations. NASA had seen nothing, 
although when they later checked its scientists realised that their com-
puters had been ‘programmed to throw out any wildly abnormal read-
ings’.93 Farman and BAS colleagues (including Shanklin) published the 
results – the discovery of the ‘ozone hole’ – in Nature in May 1985.94
By 1985 some of the Falklands tensions were lessening, to the 
extent that the Royal Society tentatively began to reopen formal rela-
tions with Argentina. The process started with a visit by Argentina’s 
Foreign Secretary, while the pharmacologist Arnold Burgen met with his 
academy counterparts to discuss resuscitating a bilateral agreement on 
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scientific exchanges signed in 1977. The Foreign Office was nervous, not 
least because ‘the PM is also FRS’.95 While several individual scientists 
had visited Argentina, and César Milstein, the Argentine co-discoverer of 
monoclonal antibodies based at Cambridge University, had felt it neces-
sary to withdraw ‘because of the bad publicity his presence would create 
in Argentina’, a Royal Society delegation successfully visited in March 
1985.96 However, with these steps towards normalisation of relations, it 
was also possible for NERC to misjudge the political significance for con-
tinued BAS support.
In 1986 Lord Shackleton (geographer, Labour minister under 
Wilson and the son of Ernest Shackleton) raised with Thatcher resurgent 
concerns about the funding of Antarctic science.97 He reminded her of 
his support for the Falklands campaign and the quality of BAS research:
How important this work is has recently been shown by the dis-
covery of the ‘ozone hole’ which forms over the Antarctic in early 
Spring. Analysis of ground-based measurements showed ozone 
amounts over the UK base at Halley to have diminished by 40% over 
a decade. The BAS findings stimulated a search through NASA sat-
ellite records by US workers, who confirmed the seasonal drop. This 
may be the first real evidence that atmospheric pollution is damag-
ing the ozone layer.
After delivering what was the earliest document that flagged the ozone 
hole discovery to the Prime Minister I have found (although surely she 
was aware of it from the 1985 news coverage), Shackleton expressed his 
worry about ‘a change in funding which could mean we lose our emi-
nently visible position … We cannot risk being seen to be weak in one 
[South Atlantic territory] without possible effects on the others’ (in 
other words, the Falklands). The cause was NERC deciding that it had 
to constrain its Antarctic funding to a level £12m per year, and therefore 
funding would drop in real terms.98 Possible consequences included the 
closure of two or even three bases and the failure to replace the ageing 
research ship John Briscoe. Thatcher demanded to see all recent corre-
spondence. She considered ‘it important to give no signal of a reduced 
commitment to the British Antarctic Territory and to the Falkland Islands 
and their Dependencies’ and let it be known that she was ‘strongly of the 
view that the higher level of activity by BAS, on which Ministers agreed 
in 1982, should be maintained’.99
Charles Powell conveyed Thatcher’s view to the Department 
for Education and Science in no uncertain terms: she considered it 
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‘inexplicable and regrettable that a collective decision by a Cabinet 
committee had not been implemented. In her view, the episode raises 
questions about the management of the Science Budget’.100 Kenneth 
Baker, who had replaced Joseph in May 1986 as Secretary of State at 
the Department of Education and Science, wrote back, chastened, say-
ing that he would give NERC the ‘direction’ to allocate the money.101 The 
significance of this moment – a politician telling the research council 
directly where research money should go – was not lost on Baker:
This will be, I believe, the first time that the holder of my office 
has given a formal direction under Section 2(1) of the Science and 
Technology Act 1965. Even so, I am convinced that it is the right 
thing to do. The Government has decided – for territorial and stra-
tegic reasons – to overrule the judgement of the Council on the rel-
ative scientific merits of its expenditure programmes. We cannot 
expect the Council to take on their own shoulders responsibility 
for a decision that will be unpopular within the scientific commu-
nity and rightly belongs to Ministers. We need to ensure that the 
Research Councils continue to be very tough-minded about their 
scientific priorities. It would damage the credibility of our selectiv-
ity policies if we tried to twist their arms behind the scenes.
While not expecting to keep such a move ‘out of the public domain’, and 
at a time when Baker assessed the research councils to be ‘in serious dif-
ficulties’ and their relation with central government ‘in a very delicate’ 
state, he did promise to ‘endeavour to minimise the adverse publicity’.
Political action, however, was taken over the ozone hole surpris-
ingly quickly. The link between chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and ozone 
depletion had been raised and investigated in the late 1970s. Indeed 
the US Environmental Protection Agency had pushed in 1977 to ban 
CFCs for non-essential uses, such as aerosol cans (but not refrigerants). 
Callaghan’s Labour government, worrying that a ban would hit industrial 
interests, such as those of ICI and Rio Tinto Zinc as well as other manu-
facturers, resisted such action.102 As with acid rain the reason given was a 
lack of scientific certainty. ‘The case against them [CFCs] falls a long way 
short of proof.’103
The revelation of the ozone hole changed this calculation. Although 
surprisingly absent from the environmental policy files placed in 
Thatcher’s overnight box,104 international political action proceeded at 
speed. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was 
agreed in 1985,105 while the Montreal Protocol, which phased out named 
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substances including CFCs, was agreed in 1987.106 Thatcher’s speech 
to the United Nations General Assembly in 1989 was a milestone in her 
international reputation as a science-trained world leader, and it (dis-
cussed below) addressed both the ozone hole and climate change through 
the prism of Antarctic science.107 Thatcher’s intervention with President 
George H. W. Bush was important in keeping the United States com-
mitted to the Protocol,108 while her 1990 speech to the United Nations, 
with its promise of industrialised countries’ assistance to industrialising 
nations, helped to make a truly international agreement stick.109
Climate change
Thatcher’s 1988 Royal Society speech – which, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
consisted for the first half of a statement of the new science policy of curi-
osity-driven basic research and cuts in government-funded near-market 
research – was famously, in the second half, devoted to the environment. 
She introduced the subject with the image of the Earth as experimental 
subject:
For generations, we have assumed that the efforts of mankind 
would leave the fundamental equilibrium of the world’s systems 
and atmosphere stable. But it is possible that with all these enor-
mous changes (population, agricultural, use of fossil fuels) concen-
trated into such a short period of time, we have unwittingly begun a 
massive experiment with the system of this planet itself.110
She then turned to what she saw as the three major environmental chal-
lenges, anthropogenic climate change, the ozone layer (in which BAS 
research was highlighted) and acid rain:
Recently three changes in atmospheric chemistry have become 
familiar subjects of concern. The first is the increase in the green-
house gase – carbon dioxide, methane, and chlorofluorocarbons – 
which has led some to fear that we are creating a global heat trap 
which could lead to climatic instability. We are told that a warm-
ing effect of 1°C per decade would greatly exceed the capacity of 
our natural habitat to cope. Such warming could cause accelerated 
melting of glacial ice and a consequent increase in the sea level of 
several feet over the next century. … It is noteworthy that the five 
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warmest years in a century of records have all been in the 1980s – 
though we may not have seen much evidence in Britain!
The second matter under discussion is the discovery by the 
British Antarctic Survey of a large hole in the ozone layer which pro-
tects life from ultra-violet radiation. We don’t know the full implica-
tions of the ozone hole nor how it may interact with the greenhouse 
effect. Nevertheless it was common sense to support a worldwide 
agreement in Montreal last year to halve world consumption of 
chlorofluorocarbons by the end of the century. As the sole measure 
to limit ozone depletion, this may be insufficient but it is a start in 
reducing the pace of change while we continue the detailed study of 
the problem on which our (the British) Stratospheric Ozone Review 
Group is about to report.
The third matter is acid deposition which has affected soils, 
lakes and trees downwind from industrial centres. Extensive action 
is being taken to cut down emission of sulphur and nitrogen oxides 
from power stations at great but necessary expense.
I have traced elsewhere in detail the surprisingly early UK governmen-
tal response to climate change.111 In short, correspondence between the 
Department of the Environment and the acting chief scientific officer on 
the subject dates to 1974, while the Heath administration’s opening up 
of long-range horizon scanning and forecasting, typified by the Official 
Committee on Future World Trends, beginning in 1972 partly in response 
to the Stockholm environment conference, created a space within which 
long-term climate change could be perceived and discussed. Despite 
sceptical views on the possibility of climate change (not least from the 
Met Office and its head John Mason), a report on global warming and its 
possible impact on the UK was ready by early 1979.
While it offered a modest but significant minister-level recognition 
that climatic change was possible, publication of the report was delayed 
until 1980 by the incoming Conservative government. One reason for the 
delay was anticipated public response. Angus Maude, a senior figure in 
the party, thought it had ‘no presentational advantage’ and might even 
provoke ‘hilarity’ in the press.112 Another reason was the Prime Minister’s 
attitude. At the first meeting with her Chief Scientific Adviser, CPRS, 
John Ashworth, she had said ‘incredulously, “Are you telling me I should 
worry about the weather?”’, when he raised the issue.113 A civil servant at 
the time noted, somewhat cryptically, ‘Ministerial (and especially Prime 
Ministerial) coolness towards “Climatic Change”’.114
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The diplomat Crispin Tickell has claimed responsibility for the pres-
ence of climate change in Thatcher’s Royal Society speech:
I went to see her when I was on holiday. … I then suggested three 
ideas to her which she might try. I didn’t know which, if any, of them 
she was going to follow. Then I heard about three weeks later that 
she was interested in the one about climate change, and we started 
toing and froing about what she might say and how she might say 
it. She’s always been very interested in science and felt she had that 
particular contribution to make.115
Tickell’s involvement in shaping the Royal Speech is confirmed by other 
documents.116 But neither the presence of Tickell’s advice, nor Thatcher’s 
scientific interest, explain the timing of why she embraced the issue of 
climate change in 1988. Tickell himself had been warning about climate 
change since the late 1970s, and had been advising Thatcher informally 
since 1984.117 The documents are silent on the question.118
However, Thatcher’s highlighting of climate change at the Royal 
Society had two major effects. The first was historiographical, in that 
most subsequent historical analysis of the UK government’s response to 
climate change begins with 1988.119 Second, it did give a considerable 
impetus and urgency to expanding climate research, especially model-
ling. Tickell advised that the ‘first requirement seems to me to isolate 
the significant areas of uncertainty, and then put real impetus behind 
research into them. Realistic policy cannot be made until more is known’. 
Tickell’s second requirement was international action, returned to below.
In terms of uncertainty and research, the Cabinet Office quickly 
pulled together departmental and government expert views on climatic 
change for ministerial discussion.120 This recorded:
There is as yet no firm evidence of climatic change resulting from 
the greenhouse effect. But there is no serious disagreement within 
the scientific community that man’s activities will lead to global 
warming. Prediction of the magnitude of the change is subject to 
considerable uncertainty… But current estimates suggest that the 
following changes would in time be inevitable: i) global warm-
ing by an average of 1.5–4.5°C … ii) a rise in sea levels by at least 
20–140 cm … iii) regional climate change …
In preparation for a meeting of relevant ministers, Richard Wilson, 
the Cabinet Office head of the economics secretariat, summarised for 
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Thatcher the policy options.121 Likewise George Guise sent a set of com-
ments.122 He followed this commentary up with two pages selected from 
a report that had been sent to him by George Porter, the President of the 
Royal Society; one page suggested that sea levels might rise and the other 
that they might fall.123 Emphasising the doubt, Guise told Thatcher that 
it ‘reinforces my belief that we cannot formulate a robust policy until 
scientific advice is more consistent. The priority therefore continues to 
be more research, analysis and computer modelling’.124 Guise later also 
questioned the assumption made in a paper for ACOST on adaptive biol-
ogy that climate change might lead to a warming of 5 degrees Celsius (he 
drew Thatcher’s attention to the National Academy of Sciences consen-
sus of 2 degrees Celsius). However, Guise also went further, hinting that 
perhaps causation was not shown at all:
a recent paper from the AT&T Bell Laboratories, gives a thorough 
statistical analysis of the evidence for correlation between CO2 
increase and global warming. … CO2 and temperature demon-
strate correlation between 1958 and 1988 but the paper warns 
against the conclusion that there is a causal link. This work is use-
ful in combatting the more hysterical arguments that the present 
climate problems are all part of greenhouse warming. John Mason 
would approve!125
A second, clearer case of the ‘merchants of doubt’ strategy at work is 
Charles Powell’s forwarding of a pamphlet from the George C. Marshall 
Institute.126 Powell, as adviser and gatekeeper to Thatcher, is a particu-
larly important carrier. Adding that its ‘authors are eminently respecta-
ble’, his summary of the Institute’s argument again brings uncertainty to 
the fore:
Against the current fashion, it predicts that, far from warming the 
earth in the next century, the greenhouse effect will have the benign 
effect of halting a new mini-Ice Age. It argues that there are far more 
powerful forces acting on the earth’s atmosphere than man-made 
pollution, principally the periodic brightening and dimming of the 
sun. If past patterns are followed, the sun is likely to be less active 
in the 21st century than in the current one, and this would lead 
naturally to a cooler earth. ‘It is possible … that the combination of 
natural and solar variability is the cause of the entire temperature 
increase of 0.9 degrees F observed since 1880 with the greenhouse 
effect relegated to a negligible role.’ The report also points out how 
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difficult it is to make accurate predictions of the greenhouse effect 
because of the highly variable effect of ocean currents and cloud 
cover.127
Nevertheless, despite the admittance to Number 10 of climate change 
denial arguments, in general they were overwhelmed by a much more 
substantial, evidence-based approach to the global warming issue.
The Prime Minister chaired a gathering of experts on 26 April 
1989.128 She took notes, in preparation for summing up at the end of the 
day, which are fascinating but somewhat cryptic: ’24 PWR’,129 ‘Targets 
and standards’, ‘Radioactivity’, ‘Loving not cutting their forests’, ‘Global 
problem’, ‘Cold Fusion’, ‘Brazil’, ‘Avoid Xssive ambition’, ‘Loose frame-
work convention’ and ‘Solutions – Silicon Valley of Energy’.130 Meanwhile 
John Fairclough, as Chief Scientific Adviser, suggested the ‘establishment 
here of an international Centre for Climate Modelling’ – an idea approved 
by a meeting of ministers on 19 April.131 On the broader research pro-
gramme the Royal Society’s British National Committee for the World 
Climate Research Programme, which convened to ‘discuss the scientific 
community’s response to the speech’ and was chaired by John Mason, 
took a coordinating role.132
The new Director General of the Met Office, John Houghton, 
pitched to the Department of the Environment an ambitious national 
plan for climate change, built around a new centre to be formed at 
Exeter. The Centre would house the Met Office’s existing ‘core work in 
climate’, ‘additions … specifically aimed at improving our knowledge of 
climate change as a result of man’s activities’, ‘work on ocean modelling’ 
and ‘work by university personnel on climate modelling’ (both the latter 
mostly funded by NERC).133 A new supercomputer (in first instance, an 
ETA-10 or a CRAY Y-MP, either of which would be eight times faster 
than its Cyber 205) would run coupled models (of atmosphere and 
ocean), with each run leading to improved, fine-grained predictions 
of future climate change. The Centre would liaise with other groups 
in universities (such as Reading, Southampton and the University of 
East Anglia) and institutes (such as the Scott Polar Research Institute 
and the Institute of Hydrology).134 By the time of Margaret Thatcher’s 
address to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1989, 
it had been named the Hadley Centre. She gave another speech at the 
Hadley’s opening in May 1990.135
Recall that Tickell’s second requirement was the need for inter-
national action. ‘I think we need to take some international initiative 
quickly,’ Thatcher had jotted on Tickell’s letter, ‘as the French will try 
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to take the lead.’136 Indeed there was a flurry of international moves, 
including the announcement of a March 1989 conference on Saving the 
Ozone Layer.137 Gro Harlem Brundtland wrote to congratulate Thatcher, 
while green NGOs stepped up the pressure.138 The wrong-footed French 
Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, was indeed reported to be ‘incensed’.139 
Thatcher also detested Rocard’s moves to secure a declaration, issued 
from The Hague, calling for a new international agency (‘GLOBE’) to 
take action on major environmental issues, seeing it as mere words:
The declaration is pathetic. If you don’t know what to do – make a 
Declaration!
We are doing things now. They aren’t – the declaration is 
pathetic.140
The head of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
Mustafa Kamal Tolba, was also upset by the French initiative – not 
least because it cut across the work of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) that had been set up in 1985 by UNEP and 
the World Meteorological Office and the International Council of Sci-
entific Unions.141 The IPCC would make its First Assessment Report in 
1990. Behind the scenes Tickell was critical of UNEP’s capacity, largely 
because it was underfunded, isolated (in Nairobi) from other UN insti-
tutions and ‘worst of all … not taken very seriously’; he pushed for a 
‘new institutional authority’, a possible ‘future International Convention 
on Climate’.142 Again the point being made was for the UK to take the 
initiative, otherwise there was the ‘risk that the Americans, the Rus-
sians, the Signatories of The Hague Declaration [led by the French] and 
others, will come forward with ideas we may find less palatable’. While 
Thatcher was initially lukewarm about the idea of a Convention on Cli-
mate Change – not least because a comment by John Mason stuck in her 
mind (that there were ‘so many meetings now [that] scientists haven’t 
enough time to “do” the science’),143 she was amenable to the idea that 
a Convention would ‘pre-empt the interventionist ideas discussed at the 
Hague conference’.144
With what the government saw as a good track record, in 1989 the 
UK pushed forward on both international and national fronts. On the 
advice of Chris Patten, Secretary of State for the Environment, urged on 
by Tickell (‘Let boldness be our friend’), Thatcher agreed to give a speech 
to the UN on the environment.145 Guise lobbied for the speech to include 
James Goldsmith’s plan to link protection of rainforests to developing 
countries’ receipt of aid, but was rebuffed.146
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More successful was a report faxed from the research ship Polarstern 
by Peter Wadhams, director of the Scott Polar Institute and an eyewitness 
to ‘what may be early signs of man-induced climatic change’. In the report 
he suggested that a ‘valuable role which we could play, in collaboration 
with the other great scientific nations of the developed world, would be to 
undertake the monitoring of climate-related processes and changes which 
are occurring in the polar regions, in order to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity which this early warning offers’.147 In her speech, on 8 November 
1989, Thatcher quoted the unnamed Wadhams, drawing parallels with 
Darwin’s voyage on the Beagle and urging that on ‘the basis then of sound 
science and sound economics, we need to build a strong framework for 
international action’.148 The speech used Wadhams’ observations to testify 
to the need for international action both on the ozone layer and climate 
change – and there is a strong sense that what she had learned from the 
former applied to the latter. Antarctic research, and its importance for 
Thatcher post-Falklands pointed out a direction for travel and a mode of 
action for an science-trained world leader on the international stage.
At home Patten won agreement to publish a White Paper, on the 
proviso that it would be ‘eminently readable’ and ‘have a strong scien-
tific base’.149 Patten’s thinking here was influenced by his special adviser, 
Professor David Pearce, an economist at University College London. In 
both published works such as Blueprint for a Green Economy and in pri-
vate advice to the government, Pearce operationalised the idea of pric-
ing environmental goods and harms.150 It might be ‘in the tradition of 
learned economic tracts – fairly turgid and repetitive’, Thatcher’s private 
secretary summarised for her, but its ‘philosophical basis was right: price 
must be a better mechanism than armies of regulators to secure a sound 
environment’.151 Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was more 
sceptical:
The Report … conveys the impression that sustainable develop-
ment is an operational concept. Regrettably, this does not stand up. 
… there are severe difficulties in the valuation of environmental 
resources and impacts; often they cannot even be quantified. …
The references to taxation … raise very difficult issues, both 
practical and political. It is very important not to encourage any 
assumption that future policy is directed towards the introduction 
of pollution taxes … to introduce any pollution tax unilaterally 
would merely disadvantage UK industry vis a vis overseas compet-
itors, without making any significant difference to the greenhouse 
effect.152
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Nevertheless, as the first IPCC report neared publication, it was becom-
ing clear that climate change was a peculiarly difficult problem – not 
only because of countries’ self-interest, but also because of the range of 
national actors affected. As the Energy Minister summarised:
First, [the analysis conducted to prepare for IPCC] demonstrates 
that, set against the rising trend in UK CO2 emissions modelled in 
the study, CO2 emission control will require action right across the 
spectrum of energy suppliers and users, including transport, with 
Government, industry and individual consumers all playing a part. 
Second, no single technology will prove dominant in our search for 
solutions, although enhanced energy efficiency in all sectors and 
the increased use of gas for power generation are among the most 
promising for the short and medium term. Nuclear power has a 
potentially important role to play but, as recent events have shown, 
is subject to special difficulties and needs to improve its economic 
performance if it is to achieve its full potential. Third, none of the 
options, apart from energy efficiency measures, comes cheaply, and 
costs rise markedly as the technologies are made to penetrate less 
and less favourable niches.153
The problem was rightly described as the ‘most important and diffi-
cult issue’ that faced a newly convened Cabinet committee (MISC 141) 
charged with shaping environment policy for the 1990s.154 Neverthe-
less, a commitment to stabilising carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 was 
announced in May 1990. In September 1990 Patten’s environment paper, 
This Common Inheritance, was published.155
Conservation
Like acid rain and global warming, conservation policies had national 
and international aspects. In 1981 Parliament passed a new Wildlife and 
Countryside Act. It continued the postwar ‘voluntary’ approach to land-
owners and their roles in protecting sites of wildlife or landscape value, 
but also encouraged claims for compensation. In particular, a perverse 
effect of the Act required the Nature Conservancy Council to offer direct 
notification to landowners and occupiers of Sites for Special Scientific 
Interest status, thereby alerting them to the possibility of recompense. 
(Sites of Special Scientific Interest, or SSSIs, had been introduced by 
postwar legislation and had grown in number in the following decades. 
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SSSIs were far more likely to be designations of the wildlife interest of 
private land than the overlapping system of National Nature Reserves. 
It was therefore over SSSIs that the conflict between development and 
nature was fought.)
By 1983 it was clear that the legislation was not working well. In 
particular there was public revulsion at an emerging pattern of large 
landowners and farmers receiving considerable compensation for not 
destroying wildlife sites. For example, a tenant farmer in the Swale, on 
the Isle of Sheppey, was in line for £340,000 per annum, plus a back 
payment of £500,000, for not draining 1,800 acres of wetland. At Kings 
Sedgemoor in Somerset 88 acres were purchased for £183,000 after the 
farmer threatened not to follow an agreement. Aristocratic actions gen-
erated special anger: Lord Cranbourne was to be paid £20,000 a year not 
to replace deciduous trees with conifers, while Lord Thurso in Scotland 
was paid £250,000 for not draining a peat bog. Halvergate Marshes, an 
extensive Site of Special Scientific Interest in Norfolk, was another prom-
inent case. The rising costs and public disquiet made it a political issue. 
Thatcher supported proposals to block the loophole (Section 28 of the 
1981 Act) that allowed three months to elapse, during which destruction 
of an SSSI might proceed.156
A working group of interested government departments produced a 
substantial document with a range of options from overhauling planning 
controls and new legislation on one extreme to continuing the status 
quo on the other.157 Most ministers supported only very minor change 
(such as closing the loophole) while bemoaning that the Conservatives 
received little credit for the actions it had taken (accusing the Labour 
Party in the 1970s, for example, of ignoring the trend towards prairie 
farming). The Minister for Agriculture, Michael Jopling, representing 
the pro-landowner interests of MAFF, went further; he wondered if ‘there 
should be some limit on the number of SSSIs’.158 The Nature Conservancy 
Council on the other hand had the aim of designating 10 per cent of the 
total land area of the United Kingdom as being necessary for conserva-
tion – an increase of 4 per cent. Yet Jopling too fell back to the status 
quo (although he expressed the wish that ‘perhaps informally the Nature 
Conservancy Council should be asked to be more self-restraining’). In 
January 1985 a ministerial meeting, chaired by Thatcher, concluded that 
the voluntary principle should continue.159
Thatcher did not take an enthusiastic interest in international con-
servation initiatives. In 1980 Heseltine, then Environment Minister, wrote 
to her about the launch by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
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(IUCN) of the World Conservation Strategy. The launch had taken place 
on 5 March 1980 in 31 countries simultaneously; in Britain the unveiling 
was at BAFTA in Piccadilly, London, with a panel that included Heseltine 
and David Attenborough.160 ‘I was expecting a document couched in the 
usual emotive terms,’ Heseltine observed. He was to be surprised, noting 
that ‘on the contrary, the Strategy effectively equates conservation with 
sustainable development’, and he urged a review of the ‘whole range’ of 
connected government policies ‘to see whether any short or long-term 
shift in emphasis is appropriate’.161 Thatcher’s private secretary thought 
it to be ‘just the kind of interminable internal Government study against 
which you and he have set your faces’. Thatcher agreed, stating ‘we have 
other things to do’.162
Nevertheless, she instructed the considerations to be taken into 
account in decision-making. There were indeed some direct conse-
quences, such as the Department of the Environment being able to 
push a reluctant Foreign and Commonwealth Office into taking some 
leads on environmental issues.163 Furthermore, the undertaking to 
complete a National Conservation Strategy was completed.164 However, 
it took six years for the UK government to publish its official response 
to the World Conservation Strategy, a glossy brochure with a foreword 
from Thatcher.165 In general, conservation matters, though partly sci-
ence-based, were not a subject of great interest for the Prime Minister.
GMOs in the environment
I have discussed genetic modification in Chapter 3 as part of the com-
mercialisation of the life sciences and the UK government’s response 
to the growth of the new biotechnology. We also saw in the Coda to 
Chapter 3 that Thatcher intervened personally to prohibit genetic 
engineering of human embryos. In 1982 an ACARD report on the food 
industry and technology considered the ‘impact of social and techno-
logical change on the production, processing and distribution of food’. 
Robin Nicholson summarised its views on biotechnology for the Prime 
Minister:
Biotechnology promises to provide a major increase in land produc-
tivity for food production (by a factor of 10 according to some esti-
mates) which, at least in industrialised countries, will far outstrip 
increase in demand for food. Additionally, biotechnology will allow 
the use of other feedstocks, eg natural gas, for food production.
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Land which is surplus for food production may either be used 
to produce agricultural products for use in other industries, eg 
energy, chemicals, or be converted to non-agricultural use.166
Genetic engineering was, for ACARD in 1982, among the ‘more specu-
lative but very significant longer-term possibilities … and could have a 
major long-term impact on the food industry’.167 Yet, as Nicholson’s sum-
mary shows, it opened a vision of the transformation of land use.
The regulation of genetic engineering had been established, after 
rising concern and controversy, by the late 1970s. It involved a Genetic 
Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG, established 1976) to advise and 
assess risks and, from 1978, the Health and Safety Executive, which 
enforced a notification system. Thatcher doubted the continued need for 
GMAG in 1981, but she was persuaded to keep it going – ‘for 2 years only’, she 
instructed.168 In 1984 GMAG was replaced with an Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Manipulation (ACGM). GMAG had done a good job, Nicholson con-
sidered, confident that ‘we have neither over-reacted nor under-reacted’.169 
Applications of genetic engineering had appeared in medicine, were being 
developed in agriculture and were expected in diverse areas from mining 
to food processing. While the engineered organisms were largely confined 
to contained spaces – essentially laboratories – in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, by the mid-1980s, as companies and institutes pushed agricultural 
applications, the central question became what to do about the release of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the environment.
In the UK the existing regulatory structure – the Health and Safety 
Executive, supported by its Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation 
– produced guidelines, issued in 1986. The guidelines, which included 
notification, local consultation and risk assessment, were voluntary. A 
Planned Release (later Intentional Introduction) Sub-Committee of the 
ACGM monitored this work. This was the regulatory structure under 
which the first GMOs were released into the UK environment. In 1986 
scientists released a genetically marked baculovirus, AcNPV, which 
infects and kills the caterpillars of the small mottled willow moth, at 
the Oxford University Field Station at Wytham, Oxfordshire.170 At the 
end of the experiment the site was decontaminated with formalin. In 
1987 researchers from the Rothamsted Experimental Station inoculated 
plants with an engineered Rhizobium bacterium in a field trial site in 
Hertfordshire, while the first genetically engineered plants, genetically 
marked potatoes, were trialled in Britain by the Institute of Plant Science 
Research, Cambridge; they were subsequently ‘manually deflowered’, 
dug up and disposed of. By March 1989 12 proposals for release had been 
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considered, and six releases had taken place. These were contemporary 
with releases in the United States.
In 1989 the HSE proposed compulsory regulation. The Royal 
Commission on Environmental Protection, in a substantial report, went 
further, calling for a statutory body, licences rather than mere compul-
sory notification, close case-by-case scrutiny and public access to GMO 
release information. They were responding to well-articulated concerns: 
genetically modified viruses might jump host, insects might become 
resistant to insecticide if the genes for generating the toxin spread to other 
plants, there might be issues of herbicide resistance and various unfore-
seen consequences. For the RCEP non-GMO ‘aliens’ – such as invasive 
species and diseases – provided case studies of analogous situations that 
could influence thinking about the likelihood of GMO impact. In Britain, 
recent instances were the devastating spread of Dutch elm disease and 
Rhododendrons outcompeting native plants; elsewhere in the world, an 
important example was the introduction of Nile perch into the African 
great lakes, which had resulted in a range of unforeseen consequences. 
Of 1,058 documented aliens, about 1 in 10 had become established in 
the British Isles.171 The RCEP rejected the kind of moratorium, or even 
outright ban, on the release of GMOs being proposed in Europe, notably 
West Germany. Unsurprisingly, given the RCEP’s traditional expertise in 
industrial pollution, it took an existing procedure for scrutinising chemi-
cals (‘HAZOP’) and modified it for GMOs (‘GENHAZ’).172
In 1989 the Secretary of State for the Environment, Chris Patten, 
after consultation with ministers, reached agreement to include a gen-
eral duty to protect the environment against GMOs in the Environment 
Protection Bill.173 Also included were systems for release consent, estab-
lished by regulations, which also spelled out the circumstances in which 
disclosure of information might take place. The Act, which received royal 
assent in November 1990, after Thatcher’s downfall, required that notifi-
cation be given and risk assessments completed before GMOs could enter 
the environment. The Secretary of State then had the power to prohibit 
the import, acquisition, releasing, marketing or even ‘keeping’ of GMOs, 
if ‘he is of the opinion that doing any such act in relation to those organ-
isms or continuing to keep them, as the case may be, would involve a 
risk of causing damage to the environment’.174 In general Thatcher did 
not consider the release of GMOs to the environment to be a major issue. 
She was content to leave policy on changing regulations to others, with 
her main concern being to reduce the central bureaucratic machinery.175 
On this issue, the Royal Commission on Environmental Protection was of 
greater influence than the Prime Minister.
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Conclusion
When political scientists reviewed Thatcher’s environmental policy at 
the end of the 1980s, their focus was largely on ideological influence 
on land development issues. Andrew Blowers, for example, concluded 
that under ‘Thatcher’s government, environmental policy has exhibited a 
pronounced ideological change … favouring private development in the 
creation of our surroundings’ and through which ‘large-scale developers 
and, until the mid-1980s, big farming interests have been major benefi-
ciaries’.176 Although the contested designation of some land as Sites of 
Special Scientific Interest is one exception, in this chapter I have focused 
on the environmental politics where science has been a major factor. 
It is also the case that the subjects of my case studies – acid rain, 
Antarctic science and the ozone hole, anthropogenic climate change, 
conservation and the outdoor release of GMOs – more than match land 
development as subjects for attention in the Number 10 files.
Another growing influence in 1980s environment policy mat-
ters, including on land development, was Europe. The then European 
Economic Community issued directives on waste, water quality, noise and 
chemicals, as well as a Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment. 
This last was issued in 1985 and required ‘the interrelationships between 
major developments and environmental consequences to be identified’ 
and assessments made compulsory for ‘developers for major projects – 
oil refineries, power stations, asbestos manufacturing plants, integrated 
chemical installations, major transportation projects, ports and toxic 
waste disposal facilities’.177 The European political arena was also, as I 
have shown, the main stage for discussions over acid rain.
Thatcher’s ‘out-of-the-blue Green’ speech to the Royal Society was 
part of a wider upswing of environmental concern in the late 1980s.178 
For many people 1988 was a ‘year of drought, floods, hurricanes and 
other disasters’ as well as a ‘spate of speculation about global warming’, 
noted Tickell, listing the reasons for ‘rising public concern’.179 By making 
it personally part of her and the Conservatives’ political image, Thatcher 
necessarily opened herself up to campaigns from NGOs claiming that the 
government was either not going far enough or had not delivered prom-
ises. Friends of the Earth, for example, issued an 80-page report criti-
quing the government’s record over 10 years in February 1989. Thatcher 
was advised to make a public riposte, attacking it on a ‘broad front’.180 
Greenpeace ran a campaign based on the unhealthy state of trees suf-
fering from atmospheric pollution near where Thatcher had lived, a sort 
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of localised eco-shaming.181 The response from within Number 10 to 
the NGOs was largely to try and keep them at arm’s length. Tom Burke, 
the head of Green Alliance, despite being seen as ‘more reasonable than 
Jonathon Porritt and others in the Friend [sic] of the Earth’, was bumped 
from the meeting of experts on global climate because he did not possess 
‘the right sort of liveliness’.182 Thatcher did finally agree to meet Porritt.183
However, activists’ voices were rather distantly heard at the centre of 
government in the case studies I have traced here. Foregrounded instead 
was scientific evidence, although research findings were as much cited 
as evidence of uncertainty and reason for delaying action as they were 
the cause of policy change. At several points industrial interests can be 
seen shaping the interpretation of evidence as it was passed into the cen-
tre of government: the electricity producers in the case of acid rain and 
the emphasis on uncertainty – what Oreskes and Conway have called the 
‘manufacture of doubt’ – by the gathering forces of climate change denial. 
Nevertheless, departmental scientific advisers made important contribu-
tions, while the Chief Scientific Adviser’s role in many of the environmen-
tal issues was largely a secondary one. Nicholson contributed in a minor 
way to the acid rain discussions; Fairclough offered guidance on the scope 
and substance of environmental research when climate change became a 
leading issue from the late 1980s.184 Furthermore, in the cases of acid 
rain, Antarctic research priorities and ozone hole and climate change ini-
tiatives, the Prime Minister’s decisions were most consequential.
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Science policy under and after 
Thatcher
[I]t was very complicated, the story of Thatcher and science, in my 
view. She, of course, greatly respected science; she thought that 
people who weren’t scientifically literate were numbskulls and 
that’s part of the reason she despised so many of my colleagues. 
But she also did fall into the hands, a bit, of the rather ideologically 
driven people, one or two of whom are still about, who said that 
the only Government funding of science should be for pure science 
and all the rest of it should be done by the private sector and look at 
Japan and so on and so forth.1
While ‘very complicated’ was how William Waldegrave, science minister 
under John Major, chose to summarise the story of Margaret Thatcher 
and science, it can be simplified helpfully by considering her actions and 
influence under four headings, of rising importance: ‘science and image’, 
‘science and power’, ‘science for policy’ and ‘policy for science’.
Science was an intermittent component of Thatcher’s image. Having 
studied chemistry at the University of Oxford in the 1940s and worked as 
an industrial chemist, publicity for her first election campaigns featured 
her in a white coat surrounded by laboratory apparatus. When, three dec-
ades later, she moved into Number 10 Downing Street as Prime Minister, 
she installed a portrait of Isaac Newton and a bust of Michael Faraday. 
These icons of science were chosen as deliberate acts of self-fashioning. 
Nevertheless, science was a minor aspect of her public image. An analysis 
of caricature can provide a telling guide. I have found only a handful of car-
toons featuring Margaret Thatcher in a white coat, and they were restricted 
to illustrations accompanying science policy articles. Far more frequent 
were the blue shoulder-padded skirt suits, pearls, exaggerated hair and 
handbag: the symbols of a powerful, female, Conservative politician.
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Yet the fact that Thatcher, politician, was once Thatcher, scientist, 
adds an intriguing dimension to the question of how Thatcher wielded 
her authority. This book started because I had a fascination with how 
power operates in modern societies. Thatcher’s power as Prime Minister 
was granted through the constitutional processes of a middle-sized, 
post-Imperial, industrialised democracy. The issues that she confronted 
were those of modern, industrial economy and society, and as such 
were saturated with science. Science is a modern form of authority, par 
excellence. I wanted to know what happened when constitutional, polit-
ical power and the authority of organised, secular, scientific knowledge 
mixed at the top.
When Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979 she inherited a 
vast array of ongoing and substantial scientific and science-based pro-
jects, including civil and military nuclear programmes, Cold War defence 
laboratories, private-sector research and commitments to international 
collaborations such as CERN, as well as a galaxy of institutes and uni-
versities. The decisions she took, and the advice she listened to, deeply 
affected all these bodies. She, unusually, reserved the right to answer sci-
ence questions, as I discussed in Chapter 2. I have shown that sometimes 
she lent her authority to support projects, as was the case in Chapter 4, 
where I traced the mutual reinforcement of Thatcher’s reputation and 
nuclear power. Yet it was also the case that her authority was primar-
ily deployed to further other manifesto goals, notably the reduction of 
public spending and the pursuit of privatisation, that cut against these 
projects.
As Prime Minister, to put in bluntly, when it came to policy decisions 
she was the most important person in the room, and as an ex-scientist, 
sometimes this training mattered. Her heavyweight status emerges, in a 
way both trivial and profound, in an odd competition devised by William 
Waldegrave in 1993. With the United Kingdom committed to contributing 
funds to build the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, the Science Minister 
wanted an account of the Higgs boson that would be comprehensible to a 
lay-person. The prize was a bottle of vintage champagne. The winner, the 
physicist David J. Miller, offered the following explanation:
Imagine a cocktail party of political party workers who are uni-
formly distributed across the floor, all talking to their nearest neigh-
bours. The ex-Prime Minister enters and crosses the room. All of 
the workers in her neighbourhood are strongly attracted to her and 
cluster round her. As she moves she attracts the people she comes 
close to, while the ones she has left return to their even spacing. 
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Because of the knot of people always clustered around her she 
acquires a greater mass than normal, that is, she has more momen-
tum for the same speed of movement across the room. Once moving 
she is harder to stop, and once stopped she is harder to get moving 
again because the clustering process has to be restarted. In three 
dimensions, and with the complications of relativity, this is the 
Higgs mechanism.2
It is striking that a scientist, when asked to explain the fundamental pro-
cesses of nature, albeit to a science minister, chose Thatcher’s influence 
as a metaphor. Yet, as political scientist Andrew Gamble has argued, the 
agency of Thatcher has been over-estimated, both by her supporters and 
critics. ‘The particular contexts in which Thatcher and her ministers were 
obliged to operate meant that their decisions were often ruled far more 
by particular circumstances and contingencies than they were by ide-
ological goals and objectives,’ Gamble wrote, adding that many of the 
‘policies that were adopted had consequences which were not foreseen; 
others did not achieve the results which were intended’.3 The picture of 
Thatcher that Gamble finds in detailed accounts of her government reveal 
her to be ‘cautious’, ‘aware of practical obstacles’, ‘adept at calculating 
the balance of forces confronting her’ and ‘particularly good at seizing 
opportunities … while presenting herself as always acting out of princi-
ple and conviction’. This description – which shows a politician respond-
ing flexibly to context and contingency, while only secondarily working 
out ideological goals – does not quite fit the detailed account I have given 
in previous chapters on how Thatcher conducted science policy.
For example, take Thatcher’s engagement with ‘science for policy’ – 
the use of science to inform policy decisions. In previous chapters I have 
traced many such cases, including the atmospheric and industrial chem-
istry necessary for grasping the processes and consequences of acid rain 
(Chapter 7), molecular biology that underpinned developments such 
as monoclonal antibodies (Chapter 3) and the properties of radioactive 
materials essential to decision-making over nuclear projects and inci-
dents (Chapters 4 and 5). In many of these cases the background science 
was prepared and delivered by her chief scientific advisers, and their 
submissions took account of, and sometimes appealed to, Thatcher’s sci-
entific knowledge.
Sometimes this provision of advice was reactive to events, as 
in the  cases of Chernobyl or AIDS and these were certainly moments 
when contingencies came to the fore. At other times I have found cau-
tion, especially when deeply opposing views could be found in her own 
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Party – as in the case of embryological research, for which Thatcher unu-
sually delegated the weighing up of evidence and the provision of advice 
to an independent inquiry under Mary Warnock, with primary legisla-
tion taking another six years to pass Parliament. I have argued that the 
issues of AIDS and bioethics were publicly prominent but atypical as sci-
ence policy issues under Thatcher. Indeed in both cases I showed that 
Thatcher responded on moralistic grounds. In the case of AIDS she inter-
vened to prevent government funding of a survey on sexual behaviour, 
which she thought was offensive and an invasion of individual privacy; 
in the case of embryological research she criticised her Chief Scientific 
Adviser’s argument that a fertilised cell only had the potential to be a 
human individual as ‘casuistry’. In these two cases, the Thatcher we see 
operating was closer to that identified by Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 
in her historical analysis of Thatcherite social policy: an ideology that 
sprang from family-centred, moralistic individualism.4
In the central debates over ‘policy for science’, however, while 
Thatcher did emphasise the individual, it was not in a family-centred 
or moralistic manner. Instead Thatcher was hostile to a science pol-
icy that favoured the collective over the individual researcher – as in 
the case of the collective exploitation of patents generated by publicly 
funded research, which she saw as infringing and deincentivising the 
entrepreneurial individual researcher. Moreover, as a counterexample to 
Gamble’s observation that ‘decisions were often ruled far more by par-
ticular circumstances and contingencies than they were by ideological 
goals and objectives’, the complex but crucial emergence of a new science 
policy in 1987 in the end was a case of ideological goals ultimately deter-
mining policy.
As I showed in Chapter 3, from 1979 to 1987 Thatcher, her minis-
ters and advisers struggled, with rising frustration, with several key ‘pol-
icy for science’ issues, each of which impacted on each other. First, broad 
public-sector funding cuts, when applied to the specific case of universi-
ties, undermined the infrastructural support of academic research, caus-
ing the despair and anger vividly expressed by Save British Science. (This 
issue was indeed one that falls under Gamble’s description of ‘policies 
that were adopted had consequences which were not foreseen’.) Second, 
key ministries and advisers favoured the continuation of publicly funded 
research funds that supported emerging and strategic industries, nota-
bly information technology and biotechnology. Yet this industrial pol-
icy incensed some Thatcherites, especially within the Number 10 Policy 
Unit. Third, ministers clashed over defence funding – amid widespread 
concern, shared by Thatcher, that defence took a disproportionately 
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high proportion of R&D spending. Fourth, international fundamental 
science projects, especially the ‘grand but useless’ CERN, were regarded 
as extravagant. Finally, stories of failure to exploit academic research for 
commercial gain enraged Thatcher, while mutterings about industry’s 
underinvestment in research increased in volume.
1987 was the year in which Thatcher’s ‘policy for science’ changed. 
Indeed, it should justly be called the first Thatcherite science policy. 
Three things happened. First, led by her Chief Scientific Adviser John 
Fairclough, the machinery of ‘policy for science’ was reformed and cen-
tralised, enabling stronger control. Second, the Advisory Board for the 
Research Councils published A Strategy for the Science Base. This called 
for a three-tiered structure with a few research-intensive universities 
distinguished from mere teaching centres, and a more mission-oriented 
approach. While the given justification for the Strategy, the efficient 
and restrained use of public funds, might seem to square with the aims 
of Thatcher’s manifesto, the truly Thatcherite science policy was actu-
ally devised in opposition. Specifically, the third event of 1987 was the 
ascendancy of the science policy advice of George Guise, of the Number 
10 Policy Unit, over that of the Chief Scientific Adviser (as well as the 
ABRC and ACARD).
Guise agreed with the Cambridge molecular biologist Max Perutz’s 
furious attack on the Strategy for the Science Base when he said that it sti-
fled innovation by seeking to micro-manage the independent researcher. 
Guise fed Thatcher with story after story – this was policy-making by 
anecdotal history of science – to argue that maximum economic ben-
efit came, in the long run, from freely conducted, undirected pure sci-
ence, while industry underinvested in research because public funding 
of ‘near-market’ research had crowded it out. Therefore, Guise argued, 
government should enthusiastically fund pure science (now branded 
‘curiosity-driven research’) and cut ‘near-market’ support – essentially 
ending an active, interventionist, science-based, publicly funded indus-
trial strategy.
Such a move deserves the epithet ‘Thatcherite’ because it was 
grounded on the values of championing the entrepreneurial individ-
ual researcher,5 cutting public funding, encouraging privatisation (not 
least of the defence laboratories) and leaving private industry to judge 
its own investments better, confident that in the cut and thrust of the 
market it would invest in research. The 1987 shift in policy was not for-
mally announced, but its language and values can be heard in Thatcher’s 
flagship science speech at the Royal Society in September 1988, read in 
the Department of Trade and Industry’s White Paper of January 1988, 
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deduced indirectly from the sharply reduced hostility to CERN at the 
centre of government, but only uncovered in detail through painstaking 
historical research on the freshly released primary sources.
What is remarkable about the shift is that it happened, as I demon-
strated, against the instincts, advice and evidence of the highest commit-
tees of science policy advice. It was also, I feel, a decision that could only 
have been taken by a politician for whom the experience of being a work-
ing scientist was now decades distant. Whereas the 1971 Rothschild deci-
sion, taken when she was Secretary of State for Education and Science 
under Heath, seemed to be one a scientist who had lived experience in 
the applied science of private industry might have naturally made, the 
1987 near-market decision was that of an ideologue politician now far 
removed from a working knowledge of science in business. Did it matter, 
then, that Thatcher had been a scientist? In terms of ‘science and image’ 
and ‘science for policy’ the answer is yes. Ironically, however, in resolving 
the central debates in ‘policy for science’, in which she accepted a picture 
of science painted by Guise that was a parody of real, working science, it 
was her distance from scientific experience that told.
How do my findings square with the existing historiography of 
Thatcher and science policy? Edgerton and Hughes argued that ‘what 
is distinctive about Mrs Thatcher is not that she is a scientist but rather 
than she is the first anti-technocratic prime minister Britain has had [in 
the twentieth] century’.6 By ‘anti-technocratic’ they meant that Thatcher 
rejected the views that science and technological change were determi-
nants of economic growth and development, and that an interventionist 
state was necessary to deliver them. Thatcher’s overall political aim was 
instead to free private enterprise, reduce state intervention and cut pub-
lic expenditure, ‘and to shape what is left to serve industry directly’. So 
far, so good. This agenda, they argue, was, however, driven by an unsta-
ble mix of economic theory. On the one hand this consisted of neoclas-
sical economics, which argued for the free market as more efficient (and 
which might require the state to intervene, say to hold the ring or to pre-
vent monopolies) and on the other of an ‘Austrian’ tradition which cele-
brated the free market because it allowed the play of the unconstrained 
entrepreneur (and in which there was no role for the state). In practice, 
says Edgerton and Hughes, there was a contradiction. Thatcher’s science 
policy in practice, they say, was ‘highly centralising and dirigiste’: indus-
trial need primarily became expressed by ‘an exclusive club’, while the 
views of the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC), one of the 
chief avenues of scientific advice, were largely irrelevant, having failed 
to see that ‘the technocratic and nationalistic policies’ it advocated had 
been ‘off the agenda since 1979’.7
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The primary sources used by Edgerton and Hughes were under-
standably limited. Indeed they are focused on just three published docu-
ments: the DTI White Paper DTI – the Department for Enterprise (1988), 
the ABRC report A Strategy for the Science Base (1987) and the White 
Paper Civil Research and Development (1987). Of course these documents 
might reasonably, at the time, have been taken as accurate and represent-
ative statements of a single coherent science policy: but, crucially, they 
were not. ‘As always in politics,’ noted Gamble of the myths of Thatcher, 
‘policies were interpreted retrospectively and stories constructed which 
gave greater coherence than was intended at the time.’8 Edgerton and 
Hughes were on the right lines when they noted that the ABRC views 
were off the agenda. The extent to which the older science policy was 
challenged (and by whom) and replaced has been one of the main find-
ings of this volume.
But it was not the case that Thatcher simply rejected the view that 
scientific and technological change determined economic growth and 
development. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 3 and summarised above, 
Thatcher was eventually persuaded that the long-term economic con-
sequences of ‘curiosity-driven research’ were almost immeasurably 
immense. We can also ask: what evidence is there for economic theory 
driving policy? Edgerton and Hughes spot, for example, the influence 
of ‘Austrian’ theory in the language of Thatcher’s 1988 Royal Society 
speech. What does further evidence show? This question can be quickly 
answered, although it has to be qualified by the fact that early 1980s 
policy was different from late. In the early radical years of the Thatcher 
administration, research and development, at least among the new, 
prominent band of economic advisers, was not seen as a major factor 
influencing national economic performance. It was a minor factor at best, 
and the reason is that if raised it was by the ‘supply side’ economists, who 
had been nearly completely pushed aside by the monetarist insurgents.
For example, at a luncheon seminar at Chequers on 13 July 1980 
there was a gathering of the key economic advisers. They were led by 
Patrick Minford, the monetarist and author of the Liverpool Model that 
underpinned the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, the centrepiece of 
monetarist policy. Also in the room were Geoffrey Howe (Chancellor 
of the Exchequer), Terry Burns, Christopher Foster and the professors 
Robin Mathews (Cambridge), Brian Griffiths (City, later director of the 
Number 10 Policy Unit), Douglas Hague and James Ball (London Business 
School), all of whom ‘could be said to be pretty much in sympathy with 
the Government strategy’.9 The suggestion to invite ‘one or two critics of 
the strategy’, such as ‘old Keynsians’ (sic), in order ‘to liven the discussion’, 
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was not taken up. In the briefing the Prime Minister was told that possi-
ble topics for discussion would fall into two categories: macro-economic 
issues ‘associated with the Government’s monetary and financial strat-
egy’ and micro-economic issues ‘associated with public expenditure, 
technology, competition policy, and nationalised industries’.10 Listed first 
among the micro-economic issues was ‘research and development’. Yet 
in the seminar all the discussion focused on macro-economic, primar-
ily monetary, matters; research and development was not raised.11 This 
valuation of the topic was perhaps more generally reflective of the place 
of R&D policy in this period of contested economic high theory and its 
experimental application in the first years of Thatcher’s government: the 
monetarists simply crowded it out.
Was it indeed the case, as Edgerton and Hughes say, that ‘the main 
thrust of government R&D policy’ concerned the ‘restructuring of publicly 
funded civil R&D’ and paid no attention to defence R&D? I demonstrated 
in Chapter 3 that attention was indeed paid to defence R&D. And, with 
respect to Edgerton and Hughes’ central conclusion, was there really a 
fundamental desire to ‘control the scientific community’ in a way that 
aimed to ‘let loose the industrial entrepreneurial spirit’ by restricting other 
entrepreneurial activities, especially that of scientists? This seems to have 
been a conflation of two separate initiatives. Edgerton and Hughes read 
Fairclough’s strengthening of the machinery of science policy as being 
motivated by an aim to control the scientific community – a framing that 
was not evident from primary sources even though such an external per-
ception might have existed – while the separate aim to loosen the entre-
preneurial spirit can be found in how Thatcher and her closest advisers 
talked about both industry and the individual academic researcher.
At this point it is useful to contrast Edgerton and Hughes’s analysis 
with a second kind of historiography of 1980s science policy, exemplified 
by the journalist-historian Tom Wilkie.12 His main point is that Thatcher 
undermined basic science. The reining in of public expenditure, a com-
mitment to the marketplace and a perceived end to the exponential 
growth of science created the conditions for action, he argues, and then 
a ‘curious compound of ideology and ignorance’ led ‘Mrs Thatcher’s gov-
ernment [to bring to] an end the way basic, curiosity-driven scientific 
research’ had been done in Britain since the First World War. Before 1988 
this meant an attack on the dual-support system of University Grants 
Committee and the research councils, downgrading basic science and 
encouraging universities to do more applied research; after 1988 there 
was an ‘ill-explained switch in policy’, when the government ‘decreed’ 
that it would no longer fund ‘near-market’ research. Yet according to 
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Wilkie ‘the evidence suggests’ that the undermining of the dual support 
system ‘was not intended’. It was rather an ‘unhappy accident’, while the 
switch in policy seemed to have originated in a DTI internal review of 
the Alvey programme (government-industry collaborative funding for 
new information technology research), referred to in passing in The 
Department for Enterprise White Paper that Edgerton and Hughes also 
commented upon.13 Whereas the latter see evidence for deeper machina-
tions, however, Wilkie sees carelessness; the former see conspiracy, the 
latter cock-up.
Wilkie’s account can also be tested against the primary document 
record. There is some evidence for ‘ideology and ignorance’ driving the 
undermining of the dual-support system, although I would not go as far 
as ‘by accident’. There was a late-1980s switch in science policy, although 
it took place in 1987, not 1988, and the origin of the switch was not a 
review of the Alvey programme. Other commentators have also noted 
the late 1980s switch in science policy. Stephen Wilks and Michelle Cini 
noticed that there was a ‘redirection of science and technology policy’, 
a ‘radical change’, a shift in ‘norms’ away from government funding 
for industrial research to a withdrawal from support for near-market 
research.14 Ian Christie called it the result of a ‘great debate’ that involved 
‘politicians, senior administrators, industrialists and scientists’, but one 
that started with a ‘wave of criticism’ following cuts.15 Roger Williams, 
an academic research policy analyst who also advised the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Select Committee, also argues that the notice-
able ‘debate’ of 1986–7 was primarily provoked by concern over cuts.16 
Nick von Tunzelmann, in an authoritative survey article, notes the exist-
ence of large-scale programmes of government support for industrial 
R&D in the early 1980s, such as LINK and Alvey; he also observes that 
they were ‘effectively wound up’ in the second half of the 1980s, but does 
not explain why.17
All of these commentators were informed observers, and some 
had more access than others. But only now, with the primary sources 
released at the National Archives, are historians able to trace in detail 
what changed in science policy, why, and who was responsible.
Science Policy under Major
I will now review the landscape of science policy in the UK as it devel-
oped after Thatcher. My main point is going to be that it displayed more 
continuity than change. John Major, the new Prime Minister, had a 
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background in banking before becoming an MP for the first time in the 
epochal 1979 election that had brought Thatcher to power. His minis-
terial career, while late, was fast and fortunate. Major was promoted to 
Minister of State for Social Security in 1986 and appointed Chief Secre-
tary at the Treasury in 1987; he joined the Cabinet as Foreign Secretary 
in July 1989 and, three months later, following Nigel Lawson’s resigna-
tion, became Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had shown no particular 
interest in science and it was a while before he had his first prime minis-
terial meeting with his Chief Scientific Adviser.
I mapped the various people, committees and organisations that 
collectively shaped science policy in the 1980s in Chapter 2. Major 
inherited a Chief Scientific Adviser, William Stewart, who himself had 
not been long in the post. The Number 10 Policy Unit, by design a small, 
handpicked group working closely with the Prime Minister, inevitably 
underwent changes in the transition from Thatcher to Major. In par-
ticular George Guise, so influential on science policy in the later years 
of Thatcher’s administration, immediately moved on. Other bodies con-
tinued. Major inherited the main central mechanisms for science policy 
as they had been settled in the late 1980s: a Cabinet committee for deci-
sion-making, the Advisory Council on Science and Technology (ACOST), 
the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) for further advice, 
a Department of Education and Science, the research council system 
complemented by a business-oriented University Funding Council under 
the dual-funding mechanism for distributing funds to academic science, 
the Rothschild customer–contractor principle to frame government 
departmental commissioning of science and civil and defence research 
still largely considered separately.
While some initiatives started earlier, it was not until the gen-
eral election of April 1992, in which the Major’s Conservatives battled 
to a close and surprising victory over Neil Kinnock’s Labour Party, that 
changes were made. First, Major gave the Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster a specific, Cabinet-level responsibility for science and tech-
nology policy. He appointed William Waldegrave to the task – a man 
with the reputation as a bright, intellectual politician who had worked 
in the CPRS in the 1970s. Waldegrave had, as we have seen in his brief 
appearances in earlier chapters, held junior posts under Thatcher at 
the Department for Education and Science and the Department of the 
Environment. Second, Major took the science policy elements of the 
Department of Education and Science and the Cabinet Office to form an 
Office of Science and Technology. In so doing he not only joined up these 
parts, but made them more visible too.
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Green-lit by Major and led by Waldegrave, the government began a 
review of science policy and organisation. The output was a White Paper, 
Realising Our Potential, which was published in May 1993.18 Describing 
itself as the result ‘the first general review of policy and organisation 
since the early 1970s reports from Lord Rothschild and Lord Dainton’,19 
and subtitled a ‘Strategy for Science, Engineering and Technology’, it was 
not quite as radical as it claimed. The switch in science policy in the late 
1980s uncovered in Chapter 3 had been just as consequential (but the 
result of central, almost private, advice rather than formal review) and, 
as I will suggest, it could not or did not unpick the changes enough to be 
described as a full strategy. Realising Our Potential, however, did reor-
ganise and add to the landscape of science policy-making. Industry, gov-
ernment and the scientific community were to work together to produce 
shared visions under a Technology Foresight Programme. Foresight, at 
least in aspiration, attempted to bring academic ‘basic’ researchers into 
conversation with industry, inspired by a Japanese model. Waldegrave 
recalled:
we set up a so-called Foresight Programme, which was definitely 
not meant to be, and was easily ridiculed as being, an attempt to 
foresee the future: it was an attempt at what you might call iterative 
discussion about how different people saw the future. The model 
was the very best Japanese companies at that time who quite often 
had their salesmen talking to their basic research scientists, and the 
basic research scientists quite often would say well if you’d told me 
you wanted that, I could easily have seen a way of doing that for 
you and the salesman on the other hand, saying my goodness, this 
thing you’re doing here is just absolutely fascinating, well there’s 
real applications for it.20
Foresight’s visions would inform a Council for Science and Technology 
(CST), developed out of the old ACOST. The research councils were 
chopped, changed and renamed: SERC was split into an Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and a Particle Physics and 
Astronomy Research Council (PPARC), to try and resolve some of the ten-
sions caused by Big Science. The Agricultural and Food Research Coun-
cil (AFRC) became the more entrepreneurial sounding Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), while the ABRC was 
folded into the Office of Science and Technology.
One remarkable aspect of science policy-making in the 1980s is that 
the process spun off peripheral institutions and bodies that sometimes 
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survived and grew to be more substantial in the 1990s. Heseltine’s 
idea of a ‘R&D Evaluation Unit’ became the Science and Technology 
Assessment Office in the Cabinet Office, and ultimately the Government 
Office of Science (GO Science); ACARD’s idea of exploitable areas of sci-
ence became Tombs’ extramural Centre for Exploitation of Science and 
Technology (CEST); Fairclough’s plan for a renaissance in British indus-
try led by picking national priorities gave us ACOST and then CST. Yet all 
of these bodies had initially been envisaged as being part of an industrial 
strategy – active, considered support for the innovation process from gov-
ernment – that ended when Guise persuaded Thatcher to end govern-
ment-funded near-market research.
Nevertheless, Realising Our Potential did clarify policy, by respond-
ing to a perception of ‘the absence of a clear statement of Government 
objectives, with the consequent transmission of mixed and sometimes 
contradictory signals to the scientific and engineering communities’ 
by clarifying policy. First and foremost, Realising Our Potential empha-
sised the contribution of science to ‘wealth creation’; by implication 
other reasons for supporting science, such as problem-solving, curiosity, 
informing policy, improved quality of life, while mentioned, were made 
secondary. The new research councils were rebranded partly to draw 
attention to new, explicit ‘missions’ that emphasised a ‘commitment to 
wealth creation and quality of life’ – a form of words that felt like a com-
promise, but were also read as placing more emphasis on the former 
than the latter.
Privatisation was confirmed as a major objective of Conservative 
policy, and I have summarised in Chapter 5 some of the consequences 
for nuclear power. By contrast, a novelty introduced by Realising Our 
Potential was greater forward scanning, if not planning. A regular 
Forward Look would be published, while ‘technology foresight’ would 
help coordination. ‘Technology transfer’ was proposed as something that 
would be ‘developed to re-emphasise the importance of the interchange 
of ideas, skills, know-how and knowledge between the science and engi-
neering base and industry’. In many ways ‘technology transfer’, as with 
the later emphasis on ‘translation’, can be seen as part of the slow crawl, 
post the 1987 reversal in policy, back to an industrial strategy.
But, overall, the main message of Realising Our Potential, for all 
its talk of wealth creation, was that ‘Government cannot, and will not 
attempt to, remove from industry its responsibility for investing in inno-
vation and bringing new products to market’. As Waldegrave recalled one 
‘thing about that White Paper that is not to be underestimated … is what 
was not in it’:
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because when I said to the Cabinet that we needed to have a review 
of science policy, huge pressure came from my friend Michael 
Heseltine, who was then in charge of the Department of Trade and 
Industry as President of the Board of Trade, that all this blue sky 
stuff was a waste of time and what we should do is what the French 
allegedly did. I think the French had some years before put a huge 
amount of Government money into applied R & D, I mean develop-
ment really, motor cars, le car. Anyway, this was what we should do 
and it was all a waste of time all this blue sky stuff. So the first battle 
that Bill [Stewart] and I had to fight was to fight off that utilitarian 
view of what the Science Budget was and we did so successfully.21
There was to be no immediate return to an industrial strategy of gov-
ernment-funded near-market applied research in priority areas identified 
by experts, although renewed interest was shown in the LINK scheme.22 
Rather faith was placed on an indistinct ‘closer partnership and better 
diffusion of ideas’.23 Diffusion is not the same as a strategy. In this way, 
Thatcher’s science policy, especially in its 1987 transformed form, would 
cast a long shadow.
Europe became an increasingly important context and institutional 
forum for UK science. Each Framework Programme, from the First, which 
ran 1984–7 and had a budget of nearly 4 billion euro-equivalent, to the 
Fourth, which was negotiated during Major’s administration, ran 1994–8 
and redistributed over 13 billion euros, and since, was larger than the last. 
European science was viewed sceptically by Thatcher and some of her 
advisers, as I showed in the case of CERN in Chapter 3. Major had his own 
deeply divisive and prominent fights with Eurosceptics. But in terms of 
science policy, the attitude shown towards the European Framework pro-
grammes was warmer. This warmth was only partly a result of the net ben-
efit that UK scientists felt – more money has come back from Europe in the 
form of grants than the UK has put in and under the Second Framework 
programme, between 1987 and 1991, British scientists secured 20 per 
cent of all the grants awarded, by value – since this was the case under the 
administrations of both Thatcher and Major.
The transition from Thatcher to Major coincided with the end of 
the Cold War. Also coincidental was the effect of the policy aim of pri-
vatisation on defence research. A list of the government laboratories 
(Table 8.1) that had been transferred to ‘agency’ status, a half-way house 
towards privatisation, proudly included in Realising Our Potential, shows 
a mix of both civil and defence entities affected, as well as the continuity 
of policy between the two administrations.24
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Table 8.1 Government laboratories transferred to agency status, 1989–92.
Under Thatcher
Warren Spring Laboratory, DTI April 1989
Laboratory of the Government Chemist, DTI October 1989
Central Veterinary Laboratory, MAFF April 1990
Meteorological Office, MoD April 1990
Building Research Establishment, Department of 
Environment
April 1990
Natural Resources Institute, ODA April 1990
National Physical Laboratory, DTI July 1990
National Engineering Laboratory, DTI October 1990
Under Major
Defence Research Agency, MoD April 1991
Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, MoD April 1991
Forensic Science Service, Home Office April 1991
Central Science Laboratory, MAFF April 1992
Scottish Agricultural Science Agency, Scottish Office April 1992
Transport Research Laboratory, Department of Transport April 1992
However, in the 1990s and 2000s the proportion of defence R&D 
 compared to civil R&D began to decline. This was a consequence, first, 
of the 1987 change in science policy that sought to remove  government 
funding of research that, in the government’s eyes, should be conducted 
by  industry and, second, of the end of the Cold War. Thatcher and her 
ministers, as I showed in Chapter 3, had desired this rebalancing, but had 
been unable to achieve it.
In Chapter 7 I discussed how some environmental issues – acid rain, 
Antarctic science and the ozone hole, climate change – attracted con-
siderable attention from the Prime Minister, while others – biodiversity 
conservation and the release of genetically modified organisms into the 
environment were my two examples – did not. Under Major, and under 
Tony Blair’s New Labour government from 1997, intertwined environ-
mental, science and food controversies – including GMOs – became mat-
ters of extraordinary national concern. In particular, some readers might 
be surprised that I have not discussed bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) and its human version variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease (vCJD), 
or salmonella, in this book so far. My reason is that while they had their 
origins in the 1980s – the first case of a mad cow was in 1984 – such 
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controversies were only beginning to be prominent. Thatcher did appoint 
the Southwood committee in 1987, to investigate the implications of BSE 
for human health, which reported in 1989. But it was a slow-moving 
catastrophe. Even more so, along with salmonella, it became linked in 
1990 as part of a pattern of failure in which there was a crisis in the role 
of expert advice. For example, in May 1990 The Economist commented 
on the death of Max, a Siamese cat from Bristol, from a brain condition 
similar to that found in cows with BSE:
Although Max’s death has failed to prove that mad-cow disease 
travels easily from species to species on a plate – a highly uncer-
tain proposition – it has proved beyond scientific doubt that nobody 
trusts MAFF [the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food] any 
more. Salmonella, botulism, listeria and now BSE (bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy) – Max belongs to a sequence of food scandals 
that the ministry seems powerless to prevent.25
The political history of these controversies was largely post-Thatcher, 
coming to a head in 1996.26 While the first case of BSE was identified as 
such in November 1986, and by 1990 local authorities were banning beef 
from schools, while academics such as Richard Lacey were recommend-
ing at the time the slaughter of millions of cattle, a historical analysis 
based on reviewing the primary policy documents will have to wait until 
they are fully available.
Another topic that had its origins in the 1980s but was much more 
important for 1990s science policy was the public understanding of 
science. As I noted in Chapter 4, in the context of Chernobyl, anxieties 
over the public grasp of scientific knowledge sometimes reached discus-
sions at the centre of government. Furthermore, in the context of the 
cuts affecting academic science, there was widespread belief within the 
academic scientific community that a falling respect for science was cor-
related to public ignorance.27 In 1985 the chemist Walter Bodmer had 
chaired a Royal Society investigation into the subject, launched in 1983 
and reporting in 1985.28 The report was followed by a programme of 
action led by the Royal Society, British Association for the Advancement 
of Science and Royal Institution’s Committee on Public Understanding 
of Science (COPUS). The ESRC also funded research on science and the 
public, which came to a diverse set of conclusions, including some which 
questioned the assumptions behind the anxiety surrounding ‘public 
understanding’. However, the most publicised result of this research, a 
survey of 1,800 people that appeared in Nature in 1989, supported the 
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Royal Society’s view that ‘the solution to the public-understanding of sci-
ence “problem” lay in the communication of science to non-scientists’.29
This knowledge ‘deficit’ model governed assumptions through 
much of the 1990s (‘a new campaign to spread the understanding of sci-
ence and technology in schools and amongst the public’ was promised in 
Realising Our Potential).30 After 2000 there was a turn towards two-way 
public dialogue as a better model of science–public interaction on poli-
cy-relevant issues. The BSE controversy which, as Gregory and Lock note, 
‘highlighted the failure of the communication of knowledge to defuse an 
issue of contested authority’, was almost certainly one major factor in 
this turning point.31 However, the public understanding of science, as a 
major programme, was never a priority science policy issue in Number 
10 Downing Street.
In 2013 Denis Noble, one of the founders of the campaign against 
the public-sector cuts that affected academic science in the 1980s, could 
write in Nature that ‘we are still saving British science from Margaret 
Thatcher’.32 In 2017 Pallab Ghosh, the BBC’s science correspondent, 
could ask, amid the resurgence of talk of an industrial strategy, ‘why 
is another Conservative government reviving a policy of subsidising 
industrial research when an earlier one junked it in the 1980s?’33 In 
some respects, therefore, the post-Thatcher world of the intersection of 
science and policy was a similar one of continuities – notably in move-
ment towards privatisation, attitudes towards the orientation of science 
towards wealth creation and the restricted role, nevertheless, of govern-
ment. Yet in other respects – notably in controversies over the food chain, 
public understanding of science and public engagement with science, dif-
ferences would emerge. These will be the focus of further, future study.
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